http://avherald.com/h?article=42a18e75&opt=0
Simon was so friendly to find, and translate, the final report. Apparently, the A300's alpha floor protection kicked in as a reaction to decaying airspeed and increasing pitch. However, the excessive nose-up trim for the situation, that had been set prior and was not adjusted properly by the crew, lead the plane directly into a stall.

Now my question: Do other aircrafts' alpha floor/stall protection work similarly or would newer Airbuses, or a Boeing, adjust trim so that the aircraft remains properly trimmed?

The A300 sounds like it might be different thaan A320s and newer. This article implies the aircraft needed manual trimming. In an A320, you can hold the sidestick full aft and it will prevent a stall. It also has low energy warnings. Also, in the 320, you never touch the trim wheels unless you're in direct law. The A300 sounds ancient... more like a 737.

The A320/330/40/50/80 is developing bad 'pilots' if you can even call them that.

The lack of trim blinds the pilots to the energy state of the aircraft. A Boeing product would have flown out of the stall AF447 was in and probably QZ8501.

The planes were designed with the lowest common denominator in mind. In normal operation, sure. In an emergency - nightmare.

greendot wrote:

The A300 sounds like it might be different thaan A320s and newer. This article implies the aircraft needed manual trimming. In an A320, you can hold the sidestick full aft and it will prevent a stall. It also has low energy warnings. Also, in the 320, you never touch the trim wheels unless you're in direct law. The A300 sounds ancient... more like a 737.

I mean, this aircraft was built in 1979, I'm not sure how advanced you expect it to be.

The A300 didn’t have FBW controls or Alpha floor, it was a conventional airplane including pilot input to trim. Those features were introduced on the A320. Now, if they meant it had autothrottles that automatically responded to the stall warning by applying TOGA power in an attempt to save them, I’d believe it.

GF

Something similar happened with an A320 in the Mediterranean with the Air NZ 888 test flight. Pitch was trimmed for slow flight, engines went to TOGA and they missed the use "Manual Pitch Trim" cue that would have most likely kept them from getting into the situation they got into.

Also wasn't there a Father and Son on the crew on this AeroUnion flight?

Varsity1 wrote:

The A320/330/40/50/80 is developing bad 'pilots' if you can even call them that.

The lack of trim blinds the pilots to the energy state of the aircraft. A Boeing product would have flown out of the stall AF447 was in and probably QZ8501.

The planes were designed with the lowest common denominator in mind. In normal operation, sure. In an emergency - nightmare.

Well, let me tell you this as a pilot who flew 707s, 737s, and now the Airbus. You say that Axxx aircraft are making bad pilots. I don't find this to be true. Trim is just one indicator and not a terribly good one because of the various weights involved with medium to large sized aircrafts. Even on the 707, with a loud moving trim wheel, it was very easy to lose track of your energy state because you were so preoccupied with so many other tasks that could be assisted by software. I personally never had any problems but the amount of training that it took to accomplish basic tasks is higher compared to Airbus aircraft. So in a way, yes, classic Boeing products make you better at stick and rudder skills. However, this is a two edge sword because it is also quite unforgiving when you don't have those stick and rudder skills. Case in point, if you are tired, you won't even recognize it. Throw in a late night flight to an airport with bad weather, windshear, and a few MELs disabling the auto pilot, and you've got a recipe for disaster. Comparable Beoings such as 737 require a significant amount of consistent attention that no pilot can reliably deliver 100% of the time. Throw in an emergency and things get quite a bit more complex in a typical 737. For example, if you encounter windshear shortly after take off, escaping it is squarely in the hands of the pilot without any real help from the airplane.

In the Airbus, it's a whole different matter. The Airbus helps you quite a bit during abnormal situations. For example, if you lose an engine after V1, you merely need to fly the crosshairs commanded by the SRS system. What is really neat is that you can engage the auto pilot almost immediately after take off and it will perfectly fly the engine failure procedure. Another example, if you get into windshear, you can simply hold the sidestick full aft and the computer will prevent the airplane from stalling while simultaneously ensuring the best performance to separate you from the ground. The same is true of a GPWS escape maneuver. The Airbus has three operating modes: normal law, alternate law, and direct law. 99% of the time you operate in normal law with all of the protections mentioned above. Very rarely you will get into alternate law which would still offer some protections, but not all. In the worst case, it's all computers and sensors fail or some similar situation occurs, the airplane will revert to direct law where it flies like a conventional airplane or otherwise exactly like a Boeing. I actually have more time in Boeing aircraft then I do in the Airbus but I find the Airbus to be a better design more suited to the common mistakes of human factors. In the end, I'm probably a lot safer in the Airbus then in the Boeing (737, 767, 757 and younger). I think all of the newer Boeing aircraft are now the fly by wire equivalent of the A320 and later.

After 4 1/2 years of flying the Airbus now, I still don't get why people think that the Airbus was designed for the common denominator. I always found the Boeing products to be simpler to understand because it is so basic. The Airbus is significantly more complex because it's not just a mechanical system. There is a very complex computer system. There is quite a bit more to know on an Airbus. I think the difference is that training departments emphasize systems more because it's more hands-on, they understand the Husky pencil sized concepts better, and thus they can drown you in the academic exercise of tracing a drop the fuel through the fuel system. In the Airbus, the systems are so complex that the end-user is abstracted from having to know all of the details. Therefore, since Training departments have such a low mastery how the Airbus systems really work, they pass on a higher level of abstraction to students. As with any modern aircraft, you essentially have to be a software engineer to truly understand how anything really works.

greendot wrote:

Varsity1 wrote:

The A320/330/40/50/80 is developing bad 'pilots' if you can even call them that.

The lack of trim blinds the pilots to the energy state of the aircraft. A Boeing product would have flown out of the stall AF447 was in and probably QZ8501.

The planes were designed with the lowest common denominator in mind. In normal operation, sure. In an emergency - nightmare.

Well, let me tell you this as a pilot who flew 707s, 737s, and now the Airbus. You say that Axxx aircraft are making bad pilots. I don't find this to be true. Trim is just one indicator and not a terribly good one because of the various weights involved with medium to large sized aircrafts. Even on the 707, with a loud moving trim wheel, it was very easy to lose track of your energy state because you were so preoccupied with so many other tasks that could be assisted by software. I personally never had any problems but the amount of training that it took to accomplish basic tasks is higher compared to Airbus aircraft. So in a way, yes, classic Boeing products make you better at stick and rudder skills. However, this is a two edge sword because it is also quite unforgiving when you don't have those stick and rudder skills. Case in point, if you are tired, you won't even recognize it. Throw in a late night flight to an airport with bad weather, windshear, and a few MELs disabling the auto pilot, and you've got a recipe for disaster. Comparable Beoings such as 737 require a significant amount of consistent attention that no pilot can reliably deliver 100% of the time. Throw in an emergency and things get quite a bit more complex in a typical 737. For example, if you encounter windshear shortly after take off, escaping it is squarely in the hands of the pilot without any real help from the airplane.

In the Airbus, it's a whole different matter. The Airbus helps you quite a bit during abnormal situations. For example, if you lose an engine after V1, you merely need to fly the crosshairs commanded by the SRS system. What is really neat is that you can engage the auto pilot almost immediately after take off and it will perfectly fly the engine failure procedure. Another example, if you get into windshear, you can simply hold the sidestick full aft and the computer will prevent the airplane from stalling while simultaneously ensuring the best performance to separate you from the ground. The same is true of a GPWS escape maneuver. The Airbus has three operating modes: normal law, alternate law, and direct law. 99% of the time you operate in normal law with all of the protections mentioned above. Very rarely you will get into alternate law which would still offer some protections, but not all. In the worst case, it's all computers and sensors fail or some similar situation occurs, the airplane will revert to direct law where it flies like a conventional airplane or otherwise exactly like a Boeing. I actually have more time in Boeing aircraft then I do in the Airbus but I find the Airbus to be a better design more suited to the common mistakes of human factors. In the end, I'm probably a lot safer in the Airbus then in the Boeing (737, 767, 757 and younger). I think all of the newer Boeing aircraft are now the fly by wire equivalent of the A320 and later.

After 4 1/2 years of flying the Airbus now, I still don't get why people think that the Airbus was designed for the common denominator. I always found the Boeing products to be simpler to understand because it is so basic. The Airbus is significantly more complex because it's not just a mechanical system. There is a very complex computer system. There is quite a bit more to know on an Airbus. I think the difference is that training departments emphasize systems more because it's more hands-on, they understand the Husky pencil sized concepts better, and thus they can drown you in the academic exercise of tracing a drop the fuel through the fuel system. In the Airbus, the systems are so complex that the end-user is abstracted from having to know all of the details. Therefore, since Training departments have such a low mastery how the Airbus systems really work, they pass on a higher level of abstraction to students. As with any modern aircraft, you essentially have to be a software engineer to truly understand how anything really works.

I admire your lengthy reply and can second that the Airbus products of today are a pleasure to work with and provide great features, both in safety redundancy as well as in day to day operations. I just transitioned from the 737 to the 330 and love the new airplane. Talking about trim, while maybe not directly aware of the actual position, the fact that the aircraft is always in a trimmed state gives very gentle and predictable handling qualities.

The first time I flew a terrain escape manœuvre in the Airbus I was amazed at the shear power and climb rate, all while staying in the flight envelope. I was just as amazed at the fact that I had somehow always been reluctant or over cautious in the 737 flying these exact same manœuvres. I was the envelope protection in the 737 and it was way more of a challenge to fly on the edge of the envelope than now on the Airbus.

I cannot agree more to the fact that you have to know and understand the Airbus product and philosophy to a greater extent than perhaps on a Boeing. But don’t be fooled about the modern Boeing fly by wire architecture. Check your rumors and facts!

Varsity1 wrote:

A Boeing product would have flown out of the stall AF447 was in and probably QZ8501.

Uh... where do we start?!

Greendot already gave you an in-depth and correct answer.

I'd add that there are plenty of accident on different types of aircraft and cockpit arrangements. Don't believe the any manufacturer is immune to issues. And in particular, humans fail in many ways, no matter what equipment they are on. Read up on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest ... light_6231, a Boeing aircraft in similar circumstances as AF447.

Finally, the list of issues from the Monterrey crash is long. From the avherald article:

- lack of crew resource management
- reduced situation awareness
- standard operating procedures not being followed
- non-stabilized approach in a non-precision approach procedure
- improper aircraft configuration
- the speed decreased to 110 knots below 1000 feet AGL for about 30 seconds without reaction by the crew

tb727 wrote:

Something similar happened with an A320 in the Mediterranean with the Air NZ 888 test flight. Pitch was trimmed for slow flight, engines went to TOGA and they missed the use "Manual Pitch Trim" cue that would have most likely kept them from getting into the situation they got into.

Also wasn't there a Father and Son on the crew on this AeroUnion flight?

Yes, the Captain was the father of the co-pilot

tb727 wrote:

Something similar happened with an A320 in the Mediterranean with the Air NZ 888 test flight. Pitch was trimmed for slow flight, engines went to TOGA and they missed the use "Manual Pitch Trim" cue that would have most likely kept them from getting into the situation they got into.

Also wasn't there a Father and Son on the crew on this AeroUnion flight?

Yes, the Captain was the father of the co-pilot

AirlineCritic wrote:

Varsity1 wrote:

A Boeing product would have flown out of the stall AF447 was in and probably QZ8501.

Uh... where do we start?!

Greendot already gave you an in-depth and correct answer.

I'd add that there are plenty of accident on different types of aircraft and cockpit arrangements. Don't believe the any manufacturer is immune to issues. And in particular, humans fail in many ways, no matter what equipment they are on. Read up on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest ... light_6231, a Boeing aircraft in similar circumstances as AF447.

Finally, the list of issues from the Monterrey crash is long. From the avherald article:

- lack of crew resource management
- reduced situation awareness
- standard operating procedures not being followed
- non-stabilized approach in a non-precision approach procedure
- improper aircraft configuration
- the speed decreased to 110 knots below 1000 feet AGL for about 30 seconds without reaction by the crew

It's a bit of a stretch comparing an accident in 1974 to one in 2009, especially considering how different the two aircraft were technology wise.

The simple fact is, no matter how much technology is put into aircraft, there will always be a case when the people up front will do something out of the norm, not follow correct proceedures, etc and find a way to write off the aircraft, no matter who made it.

In the Airbus, it's a whole different matter. The Airbus helps you quite a bit during abnormal situations. For example, if you lose an engine after V1, you merely need to fly the crosshairs commanded by the SRS system. What is really neat is that you can engage the auto pilot almost immediately after take off and it will perfectly fly the engine failure procedure. Another example, if you get into windshear, you can simply hold the sidestick full aft and the computer will prevent the airplane from stalling while simultaneously ensuring the best performance to separate you from the ground. The same is true of a GPWS escape maneuver. The Airbus has three operating modes: normal law, alternate law, and direct law. 99% of the time you operate in normal law with all of the protections mentioned above. Very rarely you will get into alternate law which would still offer some protections, but not all. In the worst case, it's all computers and sensors fail or some similar situation occurs, the airplane will revert to direct law where it flies like a conventional airplane or otherwise exactly like a Boeing. I actually have more time in Boeing aircraft then I do in the Airbus but I find the Airbus to be a better design more suited to the common mistakes of human factors. In the end, I'm probably a lot safer in the Airbus then in the Boeing (737, 767, 757 and younger). I think all of the newer Boeing aircraft are now the fly by wire equivalent of the A320 and later.

End of quote
———————————————————————
Everything in here has made bad pilots.

This is monkey stuff. Nowhere in it does any intuition come into play. In trouble? Reef back on stick. It’s complete nonsense.

Any Airbus pilots want to tell me how great and intuitive the aircraft is, explain sidestick priority logic to me in two sentences. It’s explained in a massive chapter in the FCOM. Flight control logic? Same nonsense. Normal, Direct, Alternate laws. Funny when you start losing these protections you can no longer fly the airplane like a monkey. No more haul on stick to fly to safetyville.

There are two massive design flaws in that aircraft. One. The sticks don’t move or repeat each other’s movements. AAF447 does not hit the water if they did. 2) thrust levers locked in detents. If they moved a simple hand rested on them can instinctively feel what the airplane is doing.

You can tell an airbus pilot as they fly around with their hands on the laps. Something you didn’t see twenty years ago.

It’s a highly successful aircraft. But there are some root design flaws that have indeed as a previous poster commented on, has created some poor pilots. Automation has trumped airmanship in some cases through odd design.

Ignoring all the A vs B comments here that are about as intelligent as a sack of expired potatoes, didn't that happen with XL 888T and China 140 too? The latter was an A300 and IIRC sth similar happened with the TO/GA mode or sth I can't quite recall

Everything in here has made bad pilots.
This is monkey stuff. Nowhere in it does any intuition come into play. In trouble? Reef back on stick. It’s complete nonsense.

Qualify what you mean by intuition? Is it intuitive to pull back on the yoke for someone who only plays Ace Combat on the PS4? (the default settings on most aviation games have you push up to climb). Is it intuitive to turn the airplane using the rudder pedals or tiller instead of turning the yoke (steering wheel) left or right? Your expectations of intuition are not defined by intuition.. they are preprogrammed through training. Would it blow your mind to think that the Airbus can be flown with a keyboard only? The sidestick, FMGS, MCDU, etc. are only artificiality built into the system for old school pilots who don't understand the computer science behind it all.

Any Airbus pilots want to tell me how great and intuitive the aircraft is, explain sidestick priority logic to me in two sentences. It’s explained in a massive chapter in the FCOM. Flight control logic? Same nonsense. Normal, Direct, Alternate laws. Funny when you start losing these protections you can no longer fly the airplane like a monkey. No more haul on stick to fly to safetyville.

Press the takeoffover/disconnect switch while actuating the control to get priority. Press it for a while and you'll lock out the other control (in the event of a faulty sidestick sensor). It's not terribly complex. I find it to be a piece of cake and I started my career flying jurassic Boeings!

Again, what do you mean by "nonsense"? Nonsense would be something like 1+1=3. That is non-sensical. I don't follow your use of the word.

As for losing the protections.. yes... you revert to flying just a regular airplane. Again, 99% of the time, this doesn't happen. LOTS of things have to fail in order for it to degrade even to Alternate Law. In the end, the Airbus is much safer overall because humans make lots and lots of mistakes. During emergencies and abnormal situations, the Airbus HELPS you quite a bit...

Read this... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flydubai_Flight_981
Go down to Findings. Look at the compounding effects of the 737 having no protections whatsever. Then tell me what you think about intuition. This was very very recent.

There are two massive design flaws in that aircraft. One. The sticks don’t move or repeat each other’s movements. AAF447 does not hit the water if they did. 2) thrust levers locked in detents. If they moved a simple hand rested on them can instinctively feel what the airplane is doing.

You have to reprogram your sense of intuition. Consider this... when I was air-refueling my airplane behind a tanker, would it be intuitive for me to hold the yoke left if I was already left of tanker centerline and drifting further left? No, it wouldn't be. Your "instinct" would be to correct back to the centerline by turning the yoke to the right. However, if you did this, you would get into a Pilot Induced Oscillation as you bounce further and further out of stability between the vortices/thrustflow of the inboard tanker engines. Instead, you have to reprogram your intuition to hold the yoke left, and gradually release it in pulses between left and center as you "walk back" to the center of the tanker. It's totally "non-intuitive"! And this was a Boeing 707-320C!

On a Boeing C-17 (USAF), is it intuitive to flare by adding thrust? Nope. Yet again.. different airplane. In that airplane, you flare with thrust.

You can tell an airbus pilot as they fly around with their hands on the laps. Something you didn’t see twenty years ago.

How many crashes and incidents were attributed to people with great stick and rudder skills back then?

Automation has trumped airmanship in some cases through odd design.

How so?

I'd really like to know what you think about the incident I linked above...

Varsity1 wrote:

The A320/330/40/50/80 is developing bad 'pilots' if you can even call them that.

The lack of trim blinds the pilots to the energy state of the aircraft. A Boeing product would have flown out of the stall AF447 was in and probably QZ8501.

The planes were designed with the lowest common denominator in mind. In normal operation, sure. In an emergency - nightmare.

Can you then explain why more Boeing’s than Airbus’s have crashed due to LOC-I (Loss of control Inflight) accidents? I can’t believe this stupid Boeing vs Airbus false perception still persists.

T54A wrote:

I can’t believe this stupid Boeing vs Airbus false perception still persists.

I agree. Having flown both A and B it's nothing more than one side puffing their chest out, then the other side doing the same back. Most of it is due to not fully understanding a difference in design or just pure preference. Maybe some nationalism sprinkled in here and there.

Hello everyone,

I am new in this forum, I live in Mexico. I want to talk a little bit about to this subject.

I have access to the original document, is a public document you can ask to the SCT, and they give to you. So I ask for permission to discuss some aspects about the airbus 300 protection system.

pismak wrote:

Hello everyone,

I am new in this forum, I live in Mexico. I want to talk a little bit about to this subject.

I have access to the original document, is a public document you can ask to the SCT, and they give to you. So I ask for permission to discuss some aspects about the airbus 300 protection system.

Welcome! No need to ask permission, discuss away!

tb727 wrote:

pismak wrote:

Hello everyone,

I am new in this forum, I live in Mexico. I want to talk a little bit about to this subject.

I have access to the original document, is a public document you can ask to the SCT, and they give to you. So I ask for permission to discuss some aspects about the airbus 300 protection system.

Welcome! No need to ask permission, discuss away!

I wrote some messages with quotes to the original report, but two messages where not approved, so It is a bit difficult, because I don't want make the original file public completely by now, and if I extract some data of the report, the message is not approved, so I am waiting, and then release the report.

Also, I want to apply the rules, and I read the terms. The report is Public Information available in the Mexico Government, and can be used with no permission, Reports are for learn about accidents.

By the way I understand a moderator could be suspicious... if I don't point out the source.

pismak wrote:

tb727 wrote:

pismak wrote:

Hello everyone,

I am new in this forum, I live in Mexico. I want to talk a little bit about to this subject.

I have access to the original document, is a public document you can ask to the SCT, and they give to you. So I ask for permission to discuss some aspects about the airbus 300 protection system.

Welcome! No need to ask permission, discuss away!

I wrote some messages with quotes to the original report, but two messages where not approved, so It is a bit difficult, because I don't want make the original file public completely by now, and if I extract some data of the report, the message is not approved, so I am waiting, and then release the report.

Also, I want to apply the rules, and I read the terms. The report is Public Information available in the Mexico Government, and can be used with no permission, Reports are for learn about accidents.

By the way I understand a moderator could be suspicious... if I don't point out the source.

Lack of sources has never stopped anybody from posting on A.net.
I suspect your first post wasn't accepted since it was your first and your account needed to be approved to prevent spamming by bots, not because of your documents.

Post away.

Varsity1 wrote:

The A320/330/40/50/80 is developing bad 'pilots' if you can even call them that.

The lack of trim blinds the pilots to the energy state of the aircraft. A Boeing product would have flown out of the stall AF447 was in and probably QZ8501.

The planes were designed with the lowest common denominator in mind. In normal operation, sure. In an emergency - nightmare.

Touche - the Asiana 242 777 crash on approach to SFO would never have happened with the low energy / alpha floor protections Airbus employs - (indeed there are many reports of these systems being triggered, investigated, etc - and you never hear about them, even though almost every scenario could have been deadly without the protections.)

On the other hand, Boeing's AT system in the 777 can become a little convoluted on approach - ironically though, the Asiana crew even stated to investigators that they "thought the system would prevent a stall" / manage the energy for them, regardless of what they did wrong. Keep in mind this is a Boeing we're talking about here.

So we need to keep an open mind - I completely agree with the issues of automation, but this isn't simply an airbus thing. If anything they go one step further and have core backups in case you really do become completely oblivious.

PS: I posted it a while back and will have to dig it up, an incident was investigated where an A320 flew a really unstable approach, essentially identical to the Asiana flight, and both alpha floor and low energy protections kicked in (over a rather significant span of time) eventually resulting in uncommanded TOGA power. You've gotta read the reports of AB protections in the real world to really appreciate them, especially comparing to similar scenarios in other aircraft or crashes. It can be pretty humbling.

Actually to add to my post above - wasn't it Boeing's response to the Asiana crash that the control logic for the 777 AT system was specifically designed to disconnect in the way it did, so that "the pilots would always be the ones in ultimate control of the aircraft" or something to that extent?

Haven't they also subsequently redesigned the way that system works?

It's really difficult to have decent automation in certain areas while also fundamentally stressing stick and rudder for critical situations. Personally I think that creates far greater confusion for pilots, which the SFO crash perfectly illustrates.

greendot wrote:

I'd really like to know what you think about the incident I linked above...

Thanks for your input and responses, it's very interesting to hear from a real pilot who has flown both and understands the systems in the real world. You don't seem to have bias - you're just a pilot doing his job that's come up with some take-aways from different aircraft over the years.

As far as intuition goes - I COMPLETELY agree. As for the other poster - we aren't talking about normal flight regimes here. In a serious emergency, bad weather, zero vis at night, exhausted flight crew, on approach, sketchy MDA/terrain, etc - for someone to suggest that the few hundred pax lives behind you should rely SOLEY on your immediate and flawless execution of not only flying the aircraft (possibly in a perfect pitch/trim with engine out or other damage with no margin for error) in addition to CRM and diagnostics simultaneously is ridiculous. Most can do that the majority of the time (sure, it's their jobs) but what about the one time you're off your game a bit? No way. In that situation its kinda "shoot first and ask questions later" - pull back on the sidestick and let the plane give you max performance automatically while you communicate and go through ECAM, checklists, etc. Everyone's safe 10 out of 10 times, zero variables. I really don't understand how people can argue against these things.

This thread is very sad, so many Boeing fan boys shooting from the hip not knowing what they are talking about.

The aircraft in question was an A300B4-200, an analogue cockpit, 3 crew operation. Similar layout to a 747 classic, L1011, DC10.

The aircraft has a yoke, fully connected, and thrust levers that move just like a Boeing autothrottle. It has a conventional trim on the yoke, and a big trim wheel next to the pilots leg.

This accident basically occourd due to the pilots having the autopilot connected and the autothrottle disconnected.

They were doing a VOR non precision approach, during the procedure turn they levelled off, the autopilot trimming the aircraft to maintain height, with thrust at idle. The aircraft autothrottle woke up and stopped them from getting too slow.

On final the were busy looking for the runway, again they let the aircraft get slow with idle thrust, aircraft adding trim to maintain the path as the speed decreased. Again the autothrottle woke up as they got too slow, they were so slow the trim was at its limit. With the added thrust they were out of trim.

Conventional controls, conventional thrust levers, conventional trim, 3 cockpit.

Accident basically happened becused all the crew were too focused on finding the runway no one was flying the aircraft.

zeke wrote:

Conventional controls, conventional thrust levers, conventional trim, 3 cockpit.

But... but... but... Airbus baaaaad!

SAAFNAV wrote:

Lack of sources has never stopped anybody from posting on A.net.
I suspect your first post wasn't accepted since it was your first and your account needed to be approved to prevent spamming by bots, not because of your documents.

Post away.

This is why I wrote again a short message to try if it was because was one of my first messages. Unfortunately, I didn't make a backup of the messages. I will try to rewrite my analysis in a while.

estorilm wrote:

Actually to add to my post above - wasn't it Boeing's response to the Asiana crash that the control logic for the 777 AT system was specifically designed to disconnect in the way it did, so that "the pilots would always be the ones in ultimate control of the aircraft" or something to that extent?

Haven't they also subsequently redesigned the way that system works?

It's really difficult to have decent automation in certain areas while also fundamentally stressing stick and rudder for critical situations. Personally I think that creates far greater confusion for pilots, which the SFO crash perfectly illustrates.

greendot wrote:

I'd really like to know what you think about the incident I linked above...

Thanks for your input and responses, it's very interesting to hear from a real pilot who has flown both and understands the systems in the real world. You don't seem to have bias - you're just a pilot doing his job that's come up with some take-aways from different aircraft over the years.

As far as intuition goes - I COMPLETELY agree. As for the other poster - we aren't talking about normal flight regimes here. In a serious emergency, bad weather, zero vis at night, exhausted flight crew, on approach, sketchy MDA/terrain, etc - for someone to suggest that the few hundred pax lives behind you should rely SOLEY on your immediate and flawless execution of not only flying the aircraft (possibly in a perfect pitch/trim with engine out or other damage with no margin for error) in addition to CRM and diagnostics simultaneously is ridiculous. Most can do that the majority of the time (sure, it's their jobs) but what about the one time you're off your game a bit? No way. In that situation its kinda "shoot first and ask questions later" - pull back on the sidestick and let the plane give you max performance automatically while you communicate and go through ECAM, checklists, etc. Everyone's safe 10 out of 10 times, zero variables. I really don't understand how people can argue against these things.

I personally think the problem with Boeing's automation is the lack of philosophy dictating why the automation is there in the first place. Automation is supposed to make things easier. In reality, it doesn't in many cases of Boeing aircraft. Modern automation increases the cognitive requirement significantly. It forces you to think and remember an extraordinary amount of information while synthesizing a solution in a limited timeline. It's poor human factors design that most Boeing aircraft suffer from. A320's and better were designed to be cognitively intuitive. Is it perfect? Not by a longshot... I certainly could improve a hundred different things on it, but at least it helps you a lot more than it works against you. The Asiana crash was a prime example of what I'm saying. Boeing products appear largely to be designed by committee, not by what a human factors trained engineer wants. I assure you that none of the Boeing engineers wanted the 737 to be what it is today. What the 737 is today is a product of customer imposed cost constraints, FAA regulations, and manufacturer legal liability. When Airbus accepted their design philosophy for the A320, they accepted the cost of all that. It was a big risk, which paid off. Boeing chose the lesser cost/lesser risk option, which offloads workload and training to the pilot.

Getting back at least somewhat on topic. Was this crash like the CI A306 TPE and NGO crashes, I vaguely recall issues with the auto pilot/auto thrust too.

Some experts say that is very similar with the China Airlines 140 crash at Nayoya in 1994. Also an A300 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Airlines_Flight_140

trex8 wrote:

Getting back at least somewhat on topic. Was this crash like the CI A306 TPE and NGO crashes, I vaguely recall issues with the auto pilot/auto thrust too.

Similar in that it was the same phase of flight - same aircraft, but the primary factor in the crash of the OP's incident was incorrect trim and lack of control authority to maintain AoA, which was very different to the last two crashes mentioned.

The last post was interesting, in that the pilots instinctively pulled back, in addition to the actions of the AP's TOGA procedure, basically instantly stalling the aircraft.

I like the A300, but I'd have to say it seems as if it's a little more unstable in TOGA regime if it's trimmed and configured for approach, almost to the point where it wants to do a backflip lol. Obviously there were thousands of perfectly successful TOGAs in the type, so (as always) there's more to it than that.

I wonder if any other pilots can chime in about the handling characteristics once you press that button.

greendot wrote:

I personally think the problem with Boeing's automation is the lack of philosophy dictating why the automation is there in the first place. Automation is supposed to make things easier. In reality, it doesn't in many cases of Boeing aircraft. Modern automation increases the cognitive requirement significantly. It forces you to think and remember an extraordinary amount of information while synthesizing a solution in a limited timeline. It's poor human factors design that most Boeing aircraft suffer from. A320's and better were designed to be cognitively intuitive. Is it perfect? Not by a longshot... I certainly could improve a hundred different things on it, but at least it helps you a lot more than it works against you. The Asiana crash was a prime example of what I'm saying. Boeing products appear largely to be designed by committee, not by what a human factors trained engineer wants. I assure you that none of the Boeing engineers wanted the 737 to be what it is today. What the 737 is today is a product of customer imposed cost constraints, FAA regulations, and manufacturer legal liability. When Airbus accepted their design philosophy for the A320, they accepted the cost of all that. It was a big risk, which paid off. Boeing chose the lesser cost/lesser risk option, which offloads workload and training to the pilot.

Exactly - automation should either "be there" or not, when you've gotta think about what will work and how it works, or how things may override different systems, or if a system is about to disconnect because of some action you're about to take, you are no longer focused on the things you're supposed to be focused on. Or conversely, if you ARE focused on something else, you might miss a disconnect or override and let it go unnoticed till things get dangerous.

Yes people will come in here and say "that's their job, it's not so hard to remember this basic stuff" - but again, we are talking about abnormal situations here, or a crew having an "off day" - which most of these crashes were. If pilots were perfect, there would be no need for any of these systems in the first place.

I do think a more streamlined approach to automation is on the horizon for Boeing - they can't keep adding and modifying systems that are still not directly/centrally linked to each other. A more clear definition of their philosophy on automation and ultimate control of the aircraft will probably be looked at in the future.

estorilm wrote:

trex8 wrote:

Getting back at least somewhat on topic. Was this crash like the CI A306 TPE and NGO crashes, I vaguely recall issues with the auto pilot/auto thrust too.

The last post was interesting, in that the pilots instinctively pulled back, in addition to the actions of the AP's TOGA procedure, basically instantly stalling the aircraft.

Following the report, in the Aerounion crash the pilots push forward the column to the top, but it was not enough to correct the influence of the trim and the 70-100% thrust