sgbroimp wrote:

USAirKid wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

Are you insinuating WN has a weak organization, weak people or weak equipment???

WN is one of the airlines with the lowest accident rate; not really an indication of weak airline/people/equipment...

WN has a history of higher profile runway overruns. I’m not sure if their rate is higher than other US airlines, but I’d really like to see the numbers for comparison.

If I recall my statistics courses, these numbers are so low as a percentage of "possibles" that even 10 for one airline and 1 for another would not be statistically different, so really no conclusion about who has more is really possible/reliable.

10 vs 1 is not that insignificant. If you expect deviation of sqrt(n), this is about 2 sigma, i.e. 95% significance..

RL757PVD wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

RL757PVD wrote:

EMAS Blocks and materials are no longer being produced, its a national problem that has the attention of the FAA.

First, you say the company is no longer in business (which is incorrect).
Now, you say they no longer manufacture the material. So, which one is it?

Do you have a source for it? Everything on Safran's website indicate that they are still installing EMASMAX systems, the same system installed in BUR.
The FAA fact sheet I linked (https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/ne ... wsId=13754) is dated July 5, 2018, makes no mention of shortage and lists 7 systems in current installation (as of July 5, 2018) at 6 airports, to be completed by the end of 2018.

So, unless you can provide facts, everything points out to the ESCO/Zodiac/Safran EMAS still being manufactured, procurable and installed.

If you worked in the airport development circuit you would be more aware... its not widely discussed because there isnt a good answer and it highlights the issues with the FAA sole-supplier approach.

http://www.aviationnews.net/index.cfm?d ... _id=271624

Google also found it disussed in these airport meeting minutes

http://bocaairport.com/wp-content/uploa ... inal-2.pdf
https://agendas.addisontx.gov/docs/2018 ... 6_4414.pdf

Thanks for those very informative links.

It’d be interesting to see the landing data for a -700, wet with standing water, 10 knots tailwind, any MEL open items. I’d bet it’d be close.

GF

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’d be interesting to see the landing data for a -700, wet with standing water, 10 knots tailwind, any MEL open items. I’d bet it’d be close.

GF

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

maint123 wrote:

Lucky escape for the passengers.Could have easily been a tragedy.
Southwest seems to have quite a few issues lately.
This might due to pilot training or poorly maintained tyres or even a badly maintained runway. Anyone checking the Ra values of the runways.
If a bit of rain would result in such mishaps, London airports would be perpetually closed.

Reminds me not to fly southwest when in the US.

A comment that reminds me of the character Dustin Hoffman played in the movie Rainman. Come to the US and look for Qantas or perhaps if you want to fly an airline that has never lost a life try G4. It amazes me that anyone on this forum would make such a statement about an airline with 4000 flights a day that has been flying since 1971 and has lost ONE passenger in its history. I guess mathematics and probability was not taught in your schools

JustAnFO wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’d be interesting to see the landing data for a -700, wet with standing water, 10 knots tailwind, any MEL open items. I’d bet it’d be close.

GF

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

As I’ve noted above, it’s very possible the conditions weren’t even “good to medium” for the brief period of time before and during this landing.

I’m not sure about the reverse thrusters but the wing devices would have been lowered afterward for emergency evacuation from the over wing exits.

ikramerica wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’d be interesting to see the landing data for a -700, wet with standing water, 10 knots tailwind, any MEL open items. I’d bet it’d be close.

GF

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

As I’ve noted above, it’s very possible the conditions weren’t even “good to medium” for the brief period of time before and during this landing.

I’m not sure about the reverse thrusters but the wing devices would have been lowered afterward for emergency evacuation from the over wing exits.

One of the first photos posted from someone sitting over the wing clearly shows the spoilers erect in the lower right corner of the window.

As far as the engines go spotting landings at BUR fairly frequently the reversers were probably closed just before approaching the safe barrier and they were probably relying on braking and either hydroplaned, slid, or misjudged the speed and available space left....again just a guess and observation.

phllax wrote:

SurfandSnow wrote:

mm320cap wrote:

As for runway 15/33, I asked a pilot on my last flight in why they don't use 15 for arrivals so they have an extra +/- 1,500 feet of concrete to play with and he responded that due to a high historical number of unstable approaches to 15, company policy prohibits use of landings on 15 during the day unless winds dictate it and conditions are clear due to terrain cropping up quickly on the crosswind leg, and apparently it's not allowed at all at night.

As a former controller at BUR in the late 70's, early 80's, we ran visual approaches to RWY 15 all day long including night time with PSA B727s and B737s, Continental B727s, Frontier B737s, and Hughes Air West DC9s and several other large jets including B707s, , and never had any issues. Maybe much less dependence on automation in those days, they just flew the airplanes. Rwy 8 (Rwy 7 at that time) always had issues with standing water in heavy rain, and I witnessed a Cessna Citation hydroplane off the end of the runway, just like this incident.

ikramerica wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’d be interesting to see the landing data for a -700, wet with standing water, 10 knots tailwind, any MEL open items. I’d bet it’d be close.

GF

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

As I’ve noted above, it’s very possible the conditions weren’t even “good to medium” for the brief period of time before and during this landing.

I’m not sure about the reverse thrusters but the wing devices would have been lowered afterward for emergency evacuation from the over wing exits.

Looking at the photos yesterday it looked like the TR’s had pushed EMAS dust onto the side of the fuselage. Think they may have been stowed after coming to rest. The left turn will be interesting to decipher. Think they may have been trying to steer onto the taxiway but had too much speed to execute the turn. The FDR is going to be fascinating. Why did they ignore and continue an approach to a short wet runway with a 10kt tailwind. What were they thinking to believe that to be safe approach?

I have to wonder at what point, if any, the captain and F/O knew this was going to be an overrun and at what point in the landing, if any, would they have been able to bail and execute a missed approach?

ikramerica wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’d be interesting to see the landing data for a -700, wet with standing water, 10 knots tailwind, any MEL open items. I’d bet it’d be close.

GF

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

As I’ve noted above, it’s very possible the conditions weren’t even “good to medium” for the brief period of time before and during this landing.

I’m not sure about the reverse thrusters but the wing devices would have been lowered afterward for emergency evacuation from the over wing exits.

The "wing devices" are called spoilers. They would have been stowed by the pilots if they had contemplated an emergency evacuation and followed the Evacuation checklist. Apparently they did not see the need to do so.

It's thrust reversers, not reverse thrusters.

Johnv707 wrote:

phllax wrote:

SurfandSnow wrote:

As a former controller at BUR in the late 70's, early 80's, we ran visual approaches to RWY 15 all day long including night time with PSA B727s and B737s, Continental B727s, Frontier B737s, and Hughes Air West DC9s and several other large jets including B707s, , and never had any issues. Maybe much less dependence on automation in those days, they just flew the airplanes. Rwy 8 (Rwy 7 at that time) always had issues with standing water in heavy rain, and I witnessed a Cessna Citation hydroplane off the end of the runway, just like this incident.

It must have been quite a sight to see a 707 screaming past the terminal, clouds of grey smoke enveloping the jet as those thrust reversers screamed on those low-bypass JT3s. Bad-asz.

Regarding your comment on "less dependence on automation"... As automation has become more prevalent in airliner operations, accident rates globally have gone down, despite the number of flights and passengers carried having increased exponentially since the late 70s/early 80s. Overdependence on automation is a thing, for sure, but without automation (and other improvements since that era, such as CRM), there's no way we could fly as many people we do today without bending a lot more metal. In fact, Boeing offers a runway overrun awareness system on the 737 Max (not an option SWA has taken), as does Airbus on the A320. Had this approach and landing been flown by an aircraft such-equipped with this system, the event might have been mitigated.

JustAnFO wrote:

ikramerica wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

As I’ve noted above, it’s very possible the conditions weren’t even “good to medium” for the brief period of time before and during this landing.

I’m not sure about the reverse thrusters but the wing devices would have been lowered afterward for emergency evacuation from the over wing exits.

The "wing devices" are called spoilers. They would have been stowed by the pilots if they had contemplated an emergency evacuation and followed the Evacuation checklist. Apparently they did not see the need to do so.

It's thrust reversers, not reverse thrusters.

Grow up a little.

kalvado wrote:

sgbroimp wrote:

USAirKid wrote:

WN has a history of higher profile runway overruns. I’m not sure if their rate is higher than other US airlines, but I’d really like to see the numbers for comparison.

If I recall my statistics courses, these numbers are so low as a percentage of "possibles" that even 10 for one airline and 1 for another would not be statistically different, so really no conclusion about who has more is really possible/reliable.

10 vs 1 is not that insignificant. If you expect deviation of sqrt(n), this is about 2 sigma, i.e. 95% significance..

WN and UA will each do over a million landings a year. Are you saying that 1 in a million and 10 in a million is a statistically significant difference? That would surprise me.

sgbroimp wrote:

kalvado wrote:

sgbroimp wrote:

If I recall my statistics courses, these numbers are so low as a percentage of "possibles" that even 10 for one airline and 1 for another would not be statistically different, so really no conclusion about who has more is really possible/reliable.

10 vs 1 is not that insignificant. If you expect deviation of sqrt(n), this is about 2 sigma, i.e. 95% significance..

WN and UA will each do over a million landings a year. Are you saying that 1 in a million and 10 in a million is a statistically significant difference? That would surprise me.

Of course these are significantly different numbers. sqrt(n)

evank516 wrote:

I have to wonder at what point, if any, the captain and F/O knew this was going to be an overrun and at what point in the landing, if any, would they have been able to bail and execute a missed approach?

Go Arounds are authorized up until T/R deployment.

Out of curiosity, I pulled the NTSB report for Southwest 1455 - the first aircraft which had that accident at BUR involving a Southwest 737 because of the similarities and because I was curious what the weather was. Interesting enough, the weather and the environmental conditions were quite similar.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Acc ... AB0204.pdf

Weather Information - March 5, 2000 - Page 8 of Report

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The transcription of ATIS information Papa follows:

burbank airport information papa zero one five three zulu wind two four zero at
six visibility one zero few clouds at six thousand five hundred ceiling niner
thousand overcast temperature niner dew point one altimeter two niner six five
i l s runway eight approach in use arriving and departing runway eight and runway
one five.

Weather observations at BUR were made by an automated surface observation system
and augmented by ATC under the limited aviation weather reporting station. Weather conditions
reported about 1653, about 1 hour and 17 minutes before the accident, were the following:

wind from 270 degrees at 18 knots gusting to 26 knots, visibility 10 miles, a few
clouds at 3,900 feet, ceiling overcast at 5,500 feet, temperature 11.1 degrees C
[Celsius] (52 degrees F [Fahrenheit]), dew point 2.2 degrees C (36 degrees F),
altimeter 29.60 inches of hg [mercury].

Weather conditions reported about 1820, about 10 minutes after the accident, were the
following:

wind from 250 degrees true at 6 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast
at 9,500 feet, temperature 9 degrees [C] (48 degrees F), dew point temperature
0 degrees C (32 degrees F), altimeter 29.66 inches of hg.

The BUR airport reported that 0.77 inch of rain had fallen in the 8 hours before the
accident and that a wind shift associated with a cold frontal passage had occurred. Runway 8 was
wet at the time of the accident.

JustAnFO wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

It’d be interesting to see the landing data for a -700, wet with standing water, 10 knots tailwind, any MEL open items. I’d bet it’d be close.

GF

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

Which then brings up the question were they dispatched with a legal factored distance for landing (landing distance within 60% of the LDA for the conditions). Did they decide to land based on actual landing distance being just barely within the LDA and just missed a perfect landing.

GF

sgbroimp wrote:

kalvado wrote:

sgbroimp wrote:

If I recall my statistics courses, these numbers are so low as a percentage of "possibles" that even 10 for one airline and 1 for another would not be statistically different, so really no conclusion about who has more is really possible/reliable.

10 vs 1 is not that insignificant. If you expect deviation of sqrt(n), this is about 2 sigma, i.e. 95% significance..

WN and UA will each do over a million landings a year. Are you saying that 1 in a million and 10 in a million is a statistically significant difference? That would surprise me.

Sure it is. It is a whole order of magnitude. 1 in a million or 1 in 100,000. 1 overrun every decade or 1 a year. Big difference.

Passedv1 wrote:

sgbroimp wrote:

kalvado wrote:

10 vs 1 is not that insignificant. If you expect deviation of sqrt(n), this is about 2 sigma, i.e. 95% significance..

WN and UA will each do over a million landings a year. Are you saying that 1 in a million and 10 in a million is a statistically significant difference? That would surprise me.

Sure it is. It is a whole order of magnitude. 1 in a million or 1 in 100,000. 1 overrun every decade or 1 a year. Big difference.

What @sgbroimp is saying, is that for small number of events it can be more about luck than anything else.
Is airline with 0 crashes over 10 years really safer that airline with 1 crash over same period? Nope, chances are they are just more lucky.
What about 1 crash and 2 crashes? Same thing. 1 and 5? well, probably there is a trend, but luck still not out of question. Official review is warranted, though. 1 and 10? still small chance of bad luck (5% maybe) - but 95% chance that something is wrong and someone has to take an action. 1 and 100? Miracles happen, but nobody believes in them.
That is why serious accidents, major crushes, hull losses - which are becoming rarer by the year - are not a good measure of safety practices. Small scale events, inspection results, close calls - those are a much better metric, there are more of those, and they paint a better pictire. Although that maybe not public data, and media is not willing to go into that. Safety-oriented management, as well as oversight agency, must keep an eye on that data. And so do we, if we want to keep a.net as a quality discussion space.
That is why I saying "I don't fly Southwest because of it!" is just not so smart. Either dig up more data and build a better case - or feel free to pay more for less, industry needs free cash. And I, for example, would prefer WN over SQ any time, as SQ has a history of interesting events being treated in an interesting fashion... but that is getting off topic.

Just to post my $0.02 re the weather:

I was in the South Bay area (near LAX) visiting a friend when the overrun occurred, and yes it was raining heavily. Not heavily as far as other places I've been, but heavy, and it was also "squally."

It was the kind of storm where the direction of the gusts kept changing, sort of like a hurricane has different quadrants. I had helped my friend tie tarps on his old cars, preparing for the predicted 17-20-mph east gusts, but then it kept changing from east to west. East then west, repeatedly. I saw something about how a Low had hit the L.A. area, instead of coming ashore more southerly as predicted. When you're under a Low, the winds can do circular things.

I'm wondering what info is available as to the actual wind direction at BUR during the last 15 minutes before landing, because again it was changing pretty starkly east then west where I was, approx 20 miles from BUR. At some points that morning, I wouldn't be surprised if some pilots had a headwind landing on Runway 8.

Would be curious to see the data.

The 270 @10 call was made only 1 to 2 minutes before the accident, per the liveatc recording.

CO953 wrote:

Just to post my $0.02 re the weather:

I was in the South Bay area (near LAX) visiting a friend when the overrun occurred, and yes it was raining heavily. Not heavily as far as other places I've been, but heavy, and it was also "squally."

It was the kind of storm where the direction of the gusts kept changing, sort of like a hurricane has different quadrants. I had helped my friend tie tarps on his old cars, preparing for the predicted 17-20-mph east gusts, but then it kept changing from east to west. East then west, repeatedly. I saw something about how a Low had hit the L.A. area, instead of coming ashore more southerly as predicted. When you're under a Low, the winds can do circular things.

I'm wondering what info is available as to the actual wind direction at BUR during the last 15 minutes before landing, because again it was changing pretty starkly east then west where I was, approx 20 miles from BUR. At some points that morning, I wouldn't be surprised if some pilots had a headwind landing on Runway 8.

Would be curious to see the data.

The weather wasn’t quite the same place in the valley. Because the storms were coming from the south the clouds were being squeezed as the elevation increased and then squeezed more as they hit against the mountains. So the rain was a bit more intense at times than where you were. Down there it looked more steady.

I was watching the radar at that exact time because my wife and I were deciding whether she wanted to go to the mall at that time (decided it wasn’t a good idea) and whether it would clear up by 11:30 so her mom could come over as scheduled (it did). So I was actually tracking the weather in that location at the exact time in question.

The precipitation overlay on the radar was showing orange in the area at that time. After a day of saturation our area can not handle orange very long. Our street was a river and the current was strong enough to move all the gravel into a downhill pile in our street edge flowerbed. That’s never happened before. Not with 3/4” gravel.

Chemist wrote:

The 270 @10 call was made only 1 to 2 minutes before the accident, per the liveatc recording.

Does Southwest have a maximum allowable tailwind regardless of how bad the weather is for their 737s?

Chemist wrote:

The 270 @10 call was made only 1 to 2 minutes before the accident, per the liveatc recording.

That's still plenty of time to re-evaluate the situation and stop the approach/perform a different approach.

WayexTDI wrote:

Chemist wrote:

The 270 @10 call was made only 1 to 2 minutes before the accident, per the liveatc recording.

That's still plenty of time to re-evaluate the situation and stop the approach/perform a different approach.

LAX is a minutes-away divert, possibly 25 min with ATC considerations. That would have been my first inquiry if it seemed like BUR wasn't going to work out. Will be interesting to see if it came up in the crew's conversation.

WayexTDI wrote:

Chemist wrote:

The 270 @10 call was made only 1 to 2 minutes before the accident, per the liveatc recording.

That's still plenty of time to re-evaluate the situation and stop the approach/perform a different approach.

Of course. I was responding to somebody posting that the winds might have been different at landing, by pointing out how recently the wind had been called on the frequency prior to the landing.

JustAnFO wrote:

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

Max Manual Brakes will give you better braking performance than Autobrakes Max, so there is a little more margin available.

n471wn wrote:

maint123 wrote:

Lucky escape for the passengers.Could have easily been a tragedy.
Southwest seems to have quite a few issues lately.
This might due to pilot training or poorly maintained tyres or even a badly maintained runway. Anyone checking the Ra values of the runways.
If a bit of rain would result in such mishaps, London airports would be perpetually closed.

Reminds me not to fly southwest when in the US.

A comment that reminds me of the character Dustin Hoffman played in the movie Rainman. Come to the US and look for Qantas or perhaps if you want to fly an airline that has never lost a life try G4. It amazes me that anyone on this forum would make such a statement about an airline with 4000 flights a day that has been flying since 1971 and has lost ONE passenger in its history. I guess mathematics and probability was not taught in your schools

Agreed. I was about to comment, but you beat me to it. Maint123’s comment is very childish and pointless. Sounds like a 13 year old posting from their parent’s basement. WN has about as good of a statistical safety record as you can imagine.

CanesFan wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

I ran the numbers on this. I had to guess on the landing weight (I used 115,000 lb), and of course, I have no idea if there were any open deferrals.
RCC 5 (wet, good), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: 57 feet of runway remaining.
RCC 4 (wet, good to med), flaps 40°, autobrakes Max: exceeds available runway length. (Max landing weight in this condition is 106.6.)
Bear in mind these results include a 15% margin, so if you do everything right and fly right to specs, you would stop more than 57 feet from the end.

I find it curious that photos show the T/Rs not deployed as the aircraft rests in the EMAS. You are supposed to start stowing the T/Rs at 60 kt, unless the threat of a runway excursion develops, in which case, you are to use all available deceleration devices. They could have been trying to save the engines from damage from the flying pulverized cellular concrete by stowing them just before entering the EMAS bed (unlikely, IMO), they could have had difficulty deploying the T/Rs on the landing roll, or they simply stowed them after they came to a stop.

Max Manual Brakes will give you better braking performance than Autobrakes Max, so there is a little more margin available.

That is true, but SWA mandates autobrakes be used on a wet runway.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Someone who knows about the barrier characteristics and specs could calculate how much speed the aircraft was carrying based on distance into the barrier and weight of the aircraft. Sure the Ftsb will be working on that. But based on how far it went, it looks like they had no business landing on that runway at that time.

kiowa wrote:

Chemist wrote:

The 270 @10 call was made only 1 to 2 minutes before the accident, per the liveatc recording.

Does Southwest have a maximum allowable tailwind regardless of how bad the weather is for their 737s?

Yes SW has a max allowable tailwind component- I’m not sure what it is, but I have seen them land on a short runway with a 15 knot tailwind. Where I work, the max tailwind is 10 knots, based on the wind check- we could have attempted the landing (although my airline assumes +RA means standing water on the runway, which has a braking action equivalent to “POOR”, so we couldnt have landed based on the rain unless someone else landed and reported better braking action)

My employer also does a runway assessment for every type of aircraft to each runway at an airport. Most of our runways have no restrictions. Some get prohibited, and others have specific restrictions- for instance a shorter runway may require some form of vertical guidance (VASI, ILS GP, or a GPS GP). As runways get shorter, we have more restrictions on weather conditions and requirements for deceleration devices.

As I said, my airline would not have allowed an airline would not have allowed us to land at BUR during that particular moment.

Additionally most US airlines do not authorize circling approaches in IMC, so the only useful approaches to BUR, are to runway 8- if the tailwind comp ent for runway 8 is too strong, it would shutdown the airport in IMC.

I'm not sure if it has been mentioned, but looking at the ILS approach plate for RWY 8, the threshold crossing height (TCH) is 60 feet. Typically it is 50 feet. The non-coincident PAPI has a TCH of 72. Combine that with a 10 knot tailwind and braking action less than good and you can see why an incident like this can happen, particularly if the PF transitioned to the PAPI. My company has short runway procedures when braking action is less than good where you pretty much have to touchdown by the 1200 foot point or else the landing performance data is not considered valid. Having a higher TCH makes that far more challenging.

JustAnFO wrote:

That is true, but SWA mandates autobrakes be used on a wet runway.

My company does as well, but allows max manual braking to be used. I believe the intent is to dissuade pilots from leaving the autobrake selector in off.

Damn, the WN bashing is kind of irritating. The fact is, nobody got hurt, and a system to prevent an overrun worked great! A few egos might get bruised, and the plane will likely require some major work, but... WN is still doing what it does best, and a tragedy was averted. This isnt going to deter me from flying WN! I get to check 2 free bags, and that alone is value to me.

I couldn't imagine looking out the front window and seeing the end of the runway coming. Just beyond thankful everyone is okay.

BoeingGuy wrote:

Agreed. I was about to comment, but you beat me to it. Maint123’s comment is very childish and pointless. Sounds like a 13 year old posting from their parent’s basement. WN has about as good of a statistical safety record as you can imagine.

Their work is no better in the JT610 thread. I added them to my "foes" list and don't have to read that stuff anymore.

Would BUR be a candidate for an RNP onto 15? Might solve some of the IMC weather issues.

YYZatcboy wrote:

Would BUR be a candidate for an RNP onto 15? Might solve some of the IMC weather issues.

I do not know about the BUR area but many airports use specific runways for noise reasons as a priority.

CanesFan wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

That is true, but SWA mandates autobrakes be used on a wet runway.

My company does as well, but allows max manual braking to be used. I believe the intent is to dissuade pilots from leaving the autobrake selector in off.

I doubt that SWA’s mandate means that you can’t kick off the Autobrakes and hit the brakes hard if the Captain thinks it’s necessay. I assume they mean you have to start the Landing with the Autobrakes set.

BoeingGuy wrote:

CanesFan wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

That is true, but SWA mandates autobrakes be used on a wet runway.

My company does as well, but allows max manual braking to be used. I believe the intent is to dissuade pilots from leaving the autobrake selector in off.

I doubt that SWA’s mandate means that you can’t kick off the Autobrakes and hit the brakes hard if the Captain thinks it’s necessay. I assume they mean you have to start the Landing with the Autobrakes set.

I agree with this. My original response to the poster above who was providing landing distances based on autobrakes max, was that max manual braking provides an even greater margin than autobrakes max. My company provides this information and allows it's use for landing distance calculations.

BoeingGuy wrote:

CanesFan wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

That is true, but SWA mandates autobrakes be used on a wet runway.

My company does as well, but allows max manual braking to be used. I believe the intent is to dissuade pilots from leaving the autobrake selector in off.

I doubt that SWA’s mandate means that you can’t kick off the Autobrakes and hit the brakes hard if the Captain thinks it’s necessay. I assume they mean you have to start the Landing with the Autobrakes set.

That’s correct, you are encouraged to use max manual braking if autobrakes alone aren’t getting the job done. But pilots are not provided max manual numbers, and if the performance system says you can’t stop with max autobrakes, you can’t land.


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JustAnFO wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

CanesFan wrote:

My company does as well, but allows max manual braking to be used. I believe the intent is to dissuade pilots from leaving the autobrake selector in off.

I doubt that SWA’s mandate means that you can’t kick off the Autobrakes and hit the brakes hard if the Captain thinks it’s necessay. I assume they mean you have to start the Landing with the Autobrakes set.

That’s correct, you are encouraged to use max manual braking if autobrakes alone aren’t getting the job done. But pilots are not provided max manual numbers, and if the performance system says you can’t stop with max autobrakes, you can’t land.

Ok, so Southwest doesn't have those numbers. Makes more sense now. Thanks.

CanesFan wrote:

JustAnFO wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

I doubt that SWA’s mandate means that you can’t kick off the Autobrakes and hit the brakes hard if the Captain thinks it’s necessay. I assume they mean you have to start the Landing with the Autobrakes set.

That’s correct, you are encouraged to use max manual braking if autobrakes alone aren’t getting the job done. But pilots are not provided max manual numbers, and if the performance system says you can’t stop with max autobrakes, you can’t land.

Ok, so Southwest doesn't have those numbers. Makes more sense now. Thanks.

If other airlines have those numbers why wouldn’t Southwest?

What is the aircraft status, please?

No Tax On Rotax

Web500sjc wrote:

kiowa wrote:

Chemist wrote:

The 270 @10 call was made only 1 to 2 minutes before the accident, per the liveatc recording.

Does Southwest have a maximum allowable tailwind regardless of how bad the weather is for their 737s?

Yes SW has a max allowable tailwind component- I’m not sure what it is, but I have seen them land on a short runway with a 15 knot tailwind. Where I work, the max tailwind is 10 knots, based on the wind check- we could have attempted the landing (although my airline assumes +RA means standing water on the runway, which has a braking action equivalent to “POOR”, so we couldnt have landed based on the rain unless someone else landed and reported better braking action)

My employer also does a runway assessment for every type of aircraft to each runway at an airport. Most of our runways have no restrictions. Some get prohibited, and others have specific restrictions- for instance a shorter runway may require some form of vertical guidance (VASI, ILS GP, or a GPS GP). As runways get shorter, we have more restrictions on weather conditions and requirements for deceleration devices.

As I said, my airline would not have allowed an airline would not have allowed us to land at BUR during that particular moment.

Additionally most US airlines do not authorize circling approaches in IMC, so the only useful approaches to BUR, are to runway 8- if the tailwind comp ent for runway 8 is too strong, it would shutdown the airport in IMC.

Max tailwind is 10 kts at WN. The only exception is 15 kts at SJO. If braking action is poor tailwind limit is 5 kts.

Any updates on the condition of the aircraft or photos. I drove past the blast fence at the end of 08 and didn’t see it parked anywhere in relative view. Perhaps storing it on the west end adjacent to Atlantic Aviation FBO where they parked and scrapped N668SW when she went thru the fence back in 2000?

I wonder what the condition of the EMAS is? Is it still torn up (I know they're using rwy 8 again now), or has it already been repaired?

[*]

Chemist wrote:

I wonder what the condition of the EMAS is? Is it still torn up (I know they're using rwy 8 again now), or has it already been repaired?

Earlier in the thread it was brought up that the manufacturer for EMAS no longer produces or supports the EMAS tiles. So I would assume they have not fixed it.

jetmatt777 wrote:

[*]

Chemist wrote:

I wonder what the condition of the EMAS is? Is it still torn up (I know they're using rwy 8 again now), or has it already been repaired?

Earlier in the thread it was brought up that the manufacturer for EMAS no longer produces or supports the EMAS tiles. So I would assume they have not fixed it.

...and that's why I'm wondering.
The end of the runway is visible from the terminal, so somebody should be able to get a picture to see what it looks like.
Also if relatively few tiles were affected, perhaps there's enough supply to fix it quickly.

Chemist wrote:

jetmatt777 wrote:

[*]

Chemist wrote:

I wonder what the condition of the EMAS is? Is it still torn up (I know they're using rwy 8 again now), or has it already been repaired?

Earlier in the thread it was brought up that the manufacturer for EMAS no longer produces or supports the EMAS tiles. So I would assume they have not fixed it.

...and that's why I'm wondering.
The end of the runway is visible from the terminal, so somebody should be able to get a picture to see what it looks like.
Also if relatively few tiles were affected, perhaps there's enough supply to fix it quickly.

Even if there was stock available, the damage needs to be assessed, quote needs to be obtained, liability established before anything happens.