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Amexair
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 1:20 pm

morrisond wrote:
Really - no pilot error? So they followed all the proper Procedures and the plane still crashed(ET)?


Based on the prelim report - I can confidently say that, yes. My only concern, in the case of ET, was the fact that they didn't manage their speed (fair point). But I've spoken with many professional (experienced) pilots who told me that they can't blame the ET crew because they doubt their own actions would have been any different given the timeline of the events (alerts etc...). So I take their word for it.

Now, if the full report comes out and makes a different conclusion, I'm willing to have that discussion on Worldwide standards, but until then, we are simply deflecting from the real issue and that's pretty sad to me.


https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-says-its-software-fix-for-the-737-max-is-ready-awaits-faa-approval/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=article_inset_1.1
“Dennis Muilenberg and his engineers need to take full responsibility for the 346 deaths,” Carey added. “Boeing needs to stop dodging responsibility and stop blaming dead pilots for its mistakes.”
 
Saintor
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 1:29 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Sure as hell that you constantly hijack this tread and contradict yourself: while you agree on a early message that "Boeing part being 60-80% responsible", the wording of your last sentence very explicitly bash ET302 "human factors" for "a large part" of the accident. A lot of the actually punished officials information prove you wrong on this, including the last FAA news. All those information contently support the fact that the broken safety management that allowed to operate the hidden MCAS ill designed software on commercial flights without D+ level training requirement is by far the largest contributor to the 737-8/9 MAX tragedy.


You think that you'll get away with just vague references? lol. We don't know the bottom of it, but it is a shared opinion by many pros here that another crew would have prevented ET302. So yes with what we know so far, human factor is likely a large part of the accident, want it or not.
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 1:35 pm

Revelation wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
If Boeing's premise really is "the airplane was certified with the system and pilot working together" and the pilot side was wrongly assumed, then this aircraft should not be re-certified until one of the two aspect are brought to a level that guarantees an acceptable level of safety. Boeing can choose if they want to redesign the aircraft so you can fly it with lower training or mandate more training.

Yet that's not how things work for any aircraft currently in service.

It's clear the A320 is much more automated than the 737 is, yet even it is "certified with the system and pilot working together" and Airbus does not take on the burden of determining if the pilots are trained to the point where they can perform all the procedures they need to perform when the automation fails or sensors deliver inaccurate information. They document the procedures, then they let the regulators certify the documents, and expect the national authorities to verify the pilots are trained to the level they need to be trained to for safe operation of the aircraft.

And as I've pointed out, Airbus too is pointing out issues with the training standards of various national entities all around the globe. The AvWeek article I linked to earlier shows they are willing to take a leadership role in demonstrating the desired standards for training, but are evidently not willing to accept the burden of certifying the level of training individual pilots achieve.


I am actually concerned that Airbus has pointed out the declining standards in training, but I am also glad they did.

And for the certification, I am well aware that Airbus probably certifies in the exact same way as does Boeing and a similar slip could also have happened in their design and engineering process, luckily it did not happen yet or it is not discovered yet.

In the long shot it is important for both manufacturers to not solely rely on the authorities to give the necessary training, but to demand it from potential buyers, and as well make sure the actual design is as robust as possible even if it costs a few bucks more.

The sole reason for automation is to reduce casualties because in general the aircraft makes way less mistakes than the human. Therefore, it should be the highest goal of the designers and the QM to make sure the automation is as fail safe as possible. If the automation increases the likelihood of failure (as the single sensor design of MCAS did), the outcome is horrible. Redundancy is costly but it safes lives. This also means that the QM processes for both manufacturers have to be up to their game. The recent discoveries show that there is a lot of room to improve.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 1:46 pm

morrisond wrote:
ET though didn't follow published procedures for safe operation with MCAS v1 (and failed to follow a few other procedures as well) - if they had they would not have crashed. Full stop. They apparently knew all about MCAS and should have easily been able to counter it.

Those pilots are dead. Did you understand or not ? Stop blaming them and start positively contribute to understand why there where unable to choose the right procedures and actions at the right moment, in the hypothesis that we can all agree on a working procedures and actions scheduling that could save the plane. What is clear is that the procedure published in the EAD was badly redacted, with illogical ordering of the text, with missing maximum time between the manual electric trim and the switches cutoff, by pretending that the trim can be done manually with the wheels after the cutoff without a big warning about the high speed. The EAD procedure is not an easy magic saver: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19902068
 
weezydrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 1:50 pm

Jamie514 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Jamie514 wrote:

Fine then. When examining the airlines safety record it would be smart to not cherry pick an analysis to a specific type like just the NG.

ET also havent crashed any of their other types since 2010.

If you can find another clear case of pilot error on ET after the late 70's or early 80's, let us know. *to be fair to USA, lets not count landing errors like ovverruns cuz the likes of AA and WN suck at those.


Did you even read the report on ET 409? Remember that the ET 302 Pilot went through the ET system for Initial 737 Type rating not that long after ET409.

From the ET409 report you will also see that ET's policy at the time was to engage AP after 400'AGL(Just like ET302 tried to do but was expressly forbidden by the Unreliable airspeed checklist they should have been following). This would also suggest a heavy reliance on Autothrottle even in Manual flight. - (ET409 left TOGA engaged the whole time as well).

I have no doubt ET training is excellent at teaching efficient normal operation of the 737 and when is the time to properly push the buttons.

However there is a lot of doubt that the Pilots had the necessary jet hand flying skills they should have had to save both flights. That is the downside of not practising manual flight in modern airliners and simulators without all the nannies - you just don't have the experience or comfort level to be confident of taking over when things go wrong.

I know that my suggestion that we should legislate multiple additional hours of sim time yearly to practise non-normal procedures will never come to pass - but I hope worldwide airlines spend a lot more time on Manual flight during recurrent training - that would seem to have helped a lot on most of the loss of life incidents in the past 10 years.


Another way of looking at it more rationally is that ET had one mishandling related crash in 30 years, so their record is very good. Southwest has had several landing incidents in the last decade alone. You never called out a training issue there.

l will not entertain agendas that grasp at flimsy straws and jump to illogical conclusions about ET's MAX crash which would never have happened the inexcusable bad practices had not prevailed at Boeing.


What’s your beef with Southwest?
 
SEU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 1:57 pm

Saintor wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Sure as hell that you constantly hijack this tread and contradict yourself: while you agree on a early message that "Boeing part being 60-80% responsible", the wording of your last sentence very explicitly bash ET302 "human factors" for "a large part" of the accident. A lot of the actually punished officials information prove you wrong on this, including the last FAA news. All those information contently support the fact that the broken safety management that allowed to operate the hidden MCAS ill designed software on commercial flights without D+ level training requirement is by far the largest contributor to the 737-8/9 MAX tragedy.


You think that you'll get away with just vague references? lol. We don't know the bottom of it, but it is a shared opinion by many pros here that another crew would have prevented ET302. So yes with what we know so far, human factor is likely a large part of the accident, want it or not.


Absolute bollocks. A few have said that, most have said otherwise, hundreds of pilots have complained the FAA and other saftey regulators about their concerns with the MAX. Some pilots have even simulated the MCAS failure and in over 100 tried only succeeded less than 18 times to save the plane. An actual 737 pilot in this thread even said he doesnt know if he would have been able to save the plane.

Remember, the pilots should never have been put in a situation with a plane trying to kill them, nor in today standards, should they have been forced to go through a paper manual to try and find the answers (that wernt there).
 
AirBoat
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 1:57 pm

The 737 has hydraulically powered elevators.
Why should the stick force become higher at high speeds?
I searched and found an article on: Elevator Feel and Centring system.
my take on this: its a system that increases the required force on the control stick at high speeds ( is this to limit any excessive elevator movement that can cause damage to it.)
This would indicate that when in a dive with speed building up, forget the elevators and try the trim. Not ideal.
With adequate elevator authority both accidents did not have to happen. I would rather have a warning come up saying Elevator overstress and take my chances.
 
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PixelPilot
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 2:01 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
ET though didn't follow published procedures for safe operation with MCAS v1 (and failed to follow a few other procedures as well) - if they had they would not have crashed. Full stop. They apparently knew all about MCAS and should have easily been able to counter it.

Those pilots are dead. Did you understand or not ? Stop blaming them and start positively contribute to understand why there where unable to choose the right procedures and actions at the right moment, in the hypothesis that we can all agree on a working procedures and actions scheduling that could save the plane. What is clear is that the procedure published in the EAD was badly redacted, with illogical ordering of the text, with missing maximum time between the manual electric trim and the switches cutoff, by pretending that the trim can be done manually with the wheels after the cutoff without a big warning about the high speed. The EAD procedure is not an easy magic saver: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19902068


So where's the procedure for turning the AP on and off few times? Or (not) checking airspeed? Stick shaker and flaps retract?
Just cause somebody died it doesn't mean they had no fault in it.
A lot of you lost objectivity and are eager to bash boeing just cause what? US company or not airbus or Trump? What else?
Did you read that airbus memo on training? They all do it same way and while it's obvious boeing has a share of blame in this it's clear that there were other factors that contributed to the crash.
I know Max crew member with plenty of hours in it and his position is the same. You need two to tango otherwise every max out there would already fall off the sky.
 
SEU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 2:04 pm

PixelPilot wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
ET though didn't follow published procedures for safe operation with MCAS v1 (and failed to follow a few other procedures as well) - if they had they would not have crashed. Full stop. They apparently knew all about MCAS and should have easily been able to counter it.

Those pilots are dead. Did you understand or not ? Stop blaming them and start positively contribute to understand why there where unable to choose the right procedures and actions at the right moment, in the hypothesis that we can all agree on a working procedures and actions scheduling that could save the plane. What is clear is that the procedure published in the EAD was badly redacted, with illogical ordering of the text, with missing maximum time between the manual electric trim and the switches cutoff, by pretending that the trim can be done manually with the wheels after the cutoff without a big warning about the high speed. The EAD procedure is not an easy magic saver: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19902068


So where's the procedure for turning the AP on and off few times? Or (not) checking airspeed? Stick shaker and flaps retract?
Just cause somebody died it doesn't mean they had no fault in it.
A lot of you lost objectivity and are eager to bash boeing just cause what? US company or not airbus or Trump? What else?
Did you read that airbus memo on training? They all do it same way and while it's obvious boeing has a share of blame in this it's clear that there were other factors that contributed to the crash.
I know Max crew member with plenty of hours in it and his position is the same. You need two to tango otherwise every max out there would already fall off the sky.


The pilots had seconds , seconds!! to try and stop the plane from nosediving into the ground. You need to start being more reasonable and start realising that the pilots are not at fault. Saying the pilots shouldve saved a faulty plane and not blame boeing is just pointless.
 
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PixelPilot
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 2:06 pm

SEU wrote:
PixelPilot wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Those pilots are dead. Did you understand or not ? Stop blaming them and start positively contribute to understand why there where unable to choose the right procedures and actions at the right moment, in the hypothesis that we can all agree on a working procedures and actions scheduling that could save the plane. What is clear is that the procedure published in the EAD was badly redacted, with illogical ordering of the text, with missing maximum time between the manual electric trim and the switches cutoff, by pretending that the trim can be done manually with the wheels after the cutoff without a big warning about the high speed. The EAD procedure is not an easy magic saver: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19902068


So where's the procedure for turning the AP on and off few times? Or (not) checking airspeed? Stick shaker and flaps retract?
Just cause somebody died it doesn't mean they had no fault in it.
A lot of you lost objectivity and are eager to bash boeing just cause what? US company or not airbus or Trump? What else?
Did you read that airbus memo on training? They all do it same way and while it's obvious boeing has a share of blame in this it's clear that there were other factors that contributed to the crash.
I know Max crew member with plenty of hours in it and his position is the same. You need two to tango otherwise every max out there would already fall off the sky.


The pilots had seconds , seconds!! to try and stop the plane from nosediving into the ground. You need to start being more reasonable and start realising that the pilots are not at fault. Saying the pilots shouldve saved a faulty plane and not blame boeing is just pointless.


Again, show me a procedure where you retract flaps with stick shaker activated or turn the AP on and off several times when you can clearly tell the plane is not flying correctly?
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 2:12 pm

Saintor wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Sure as hell that you constantly hijack this tread and contradict yourself: while you agree on a early message that "Boeing part being 60-80% responsible", the wording of your last sentence very explicitly bash ET302 "human factors" for "a large part" of the accident. A lot of the actually punished officials information prove you wrong on this, including the last FAA news. All those information contently support the fact that the broken safety management that allowed to operate the hidden MCAS ill designed software on commercial flights without D+ level training requirement is by far the largest contributor to the 737-8/9 MAX tragedy.


You think that you'll get away with just vague references? lol. We don't know the bottom of it, but it is a shared opinion by many pros here that another crew would have prevented ET302. So yes with what we know so far, human factor is likely a large part of the accident, want it or not.

A bunch of references from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX_groundings#Certification_inquiry, since you blame ET302 pilots for "a large part of the accident" without even reading all the references already available in this thread and the previous related threads.
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/briefing-room/334391/memorandum-secretary-audit-certification-boeing-737-max8-2012-2017.pdf
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/03/18/boeing-737-max-faa-congress-investigation/
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/fbi-joining-criminal-investigation-into-certification-of-boeing-737-max/
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-fbi-idUSKCN1R12NG
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/02/politics/boeing-faa-investigations/index.html
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/04/whistleblowers-faa-737-max-safety-inspectors-lacked-training-certification/

What we know so far is that the 737-8/9 MAX is grounded by more than 50 authorities around the world waiting for an approbation of a fix while Lion Air and Ethiopian Airline still operate every days. The human factors you are talking about are inside Boeing and the FAA.
 
OldAeroGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 2:41 pm

SEU wrote:
Some pilots have even simulated the MCAS failure and in over 100 tried only succeeded less than 18 times to save the plane.


Do you have a reference for these simulations? I'm interested in reading them.

Thanks, OAG
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 2:42 pm

PixelPilot wrote:
So where's the procedure for turning the AP on and off few times? Or (not) checking airspeed? Stick shaker and flaps retract?
Just cause somebody died it doesn't mean they had no fault in it.
A lot of you lost objectivity and are eager to bash boeing just cause what? US company or not airbus or Trump? What else?
Did you read that airbus memo on training? They all do it same way and while it's obvious boeing has a share of blame in this it's clear that there were other factors that contributed to the crash.
I know Max crew member with plenty of hours in it and his position is the same. You need two to tango otherwise every max out there would already fall off the sky.

Where's the procedure without possible bad interpretation that could have saved the flight ?

My motivation have nothing to do with brand/country/politic, but to understand how each peoples involved (management/design/safety/certification/training/maintenance/operators/pilots) was thinking, what was important to them and why. Blaming is just so non constructive. If you make a mistake yourself, you only realize this is a mistake after having made it. At the moment you make the mistake, you don't have the perception to make a mistake. At that precise moment your action looked fine to yourself. You can blame yourself after you realize this was a mistake, but this is pointless. You have to understand why your action looked fine to yourself in the first place. This is objective and constructive.

I fail to see how Airbus memo prove anything regarding the 737-8/9 MAX grounding. There try proactively to improve a possible issue, way to go.

Every max out there have already fall off the sky: there are all on the ground, if not deeper. :tombstone:
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 2:53 pm

planecane wrote:
zippy wrote:
morrisond wrote:
I'm not trying to hijack the thread - I'm responding to those who keep coming on here who keep insisting that Boeings terrible design is the only factor that contributed to the crash.


It's not the only factor but it's the primary factor. Experienced pilots who've been briefed on MCAS have been run through at least two simulator sessions (one for each flight I believe). The reaction has consistently been "that was more difficult to handle that expected." In fact the latest run, simulating the Ethiopian crash, saw pilots unable to use the trim wheels. At 10,000 ft AGL they lost about 8,000 ft trying to regain control. It is a terrible design.

I don't know about the Lion Air simulation but the one that aviation week for the ET crash was stupid. They simulated AFTER the electric trim was cut off but while in the severe our of trim condition. It is not surprising that they had difficulties.

What they should have simulated is starting from the beginning of the failure and running the correct checklists properly to see if doing things as documented would have led to recovery and how difficult it was. ET's worst problem to deal with started when they cut off the electric trim too soon.


The NNC assumes a reasonably trained pilot using the electric thumb switches gets the plane in trim at a reasonable speed. Letting it get grossly out of trim with speed rapidly accelerating due to A/T still at take-off thrust isn’t contemplated. A reasonably trained pilot would sense the out of trim condition, use the thumb switches which act at the same speed as MCAS and return to a trimmed condition AND pull the thrust back.

I strongly suspect a pure runaway at altitude would have ended similarly as these two accidents. Way too much dependence on automation—autopilot ON at 500’, uneventful cruise, VNAV to coupled ILS, autopilot OFF at 200’, CFIT the plane to the runway. I’ve seen it lots and becomes the easy way.

GF
 
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spinotter
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 3:00 pm

Saintor wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Sure as hell that you constantly hijack this tread and contradict yourself: while you agree on a early message that "Boeing part being 60-80% responsible", the wording of your last sentence very explicitly bash ET302 "human factors" for "a large part" of the accident. A lot of the actually punished officials information prove you wrong on this, including the last FAA news. All those information contently support the fact that the broken safety management that allowed to operate the hidden MCAS ill designed software on commercial flights without D+ level training requirement is by far the largest contributor to the 737-8/9 MAX tragedy.


You think that you'll get away with just vague references? lol. We don't know the bottom of it, but it is a shared opinion by many pros here that another crew would have prevented ET302. So yes with what we know so far, human factor is likely a large part of the accident, want it or not.


Perhaps another crew might have survived. That is not the point. A poorly implemented, poorly documented system such as MCAS is foisted upon air crews because of poor design decisions. That is the point. And they had to react within minutes to a system poorly design and poorly understood. How did that all happen is what I wonder.
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 3:18 pm

kalvado wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
kalvado wrote:
I think this is where the problem is.
A lot of US pilots are trained by those barely above initial level, things are not systematically learned but picked up by try-and-fail. Crash rate in GA is unbelievable. Some still survive.
So hours of survival are the only professional metrics.
Education requirements for professional pilots are... funny. BA in arts is good enough, no technical background required. My impression is that the phrase "trained pilot" doesn't mean "educated professional", but sounds more like "trained circus lion". Of course, no amount of hours builts a true professional that way...


To obtain an FAA flight instructor certificate one is required to have 250 hours total flight time. The ET302 preliminary report says the first officer had 361 hours total time, with 207 hours in the Boeing 737. If he started with the airline right after he completed his academy training, that would indicate he had a whopping 154 hours when he started with the airline.

So 154 hours is fine to be a first officer on a 737, but a 250 hour flight instructor is "barely above initial level"?

Aircraft handling skills and technical knowledge are not usually the problem, in any aircraft accident. The issue is more often judgement, or what the industry likes to call "aeronautical decision making". You cant teach that in a classroom, or a simulator. You have to have personal experience. Often times, just because something is legal, and within limits of your SOP's doesn't make it the smart and safest course of action.

I own and fly a general aviation airplane, and still hold my flight instructors certificate. In the U.S., GA does have a higher accident rate than commercial flying. Taking into consideration the number, and types of GA flight operations in the states, the accident rate is far from "unbelievable".

The absolute worst pilots I've ever flown with were "educated professionals". Career changers, that left whatever profession they had been doing most of their lives, to become pilots.

Hours, lots of hours - easily meaning minimal skills and no understanding. And you think daily fatal GA accidents are OK? Most people, literally, don't believe that simple fact.
250 hours to CFI? Tons of experience, sure! Not enough for a job, enough to teach.... (censored). In most other professions instructors often wear gray hair for some reason.
And if you look, a lot of industry trends are to establish procedures, automate, and eliminate requirement for Chuck Eager in cockpit. If you want decision making - it doesn't come with hours, anyway. Hours are just that, hours. Even cycles may be a better metrics, if you want one...
Career switch is a difficult subject overall. Blaming poor skills on BA diploma is pointless, you know...


Flying is as much art, as it is science. You can only teach so much in a class room, or a simulator. And as much as some would like us to believe simulators are just as good as a real airplane, thats not at all the case.

Judgement does indeed come with experience, call it hours, or cycles, a pilot needs to get out and get the experience. And not plowing around watching all the automation drive the bus, while they simply mind the store.

You can do whatever makes you comfortable, but there is a reason I wont put my family on an airline that uses MPL pilots.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 3:29 pm

SEU wrote:
You need to start being more reasonable and start realising that the pilots are not at fault. Saying the pilots shouldve saved a faulty plane and not blame boeing is just pointless.

Such absolutes helps no one in these type accidents, so far I have not seen anyone say that Boeing is blameless.
 
zoom321
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 3:35 pm

PixelPilot wrote:
SEU wrote:
PixelPilot wrote:

So where's the procedure for turning the AP on and off few times? Or (not) checking airspeed? Stick shaker and flaps retract?
Just cause somebody died it doesn't mean they had no fault in it.
A lot of you lost objectivity and are eager to bash boeing just cause what? US company or not airbus or Trump? What else?
Did you read that airbus memo on training? They all do it same way and while it's obvious boeing has a share of blame in this it's clear that there were other factors that contributed to the crash.
I know Max crew member with plenty of hours in it and his position is the same. You need two to tango otherwise every max out there would already fall off the sky.


The pilots had seconds , seconds!! to try and stop the plane from nosediving into the ground. You need to start being more reasonable and start realising that the pilots are not at fault. Saying the pilots shouldve saved a faulty plane and not blame boeing is just pointless.


Again, show me a procedure where you retract flaps with stick shaker activated or turn the AP on and off several times when you can clearly tell the plane is not flying correctly?


Still yapping about ET pilots. Same pilots doing the same actions under the same conditions on planes other than Max would have been fine. With Max, it crashed. It's not hard to understand.
 
Saintor
Posts: 63
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 3:55 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Saintor wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Sure as hell that you constantly hijack this tread and contradict yourself: while you agree on a early message that "Boeing part being 60-80% responsible", the wording of your last sentence very explicitly bash ET302 "human factors" for "a large part" of the accident. A lot of the actually punished officials information prove you wrong on this, including the last FAA news. All those information contently support the fact that the broken safety management that allowed to operate the hidden MCAS ill designed software on commercial flights without D+ level training requirement is by far the largest contributor to the 737-8/9 MAX tragedy.


You think that you'll get away with just vague references? lol. We don't know the bottom of it, but it is a shared opinion by many pros here that another crew would have prevented ET302. So yes with what we know so far, human factor is likely a large part of the accident, want it or not.

A bunch of references from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX_groundings#Certification_inquiry, since you blame ET302 pilots for "a large part of the accident" without even reading all the references already available in this thread and the previous related threads.
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/briefing-room/334391/memorandum-secretary-audit-certification-boeing-737-max8-2012-2017.pdf
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/03/18/boeing-737-max-faa-congress-investigation/
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/fbi-joining-criminal-investigation-into-certification-of-boeing-737-max/
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-fbi-idUSKCN1R12NG
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/02/politics/boeing-faa-investigations/index.html
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/04/whistleblowers-faa-737-max-safety-inspectors-lacked-training-certification/

What we know so far is that the 737-8/9 MAX is grounded by more than 50 authorities around the world waiting for an approbation of a fix while Lion Air and Ethiopian Airline still operate every days. The human factors you are talking about are inside Boeing and the FAA.


Again just pitching general references with zero specific is totally pointless.

spinotter wrote:

Perhaps another crew might have survived. That is not the point. A poorly implemented, poorly documented system such as MCAS is foisted upon air crews because of poor design decisions. That is the point. And they had to react within minutes to a system poorly design and poorly understood. How did that all happen is what I wonder.


Disagree. The point is that the pilots are there to save the day in situations like this. You can just love to blame big bad corporations. Boeing is not a bad corporation. Despite horrible mistakes like relying on one sensor, it is about thousands of workers who cares. It will duly costs billions to Boeing to recover and some people will probably have to leave.

Pilots have procedures to follow but for whatever reason, ET302's one overlooked many, wasting minutes and IMO this crash resulted. And then there is a little thing called skill.
Last edited by Saintor on Fri May 17, 2019 4:02 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
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william
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 4:01 pm

BlueSky1976 wrote:
PixelPilot wrote:
Boeing is ready to get it up in the air.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130434


Fortunately, it's not up to Boeing to decide if the fix is to be certified or not. FAA, EASA, CAAC and others must do that and they will scrutinize it thoroughly to ensure no more deaths are caused by 737 MAX flawed systems.


It will fly again, and it will be safe. Not sure Boeing CEO will survive this though.
Last edited by william on Fri May 17, 2019 4:09 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
Venatt
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 4:05 pm

Saintor wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Saintor wrote:

You think that you'll get away with just vague references? lol. We don't know the bottom of it, but it is a shared opinion by many pros here that another crew would have prevented ET302. So yes with what we know so far, human factor is likely a large part of the accident, want it or not.

A bunch of references from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX_groundings#Certification_inquiry, since you blame ET302 pilots for "a large part of the accident" without even reading all the references already available in this thread and the previous related threads.
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/briefing-room/334391/memorandum-secretary-audit-certification-boeing-737-max8-2012-2017.pdf
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/03/18/boeing-737-max-faa-congress-investigation/
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/fbi-joining-criminal-investigation-into-certification-of-boeing-737-max/
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-fbi-idUSKCN1R12NG
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/02/politics/boeing-faa-investigations/index.html
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/04/whistleblowers-faa-737-max-safety-inspectors-lacked-training-certification/

What we know so far is that the 737-8/9 MAX is grounded by more than 50 authorities around the world waiting for an approbation of a fix while Lion Air and Ethiopian Airline still operate every days. The human factors you are talking about are inside Boeing and the FAA.


Again just pitching general references with zero specific is totally pointless.

spinotter wrote:

Perhaps another crew might have survived. That is not the point. A poorly implemented, poorly documented system such as MCAS is foisted upon air crews because of poor design decisions. That is the point. And they had to react within minutes to a system poorly design and poorly understood. How did that all happen is what I wonder.


Disagree. The point is that the pilots are there to save the day in situations like this. You can just love to blame big bad corporations. Boeing is not a bad corporation. Despite mistakes, it is about thousands of workers who cares.

Pilots have procedures to follow but for whatever reason, ET302's one overlooked many, wasting minutes and IMO this crash resulted. And then there is a little thing called skill.


Boeing is not a bad corporation despite not telling airlines nothing about MCAS, not putting it on the manual and not training pilots with the issue ???? Really ???? Boieng is in fact VERY BAD corporation because all it cares is about money ? But things like this where been gritty is a priority over safety sooner or later comes back to haunt you ? Some people in Boeing should be behind bars.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 4:10 pm

Unfortunately, whether we like it or not, pilots are there to save the day when automation goes wrong.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 4:11 pm

Venatt wrote:
Some people in Boeing should be behind bars.

We could explore that, where do you suggest we start, engineers who coded, supervisors who approved, FAA inspectors who certified, Boeing CEO because the buck stops there?
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 4:21 pm

It’s not about “procedures to follow”; trimming is a basic task taught on Flight 1. Look at the FDR traces, very few, intermittent and short manual electric trim actuations on either mishap flight.

Boeing designed a very risky system that depended on one vane at time not failing, but the pilots had operating controls to solve the problem and using those controls should have been an unconscious action—apply stab trim to neutralize stick forces. Job 1 of any pilot.

GF
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 4:49 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
It’s not about “procedures to follow”; trimming is a basic task taught on Flight 1. Look at the FDR traces, very few, intermittent and short manual electric trim actuations on either mishap flight.

Boeing designed a very risky system that depended on one vane at time not failing, but the pilots had operating controls to solve the problem and using those controls should have been an unconscious action—apply stab trim to neutralize stick forces. Job 1 of any pilot.

GF


That’s the “Elephant in the room” here. If the normal stab trim, via the thumb switches was working as advertised, neither of these accidents should have happened.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:10 pm

Saintor wrote:
Again just pitching general references with zero specific is totally pointless.

There are all specific to the 737-8/9 MAX grounding and the analysis to understand what happened at Boeing and the FAA.
If you are unable to analyse not even a single information on those list of documents, nor in any of the documents pointed from this thread, then I can't help you. :worried:
 
Jamie514
Posts: 155
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:15 pm

weezydrvr wrote:
Jamie514 wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Did you even read the report on ET 409? Remember that the ET 302 Pilot went through the ET system for Initial 737 Type rating not that long after ET409.

From the ET409 report you will also see that ET's policy at the time was to engage AP after 400'AGL(Just like ET302 tried to do but was expressly forbidden by the Unreliable airspeed checklist they should have been following). This would also suggest a heavy reliance on Autothrottle even in Manual flight. - (ET409 left TOGA engaged the whole time as well).

I have no doubt ET training is excellent at teaching efficient normal operation of the 737 and when is the time to properly push the buttons.

However there is a lot of doubt that the Pilots had the necessary jet hand flying skills they should have had to save both flights. That is the downside of not practising manual flight in modern airliners and simulators without all the nannies - you just don't have the experience or comfort level to be confident of taking over when things go wrong.

I know that my suggestion that we should legislate multiple additional hours of sim time yearly to practise non-normal procedures will never come to pass - but I hope worldwide airlines spend a lot more time on Manual flight during recurrent training - that would seem to have helped a lot on most of the loss of life incidents in the past 10 years.


Another way of looking at it more rationally is that ET had one mishandling related crash in 30 years, so their record is very good. Southwest has had several landing incidents in the last decade alone. You never called out a training issue there.

l will not entertain agendas that grasp at flimsy straws and jump to illogical conclusions about ET's MAX crash which would never have happened the inexcusable bad practices had not prevailed at Boeing.


What’s your beef with Southwest?


I think you've totally missed my point in this example. My beef isn't with any airline. My beef is this thread (MAX grounding) being overrun with a personal opinion of a couple posters whos personal belief is that because this particular plane with severe design flaws crashed twice and got grounded due to those flaws, there now exists a worldwide pilot training problem, or more aptly, a reason to call persistently for better training as a way to shift MAX design blame back to the pilots.

They point to Ethiopian's record of just the one crash that was due to a loss of control in a 30 year period before ET302. They include ET302 even knowing that the plane crashed not due to training but due to design flaw. They throw the pilot under the bus for failing to follow a checklist when they have not read a final report of various conditions in the cockpit nor seen a complete voice transcript.

At this point, I have to ask why it is that these same people who are capable of recognizing "training issues" after the recent crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia, have never voiced any similar concerns about the state of training worldwide after any of the nasty slip-ups at home. Unlike a crash on a flawed design with a system that was not fully disclosed or revised, Southwest has had obvious hard landings resulting in write-off, and runway excursions resulting in death. Delta too wrote off an LGA destined MD88 four years ago, that one came down to pilot error too.

It is telling of these posters specific agenda, that they can be on the forum for 9 years but have shown no passion for voicing pilot training concerns after incidents in the US had clear piloting errors and were discussed on here at length, but have made it their business to make every second post on this thread about a plane grounded due to design flaw be shifting blame back to pilot error.
Last edited by Jamie514 on Fri May 17, 2019 5:17 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
Saintor
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:16 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Saintor wrote:
Again just pitching general references with zero specific is totally pointless.

There are all specific to the 737-8/9 MAX grounding and the analysis to understand what happened at Boeing and the FAA.
If you are unable to analyse not even a single information on those list of documents, nor in any of the documents pointed from this thread, then I can't help you. :worried:



They are not specific to a particular argument . Sorry you are just invoking general stuff that you don't understand details.
 
chiad
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:17 pm

spinotter wrote:
Saintor wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:


Again just pitching general references with zero specific is totally pointless.

spinotter wrote:

Perhaps another crew might have survived. That is not the point. A poorly implemented, poorly documented system such as MCAS is foisted upon air crews because of poor design decisions. That is the point. And they had to react within minutes to a system poorly design and poorly understood. How did that all happen is what I wonder.


Disagree. The point is that the pilots are there to save the day in situations like this. You can just love to blame big bad corporations. Boeing is not a bad corporation. Despite horrible mistakes like relying on one sensor, it is about thousands of workers who cares. It will duly costs billions to Boeing to recover and some people will probably have to leave.

Pilots have procedures to follow but for whatever reason, ET302's one overlooked many, wasting minutes and IMO this crash resulted. And then there is a little thing called skill.


It sounds as if you are paid by Boeing.


Your suspicion might not be so far off as the profile is only two months old.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:33 pm

par13del wrote:
Unfortunately, whether we like it or not, pilots are there to save the day when automation goes wrong.

True.

We all know airlines will get rid of pilots as soon as they can find a way to convince themselves they are not needed.

Given that this hasn't happened yet, and given the automation can handle the routine stuff, we can be darn sure they are still needed to deal with the extraordinary stuff.

Of course Boeing should not have released such a flawed system, but in the end, no one can be sure there are no glitches/bugs still lurking in any current airliner, and there are fault modes that are known to cause the automation to shut down or degrade itself to bare metal flying mode, so the pilots job is expecting the unexpected rather than watching the automation drive the plane.

As mentioned above, the expectation that the pilots can and will follow procedures is baked in to the certification process.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:36 pm

Virtual737 wrote:
planecane wrote:
What they should have simulated is starting from the beginning of the failure and running the correct checklists properly to see if doing things as documented would have led to recovery and how difficult it was. ET's worst problem to deal with started when they cut off the electric trim too soon.


The runaway stabilizer checklist actually only mentions using main electric trim as an indented section in the "Autopilot (if-engaged) ,,,,,,,,, Disengage" section (2). In other words, looking at that checklist in the cold light of day with all the bells and whistles going off, you would skip straight to step 3 (Autothrottle) if the autopilot was not engaged.

No idea how the memory item is taught, but the checklist itself is pretty ambiguous to say the least.


Many posts back I posted the NNC but the step immediately after disengaging the autopilot is to control the pitch using the control column and manual electric trim to balance control column forces.

What you posted makes no sense. If the issue is a runaway stabilizer, the autopilot is disengaged first because it might be causing the runaway.

Since the manifestation is a pitch problem the next step is to regain control of the pitch. Why on Earth would the procedure skip to disengaging the autothrottles? You'd be skipping the step where you recover the aircraft.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:38 pm

Revelation wrote:
par13del wrote:
Unfortunately, whether we like it or not, pilots are there to save the day when automation goes wrong.

True.

We all know airlines will get rid of pilots as soon as they can find a way to convince themselves they are not needed.

Given that this hasn't happened yet, and given the automation can handle the routine stuff, we can be darn sure they are still needed to deal with the extraordinary stuff.

Of course Boeing should not have released such a flawed system, but in the end, no one can be sure there are no glitches/bugs still lurking in any current airliner, and there are fault modes that are known to cause the automation to shut down or degrade itself to bare metal flying mode, so the pilots job is expecting the unexpected rather than watching the automation drive the plane.

As mentioned above, the expectation that the pilots can and will follow procedures is baked in to the certification process.

My impression was that recognizing voice communications from ATC is the biggest non-automated part of it, followed by taxi and takeoff roll.
 
madmouse
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:46 pm

Dear Airliners friends

If this question has allready been posted, feel free to delete !

I have been reading this topice for a while, and there is 1 question I have about the 737MAX.

I saw this on youtube : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QytfYyHmxtc about the MAX, and basically is says that boeing got worried when Airbus released the NEO, and Amcerian Airlines wanted to buy It. So they almost overnight went for the max. My question is why did airbus succesfully put new better engines on a older design (the a320) , and when boeing did almost the same thing they ran into stability problems and had to come with mcas.

Thanks
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:53 pm

madmouse wrote:
Dear Airliners friends

If this question has allready been posted, feel free to delete !

I have been reading this topice for a while, and there is 1 question I have about the 737MAX.

I saw this on youtube : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QytfYyHmxtc about the MAX, and basically is says that boeing got worried when Airbus released the NEO, and Amcerian Airlines wanted to buy It. So they almost overnight went for the max. My question is why did airbus succesfully put new better engines on a older design (the a320) , and when boeing did almost the same thing they ran into stability problems and had to come with mcas.

Thanks


Because the A320 stands higher off the ground so the bigger engines could fit in the same location.

Also, the A320 is fly-by-wire so any handling changes can be handled with simple adjustment of the FCC.
 
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JetBuddy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 5:59 pm

madmouse wrote:
Dear Airliners friends

If this question has allready been posted, feel free to delete !

I have been reading this topice for a while, and there is 1 question I have about the 737MAX.

I saw this on youtube : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QytfYyHmxtc about the MAX, and basically is says that boeing got worried when Airbus released the NEO, and Amcerian Airlines wanted to buy It. So they almost overnight went for the max. My question is why did airbus succesfully put new better engines on a older design (the a320) , and when boeing did almost the same thing they ran into stability problems and had to come with mcas.

Thanks


The 737 ground clearance is much lower than on the A320. This is because the original 737 was designed in an era where engines were much narrower.

The 737 has gone through many design changes over the times to be able to hang bigger, more modern engines on the wings.

One of the changes made to the MAX was to move the engines forward and upwards so they're mounted in front of the leading edge of the wings. This changed the flight characteristics of the airplane.

To solve this, they couldn't make large changes to the plane itself because they wanted the 737-8 MAX to be as similar to the 737-800 as possible (for certification and training reasons) - so they implemented a software solution instead. MCAS.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 6:28 pm

Venatt wrote:
Disagree. The point is that the pilots are there to save the day in situations like this.

This doesn't work so simply, there was pilots in every aircraft that crashed. Aside of a very few spacial cases, there all wanted to save the day.

For each crash you have to understand why the pilot was doing each of his actions. What information he perceived, what knowledge he have, what was his workload, hi stress, how much time he have, what his priority and why, etc... You have to take in account that human pilot do make error sometime, for various reasons, and that an aircraft must be designed to tolerate such errors to ensure safety. This is a complex task that take time and when it come to some recommendations to improve safety, this need to be implemented and maintained for about 300k commercial pilots worldwide. And don't forget that the vast part of the time pilots are busy doing others tasks than handling emergencies situations.
 
Virtual737
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 6:39 pm

planecane wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
planecane wrote:
What they should have simulated is starting from the beginning of the failure and running the correct checklists properly to see if doing things as documented would have led to recovery and how difficult it was. ET's worst problem to deal with started when they cut off the electric trim too soon.


The runaway stabilizer checklist actually only mentions using main electric trim as an indented section in the "Autopilot (if-engaged) ,,,,,,,,, Disengage" section (2). In other words, looking at that checklist in the cold light of day with all the bells and whistles going off, you would skip straight to step 3 (Autothrottle) if the autopilot was not engaged.

No idea how the memory item is taught, but the checklist itself is pretty ambiguous to say the least.


Many posts back I posted the NNC but the step immediately after disengaging the autopilot is to control the pitch using the control column and manual electric trim to balance control column forces.

What you posted makes no sense. If the issue is a runaway stabilizer, the autopilot is disengaged first because it might be causing the runaway.

Since the manifestation is a pitch problem the next step is to regain control of the pitch. Why on Earth would the procedure skip to disengaging the autothrottles? You'd be skipping the step where you recover the aircraft.


Let me explain what I wrote. Here is the checklist from the FCOM:

Image

Item 2 states that A/P should be disengaged if it is still engaged. The next 2 items (do not re-engage the autopilot and control pitch manually with column and trim) are indented as part of item 2. So.... if the AP was not engaged (which it wouldn't be anyway otherwise MCAS wouldn't come into play) then it might be reasonable to skip straight to section 3 - autothrottle (if engaged)..... disengage.

If the section for controlling pitch manually with column and trim is ALWAYS to be followed, it should not be indented. The following modified checklist would make that far more obvious...

Image

Do you see the subtle but important difference? The first suggests that you only manually trim if you had to disconnect the A/P. The second states that you do it regardless. More than one poster has argued that these checklists should be followed to the letter, no exceptions, no excuses. It would help if the checklists were accurate.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 6:44 pm

Saintor wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Saintor wrote:
Again just pitching general references with zero specific is totally pointless.

There are all specific to the 737-8/9 MAX grounding and the analysis to understand what happened at Boeing and the FAA.
If you are unable to analyse not even a single information on those list of documents, nor in any of the documents pointed from this thread, then I can't help you. :worried:

They are not specific to a particular argument . Sorry you are just invoking general stuff that you don't understand details.

So easy... :rotfl:
Come back when you will be able list the stuff I don't understand in details so I can learn from your valuable knowledge. :bigthumbsup:
 
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Moose135
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 7:39 pm

Virtual737 wrote:
If the section for controlling pitch manually with column and trim is ALWAYS to be followed, it should not be indented. The following modified checklist would make that far more obvious...

Do you see the subtle but important difference? The first suggests that you only manually trim if you had to disconnect the A/P. The second states that you do it regardless. More than one poster has argued that these checklists should be followed to the letter, no exceptions, no excuses. It would help if the checklists were accurate.

Maybe I'm missing something but wouldn't you be controlling the pitch manually with column and trim whenever the A/P isn't engaged, regardless of how you got to that state? Why should it be a separate step on the checklist? The way it is written, it sounds like a reminder of standard pilot procedure.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 7:46 pm

Saintor wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Saintor wrote:
They are not specific to a particular argument . Sorry you are just invoking general stuff that you don't understand details.

So easy... :rotfl:
Come back when you will be able list the stuff I don't understand in details so I can learn from your valuable knowledge. :bigthumbsup:


You can continue your copy&paste journey to support your fallacious and unproven arguments now. :bigthumbsup:

Thanks. I didn't know that I needed your permission. :lol:
 
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InsideMan
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 8:10 pm

SomebodyInTLS wrote:
InsideMan wrote:
Why is it that all the armchair pilots on here believe they know better than trained 737 pilots with years of experience?


Because a lot of us are involved in design, manufacture, maintenance etc. and might therefore know a damned sight more than a 737 pilot!


:rotfl:

said no F1 designer / mechanic to any of the drivers ..... ever

Just because you know how to design or build a plane doesn't mean you know how it behaves in real life. As q.e.d. with this 737 clusterf....
 
speedbird52
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 8:22 pm

InsideMan wrote:
SomebodyInTLS wrote:
InsideMan wrote:
Why is it that all the armchair pilots on here believe they know better than trained 737 pilots with years of experience?


Because a lot of us are involved in design, manufacture, maintenance etc. and might therefore know a damned sight more than a 737 pilot!


:rotfl:

said no F1 designer / mechanic to any of the drivers ..... ever

Just because you know how to design or build a plane doesn't mean you know how it behaves in real life. As q.e.d. with this 737 clusterf....

Are we sure that comment isn't a joke
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 9:12 pm

Moose135 wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
If the section for controlling pitch manually with column and trim is ALWAYS to be followed, it should not be indented. The following modified checklist would make that far more obvious...

Do you see the subtle but important difference? The first suggests that you only manually trim if you had to disconnect the A/P. The second states that you do it regardless. More than one poster has argued that these checklists should be followed to the letter, no exceptions, no excuses. It would help if the checklists were accurate.

Maybe I'm missing something but wouldn't you be controlling the pitch manually with column and trim whenever the A/P isn't engaged, regardless of how you got to that state? Why should it be a separate step on the checklist? The way it is written, it sounds like a reminder of standard pilot procedure.


If we need a checklist step instructing pilots to control pitch with the column and manual electric trim; training is far, FAR worse than I imagined.

GF
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 9:15 pm

Virtual737 wrote:
planecane wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:

The runaway stabilizer checklist actually only mentions using main electric trim as an indented section in the "Autopilot (if-engaged) ,,,,,,,,, Disengage" section (2). In other words, looking at that checklist in the cold light of day with all the bells and whistles going off, you would skip straight to step 3 (Autothrottle) if the autopilot was not engaged.

No idea how the memory item is taught, but the checklist itself is pretty ambiguous to say the least.


Many posts back I posted the NNC but the step immediately after disengaging the autopilot is to control the pitch using the control column and manual electric trim to balance control column forces.

What you posted makes no sense. If the issue is a runaway stabilizer, the autopilot is disengaged first because it might be causing the runaway.

Since the manifestation is a pitch problem the next step is to regain control of the pitch. Why on Earth would the procedure skip to disengaging the autothrottles? You'd be skipping the step where you recover the aircraft.


Let me explain what I wrote. Here is the checklist from the FCOM:

Image

Item 2 states that A/P should be disengaged if it is still engaged. The next 2 items (do not re-engage the autopilot and control pitch manually with column and trim) are indented as part of item 2. So.... if the AP was not engaged (which it wouldn't be anyway otherwise MCAS wouldn't come into play) then it might be reasonable to skip straight to section 3 - autothrottle (if engaged)..... disengage.

If the section for controlling pitch manually with column and trim is ALWAYS to be followed, it should not be indented. The following modified checklist would make that far more obvious...

Image

Do you see the subtle but important difference? The first suggests that you only manually trim if you had to disconnect the A/P. The second states that you do it regardless. More than one poster has argued that these checklists should be followed to the letter, no exceptions, no excuses. It would help if the checklists were accurate.

I guess I can see what you are saying. The way I read it, it is part of step 2. I think it is just treated kind of like common sense basically saying "fly the airplane."
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 9:40 pm

planecane wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
Do you see the subtle but important difference? The first suggests that you only manually trim if you had to disconnect the A/P. The second states that you do it regardless. More than one poster has argued that these checklists should be followed to the letter, no exceptions, no excuses. It would help if the checklists were accurate.

I guess I can see what you are saying. The way I read it, it is part of step 2. I think it is just treated kind of like common sense basically saying "fly the airplane."

The common sens will not guess that the pilot have only maximum 5 seconds to go from the second indented (could be misinterpreted as only if AP engaged) point 2 to the first indented (could be misinterpreted due to MCAS discontinue action) point 5, and that all the next points can't be done at high speed. Under stress and without appropriate specific training, this procedure as redacted could easily be error prone.
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 215
Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2016 6:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 9:48 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Moose135 wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
If the section for controlling pitch manually with column and trim is ALWAYS to be followed, it should not be indented. The following modified checklist would make that far more obvious...

Do you see the subtle but important difference? The first suggests that you only manually trim if you had to disconnect the A/P. The second states that you do it regardless. More than one poster has argued that these checklists should be followed to the letter, no exceptions, no excuses. It would help if the checklists were accurate.

Maybe I'm missing something but wouldn't you be controlling the pitch manually with column and trim whenever the A/P isn't engaged, regardless of how you got to that state? Why should it be a separate step on the checklist? The way it is written, it sounds like a reminder of standard pilot procedure.


If we need a checklist step instructing pilots to control pitch with the column and manual electric trim; training is far, FAR worse than I imagined.

GF


That’s a massive understatement.
 
morrisond
Posts: 4271
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 9:58 pm

AABusDrvr wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Moose135 wrote:
Maybe I'm missing something but wouldn't you be controlling the pitch manually with column and trim whenever the A/P isn't engaged, regardless of how you got to that state? Why should it be a separate step on the checklist? The way it is written, it sounds like a reminder of standard pilot procedure.


If we need a checklist step instructing pilots to control pitch with the column and manual electric trim; training is far, FAR worse than I imagined.

GF


That’s a massive understatement.


Apparently monitoring airspeed and controlling thrust with the Throttles to keep it from over or underspend should be on the checklist as well.

Maybe also they should add "Check Engines are on"
 
Passedv1
Posts: 672
Joined: Sun Oct 07, 2012 3:40 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 10:21 pm

AVGeekNY wrote:

A question for 737 pilots, if the need for MCAS was driven by quirky aerodynamics then why should we even trust the aircraft design?


I agree 100%. I. Believe that regulations need to he changed so that in order for a manufacturer to maintain a type, the analysis used must compare the proposed variant to the ORIGINAL type and not the latest derivative . I think when you are modifying a derivative of a derivative of a derivative, as you do with the Max, you end with a hacked together Franken-plane. It's like making a copy of a copy of a copy, small errors/un-ideal design decisions blow-up quickly into dangerous conditions as happened here.

If you compare a 737-MAX to a 737-100, there is no way you end up calling them the same type. If Boeing wasn't trying so hard to maintain the type, their design decisions would have certainly been different.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 1033
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 10:27 pm

"The Beat Goes On", by Peter Lemme: https://www.satcom.guru/2019/05/the-beat-goes-on.html Please read.
 
User avatar
SomebodyInTLS
Posts: 2017
Joined: Wed Jun 15, 2016 12:31 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 17, 2019 11:53 pm

InsideMan wrote:
SomebodyInTLS wrote:
InsideMan wrote:
Why is it that all the armchair pilots on here believe they know better than trained 737 pilots with years of experience?


Because a lot of us are involved in design, manufacture, maintenance etc. and might therefore know a damned sight more than a 737 pilot!


:rotfl:

said no F1 designer / mechanic to any of the drivers ..... ever

Just because you know how to design or build a plane doesn't mean you know how it behaves in real life. As q.e.d. with this 737 clusterf....


I'm sure you're wrong. As with aircraft, F1 is most definitely a team effort where the engineers definitely know a lot more about the things affecting the car's behaviour and how those can be changed, while the driver has the skill to apply the right amount of control at the right time and also to be able to describe the behaviour to the engineer such that the engineer can understand what is happening to the car. Both respect each other's skills, but make no mistake that it's the engineer who knows more about the car.

It seems I trod on the toes of a sky god by pointing out the same truth in the aircraft world...

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