The preliminary report show that the MCAS is the cause of the runaway trim situation. Boeing not only confirmed this officially with the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) Number 2018-23-51, but detailed the unsafe condition that exist in 737-8 and -9 aircraft design, and revised operating procedure to be effective within 3 days after receipt.
Are you sure it's not a "potential unsafe condition if pilots don't follow the recovery procedure in a timely fashion"? I find it hard to believe Boeing would say that MCAS failing by itself is unsafe.
Yes I am sure this is a "Unsafe Condition" (not a potential one, a very real one), because this is Boeing own words. Read carefully the AD and verify by yourself: the unsafe condition is the _CAUSE_ of the crew difficulty controlling the airplane. The crew is not part of the unsafe condition creation at all, the Boeing design is. This point was officially addressed by Boeing itself, so there no point for conspiracy theory against Boeing on that exact subject. My point of view, as you can verify be reading my previous posts, is that the civil aircraft industry, regardless of the brand, have to evolve the algorithms used to filter the sensors to take a system width approach and flight dynamic predictors.
Some keys parts of the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) Number 2018-23-51:
"(a) Effective Date
This Emergency AD is effective upon receipt."
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-8 and -9 airplanes, certificated in any
"(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by analysis performed by the manufacturer showing that if an
erroneously high single angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is received by the flight control system,
there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer. We are issuing
this AD to address this potential resulting nose-down trim, which could cause the flight crew to have
difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss,
and possible impact with terrain."
"(g) Revision of Airplane Flight Manual (AFM): Certificate Limitations
Within 3 days after receipt of this AD, revise the Certificate Limitations chapter of the
applicable AFM to include the information in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD."
"(h) AFM Revision: Operating Procedures
Within 3 days after receipt of this AD, revise the Operating Procedures chapter of the
applicable AFM to include the information in figure 2 to paragraph (h) of this AD."