planecane wrote:

aerolimani wrote:

smartplane wrote:

What's the point? None of the simulations have been on true MCAS representative simulators. Even the Boeing simulator is claimed not to accurately reflect actual manual trim loads.

As far as we know, the NG simulators are accurately representing manual trim loads of an NG. Boeing's statement, and subsequently released update, is specific to MAX simulators. Unless the manual trim is radically different between MAX and NG, and there is no reason they are different, then the simulations performed in NG simulators should be a reasonably accurate representation of a MAX's manual trim system.

TL;DR… there's no reason to believe an NG sim is not accurately representing the manual trim wheel system in a MAX.

There shouldn't be any difference in manual trim wheel load for MAX vs. NG. Either the MAX simulators changed it for no apparent reason or the NG simulators aren't accurate either.

Given that Boeing released new software/specs for MAX simulation only, the conclusion can only be that NG simulation is accurate.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/busi ... ators.html

“Boeing has made corrections to the 737 Max simulator software and has provided additional information to device operators to ensure that the simulator experience is representative across different flight conditions,” said Gordon Johndroe, a Boeing spokesman. “Boeing is working closely with the device manufacturers and regulators on these changes and improvements, and to ensure that customer training is not disrupted.”

It is strange to me that the MAX simulator software was so screwed up, especially having come directly from Boeing. They didn’t include MCAS 1.0 or proper manual trim function. How is this possible?

aerolimani wrote:

It is strange to me that the MAX simulator software was so screwed up, especially having come directly from Boeing. They didn’t include MCAS 1.0 or proper manual trim function. How is this possible?

Same way the whole MAX fiasco was possible. Garbage/rushed engineering with pressure from the top to expedite, little/no oversight (self certification), etc.

morrisond wrote:

StTim wrote:

morrisond wrote:

All you need is a Control Column and a thrust lever...

Are you a pilot? - if so I pray I am never on one of your flights.

You should but it will never happen - I only have about 120 hours as a Private Pilot in Canada with experience only in an Cessna and have no visions at this stage in my life of becoming a pro - the ET pilots barely had more time before being put into the cockpit of an 737 as full instrument /commercial rated pilots.

ONE of the pilots, the FO. The other one was pro with really huge number of flying hours.

And let's focus on this. There is pretty amazing video of russian captain training his FO to become captain one day. They are flying plane full of passengers into Tivat, famous for its windy conditions and difficult approach, in, what I believe is 737 NG:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zj5DfmDRcT8 (part 1, go around)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNlmdpWiDvY (part 2, finally landing)

And here is captain's explanation of what he did and why he did it, mainly the answer to a flood of critical youtube comments:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ryxlzB ... D82Nt/view

Now, what should we think about this? At one point captain took the control away from the FO who could not keep the speed under control (albeit in very difficult conditions), and explained to him "I don't want to be a hero and land like that". Please watch and then answer. Is this:

a) a great example how the commercial pilots should be trained to fly manually in challenging conditions
b) horrible example how a plane full of passengers has only one pilot capable of landing without damaging a plane

Because there is no other way, especially if airlines (AMERICAN ones) insist on minimum simulator training!

The question is, what would happen in Ethiopian-like scenario with this crew? Because, solely the fact that the FO could not land at Tivat would not be such a huge problem, even if the captain would be somehow incapacitated - presumably he would divert to secondary (better equipped) airport. But I would really like the opinion of others who think pilots should have more training.

planecane wrote:

aerolimani wrote:

smartplane wrote:

What's the point? None of the simulations have been on true MCAS representative simulators. Even the Boeing simulator is claimed not to accurately reflect actual manual trim loads.

As far as we know, the NG simulators are accurately representing manual trim loads of an NG. Boeing's statement, and subsequently released update, is specific to MAX simulators. Unless the manual trim is radically different between MAX and NG, and there is no reason they are different, then the simulations performed in NG simulators should be a reasonably accurate representation of a MAX's manual trim system.

TL;DR… there's no reason to believe an NG sim is not accurately representing the manual trim wheel system in a MAX.

There shouldn't be any difference in manual trim wheel load for MAX vs. NG. Either the MAX simulators changed it for no apparent reason or the NG simulators aren't accurate either.

Exactly. And in MentourPilot video, the (NG?) simulator seemed to simulate the load on the wheel quite accurately. Maybe this depends on the manufacturer of the simulator? That one 3rd party, accurately simulates this, but Boeing's own (MAX or NG) simulators does not?!?!? I mean, how incompetent they could be?

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

As predicted.

Boeing and the FAA are already well established bedfellows, so it'll get rubber stamped and back in US service pretty quickly. The rest of the world however will be placing greater value on people's lives and will be scrutinizing the MAX much more than Boeing (since the FAA delegates) will.

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

really good news!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

zckls04 wrote:

This sort of thing is why nobody buys your "I agree Boeing is at fault" line. Saying "Boeing/FAA screwed up by underestimating how incredibly thick and useless the pilots were" isn't really blaming Boeing at all. You're like the guy who insults somebody and when they protest says "I'm sorry you misunderstood what I said".

You are certainly right that more pilot training would be valuable, as it always would be. But that's a distraction from the most important issue here, which is Boeing's shoddy design, their sordid attempt to cover it up, and the FAA's almost total lack of oversight. If you put half as much energy into calling for improvements in those areas as you do to defaming the pilots, you might come across as rather more genuine.

In other words, let's put out the fire before we worry about repainting the house.

There's no need to put more energy into the "Boeing's fault" category since nobody is denying Boeing's role, and there's been plenty of energy placed there already by misinformation artists trying to absolve the non-Boeing parties that contributed to these crashes. The fire is out. Time to paint.

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

Or a return could be fairly soon, according to that article. We don't know. It's not new information.

morrisond wrote:

ET pilots barely had more time before being put into the cockpit of an 737 as full instrument /commercial rated pilots.

ONE ET pilot.
ONE.
1.

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

How do you make that summary from that statement? The ECA that made the statement said:

For this reason, we will rely heavily on the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to scrutinise and explain the certification and the potential return to service of the MAX. On top of the strong commitment from EASA’s Executive Director Patrick Ky to EU Parliament’s Transport Committee on 18th March, the Agency has also defined ‘prerequisite conditions’ for allowing the MAX back in the air: any design changes by Boeing are to be EASA approved and mandated; an additional independent design review is to be conducted by the Agency; and that MAX flight crews “have been adequately trained”.

“We fully support EASA’s prerequisite conditions.” says Jon Horne. “And we understand the tremendous pressure that the Agency is under to be thorough, yet swift; independent, yet cooperative. We know this is not an enviable position to be in. But the Agency must be able to resist any such pressure and carry out an independent and thorough review. Simply accepting the FAA’s word on the MAX’s safety won’t be enough.”

How do you get a "full internal review of the MAX" from that? The EASA has defined prerequisite conditions for the MAX to return to service that the ECA accepts. The only mentions of a review are in reference to design changes, not the entire aircraft. The EASA has not said anything that indicates essentially a recertification.

Also, keep in mind that this is a statement by a pilots union, not the EASA.

MSPNWA wrote:

zckls04 wrote:

This sort of thing is why nobody buys your "I agree Boeing is at fault" line. Saying "Boeing/FAA screwed up by underestimating how incredibly thick and useless the pilots were" isn't really blaming Boeing at all. You're like the guy who insults somebody and when they protest says "I'm sorry you misunderstood what I said".

You are certainly right that more pilot training would be valuable, as it always would be. But that's a distraction from the most important issue here, which is Boeing's shoddy design, their sordid attempt to cover it up, and the FAA's almost total lack of oversight. If you put half as much energy into calling for improvements in those areas as you do to defaming the pilots, you might come across as rather more genuine.

In other words, let's put out the fire before we worry about repainting the house.

There's no need to put more energy into the "Boeing's fault" category since nobody is denying Boeing's role, and there's been plenty of energy placed there already by misinformation artists trying to absolve the non-Boeing parties that contributed to these crashes. The fire is out. Time to paint.

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

Or a return could be fairly soon, according to that article. We don't know. It's not new information.

If you've experienced an epiphany, why do you declare so with a provocative statement that is bound to draw further response? I'm afraid the fire you have tried to douse with whitewash from the start is not out. I'm sure it will be money that does that in the end, but not yet.

Ray

planecane wrote:

For this reason, we will rely heavily on the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to scrutinise and explain the certification and the potential return to service of the MAX. On top of the strong commitment from EASA’s Executive Director Patrick Ky to EU Parliament’s Transport Committee on 18th March, the Agency has also defined ‘prerequisite conditions’ for allowing the MAX back in the air: (1)any design changes by Boeing are to be EASA approved and mandated; (2)an additional independent design review is to be conducted by the Agency; and that MAX flight crews “have been adequately trained”.

“We fully support EASA’s prerequisite conditions.” says Jon Horne. “And we understand the tremendous pressure that the Agency is under to be thorough, yet swift; independent, yet cooperative. We know this is not an enviable position to be in. But the Agency must be able to resist any such pressure and carry out an independent and thorough review. Simply accepting the FAA’s word on the MAX’s safety won’t be enough.”

How do you get a "full internal review of the MAX" from that? The EASA has defined prerequisite conditions for the MAX to return to service that the ECA accepts. The only mentions of a review are in reference to design changes, not the entire aircraft. The EASA has not said anything that indicates essentially a recertification.

Also, keep in mind that this is a statement by a pilots union, not the EASA.

1. "Any design changes by Boeing" probably relates to MCAS update and possibly other updates that are part of the package but have yet to be made public (or not...)

2. "an additional independent design review" : is clearly stated as being something different than #1. It does not mean recertification from scratch, probably far from that, but it has every chance to be a much more thorough review than what Boeing would like it to be. Who knows what is to be discovered next if a comprehensive review takes place...

This is some mildly encouraging News for safety, and I hope actions will follow words.

oschkosch wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

really good news!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

planecane wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

really good news!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

The good news were that there is somebody really checking on the 737MAX, rather than just rubber stamping the upgrade offering from Boeing.

There are a lot of posters here trying to absolve Boeing from as much blame as possible.

The point to Boeing's conduct, is not only the negligent design of MCAS, but the behavior after they must have realized that something was wrong.

I at least hope there will never be another accident on a 737MAX. But as my main airline is flying that beast, I am all for making as sure as possible that all problems with that bird are found, even if it needs a lengthy recertification. Plainly said, I do not trust the Boeing FAA combination any longer.

Just for information, as it really has little to do with this thread, what poor design decision on the A300 are you referring to?

planecane wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

really good news!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

Your persecution complex is showing again and deflection attempt is facile. Any additional review activity should be welcomed due to the clear loss of confidence and to provide re-assurance to the crews and passengers.

Ray

planecane wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

European lifting of the grounding could take a while. They are going to be doing a full internal review of the MAX.

https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/boeings ... ansparency

really good news!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

Agree that there is a sort of malicious desire to see Boeing fail on the part of some and I myself and friends who are engineers do have issues with their hiring practices of late which I won't discuss on this thread because I don't want to get in trouble again but that should not cloud objectivity towards this crash. I disagree however with your assertion that the AA587 crash was not survivable and was due to bad rudder design . There had been plenty of other A300's that flew through wake turbulence and didn't crash. The F/O reacted over aggressively to wake turbulence by applying alternating rudder deflections and didn't understand how materials react to sudden changes in load direction This is because American Airlines trained pilots to react that way which is why they subsequently changed their program. Even the "biased" US NTSB placed the blame mostly on the pilot training. Also, when the FAA tried to mandate rudder warning lights in 2009, Fedex, a large A300 user resisted feeling better pilot training for inputing appropriate rudder deflection was more important. Pilot error due to training contributed mostly to AA587 whereas the 737MAX has much more serious design issues so I disagree with your comparison.

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

really good news!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

Your persecution complex is showing again and deflection attempt is facile. Any additional review activity should be welcomed due to the clear loss of confidence and to provide re-assurance to the crews and passengers.

Ray

Persecution complex? If you don't see the glee from some posters whenever something is seen as bad news for Boeing then you are not very perceptive.

phugoid1982 wrote:

planecane wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

really good news!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

Agree that there is a sort of malicious desire to see Boeing fail on the part of some and I myself and friends who are engineers do have issues with their hiring practices of late which I won't discuss on this thread because I don't want to get in trouble again but that should not cloud objectivity towards this crash. I disagree however with your assertion that the AA587 crash was not survivable and was due to bad rudder design . There had been plenty of other A300's that flew through wake turbulence and didn't crash. The F/O reacted over aggressively to wake turbulence by applying alternating rudder deflections and didn't understand how materials react to sudden changes in load direction This is because American Airlines trained pilots to react that way which is why they subsequently changed their program. Even the "biased" US NTSB placed the blame mostly on the pilot training. Also, when the FAA tried to mandate rudder warning lights in 2009, Fedex, a large A300 user resisted feeling better pilot training for inputing appropriate rudder deflection was more important. Pilot error due to training contributed mostly to AA587 whereas the 737MAX has much more serious design issues so I disagree with your comparison.

I feel it is a sub optimal design because the deflection could have easily been limited based on air speed and it wasn't. Just like MCAS could have easily been designed like the software update will make it now.

If pilots had been better trained on the A300 rudder, the tail wouldn't have fallen off of AA587. If pilots had been better trained on runaway stabilizer procedures, neither MAX crash would have happened.

Yes, in the case of the MAX, the poor design caused the emergency and on AA587 the pilots actions caused the poor design to manifest. However, in both cases there was a confluence of a suboptimal design that could have easily been designed better and pilot actions due to improper or inadequate training.

Amexair wrote:

I'm confused, did I not read somewhere that he said something along the lines of "even if it takes a year, so be it"?

You did, I did too. It is confusing all right...

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

Your persecution complex is showing again and deflection attempt is facile. Any additional review activity should be welcomed due to the clear loss of confidence and to provide re-assurance to the crews and passengers.

Ray

Persecution complex? If you don't see the glee from some posters whenever something is seen as bad news for Boeing then you are not very perceptive.

There are lots of emotions in this thread; but main takehome message is that Boeing, in the endeavor to minimize compensation payments, created optics of a company which doesn't learn from their mistakes and doesn't care. How much they believe in their denial messages themselves is a different question.
People also blame FAA and Boeing for being too friendly. While that may be true, a significant portion of current worldwide safety record can be attributed to this duo, so that is not something unconditionally bad. Unlike individuals, however, organizations can turn on the spot in terms of their moral character.
That brings us to MAX, where Boeing is publicly denying most blame, and so does FAA. It doesn't mean they were sitting on their hands for 2 months since MAX got grounded - but doesn't mean otherwise as well. Moreover, Boeing keeping their mouth shut doesn't really mean they learned their lessons, and that the rest of design is up to standard. To make things worse, one may question Boeing's ability to do an internal review as they seem to lose control over design progression at some point - too many issues already found in a small AoA domain.
And now a multi-billion dollar question: how much are you willing to trust Boeing on the issue? For me, the answer is very uncertain....

mjoelnir wrote:

planecane wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

really good news!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

The good news were that there is somebody really checking on the 737MAX, rather than just rubber stamping the upgrade offering from Boeing.

There are a lot of posters here trying to absolve Boeing from as much blame as possible.

The point to Boeing's conduct, is not only the negligent design of MCAS, but the behavior after they must have realized that something was wrong.

I at least hope there will never be another accident on a 737MAX. But as my main airline is flying that beast, I am all for making as sure as possible that all problems with that bird are found, even if it needs a lengthy recertification. Plainly said, I do not trust the Boeing FAA combination any longer.

Just for information, as it really has little to do with this thread, what poor design decision on the A300 are you referring to?

The FAA isn't rubber stamping. They formed an independent group of experts that had nothing to do with MAX design or certification to review the fix. They have said that they won't allow the MAX to fly until the expert group blesses the fix.

Trust me, in the post I was replying to, the response was meant as "good news, the grounding will last long" not "good news that another agency is making sure the FAA didn't miss something."

zckls04 wrote:

This sort of thing is why nobody buys your "I agree Boeing is at fault" line. Saying "Boeing/FAA screwed up by underestimating how incredibly thick and useless the pilots were" isn't really blaming Boeing at all. You're like the guy who insults somebody and when they protest says "I'm sorry you misunderstood what I said".

One of many posts with absurd distortion of other people's positions, presumably because people are intensively triggered by investigation of the actions of the pilots. sigh.

Let's cut to the chase.

Please vote:

When the accident reports for JT610 and ET302 are issued:

A) No criticism will be directed towards the pilots and all will be directed to Boeing, FAA, the airlines, etc.

-- or --

B) Some criticism for the accident will be directed towards the pilots and some will be directed to Boeing FAA, the airlines, etc.

My prediction of the response to this simple request:

A) It will be ignored, or
B) People will answer a similar but different question, or
C) People will answer an dissimilar, very different question

Because: they know the answer is (B).

Major kudos for FAA not giving in to boeing - paid lobbyists and PR machine. The decision only proves that all regulators will work together to ensure the aircraft is truly safe because they determine it to be safe - NOT the manufacturer and its PR BS.

Revelation wrote:

zckls04 wrote:

This sort of thing is why nobody buys your "I agree Boeing is at fault" line. Saying "Boeing/FAA screwed up by underestimating how incredibly thick and useless the pilots were" isn't really blaming Boeing at all. You're like the guy who insults somebody and when they protest says "I'm sorry you misunderstood what I said".

One of many posts with absurd distortion of other people's positions, presumably because people are intensively triggered by investigation of the actions of the pilots. sigh.

Let's cut to the chase.

Please vote:

When the accident reports for JT610 and ET302 are issued:

A) No criticism will be directed towards the pilots and all will be directed to Boeing, FAA, the airlines, etc.

-- or --

B) Some criticism for the accident will be directed towards the pilots and some will be directed to Boeing FAA, the airlines, etc.

My prediction of the response to this simple request:

A) It will be ignored, or
B) People will answer a similar but different question, or
C) People will answer an dissimilar, very different question

Because: they know the answer is (B).

The issue seems to be how much the "some" will be for Boeing, the airlines and the pilots in a quantitative sense. Mostly pilots, mostly Boeing and Airline company, or equal blame to each.

A really interesting read:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286623947_The_Boeing_Company_The_Grounding_of_the_787_Dreamliner

It is about the 787 grounding but one aspect is really interesting:

According to Reuters, the FAA granted the 787 special conditions, knowing that the batteries could cause problems and saying that existing contain-and-vent systems would be enough to control the buildup of explosive or toxic gases created in the event of a battery bursting into flames.22 Other instances in which the FAA might have sidestepped processes to Boeing’s advantage have been mentioned, but none have been properly documented

Here the full reuters article:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-787-faa/insight-boeing-787-battery-woes-put-faa-approval-under-scrutiny-idUSBRE90M04620130123

Aviation officials from Canada, China, Ethiopia, Europe and Indonesia were in attendance at the meeting, but many of the nations said the 737 MAX planes would have to be approved by their own government agencies before being allowed to fly in their respective countries.

https://www.travelpulse.com/news/airlin ... -june.html

It's not going to be a one in all in decision so the ungrounding is going to be a protracted process as difference countries go through their own processes. With the tricky global trade situation China may choose to drag out it's approval process since Huawei is now effectively banned from the USA.

RickNRoll wrote:

The issue seems to be how much the "some" will be for Boeing, the airlines and the pilots in a quantitative sense. Mostly pilots, mostly Boeing and Airline company, or equal blame to each.

Indeed, and this gets us back to the point that even those who have questions about the pilots actions are also saying that Boeing deserves the majority of the blame.

I don't read anyone saying Boeing deserves no blame.

Even Boeing (while obviously trying to minimize liability) said it made a mistake and apologized and is working hard on developing a fix.

Even Airbus has stated they have concerns about global pilot training levels and that it is important for the aviation industry for the MAX to return to flight in the near future.

Yet some here get triggered by any criticism of pilots, or any idea that their favorite whipping boy (be it Boeing, the FAA, the USA itself, some combination of these or others) isn't getting all the blame.

In the end, the accident report will have some criticism of the pilot's actions, because in 100% hindsight we know they could have done better, and it's the accident report's purpose to identify things that can be done better.

kalvado wrote:

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Your persecution complex is showing again and deflection attempt is facile. Any additional review activity should be welcomed due to the clear loss of confidence and to provide re-assurance to the crews and passengers.

Ray

Persecution complex? If you don't see the glee from some posters whenever something is seen as bad news for Boeing then you are not very perceptive.

There are lots of emotions in this thread; but main takehome message is that Boeing, in the endeavor to minimize compensation payments, created optics of a company which doesn't learn from their mistakes and doesn't care. How much they believe in their denial messages themselves is a different question.
People also blame FAA and Boeing for being too friendly. While that may be true, a significant portion of current worldwide safety record can be attributed to this duo, so that is not something unconditionally bad. Unlike individuals, however, organizations can turn on the spot in terms of their moral character.
That brings us to MAX, where Boeing is publicly denying most blame, and so does FAA. It doesn't mean they were sitting on their hands for 2 months since MAX got grounded - but doesn't mean otherwise as well. Moreover, Boeing keeping their mouth shut doesn't really mean they learned their lessons, and that the rest of design is up to standard. To make things worse, one may question Boeing's ability to do an internal review as they seem to lose control over design progression at some point - too many issues already found in a small AoA domain.
And now a multi-billion dollar question: how much are you willing to trust Boeing on the issue? For me, the answer is very uncertain....

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts. Maybe there wasn't Pilots or experienced Engineers involved in the design of MCAS who could have said "Stop - what happens if..."

That is the tribal knowledge that is lost when you have a revolving door for engineers. The design's meet the specs as laid out - but the wisdom isn't there to know when something isn't as safe as it could be for minimal more effort. To be clear MCAS was software - it shouldn't have added much cost at all to make it a lot more robust.

We have heard how much inexperience the Person at the FAA who was responsible for this had - however she was a Pilot so you think she could have thought it through(if that was her Job to do so vs just managing the team). However if she was a product of today's training system with it's emphasis on Automated flight and not thinking through the implications of MCAS failure as the computers never fail...and the pilot's might have to control the plane manually then that's an issue as well.

It's a Catch 22. The Auto-pilots and nannies have led to lower crash rates as arguably they are better at flying and more precise - however by relying on them too much Pilots never get the hand flying experience they need to stay sharp and have the confidence in there skills when the nannies go bad.

Big Airlines used to have fleets of Trainers for Pilots to use so they could keep there skills sharp.

A lot better solution would be to have fleets of Simulators installed and mandate that Pilots spend more time than they are currently spending on practising Manual flight and non-normal procedures in a no-fail environment so they can stay sharp for that 1 in a Million flight when the nannies fail.

One thing we can probably reasonably assume is that Boeing's next design (Probably NMA/MOM/797) will be the most tested, scrutinized design ever and cross our fingers should set new standards for safety and reliability.

Yes - this should be the last design evolution of the 737 - newer aircraft architectures can be made safer.

The one thing that really concerns me is that with with MTOW's of Single Aisle aircraft being constantly pushed without an increase in Wing area it's leading to higher and higher landing speeds and more runway excursions.

That seems to be a big issue with the 737 not so much the A320/A321 but that could change as it's weights are increased way beyond it's initial design spec's.

AirwayBill wrote:

planecane wrote:

For this reason, we will rely heavily on the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to scrutinise and explain the certification and the potential return to service of the MAX. On top of the strong commitment from EASA’s Executive Director Patrick Ky to EU Parliament’s Transport Committee on 18th March, the Agency has also defined ‘prerequisite conditions’ for allowing the MAX back in the air: (1)any design changes by Boeing are to be EASA approved and mandated; (2)an additional independent design review is to be conducted by the Agency; and that MAX flight crews “have been adequately trained”.

“We fully support EASA’s prerequisite conditions.” says Jon Horne. “And we understand the tremendous pressure that the Agency is under to be thorough, yet swift; independent, yet cooperative. We know this is not an enviable position to be in. But the Agency must be able to resist any such pressure and carry out an independent and thorough review. Simply accepting the FAA’s word on the MAX’s safety won’t be enough.”

How do you get a "full internal review of the MAX" from that? The EASA has defined prerequisite conditions for the MAX to return to service that the ECA accepts. The only mentions of a review are in reference to design changes, not the entire aircraft. The EASA has not said anything that indicates essentially a recertification.

Also, keep in mind that this is a statement by a pilots union, not the EASA.

1. "Any design changes by Boeing" probably relates to MCAS update and possibly other updates that are part of the package but have yet to be made public (or not...)

2. "an additional independent design review" : is clearly stated as being something different than #1. It does not mean recertification from scratch, probably far from that, but it has every chance to be a much more thorough review than what Boeing would like it to be. Who knows what is to be discovered next if a comprehensive review takes place...

This is some mildly encouraging News for safety, and I hope actions will follow words.

I would think Boeing welcomes a full review of the changes they made. The reasoning is the regulatory board will then share liability should something else happens. Each one of these regulatory bodies needs to do their due diligence. Boeing needs to have 3rd party validation of their design. If one of these goes down again everybody is going to be up crapcreek.

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

Your persecution complex is showing again and deflection attempt is facile. Any additional review activity should be welcomed due to the clear loss of confidence and to provide re-assurance to the crews and passengers.

Ray

Persecution complex? If you don't see the glee from some posters whenever something is seen as bad news for Boeing then you are not very perceptive.

This chap (apology if chapess), in all the posts, has said nothing to justify your ire. The only posts I have seen this rabid anti-Boeing retoric is in yours and attributed to others somehow. Perhaps it is your perception that is off a touch. I could really do without going round the block for another 40 years to be honest.

Perhaps you might find some solace in rising above any perceived unwarranted anti-Boeing sentiment.


Ray

There is evidence of a heated conversation between Boeing and pilots - actual Audio - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n6vKrg2 ... _P0Zi0nacY

Boeing Engineers admitting

planecane wrote:

phugoid1982 wrote:

planecane wrote:

I really don't understand why there are people that seem to get excited for any potential bad news for Boeing. If, God forbid, there is another MAX incident after it returns to service there are several posters on here that seem like they'd almost be happy (even if the incident has nothing to do with the design) because they can "get" evil greedy Boeing.

If an Airbus ever crashed due to an issue stemming from it being designed and produced inefficiently across 65 different locations (I'm exaggerating), would that somehow be better because they weren't putting profit first?

There has never been a crash involving an Airbus that was the result of a design that wasn't well thought out combined with inadequate training. Oh, wait, there was. Was it a great design not to limit the A300 rudder deflection so that a pilot could apply enough force to break the tail off? Certainly not. Should the pilots have been trained to avoid doing so? Absolutely. See any similarities with the MCAS issue?

At least with the bad MCAS design it was possible to recover and survive. It took 25 years of service for the A300 poor design decision to show up. It isn't out of the realm of possibility that an aircraft other than the 737MAX has something lurking. Stop being gleeful that this happened to evil greedy Boeing over in the unsophisticated USA. The same could happen to your "team" one day. If it does, I will definitely not be the least bit happy about it.

Agree that there is a sort of malicious desire to see Boeing fail on the part of some and I myself and friends who are engineers do have issues with their hiring practices of late which I won't discuss on this thread because I don't want to get in trouble again but that should not cloud objectivity towards this crash. I disagree however with your assertion that the AA587 crash was not survivable and was due to bad rudder design . There had been plenty of other A300's that flew through wake turbulence and didn't crash. The F/O reacted over aggressively to wake turbulence by applying alternating rudder deflections and didn't understand how materials react to sudden changes in load direction This is because American Airlines trained pilots to react that way which is why they subsequently changed their program. Even the "biased" US NTSB placed the blame mostly on the pilot training. Also, when the FAA tried to mandate rudder warning lights in 2009, Fedex, a large A300 user resisted feeling better pilot training for inputing appropriate rudder deflection was more important. Pilot error due to training contributed mostly to AA587 whereas the 737MAX has much more serious design issues so I disagree with your comparison.

I feel it is a sub optimal design because the deflection could have easily been limited based on air speed and it wasn't. Just like MCAS could have easily been designed like the software update will make it now.

If pilots had been better trained on the A300 rudder, the tail wouldn't have fallen off of AA587. If pilots had been better trained on runaway stabilizer procedures, neither MAX crash would have happened.

Yes, in the case of the MAX, the poor design caused the emergency and on AA587 the pilots actions caused the poor design to manifest. However, in both cases there was a confluence of a suboptimal design that could have easily been designed better and pilot actions due to improper or inadequate training.

Regarding the training for the A300 there were clear recommendations by Airbus, that American Airlines choose not to follow, they changed their training after the accident and no second accident ever materialized. The change was not that the pilot had to do something, just to refrain for doing what AA training had indicated.
No changes to the frame were recommended by the authorities.

In regards to MCAS, that was hidden away by Boeing and they tried to sabotage any possibility of pilots knowing about it or being able to train for it. They kept hiding behind a MACAS failure being just a trim runaway, even if it is difficult to recognize it as a trim runaway, most likely because it is not a trim runaway and behaves differently.

The main problem with Boeing's behavior (and the FAA's) is there inaction after the first crash.

morrisond wrote:

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts.

But this is an airplane! And MCAS has direct influence on plane control surfaces - it is not the question whether the original designer bungled it up, the question is, what is wrong in Boeing that such stupidity passed all internal checks and balances (even before thing went to FAA).

That's why many of us are intensely triggered when somebody is saying "they'll fix it and it will be safe plane again". No. This is not enough. The question is how severely broken is the system inside Boeing that allows something like this to happen. How came that no one protested, vetoed, demanded changes upon seeing the MCAS design. And at least I won't be pleased until this is properly audited and investigated.

Because we don't know how long these dangerous conditions have been in place at Boeing. What else could be affected?

morrisond wrote:

kalvado wrote:

planecane wrote:

Persecution complex? If you don't see the glee from some posters whenever something is seen as bad news for Boeing then you are not very perceptive.

There are lots of emotions in this thread; but main takehome message is that Boeing, in the endeavor to minimize compensation payments, created optics of a company which doesn't learn from their mistakes and doesn't care. How much they believe in their denial messages themselves is a different question.
People also blame FAA and Boeing for being too friendly. While that may be true, a significant portion of current worldwide safety record can be attributed to this duo, so that is not something unconditionally bad. Unlike individuals, however, organizations can turn on the spot in terms of their moral character.
That brings us to MAX, where Boeing is publicly denying most blame, and so does FAA. It doesn't mean they were sitting on their hands for 2 months since MAX got grounded - but doesn't mean otherwise as well. Moreover, Boeing keeping their mouth shut doesn't really mean they learned their lessons, and that the rest of design is up to standard. To make things worse, one may question Boeing's ability to do an internal review as they seem to lose control over design progression at some point - too many issues already found in a small AoA domain.
And now a multi-billion dollar question: how much are you willing to trust Boeing on the issue? For me, the answer is very uncertain....

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts. Maybe there wasn't Pilots or experienced Engineers involved in the design of MCAS who could have said "Stop - what happens if..."

That is the tribal knowledge that is lost when you have a revolving door for engineers. The design's meet the specs as laid out - but the wisdom isn't there to know when something isn't as safe as it could be for minimal more effort. To be clear MCAS was software - it shouldn't have added much cost at all to make it a lot more robust.

We have heard how much inexperience the Person at the FAA who was responsible for this had - however she was a Pilot so you think she could have thought it through(if that was her Job to do so vs just managing the team). However if she was a product of today's training system with it's emphasis on Automated flight and not thinking through the implications of MCAS failure as the computers never fail...and the pilot's might have to control the plane manually then that's an issue as well.

It's a Catch 22. The Auto-pilots and nannies have led to lower crash rates as arguably they are better at flying and more precise - however by relying on them too much Pilots never get the hand flying experience they need to stay sharp and have the confidence in there skills when the nannies go bad.

Big Airlines used to have fleets of Trainers for Pilots to use so they could keep there skills sharp.

A lot better solution would be to have fleets of Simulators installed and mandate that Pilots spend more time than they are currently spending on practising Manual flight and non-normal procedures in a no-fail environment so they can stay sharp for that 1 in a Million flight when the nannies fail.

One thing we can probably reasonably assume is that Boeing's next design (Probably NMA/MOM/797) will be the most tested, scrutinized design ever and cross our fingers should set new standards for safety and reliability.

Yes - this should be the last design evolution of the 737 - newer aircraft architectures can be made safer.

The one thing that really concerns me is that with with MTOW's of Single Aisle aircraft being constantly pushed without an increase in Wing area it's leading to higher and higher landing speeds and more runway excursions.

That seems to be a big issue with the 737 not so much the A320/A321 but that could change as it's weights are increased way beyond it's initial design spec's.

You can not keep from the smoke and mirrors.

Boeing sold minimal training to the airlines. Boeing sabotaged training for the 737MAX, because accepting that you need for more than minimal training for moving from NG to MAX would have cost Boeing millions.

The NG is not falling out of the sky regularly flown by the same pilots you choose to denigrate.

Ethiopian is one of the very few airlines having spend money to train there 737MAX pilots. Your steady denigration of Ethiopian to protect Boeing are getting absurd.

You hammer on the flight hours on the pilot. The USA Air Force has a similar system of intensive training and few hours. There your answer was that while accepting to know nothing about it, the training at the USA Air Force had to be much better.

I am tired off the declaration that trim runaway training is all that is needed when you encounter the MCAS failure mode. For the first you have to recognize the intermittent trim impulses of MCAS for what it is behind the at the same time active STS. For the second MCAS is trimming very fast and very aggressive.

To say it very simple, if Boeing had not this negligent design of MCAS, the Lion air accident would not have happened. If Boeing had taking action after the Lion air accident the Ethiopian airline accident would not have happened. Just simply allowing pilots to train on simulators that were similar to a 737MAX could have helped. But Boeing had to sabotage that by crippling the simulators.

You can keep your smoke and mirror tactics, but you will not be able to divert a iota of the blame from Boeing killing 350 people with an absurd design and inaction.

mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

kalvado wrote:

There are lots of emotions in this thread; but main takehome message is that Boeing, in the endeavor to minimize compensation payments, created optics of a company which doesn't learn from their mistakes and doesn't care. How much they believe in their denial messages themselves is a different question.
People also blame FAA and Boeing for being too friendly. While that may be true, a significant portion of current worldwide safety record can be attributed to this duo, so that is not something unconditionally bad. Unlike individuals, however, organizations can turn on the spot in terms of their moral character.
That brings us to MAX, where Boeing is publicly denying most blame, and so does FAA. It doesn't mean they were sitting on their hands for 2 months since MAX got grounded - but doesn't mean otherwise as well. Moreover, Boeing keeping their mouth shut doesn't really mean they learned their lessons, and that the rest of design is up to standard. To make things worse, one may question Boeing's ability to do an internal review as they seem to lose control over design progression at some point - too many issues already found in a small AoA domain.
And now a multi-billion dollar question: how much are you willing to trust Boeing on the issue? For me, the answer is very uncertain....

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts. Maybe there wasn't Pilots or experienced Engineers involved in the design of MCAS who could have said "Stop - what happens if..."

That is the tribal knowledge that is lost when you have a revolving door for engineers. The design's meet the specs as laid out - but the wisdom isn't there to know when something isn't as safe as it could be for minimal more effort. To be clear MCAS was software - it shouldn't have added much cost at all to make it a lot more robust.

We have heard how much inexperience the Person at the FAA who was responsible for this had - however she was a Pilot so you think she could have thought it through(if that was her Job to do so vs just managing the team). However if she was a product of today's training system with it's emphasis on Automated flight and not thinking through the implications of MCAS failure as the computers never fail...and the pilot's might have to control the plane manually then that's an issue as well.

It's a Catch 22. The Auto-pilots and nannies have led to lower crash rates as arguably they are better at flying and more precise - however by relying on them too much Pilots never get the hand flying experience they need to stay sharp and have the confidence in there skills when the nannies go bad.

Big Airlines used to have fleets of Trainers for Pilots to use so they could keep there skills sharp.

A lot better solution would be to have fleets of Simulators installed and mandate that Pilots spend more time than they are currently spending on practising Manual flight and non-normal procedures in a no-fail environment so they can stay sharp for that 1 in a Million flight when the nannies fail.

One thing we can probably reasonably assume is that Boeing's next design (Probably NMA/MOM/797) will be the most tested, scrutinized design ever and cross our fingers should set new standards for safety and reliability.

Yes - this should be the last design evolution of the 737 - newer aircraft architectures can be made safer.

The one thing that really concerns me is that with with MTOW's of Single Aisle aircraft being constantly pushed without an increase in Wing area it's leading to higher and higher landing speeds and more runway excursions.

That seems to be a big issue with the 737 not so much the A320/A321 but that could change as it's weights are increased way beyond it's initial design spec's.

You can not keep from the smoke and mirrors.

Boeing sold minimal training to the airlines. Boeing sabotaged training for the 737MAX, because accepting that you need for more than minimal training for moving from NG to MAX would have cost Boeing millions.

The NG is not falling out of the sky regularly flown by the same pilots you choose to denigrate.

Ethiopian is one of the very few airlines having spend money to train there 737MAX pilots. Your steady denigration of Ethiopian to protect Boeing are getting absurd.

You hammer on the flight hours on the pilot. The USA Air Force has a similar system of intensive training and few hours. There your answer was that while accepting to know nothing about it, the training at the USA Air Force had to be much better.

I am tired off the declaration that trim runaway training is all that is needed when you encounter the MCAS failure mode. For the first you have to recognize the intermittent trim impulses of MCAS for what it is behind the at the same time active STS. For the second MCAS is trimming very fast and very aggressive.

To say it very simple, if Boeing had not this negligent design of MCAS, the Lion air accident would not have happened. If Boeing had taking action after the Lion air accident the Ethiopian airline accident would not have happened. Just simply allowing pilots to train on simulators that were similar to a 737MAX could have helped. But Boeing had to sabotage that by crippling the simulators.

You can keep your smoke and mirror tactics, but you will not be able to divert a iota of the blame from Boeing killing 350 people with an absurd design and inaction.

For a second I thought you were making a little bit of progress as I read iota as "a lot of" the first time through.

Have you read the FCOM bulletin that Ethiopian supposedly provided to it's Pilots? It's on the last two pages of the Preliminary report https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

How is that not clear in describing the failure mode and what to do about it on the second page under Operating Instructions?

Or are you saying this is beyond the ability of any pilot?

And just to be clear - I am not denigrating the Pilots - I am denigrating the ET training system (and I suspect the same of many others Worldwide) - there is a large but subtle difference - Pilots can't learn what they aren't being taught.

mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

kalvado wrote:

There are lots of emotions in this thread; but main takehome message is that Boeing, in the endeavor to minimize compensation payments, created optics of a company which doesn't learn from their mistakes and doesn't care. How much they believe in their denial messages themselves is a different question.
People also blame FAA and Boeing for being too friendly. While that may be true, a significant portion of current worldwide safety record can be attributed to this duo, so that is not something unconditionally bad. Unlike individuals, however, organizations can turn on the spot in terms of their moral character.
That brings us to MAX, where Boeing is publicly denying most blame, and so does FAA. It doesn't mean they were sitting on their hands for 2 months since MAX got grounded - but doesn't mean otherwise as well. Moreover, Boeing keeping their mouth shut doesn't really mean they learned their lessons, and that the rest of design is up to standard. To make things worse, one may question Boeing's ability to do an internal review as they seem to lose control over design progression at some point - too many issues already found in a small AoA domain.
And now a multi-billion dollar question: how much are you willing to trust Boeing on the issue? For me, the answer is very uncertain....

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts. Maybe there wasn't Pilots or experienced Engineers involved in the design of MCAS who could have said "Stop - what happens if..."

That is the tribal knowledge that is lost when you have a revolving door for engineers. The design's meet the specs as laid out - but the wisdom isn't there to know when something isn't as safe as it could be for minimal more effort. To be clear MCAS was software - it shouldn't have added much cost at all to make it a lot more robust.

We have heard how much inexperience the Person at the FAA who was responsible for this had - however she was a Pilot so you think she could have thought it through(if that was her Job to do so vs just managing the team). However if she was a product of today's training system with it's emphasis on Automated flight and not thinking through the implications of MCAS failure as the computers never fail...and the pilot's might have to control the plane manually then that's an issue as well.

It's a Catch 22. The Auto-pilots and nannies have led to lower crash rates as arguably they are better at flying and more precise - however by relying on them too much Pilots never get the hand flying experience they need to stay sharp and have the confidence in there skills when the nannies go bad.

Big Airlines used to have fleets of Trainers for Pilots to use so they could keep there skills sharp.

A lot better solution would be to have fleets of Simulators installed and mandate that Pilots spend more time than they are currently spending on practising Manual flight and non-normal procedures in a no-fail environment so they can stay sharp for that 1 in a Million flight when the nannies fail.

One thing we can probably reasonably assume is that Boeing's next design (Probably NMA/MOM/797) will be the most tested, scrutinized design ever and cross our fingers should set new standards for safety and reliability.

Yes - this should be the last design evolution of the 737 - newer aircraft architectures can be made safer.

The one thing that really concerns me is that with with MTOW's of Single Aisle aircraft being constantly pushed without an increase in Wing area it's leading to higher and higher landing speeds and more runway excursions.

That seems to be a big issue with the 737 not so much the A320/A321 but that could change as it's weights are increased way beyond it's initial design spec's.

You can not keep from the smoke and mirrors.

Boeing sold minimal training to the airlines. Boeing sabotaged training for the 737MAX, because accepting that you need for more than minimal training for moving from NG to MAX would have cost Boeing millions.

The NG is not falling out of the sky regularly flown by the same pilots you choose to denigrate.

Ethiopian is one of the very few airlines having spend money to train there 737MAX pilots. Your steady denigration of Ethiopian to protect Boeing are getting absurd.

You hammer on the flight hours on the pilot. The USA Air Force has a similar system of intensive training and few hours. There your answer was that while accepting to know nothing about it, the training at the USA Air Force had to be much better.

I am tired off the declaration that trim runaway training is all that is needed when you encounter the MCAS failure mode. For the first you have to recognize the intermittent trim impulses of MCAS for what it is behind the at the same time active STS. For the second MCAS is trimming very fast and very aggressive.

To say it very simple, if Boeing had not this negligent design of MCAS, the Lion air accident would not have happened. If Boeing had taking action after the Lion air accident the Ethiopian airline accident would not have happened. Just simply allowing pilots to train on simulators that were similar to a 737MAX could have helped. But Boeing had to sabotage that by crippling the simulators.

You can keep your smoke and mirror tactics, but you will not be able to divert a iota of the blame from Boeing killing 350 people with an absurd design and inaction.

If you did an experiment and caused runaway stabilizer on purpose (caused by whatever can cause it) on an NG along with the other issues that were happening on both of the MAX crash flights, I suspect the NG would fall from the sky in a high percentage of cases as well.

MCAS is most certainly a terrible design. I still don't believe that if it was documented and included in training materials that it would have made any difference, especially in the case of the ET crash. The documentation would have been the same as the post Lion Air EAD documentation. The documentation said to run the runaway stabilizer NNC. It would have said the same thing before entry into service if they had documented it. It is assumed that a 737 pilot has already been trained on runaway stabilizer so what additional training would there have been?

My belief is that there are many 737 pilots that would fail to recover a 737NG or 737-100 for that matter with a runaway stabilizer. MCAS causing it at an unacceptably high rate is why we have evidence that they couldn't recover.

xmp125a wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts.

But this is an airplane! And MCAS has direct influence on plane control surfaces - it is not the question whether the original designer bungled it up, the question is, what is wrong in Boeing that such stupidity passed all internal checks and balances (even before thing went to FAA).

That's why many of us are intensely triggered when somebody is saying "they'll fix it and it will be safe plane again". No. This is not enough. The question is how severely broken is the system inside Boeing that allows something like this to happen. How came that no one protested, vetoed, demanded changes upon seeing the MCAS design. And at least I won't be pleased until this is properly audited and investigated.

Because we don't know how long these dangerous conditions have been in place at Boeing. What else could be affected?

In the squillions of posts in these MAX threads, this is one that hits the nail on the head, and to which I concur 100%

I spent 5 or so years in establishing a QC culture in a software company, as QA manager, and that company was the first European software company to obtain ISO9001 certification. I know how hard it is to respect all the lifecycle required to achieve that. I can easily imagine how easy it is to short-cut all of that, especially for a rushed job demanded from "the guys in Chicago"!

A company needs to decide at the highest level - ISO 9001-type certification, or get a fix out "tomorrow" by letting Coding King work it overnight without supervision! Or testing! Or review, verification, and updating the entire documentation suite! Sounds like MCAS V1 to me

sassiciai wrote:

A company needs to decide at the highest level - ISO 9001-type certification, or get a fix out "tomorrow" by letting Coding King work it overnight without supervision! Or testing! Or review, verification, and updating the entire documentation suite! Sounds like MCAS V1 to me

There was a mention that MCAS code was not done in-house. That is another strange detail

I am still wondering how Boeing was able to let that MCAS design slip through QM.

The aero dynamic guys must have said to the engineers: guys the calculations show that the aircraft cannot be certified because the control colum forces get lighter approaching a stall in certain condidions.

So there was a meeting to find a solution. Some probably said we can change the design of the h-stab and the question was raised how long it takes and it was too long. Luckily someone remembered that there is a pitch augmentation system on the 767 tanker version.

So easy put it on the MAX. But wait, it actually has two sensor input on the 767. That would lead to more training because if the two inputs differ the crew will have to deal with an MCAS off condition.

So someone cane up with the idea to only use one sensor. Why not no training needed then.

After that there were even test flights to see if MCAS was ok and actually it was redesigned to change the deflection rate.

No one did then ask themselfs: Hmm maybe with that big of a deflection rate a single sensor input might be a bit unsafe? Or did someone and the concern was dismissed? Why was the FAA not informed on the changes?

Also how on earth did they miss that the disagree light did not work and when they did they thought: Ah come on we even missed it first, our customers do not need to know!

What else was missed or deliberately hidden? Is this aircraft really safe? Can Boeing and the FAA be trusted?

I dont know, I hope so but the only clarity can come from the criminal investigations. So I think it would be dangerous to let the aircraft fly again before we know if there was no other slip.

Looks like orders are ready to resume as soon as Max is cleared.
I bet whoever is first will get the best deals.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ry-458458/

“After the Lion Air crash, we didn’t have the information or data we needed to ground an aircraft,” Elwell told the BBC.
“The action that we took after the Lion Air accident was sufficient to make sure that, if that happened again, crews and operators could handle it.”
https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/ne ... 28366.html

What do we suppose the information or data they did not have actually was over the next 5 months whilst Boeing developed a fix?

Ray

XRAYretired wrote:

“After the Lion Air crash, we didn’t have the information or data we needed to ground an aircraft,” Elwell told the BBC.
“The action that we took after the Lion Air accident was sufficient to make sure that, if that happened again, crews and operators could handle it.”
https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/ne ... 28366.html

What do we suppose the information or data they did not have actually was over the next 5 months whilst Boeing developed a fix?

Ray

Might mean that there are more factors to this whole story.
Or maybe the data they received was inconclusive.
Remember we still DON'T have full reports.

xmp125a wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts.

But this is an airplane! And MCAS has direct influence on plane control surfaces - it is not the question whether the original designer bungled it up, the question is, what is wrong in Boeing that such stupidity passed all internal checks and balances (even before thing went to FAA).

That's why many of us are intensely triggered when somebody is saying "they'll fix it and it will be safe plane again". No. This is not enough. The question is how severely broken is the system inside Boeing that allows something like this to happen. How came that no one protested, vetoed, demanded changes upon seeing the MCAS design. And at least I won't be pleased until this is properly audited and investigated.

Because we don't know how long these dangerous conditions have been in place at Boeing. What else could be affected?

I completely agree. Since the flight crews have come under such scrutiny, one wonders what the experience of the designers was? Were they the best and brightest or perhaps this was not the most interesting work in a basic re-engine backwater program. But that is just a human interest note. Even the best make mistakes. The point is, that a robust design process should catch those mistakes and be approaching 100% perfect. The fact that Boeing will not own up to this bothers me as someone with an engineering education. If safety and engineering is Boeing's stock in trade, their curt response that they did everything by the book is maddening.

DenverTed wrote:

xmp125a wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts.

But this is an airplane! And MCAS has direct influence on plane control surfaces - it is not the question whether the original designer bungled it up, the question is, what is wrong in Boeing that such stupidity passed all internal checks and balances (even before thing went to FAA).

That's why many of us are intensely triggered when somebody is saying "they'll fix it and it will be safe plane again". No. This is not enough. The question is how severely broken is the system inside Boeing that allows something like this to happen. How came that no one protested, vetoed, demanded changes upon seeing the MCAS design. And at least I won't be pleased until this is properly audited and investigated.

Because we don't know how long these dangerous conditions have been in place at Boeing. What else could be affected?

I completely agree. Since the flight crews have come under such scrutiny, one wonders what the experience of the designers was? Were they the best and brightest or perhaps this was not the most interesting work in a basic re-engine backwater program. But that is just a human interest note. Even the best make mistakes. The point is, that a robust design process should catch those mistakes and be approaching 100% perfect. The fact that Boeing will not own up to this bothers me as someone with an engineering education. If safety and engineering is Boeing's stock in trade, their curt response that they did everything by the book is maddening.

The problem is that they may have gone by what is in the book - but it's not what is in the book that experience teaches that could have been lacking.

Basically the book needs to be changed.

brunoguemes wrote:

It is amazing how many still try to blame the pilots after all the info we have.
How many saying that American pilots would never have the same problem.
Well, guess what, the American pilots Union is fed up with the blaming of the pilots.

https://www.theguardian.com/business/20 ... _clipboard

The Max will be a great plane, a success for decades, but Boeing does not deserve such a terrible management of this crisis. Such a great and proud company should recognize mistakes and propose solutions and not try to blame foreign pilots or birds.
Boeing is and will be great but has to do something better about this. Boeing deserves better and even if yes, in general the aviation world would benefit from better training we have to stop using the pilots as a scape goat.
You can love Boeing and still want them to take responsibility...right? Or everything needs to be black or white?

Nobody is blaming the pilots for CAUSING these accidents, but there can be an expectation, especially for ET, that the pilots might exhibit more skill in handling the situation. Certainly an effort to contain the speed by pulling the power back and more aggressively using the electric trim which was operational throughout. Engaging the autopilot and retracting the flaps does not show great skill into hand flying.

GF

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

and more aggressively using the electric trim which was operational throughout

GF

Which I think was another problem, the AD was very poor. After a crash, this is the AD? It should have been a foolproof recipe to avoid an MCAS problem.

1. You must use trim switch to regain neutral column force
2. You must use trim switch to regain neutral column force
3. You must use trim switch to regain neutral column force
4. Shut off both trim cut out switches quickly

DenverTed wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

and more aggressively using the electric trim which was operational throughout

GF

Which I think was another problem, the AD was very poor. After a crash, this is the AD? It should have been a foolproof recipe to avoid an MCAS problem.

1. You must use trim switch to regain neutral column force
2. You must use trim switch to regain neutral column force
3. You must use trim switch to regain neutral column force
4. Shut off both trim cut out switches quickly

ET302 FDR appears to indicate that Electric Trim could not achieve better than 2.4/2.3 units.


Ray

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I basically agree with this post - Boeing really screwed up. However I think it much more likely that whoever was in charge of MCAS design and sign off maybe really wasn't that bright - it sounds like the design met the technical specs but they missed the second order impacts. Maybe there wasn't Pilots or experienced Engineers involved in the design of MCAS who could have said "Stop - what happens if..."

That is the tribal knowledge that is lost when you have a revolving door for engineers. The design's meet the specs as laid out - but the wisdom isn't there to know when something isn't as safe as it could be for minimal more effort. To be clear MCAS was software - it shouldn't have added much cost at all to make it a lot more robust.

We have heard how much inexperience the Person at the FAA who was responsible for this had - however she was a Pilot so you think she could have thought it through(if that was her Job to do so vs just managing the team). However if she was a product of today's training system with it's emphasis on Automated flight and not thinking through the implications of MCAS failure as the computers never fail...and the pilot's might have to control the plane manually then that's an issue as well.

It's a Catch 22. The Auto-pilots and nannies have led to lower crash rates as arguably they are better at flying and more precise - however by relying on them too much Pilots never get the hand flying experience they need to stay sharp and have the confidence in there skills when the nannies go bad.

Big Airlines used to have fleets of Trainers for Pilots to use so they could keep there skills sharp.

A lot better solution would be to have fleets of Simulators installed and mandate that Pilots spend more time than they are currently spending on practising Manual flight and non-normal procedures in a no-fail environment so they can stay sharp for that 1 in a Million flight when the nannies fail.

One thing we can probably reasonably assume is that Boeing's next design (Probably NMA/MOM/797) will be the most tested, scrutinized design ever and cross our fingers should set new standards for safety and reliability.

Yes - this should be the last design evolution of the 737 - newer aircraft architectures can be made safer.

The one thing that really concerns me is that with with MTOW's of Single Aisle aircraft being constantly pushed without an increase in Wing area it's leading to higher and higher landing speeds and more runway excursions.

That seems to be a big issue with the 737 not so much the A320/A321 but that could change as it's weights are increased way beyond it's initial design spec's.

You can not keep from the smoke and mirrors.

Boeing sold minimal training to the airlines. Boeing sabotaged training for the 737MAX, because accepting that you need for more than minimal training for moving from NG to MAX would have cost Boeing millions.

The NG is not falling out of the sky regularly flown by the same pilots you choose to denigrate.

Ethiopian is one of the very few airlines having spend money to train there 737MAX pilots. Your steady denigration of Ethiopian to protect Boeing are getting absurd.

You hammer on the flight hours on the pilot. The USA Air Force has a similar system of intensive training and few hours. There your answer was that while accepting to know nothing about it, the training at the USA Air Force had to be much better.

I am tired off the declaration that trim runaway training is all that is needed when you encounter the MCAS failure mode. For the first you have to recognize the intermittent trim impulses of MCAS for what it is behind the at the same time active STS. For the second MCAS is trimming very fast and very aggressive.

To say it very simple, if Boeing had not this negligent design of MCAS, the Lion air accident would not have happened. If Boeing had taking action after the Lion air accident the Ethiopian airline accident would not have happened. Just simply allowing pilots to train on simulators that were similar to a 737MAX could have helped. But Boeing had to sabotage that by crippling the simulators.

You can keep your smoke and mirror tactics, but you will not be able to divert a iota of the blame from Boeing killing 350 people with an absurd design and inaction.

For a second I thought you were making a little bit of progress as I read iota as "a lot of" the first time through.

Have you read the FCOM bulletin that Ethiopian supposedly provided to it's Pilots? It's on the last two pages of the Preliminary report https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

How is that not clear in describing the failure mode and what to do about it on the second page under Operating Instructions?

Or are you saying this is beyond the ability of any pilot?

And just to be clear - I am not denigrating the Pilots - I am denigrating the ET training system (and I suspect the same of many others Worldwide) - there is a large but subtle difference - Pilots can't learn what they aren't being taught.

Smoke and mirrors and now gripping at the last straws. You are bringing the preliminary Ethiopian report. What a joke. How late in the game are you, after the two crashes??

It was the job of Boeing and the FAA to explain the working of MCAS and how one has to react in detail, BEFORE the first accident. It was the job of Boeing to include MCAS into the 737MAX simulator design. It is was the job of the FAA and Boeing to design robust training routines for MCAS.

In this jobs Boeing and the FAA failed miserably and perhaps deliberately, to keep the false narrative that the move from NG to MAX does need no training.