morrisond wrote:

You obviously haven't looked at the Flight Experience of the ET302 crew - both let into the cockpit of a 737 with only a few hundred hours. The pilot has a bunch of hours but the co-pilot was very low hour and seemed to know more than the pilot. He had less than two months in the 737.

Why don't you stop the American obsession with flight hours and just admit Boeing has made serious mistakes with its latest variant of the 737? The fact that airplanes need software updates to be able to fly safe is just ridiculous.

When Airbus introduced fly by wire on the A320 some pilots said they preferred to keep flying the 737. Because by just laying your hands on the control column you knew how the aircraft was flying. That's not the case anymore. Pilots don't trust the MAX, because they don't know what the aircraft is doing. Even a pilot with over 8,000 hours flew this brand new plane into the ground.

I guess I don't share the fear that many posters have of the 737 Max. Happy to fly on it again whenever the next opportunity arises.

Like over 50% of the people on this forum, I am not an expert, but with the software, hardware, and training changes, it will all be fine.

morrisond wrote:

You obviously haven't looked at the Flight Experience of the ET302 crew - both let into the cockpit of a 737 with only a few hundred hours. The pilot has a bunch of hours but the co-pilot was very low hour and seemed to know more than the pilot. He had less than two months in the 737.

Please stop this insane pilot bashing. The two was qualified for the job. Your are not the authority that decide when a pilot is able to flight a 737-8/9 MAX.

1.5.1 PILOT IN COMMAND
According to Ethiopian Airlines records, the captain has the following flight experience:
 Total hours: 8122
 Total hours in B737: 1417
 Total hours in B737-8 MAX: 103
 Flight time in previous 90 days: 266 hours and 9 minutes
 Flight time in previous 7 days: 17 hours and 43 minutes
 Flight time in previous 72 hours: no flight time

1.5.2 FIRST-OFFICER
According to Ethiopian Airlines records, the First-Officer has the following flight experience:
 Total hours: 361
 Total hours in B737: 207
 Total hours in B737-8 MAX: 56
 Flight time in previous 90 days: 207 hours and 26 minutes
 Flight time in previous 7 days: 10 hours and 57 minutes
 Flight time in previous 72 hours: 5 hours and 25 minutes

The crew obtained the license and qualifications to conduct the flight;

airnorth wrote:

I guess I don't share the fear that many posters have of the 737 Max. Happy to fly on it again whenever the next opportunity arises.

Like over 50% of the people on this forum, I am not an expert, but with the software, hardware, and training changes, it will all be fine.

You should read Roger's commission report on Challenger investigation. While cause of the crash was identified as a specific seal, most of return to flight effort was focused on engine update as test data was so misinterpreted that is was borderline to falsification. And the Columbia crash came from yet another issue.
You may call it "lemon design" - and MAX can be a contender to the title given Boeing later approaches.

morrisond wrote:

InsideMan wrote:

Revelation wrote:

The situation that triggers MCAS is not typically triggered by the application of power.


No, [...].

Everything past that is irrelevant.
Why is it that all the armchair pilots on here believe they know better than trained 737 pilots with years of experience?

You obviously haven't looked at the Flight Experience of the ET302 crew - both let into the cockpit of a 737 with only a few hundred hours. The pilot has a bunch of hours but the co-pilot was very low hour and seemed to know more than the pilot. He had less than two months in the 737.

Delusional. You simply cannot fathom the fact that maybe Boeing is the in the wrong here? Pilots = 0 Blame. Non whatsoever. Give up on it.

smartplane wrote:

One defect with 4 aircraft generations of 737, is the latest iteration uses the previous iteration as the baseline (plus scaling), not the 100/200 for which the original type certificate is held. STC's should be capped at two or maybe three generations.

New generation 737s are not STCs. They are added as additional models to the original type certificate. An STC covers approved deviations from the original TC, and can be issued for something as small as a new type of instrument or as big as an engine swap.

smartplane wrote:

AVGeekNY wrote:

One defect with 4 aircraft generations of 737, is the latest iteration uses the previous iteration as the baseline (plus scaling), not the 100/200 for which the original type certificate is held.

Well, two defects in the history of the airplane if you include the defective PCU/rudder hard over incidents of the mid-1990s.

Saintor wrote:

it is quite possible that pilots with 100 000 or zillions hours make questionable [read wrong] decisions.

Blaming the pilots without understanding how there was thinking, what was important to them and why is a questionable [read wrong] decisions. This attitude will not improve safety.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

The F/O had a TOTAL of 361 flight hours, of which 207.5 hours was in the last 90 days in type meaning he had a whole 153.5 hours of instructional time in flight. Speaking of 90-day wonders. How much hands on flight training does a 153 hours represent? What type of plane? How many actual emergencies?

Hours are meaningless, if it’s all spent watching the autopilot fly which, based on the crew’s selection of autopilot in the first minute, I’d what the CA did for all those hours. Pilot skill is based on training, hard training, and experience. Watching an autopilot is worthless as a gauge of skill.

The pilots bashing loop is out of control. I suggest to open a dedicated thread to purge this "Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019" thread.

PixelFlight wrote:

Saintor wrote:

it is quite possible that pilots with 100 000 or zillions hours make questionable [read wrong] decisions.

Blaming the pilots without understanding how there was thinking, what was important to them and why is a questionable [read wrong] decisions. This attitude will not improve safety.

Blaming the manufacturer without understanding how the pilots were doing , what was important for the designers and why basic checklists were disregarded are other questions you should ask. This attitude will not improve safety.

Saintor wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

Saintor wrote:

it is quite possible that pilots with 100 000 or zillions hours make questionable [read wrong] decisions.

Blaming the pilots without understanding how there was thinking, what was important to them and why is a questionable [read wrong] decisions. This attitude will not improve safety.

Blaming the manufacturer without understanding how the pilots were doing , what was important for the designers and why basic checklists were disregarded are other questions you should ask. This attitude will not improve safety.

The factual reality is that it's the 737-8/9 MAX that is grounded while Lionaire and Ethiopian Airlines continue to operate others aircraft types every days. Are you suggesting that all the authorities that handle those decisions are all wrongs ?

You are totally diverting the issue (and conveniently not answering basic questions).

PixelFlight wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

The F/O had a TOTAL of 361 flight hours, of which 207.5 hours was in the last 90 days in type meaning he had a whole 153.5 hours of instructional time in flight. Speaking of 90-day wonders. How much hands on flight training does a 153 hours represent? What type of plane? How many actual emergencies?

Hours are meaningless, if it’s all spent watching the autopilot fly which, based on the crew’s selection of autopilot in the first minute, I’d what the CA did for all those hours. Pilot skill is based on training, hard training, and experience. Watching an autopilot is worthless as a gauge of skill.

The pilots bashing loop is out of control. I suggest to open a dedicated thread to purge this "Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019" thread.

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?


GF

Saintor wrote:

You are totally diverting the issue (and conveniently not answering basic questions).

The issue subject of this thread is "Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019".
What "basic questions" related to the subject of this thread are you talking about ?

Saintor wrote:

You are totally diverting the issue (and conveniently not answering basic questions).

It's not a diversion. It is the root of the problem. That started with Boeing makeing considered, deliberate, intentionally risky decisions. This chain of events ended with the pilots who in each case had five minutes to work out, from a myriad of alerts that started as soon as the plane left the ground, what exactly was the right sequence of actions to be followed.

In each case the first thing they were told was that the plane was in danger of stalling. Now that is going to focus your mind on keeping the plane up in the air by climbing when you are in takeoff phase of flight.

There were other alerts.

Then the nose suddenly pitches down and repeatedly does so for no reason at all. You then have to change your whole focus from what was your initial problem. This can be very difficult to do. You are focused on not dying from a pending stall at low altitude and then you are suddenly being forcefully pitched down by the rear stabiliser, the most powerul control area on the plane.

Any slip up can get you locked in a configuration where there is no escape no matter what you do.

After the first crash Boeing was being told by "genuine American pilots" that they were not happy with the response from Boeing. The EAD was insufficient to deal what would be for any pilot a terrifying experience. They did not believe it was a standard "runaway trim" situation. These are trained for at level flight when the plane is stable. Boeing insisted it was because that was their mindset from the start and they weren't going to deviate from it because it would cost them short term profits and short term profits, share buy backs and corporate bonsues were pouring in. No executive wanted to be the one to tell everyone that the party was over and they all had to go home.

kalvado wrote:

airnorth wrote:

I guess I don't share the fear that many posters have of the 737 Max. Happy to fly on it again whenever the next opportunity arises.

Like over 50% of the people on this forum, I am not an expert, but with the software, hardware, and training changes, it will all be fine.

You should read Roger's commission report on Challenger investigation. While cause of the crash was identified as a specific seal, most of return to flight effort was focused on engine update as test data was so misinterpreted that is was borderline to falsification. And the Columbia crash came from yet another issue.
You may call it "lemon design" - and MAX can be a contender to the title given Boeing later approaches.

I never called it a lemon design at all. I'm not sure the space shuttle program is too comparable to commercial flight, but I assume there may be some parallels? Either way, the Max is nothing that I personally fear to fly on, and almost all aircraft are in that camp for me. I do however question some airlines, regardless of what they fly, and would choose different option.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

JT610 pilots was 6028 hours and 5174 hours.
ET302 pilots was 8122 hours and 361 hours.
All owned valid licenses to operate the 737-8 MAX, according to the findings of the respective investigators.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

GF

How do you expect a pilot to start flying an airliner? 5000 hours coded in his/her genes? All pilots start with zero hours. It is pilot bashing.

I am all in favour of more training for pilots. Training and experience are two attributes that the bean counters tend to overlook when they are looking to cut costs and maxmise profits. Airbus has already raised this is a serious issue.

kayik wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

GF

How do you expect a pilot to start flying an airliner? 5000 hours coded in his/her genes? All pilots start with zero hours. It is pilot bashing.

I had about 4,500 hours before I got in the engineer’s seat. Average time for pilots hired at US legacy carriers is 8,000-10,000 with 2,000 turbine PIC time. Average for military heavy drivers is north of 3,000. You finish US military training with 250 hours, go to a conversion unit then top up training in unit. At an average of 30mph, your happy with a school bus driven by a 21-year old with 3,000 miles? The bigger issue is too much time be credited for watching the autopilot.

I’m actually in favor of structured ab initio training programs, but 150 hours is seriously insufficient time. The captain was flying solo once it went off the script. Have you flown a jet with inexperienced pilots across from you? An emergency is a serious challenge and I have been at 40W shutting down an engine with a 300 hour co-pilot.


GF

morrisond wrote:

You obviously haven't looked at the Flight Experience of the ET302 crew - both let into the cockpit of a 737 with only a few hundred hours. The pilot has a bunch of hours but the co-pilot was very low hour and seemed to know more than the pilot. He had less than two months in the 737.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

Just as relevant is: How many hours did the designers and auditors of MCAS have on the job?

If it was only a couple of hundred then why in the world were they in that position without a grown up sat with them? If several thousand then how in the world did they make such a magnificent mistake?

Using hours on the job as the sole and conclusive factor in determining whether they are qualified (subjectively, as legally they clearly were) is not that valuable a metric.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

I had about 4,500 hours before I got in the engineer’s seat. Average time for pilots hired at US legacy carriers is 8,000-10,000 with 2,000 turbine PIC time. Average for military heavy drivers is north of 3,000. You finish US military training with 250 hours, go to a conversion unit then top up training in unit. At an average of 30mph, your happy with a school bus driven by a 21-year old with 3,000 miles?

How is that related to the decisions of many authorities to ground the 737-8/9 MAX ?

Virtual737 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

You obviously haven't looked at the Flight Experience of the ET302 crew - both let into the cockpit of a 737 with only a few hundred hours. The pilot has a bunch of hours but the co-pilot was very low hour and seemed to know more than the pilot. He had less than two months in the 737.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

Just as relevant is: How many hours did the designers and auditors of MCAS have on the job?

If it was only a couple of hundred then why in the world were they in that position without a grown up sat with them? If several thousand then how in the world did they make such a magnificent mistake?

Using hours on the job as the sole and conclusive factor in determining whether they are qualified (subjectively, as legally they clearly were) is not that valuable a metric.

Good point, there has been reports of lots of engineering turnover at Boeing.

GF

Boeing / USA hate is quite strong in this forums
Obvious pilot errors (AP ON/OFF/ON/OFF/ON) yet people say that are at 0 fault.
I just really hope that all the bodies investigating this accidents have a bit more professionalism than some of you.
I'm not American but this is borderline stupid.

PixelFlight wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

JT610 pilots was 6028 hours and 5174 hours.
ET302 pilots was 8122 hours and 361 hours.
All owned valid licenses to operate the 737-8 MAX, according to the findings of the respective investigators.

Yes they all had valid licenses but that doesn't mean they were proficient.

There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system as evidence by these crashes.

It is not Pilot bashing.

I would also assume that lack of engineer experience will turn out to be a significant issue as well as lack of oversight experience.

It's a combination of all three. Those who don't recognize that are deluding themselves.

Ive heard the Max10 will not have MCAS. Is this true and why? Thanks

RickNRoll wrote:

Saintor wrote:

You are totally diverting the issue (and conveniently not answering basic questions).

It's not a diversion. It is the root of the problem.

You can say that about AF447 and guess what? *It should and would have been saved by more competent crew*. Very sorry if that sounds blunt, but it looks like a determinant part of the puzzle.

Saintor wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

Saintor wrote:

You are totally diverting the issue (and conveniently not answering basic questions).

It's not a diversion. It is the root of the problem.

You can say that about AF447 and guess what? *It should and would have been saved by more competent crew*. Very sorry if that sounds blunt, but it looks like a determinant part of the puzzle.

AF447 was in a stable configuration when the pitot tubes froze up. The PNF even said to the PF that it was important to do as little as possible. The PF then initiated anti stall at take procedure in "coffin corner". He was under no pressure to respond instantly as the plane was not making uncommanded changes to the flight.

Bobloblaw wrote:

Ive heard the Max10 will not have MCAS. Is this true and why? Thanks

No idea if it's true, but it is technically possible.

There is no need or wish for the MAX-10 to be identical to a 737-1000 since the latter doesn't exist. Therefore the MAX-10 may be certified with narrower CG limits, that will be a more forward aft CG limit. That could eliminate the need for MCAS while still obeying to the FARs.

The disadvantage would be that load and balance calculations of the MAX-10 would be less flexible. And theoretically a slightly higher fuel burn since a CG near the aft limit normally gives best fuel performance.

Boeing can of course also choose to make more dramatic aerodynamic changes which we haven't heard about.

If the MAX-10 is made sans MCAS, then we will likely never be told how that was possible. Boeing will just make it and tell it's operational limits to the operators.

Everybody is acting like it is a binary game. "It's all Boeing's fault" or "It's all the pilots' fault".

The real world isn't that simple.

IMHO, Boeing designed a very flawed system (yes, bordering on criminal). But very competent pilots should have been able to get out of it. And the two crashes did not.

The correct solution involves BOTH fixing the design problems AND making it less likely that the pilots will make the wrong choices in similar situations.

Chemist wrote:

Everybody is acting like it is a binary game. "It's all Boeing's fault" or "It's all the pilots' fault".

The real world isn't that simple.

IMHO, Boeing designed a very flawed system (yes, bordering on criminal). But very competent pilots should have been able to get out of it. And the two crashes did not.

The correct solution involves BOTH fixing the design problems AND making it less likely that the pilots will make the wrong choices in similar situations.

The design was bad but to call it borderline criminal is a bit over the top. It didn't create a situation that could not be recovered from.

What the bad design did was seemingly cause a MUCH higher rate of runaway stabilizer on the 737 AND made it so when it happened there would be other things going on like a stick shaker on one side only. The bad design philosophy seems to have increased the runaway stabilizer incidence by an order of magnitude or 2.

That said, some criticism of the crew's ability to respond to the situation and recover is warranted. It could be due to inadequate training or just not skilled enough pilots, I don't know.

I just don't believe that if either crew was confronted with a "normal" runaway stabilizer (whatever causes it other than MCAS) at the same point in the flight that they would have responded to it correctly either. There seems to be a lack of training for the 737 in general on something that is a memory item.

Bottom line is like you said. Boeing is at fault for creating a terrible design, the FAA is at fault for certifying it (I added that one) and the pilots are at fault for not properly executing the runaway stabilizer NNC. How you assign a percentage of blame I don't know. Maybe the final reports will give an answer. But, it isn't a choice of either Boeing created a death trap or the pilots were incompetent. It is much more gray than that.

Revelation wrote:

AVGeekNY wrote:

My confidence and trust is forever shaken in Boeing. After watching the 60 minutes Australia, reading commentary from pilots and this article https://medium.com/@gregoryreedtravis/t ... b1869839b6 I don't know how the Max could ever be trusted.

A question for 737 pilots, if the need for MCAS was driven by quirky aerodynamics then why should we even trust the aircraft design?

Seems the media has done its job in getting you agitated.

Didn't you take away from all of that viewing that those "quirky aerodynamics" only happened when the airplane was approaching the stall condition?

Didn't you wonder why in both crashes the pilots didn't respond to the stick shaker telling them they were heading towards a stall in a timely fashion?

I will fly on a Boeing plane every time of that's the one for my flight. I don't trust Boeing as a corporation though. Every week new revelations make it clear Boeing put profits before safety. If you think I'm just hating on Boeing other companies are doing exactly the same around the world. Look at BHP and their collapsing dams or Volkswagen and their lies about their diesel engines.

The fact is the pilots had conflicting alerts and an MCAS that was deliberately designed to not be as safe as it could be.

Chemist wrote:

Everybody is acting like it is a binary game. "It's all Boeing's fault" or "It's all the pilots' fault".

The real world isn't that simple.

IMHO, Boeing designed a very flawed system (yes, bordering on criminal). But very competent pilots should have been able to get out of it. And the two crashes did not.

The correct solution involves BOTH fixing the design problems AND making it less likely that the pilots will make the wrong choices in similar situations.

Very well said. I will also disagree with "bordering on criminal" however. Really poor judgement for sure, but no one set out to build an inherently dangerous airplane.

The will absolutely be a flight crew human factors/performance issue in both these accidents.

My problem with the push to MPL style training, is that it produces pilots that may be technically proficient, but lack experience. Without experience, your "judgement bank" has a very low balance. The cockpit of an airliner, with people sitting behind them, isn't the place new pilots should be trying to gain that base level of experience.

Having a minimum experience requirement (hours) may not be ideal, but it's a good start.


The FAA weighs in during congressional hearings today.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/05/15/faa-chief-be-pressed-boeing-max-while-would-be-replacement-faces-questions-his-approach-air-safety/?utm_term=.cba42d0bee7f

morrisond wrote:

bgm wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Yes we have statistically significant results that after every MAX pilot in the world should have known about MCAS and how to counter it (after Lionair and the bulletin was Published on Nov 8) - they (ET) still managed to not follow the published procedure (and a few others) and still crash the plane.

That does not say anything about the safety of the MAX - that says something about the Worldwide standard (or lack thereof) of training.

Lionair almost got it right - they just had to turn off the system that misacted 22 times. So is the new World Standard 23? Everything under 23 it's the plane designers fault - over 23 the Pilot?

No profession in the world would survive with that level of failure.

You realize that the false narrative you are peddling (solely blaming the pilots) is an exercise in futility. The pilots do share a small portion of the blame, but Boeing takes the vast majority. You can keep harking the same mantra defending your 'cousins south of the border' but very few people are buying it. It's just looking more and more silly.

Nope - I have said Boeing is 60-80% of the blame - I apologize if it appears I get a little one sided sometimes It's usually in response to Posts that go 100% the other way that say It's all Boeing's fault and Training and pilots had no contribution to the terrible outcome.

And I'm not blaming the pilots - I am blaming the Worldwide training system - there is a huge difference in the two. Pilots can only do what they are taught.

It became 100% Boeing's fault when they pulled out all the stops based on maintaining type certificate. Those stops include:
Not telling test pilots of the MCAS changes (from 0.6 to 2.5 deg stab movement per MCAS cycle).
Not telling the FAA of those same MCAS changes.
Not categorizing MCAS as a catastrophic system, obfuscating the FAA requirement to review it as a safety critical system.
Not telling operators and their pilots of MCAS until a real crash happened.
Not telling operators and their pilots that a AOA sensor disagree alert wasn't working (specifically Southwest) for a full year, until a report by WSJ a month after two crashes.

Revelation wrote:

I have a hard time understanding how two pilots with ATPLs can lose situational awareness to the point of finding themselves in that part of the flight envelope and needing to then figure out how to do the runaway stab checklist when they really should not have been there in the first place.

Are you talking about the actual crashes, or are you speaking hypothetically? Either way, I’m not understanding you.

As to a hypothetical scenario, if you’ve flown a properly functioning plane into the situation where MCAS activates, then MCAS will just do its planned function; even MCAS v1.0. Once the plane has left stall territory, and the AOA has returned to normal range, the MCAS system is designed to restore the trim back to where it was. The MCAS would only keep trying to trim down if the pilots resisted it, and kept trying to put the plane in a stall.

If the plane is functioning properly, including the AOA sensors, then there would be no need to run the runaway stabilizer list. I expect that Boeing’s theory is/was that the spinning wheels (MCAS doing its thing) wouldn't be noticed as anything unusual.

From http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm

After AoA falls below the hysteresis threshold (0.5 degrees below the activation angle), MCAS commands nose up stabilizer to return the aircraft to the trim state that existed before the MCAS activation.

planecane wrote:

Chemist wrote:

Everybody is acting like it is a binary game. "It's all Boeing's fault" or "It's all the pilots' fault".

The real world isn't that simple.

IMHO, Boeing designed a very flawed system (yes, bordering on criminal). But very competent pilots should have been able to get out of it. And the two crashes did not.

The correct solution involves BOTH fixing the design problems AND making it less likely that the pilots will make the wrong choices in similar situations.

The design was bad but to call it borderline criminal is a bit over the top. It didn't create a situation that could not be recovered from.

What the bad design did was seemingly cause a MUCH higher rate of runaway stabilizer on the 737 AND made it so when it happened there would be other things going on like a stick shaker on one side only. The bad design philosophy seems to have increased the runaway stabilizer incidence by an order of magnitude or 2.

That said, some criticism of the crew's ability to respond to the situation and recover is warranted. It could be due to inadequate training or just not skilled enough pilots, I don't know.

I just don't believe that if either crew was confronted with a "normal" runaway stabilizer (whatever causes it other than MCAS) at the same point in the flight that they would have responded to it correctly either. There seems to be a lack of training for the 737 in general on something that is a memory item.

Bottom line is like you said. Boeing is at fault for creating a terrible design, the FAA is at fault for certifying it (I added that one) and the pilots are at fault for not properly executing the runaway stabilizer NNC. How you assign a percentage of blame I don't know. Maybe the final reports will give an answer. But, it isn't a choice of either Boeing created a death trap or the pilots were incompetent. It is much more gray than that.

All in favour of better training. People commonly reference, though, how to top gun veteran was in a situation that was difficult and he got out of it. Most pilots aren't top gun veterans and the expectation that pilots have to be at that standard is not realistic either. Airbus appear to want to set up a minimum certification standard for pilots that they will endorse and support. I agree totally with that. A pilot with minimum hours should not be put in the situation where the job is beyond him for 'normal' difficult situations. It's not fair to him, and especially not to the passengers. In the long run it costs the airline itself far more than it saves. If it means higher air fares then that is how it should be. Which also means that airlines are going to have to sacrifice some potential profits and market competitiveness.

kayik wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

GF

How do you expect a pilot to start flying an airliner? 5000 hours coded in his/her genes? All pilots start with zero hours. It is pilot bashing.

In addition those bemoaning the lack of flying hours also seem to support the notion that no additional hands on training (sim or otherwise) is required to fly the Max.

How are pilots supposed to get these hundreds of hours of experience?

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

I did hit me how insane just 153 hours is until I compared it to a student pilot I know. This pilot has about 250 hours and only now will start to work on multi-engine time. The student has never flown anything larger or more complex as a light piston-engine aircraft. No turbines. No two engine time. And of course no commercial duty of any type.. A hundred hours earlier the ET pilot was sitting in the right seat of a 737. Unbelievable. I can't even fathom how rudimentary the ET's FO's knowledge base was. It wasn't fair to him. It wasn't fair to the rest of the crew. It wasn't fair to the passengers on board. And similarly striking is that from the CVR the FO seemed to be on top of some things better than the veteran captain. I'm afraid we've trained a generation of button pushers and system monitors.

PixelFlight wrote:

JT610 pilots was 6028 hours and 5174 hours.
ET302 pilots was 8122 hours and 361 hours.
All owned valid licenses to operate the 737-8 MAX, according to the findings of the respective investigators.

And the MAX met certification and was valid to fly. Does that make MCAS a good design? Of course not.

StTim wrote:

kayik wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

GF

How do you expect a pilot to start flying an airliner? 5000 hours coded in his/her genes? All pilots start with zero hours. It is pilot bashing.

In addition those bemoaning the lack of flying hours also seem to support the notion that no additional hands on training (sim or otherwise) is required to fly the Max.

How are pilots supposed to get these hundreds of hours of experience?

This has always been the lament of the new pilot. I know things are different in other parts of the world, but in North America, those that want it bad enough, find a way.

When I was starting out, we became flight instructors, charter or freight pilots, towed banners, or did tours. I even know one guy who flew cadavers for a funeral home. We all learned the hard lessons in airplanes that were much smaller, slower and lighter than an airliner. We scared only ourselves when we made bad decisions.

Before I ever sat in the first officers seat of an "airliner", a 36 seat turboprop, with no autopilot or pressurization, that would only go 180 knots, I had 2,000 hours.

I spent several more years hand flying those airplanes, in hard winter weather, before I was ever given the keys to a regional jet. And I had well over 10,000 hours before I got to fly a DC-9.

Recently I flew with a first officer who was brand new to my airline, and the 737. He has over 9,000 hours, most of that in a Dash 8. Our combined flight time was over 30,000 hours.

I still learn something, every flight I fly.

morrisond wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’s NOT pilot bashing, it’s pointing the truth of the their backgrounds. Do you think 153 hours is adequate flight time to pilot an airliner?

JT610 pilots was 6028 hours and 5174 hours.
ET302 pilots was 8122 hours and 361 hours.
All owned valid licenses to operate the 737-8 MAX, according to the findings of the respective investigators.

Yes they all had valid licenses but that doesn't mean they were proficient.

There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system as evidence by these crashes.

It is not Pilot bashing.

I would also assume that lack of engineer experience will turn out to be a significant issue as well as lack of oversight experience.

It's a combination of all three. Those who don't recognize that are deluding themselves.

Your claim have to explain why so many authorities have grounded the 737-8/9 MAX while none have taken action to limit Lion Air and/or Ethiopian Airline, and that both airlines still carry peoples every single days with aircraft others than the 737-8/-9 MAX. You can't blame the pilots to lack a level D+ training specific to the 737-8/9 MAX high AoA erratic MCASv1 condition that Boeing actively avoided, a subject under investigation by USA federal prosecutors.

You take facts like "these crashes" as a evidence that "There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system" while so many authorities officially decided otherwise.

MSPNWA wrote:

I did hit me how insane just 153 hours is until I compared it to a student pilot I know. This pilot has about 250 hours and only now will start to work on multi-engine time. The student has never flown anything larger or more complex as a light piston-engine aircraft. No turbines. No two engine time. And of course no commercial duty of any type.. A hundred hours earlier the ET pilot was sitting in the right seat of a 737. Unbelievable. I can't even fathom how rudimentary the ET's FO's knowledge base was. It wasn't fair to him. It wasn't fair to the rest of the crew. It wasn't fair to the passengers on board. And similarly striking is that from the CVR the FO seemed to be on top of some things better than the veteran captain. I'm afraid we've trained a generation of button pushers and system monitors.

Not disputing your argument. But please keep in mind that there is currently ZERO evidence that this was in any way related to the accident.
In fact, indications are that the very junior FO, actually was quite up to his task . . .

Also keep in mind that it would be good to first establish what went wrong, why it went wrong, dig into root cause. If that turns out that there is some factor of pilot performance related (which would not surpirse me), only then the training of the crew should be in focus.

Some on here seem to have a rather urgent desire to start with the last part, and use that as evidence towards the first parts. Which usually suggest those have an agenda . . .

MSPNWA wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

JT610 pilots was 6028 hours and 5174 hours.
ET302 pilots was 8122 hours and 361 hours.
All owned valid licenses to operate the 737-8 MAX, according to the findings of the respective investigators.

And the MAX met certification and was valid to fly. Does that make MCAS a good design? Of course not.

The 737-8/9 MAX certification process is under investigation by USA federal prosecutors and multiples parties have initiated legal procedures that will probe that subject.
Boeing publicly communicate about the reorganization of the safety and certification process, as well as multiples fixes to release the grounding.
FAA have publicly lost leading credibility from others authorities because on how the 737-8/9 was certified.

To date this is no publicly identifiable authorities raising issue on any of the training systems that those pilots have followed. Please share if you find.

PW100 wrote:

In fact, indications are that the very junior FO, actually was quite up to his task . . .

A minor detail.

(Or am I speculating here? )

He knows not what he is saying?

-Sinnett said that Boeing felt pilots did not need to know more about the system, given how unlikely it was to misfire.
"I don't know that understanding this system would've changed the outcome on this. In a million miles, you're going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you're going to see this, ever. So we try not to overload the crews with information that's unnecessary so they actually know the information we believe is important," he said, according to the recording obtained by CBS.-
From <https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-played-down-737-max-second-crash-concern-pilots-audio-reports-2019-5?r=US&IR=T>

As a rough estimate. 1E6 miles ~=3500 flight hours~=1 year service. With 5000 A/C in the fleet eventually, it would be experienced ~5000 times every year.

Don't think this is what he meant - but he said it!

NB Even if he meant 1E6 flight hours, that would still work out ~280 times a year!

Would have thought he would have a more convincing grasp on the numbers for such an important meeting?

Ray

AABusDrvr wrote:

This has always been the lament of the new pilot. I know things are different in other parts of the world, but in North America, those that want it bad enough, find a way.

When I was starting out, we became flight instructors, charter or freight pilots, towed banners, or did tours. I even know one guy who flew cadavers for a funeral home. We all learned the hard lessons in airplanes that were much smaller, slower and lighter than an airliner. We scared only ourselves when we made bad decisions.

I think this is where the problem is.
A lot of US pilots are trained by those barely above initial level, things are not systematically learned but picked up by try-and-fail. Crash rate in GA is unbelievable. Some still survive.
So hours of survival are the only professional metrics.
Education requirements for professional pilots are... funny. BA in arts is good enough, no technical background required. My impression is that the phrase "trained pilot" doesn't mean "educated professional", but sounds more like "trained circus lion". Of course, no amount of hours builts a true professional that way...

Take a world view, how many nations have the extensive aviation industry to allow multiple aviation schools, economic activity that will allow the banner-pulling industry, air cargo, etc etc etc. How the US trains its pilots can only be duplicated in countries of similar mass and economic activity. So how do pilots in other countries of the world get trained and qualified to be pilots of commercial airlines, when within their nations, there is primary commercial aviation with minimal cargo activity? Options for the mass of young men and women who see pilots and aviation as a top of the line profession far out-weighs the slots available.

Difficult to have them trained in the developing world, OEM's like Airbus and Boeing want to sell their a/c so that have to come up with some sort of training program that does not include years of training. Aviation schools in the USA get a lot of international students, once completed, they return home to gain what ever their nation requirements are to be able to sit in the seats. Just as the USA does not want a bunch of foreign pilots flying their a/c around the skies, other countries have the same nationalistic intent, they may recognize that they do not have the local industry to generate the pilots, so will allow foreign pilots in, but always with the intention of getting the locals trained to take over the jobs.
Only the OEM's can do this in my opinion, as politics will never allow a level field for training.

keesje wrote:

PW100 wrote:

In fact, indications are that the very junior FO, actually was quite up to his task . . .

A minor detail.

(Or am I speculating here? )

The FO got it partially right. He called for the trim cut-off but forgot to mention the part about returning the flight to in-trim before hitting the switches.

That's probably more indicative that he was recalling the Runaway Horizontal Stabilizer procedure.

As he had just been in the sim Jan 31 - that makes a lot of sense.

InsideMan wrote:

Why is it that all the armchair pilots on here believe they know better than trained 737 pilots with years of experience?

Because a lot of us are involved in design, manufacture, maintenance etc. and might therefore know a damned sight more than a 737 pilot!

(On the subject of discussing Boeing's problems instead of just blaming pilots)

Saintor wrote:

You are totally diverting the issue (and conveniently not answering basic questions).

[Read thread title... rolls eyes...]

Does anyone know when the grounding will be lifted?