danj555 wrote:

jeffrey0032j wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

The huge victory of the 330 was Airbus taking advantage of the 787s years of delays and initial high cost of production. They sold hundreds. Most of us see that window has shut.

That huge victory came at a price. A price they are paying right now. They could had spent that time launching the neo earlier, to get a foothold in the market, but their shortsightedness and easy way out mentality got them into the A330neo rut they are in right now.

That's super true.. didn't think about it like that. If they launched 2-5 years before it would have killed

Engines weren't a problem, they could have done it.

It was the original "A350" but it seems the "market" (ILFC & GECAS) did not want it according to wikipedia...

Aither wrote:

danj555 wrote:

jeffrey0032j wrote:

That huge victory came at a price. A price they are paying right now. They could had spent that time launching the neo earlier, to get a foothold in the market, but their shortsightedness and easy way out mentality got them into the A330neo rut they are in right now.

That's super true.. didn't think about it like that. If they launched 2-5 years before it would have killed

Engines weren't a problem, they could have done it.

It was the original "A350" but it seems the "market" (ILFC & GECAS) did not want it according to wikipedia...

The A350 mk1 was not a bad plane but did not address Airbus’s issue of having nothing competitive (and later nothing at all) between the A333 and A380, which is a huge gap, while still largely just matching the 787 (like the A330neo, although the original A359 matched the 789’s range better). That was part of the market issue with the plane.

I’m not certain those CEO sales were short sighted. They came at essentially no cost to Airbus. What I think was short sighted was Airbus developing the NEO instead of optimizing the A350-800. The A350-800/900/1000 would have been very compelling to a lot of carriers, had that -800 been optimized for it’s size instead of a shrink of the -900.

Of course this is all from my kitchen while I’m waiting for my Airbus consulting fees.

Prost wrote:

I’m not certain those CEO sales were short sighted. They came at essentially no cost to Airbus. What I think was short sighted was Airbus developing the NEO instead of optimizing the A350-800. The A350-800/900/1000 would have been very compelling to a lot of carriers, had that -800 been optimized for it’s size instead of a shrink of the -900.

Of course this is all from my kitchen while I’m waiting for my Airbus consulting fees.

An A358 actually optimized for its size would be expensive to develop (probably close to the entire cost of the A330neo program if not more) and differ significantly from the A359. That is why Airbus dropped the optimization for a straight shrink in the first place. The A358 wasn’t getting enough market traction to justify developing it further than a shrink.

2175301 wrote:

[mjoelnir; the problem I see with your facts is that few people who buy the A350-900 are buying it for it's maximum range and payload (those routes are limited). What data I see on the average routes of the A350-900 is that they are within the capability of the 789. So, on average... the 789 is a better financial deal for the average A350-900 route. That appears to bring the 789 into play unless someone really has a need for the extra capacity and/or range of the A350-900. As I see it, the A350 does best competing within markets that predominantly use several of the later 777 models.

Have a great day,

I doubt the validity of that comparison. The biggest A350 operators all fly them on short haul routes; CX HKG-TPE/BKK/SIN etc, SQ SIN-CGK/BKK/HKG etc, QR DOH-MLE/MCT, AY HEL-LHR, VN HAN-SGN/HKG etc. All of those will heavily skew the 'average' A350 route.

Prost wrote:

What I think was short sighted was Airbus developing the NEO instead of optimizing the A350-800. The A350-800/900/1000 would have been very compelling to a lot of carriers, had that -800 been optimized for it’s size instead of a shrink of the -900.

The A350-800XWB was pinched between the 787-8 and 787-9 - offering the capacity of the former, but with the empty and operating weights of the latter. This negatively impacted it's economics against both 787 models and customers who had converted their original A350-800 orders to the A350-800XWB were subsequently converting them again to the A350-900 and the order book contracted to the point the investment to make it an optimized frame did not pan out so Airbus switched to just removing 10 frames from the A350-900. Some customers were okay with this and some were not and this shrank the order book even more so Airbus came to the conclusion they would just prefer to not offer it and worked on converting the remainder to the A350-900.

seabosdca wrote:

lightsaber wrote:

Boeing only has the economy of scale to PIP the 787 and 777. Sorry 747 fans (like myself), without a PIP a major sales recovery is unlikely.

[snip]

But for airframe PIPs on the A330NEO, more sales are required, which requires producing the airframe at a better economy of scale.

What I hear you saying is that partial commonality doesn't get you there. There's not enough commonality between the GEnx-1B and the GEnx-2B to permit improvements to the -2B to be cost-effective. There's not enough commonality between the T1000 and the T7000 to make improvements to the latter cost-effective unless quite a few more T7000-equipped A330s sell. Am I reflecting your opinions correctly?

The T1000 TEN and T7000 have sufficient commonality to 85% of the dollar value, and are reflected in my above dollar values. This is most of the basic mechanical systems.

But the Trent TEN has more compressor surge margin due to electrical anti-ice and cabin pressure. So the T7000 will have some small loss in fuel burn and lots of new plumbing, different than much of the A330CEO.

The nacelle won't fit both because the T7000 must fit more valves and plumbing (vs. a big generator which the basic engine comes sized around). The anti-ice systems no commonality. The casing on the two engines get a discount, but won't be the same.

I was thinking Airframe PIPs. High spool PIPs should be mechanically the same. The mapping of the compressor staters (software) must be different.

But we could have a CFM-56-5 vs. cfm-56-7. Boeing, as a condition of the exclusive engine deal, had CFM under contract for a fuel reduction PIP that 95% of the cost was common to the -7. CFM calculated doing the PIP would cost $250 million for $200 million more profit (or the do nothing was $50 million better than the PIP). No PIP for the -5 (it is a full PIP behind the -7). Pratt and RR did a PIP that cost more, but they estimated they would sell so many more A321s, the PIP would increase profit by 50% more than the cost of the PIP so they did it then it sold so much better than expectations that they paid engineers to look at lots of data and paid for a flight test campaign for a software only PIP! See. V2500 A321 sales to see if you think that PIP made business sense.

But Airbus learned. Pratt must PIP the PW1100G as condition on getting on the A321LR and another PIP some number of years later.

CFM balked at Airbus terms and were originally excluded from the A321LR as they only signed up for the later PIP, not the get on the A321LR early PIP. Pratt's... Issues allowed CFM on for a thrust bump & durability PIP.

As this is an A330NEO thread, the T7000 will get TEN PIPs, but only at volume thresholds. It costs $150 million+ just to test an engine PIP for an airframe. There will be another $150 million in costs just to modify parts that aren't common. . Most engine vendors will PIP an in production engine at break even on the assumption they will sell more engines (see PW4062 on the 767 which exceeded all sales expectations, which weren't much beyond the tanker...).

Testing major engine PIPs are expensive. Durability PIPs can be as little as $500k. For example, I know GE wanted to extend CF-34-10E overhaul intervals as too many engines were coming in a little short of promise (met guarantees, but not promise). It cost GE about $12 millions (that is it!) to fix the issues and not only make customers happy, but it cuts c-check maintenance bills which will only help keep the power by the hour revenue coming in.

It takes volume to make ever business case.

So take the small Pratt purepower engines:. PW1500, PW1200, PW1900, PW816, and PW812. It takes 400 engines in service to pay to test a PIP developed for any one engine and migrate it over to another.

I see only 2 of those engines certain to cross that threshold. Let us see if the others get the PIPs. For the A330NEO, that means no more defections, including leasing companies...

Lightsaber

I think he´s right not to panic - there are always ups and downs. If I´m not mistaken there are currently 14 direct clients (ouright purchase from Airbus), thereof a bit less than 1/3 lessor orders.

Of these 61 lessor orders from Avalon, BOC, CIT and Air Lease, several have been placed already with either existing customers or new operators:

TAP 4x A330-900neo
HiFly 1x A330-900neo
WoW Air 4x A330-900neo
Air Mauritius 2x A330-900neo
Azul 5x A330-900neo
Rwandair 2x A330-900neo

That´s about 1/3 of the lessor orders already been placed so far - as far as we know. And means a fleet of 15+ airlines to operate the plane with some risk spread accociated to it

I'm curious and I'd like to be educated - really. The way I see it, the NEO/CEO was relevant as long as fuel costs stayed low. That made the acquisition costs low by extension and the extra fuel burn of the NEO/ CEO compared to the 787 was financially acceptable. Now that fuel costs are creeping up, the 787 is looking far more efficient, and fuel burn numbers are suddenly more important, perhaps outweighing lower NEO/CEO acquisition costs. Does this sound reasonable? Seriously, its a real question, not an A versus B rant. Ideas? Views? Opinions?

zkojq wrote:

2175301 wrote:

[mjoelnir; the problem I see with your facts is that few people who buy the A350-900 are buying it for it's maximum range and payload (those routes are limited). What data I see on the average routes of the A350-900 is that they are within the capability of the 789. So, on average... the 789 is a better financial deal for the average A350-900 route. That appears to bring the 789 into play unless someone really has a need for the extra capacity and/or range of the A350-900. As I see it, the A350 does best competing within markets that predominantly use several of the later 777 models.

Have a great day,

I doubt the validity of that comparison. The biggest A350 operators all fly them on short haul routes; CX HKG-TPE/BKK/SIN etc, SQ SIN-CGK/BKK/HKG etc, QR DOH-MLE/MCT, AY HEL-LHR, VN HAN-SGN/HKG etc. All of those will heavily skew the 'average' A350 route.

But if we actually look at the "long-haul" routings such airlines use A350s on, the distribution of ULH is actually not much, and none of them are beyond the 789`s capabilities.

-AY's A350s basically don't have routes that take them past 6000 miles (HEL-SIN seems to be the furthest)
-CX's A350s, at the moment are predominantly on routes to Europe and Oceania, none of which count as ULH, with the exception of HKG-EWR, none of the A350's routes are past ~7000 miles.
-VN's A350s predominantly fly to Europe, which really isn't that long for sector length.
-Ditto for SQ, with routes to Europe that are all under 6000nm. SIN-SFO stands out, but UA is also flying that route with.... a 789. I guess you could argue that SIN-EWR with the ULR is beyond the capability of a 789?

JustSomeDood wrote:

But if we actually look at the "long-haul" routings such airlines use A350s on, the distribution of ULH is actually not much, and none of them are beyond the 789`s capabilities.

"Capability" is not just how far an airliner can fly but also how much it can carry over this distance. On average A350-900 can carry 30 more passengers than 787-9 for ~400nm further and if these 30 passengers can be filled consistently it is the more appropriate aircraft. The claim "So, on average... the 789 is a better financial deal for the average A350-900 route" by member 2175301 is therefore likely over-simplistic.

The reality is there is not that many ULR routes that is worth flying that is over 7000nm long. 7000nm@HEL covers pretty much every in the world except South America and Australia. Similarly 7000nm@HKG covers everywhere except South America. Anything much longer than that you need 350ULR or 777-8X.

Aptivaboy wrote:

I'm curious and I'd like to be educated - really. The way I see it, the NEO/CEO was relevant as long as fuel costs stayed low. That made the acquisition costs low by extension and the extra fuel burn of the NEO/ CEO compared to the 787 was financially acceptable. Now that fuel costs are creeping up, the 787 is looking far more efficient, and fuel burn numbers are suddenly more important, perhaps outweighing lower NEO/CEO acquisition costs. Does this sound reasonable? Seriously, its a real question, not an A versus B rant. Ideas? Views? Opinions?

There is a about 15% fuel burn difference between the A330neo and A330ceo, their is a small single digit fuel burn difference between the A330neo and the 787.

mjoelnir wrote:

Aptivaboy wrote:

I'm curious and I'd like to be educated - really. The way I see it, the NEO/CEO was relevant as long as fuel costs stayed low. That made the acquisition costs low by extension and the extra fuel burn of the NEO/ CEO compared to the 787 was financially acceptable. Now that fuel costs are creeping up, the 787 is looking far more efficient, and fuel burn numbers are suddenly more important, perhaps outweighing lower NEO/CEO acquisition costs. Does this sound reasonable? Seriously, its a real question, not an A versus B rant. Ideas? Views? Opinions?

There is a about 15% fuel burn difference between the A330neo and A330ceo, their is a small single digit fuel burn difference between the A330neo and the 787.

The higher the fuel prices become the more airlines care about small single digit fuel burn differences though, especially if the better one is still price competitive.

We have to remember folks we are comparing apples and oranges. The apple - the 787 are a whole new product while the orange - A330 Neo is a product update without the technology of the A350 / 787. Airbus of course is well aware of this and no doubt its design team are progressing plans for the replacement for the A330/340 that fits between the A320 and the A350. What the 330 Neo has the potential to do is buy Airbus time to do this work properly while gaining additional sales and generating income for a relatively small investment in a update. Different strokes for different folks. Meanwhile all the signs are that the 797 / MOM will be quite a bit longer coming to market than initially envisaged and this is all time for Airbus to win sales from customers wanting a NEO for the right price while it comes up with a replacement which I imagine we will hear about in the next couple of years. The basis for comparison is not straight-forward and the aircraft are not direct competitors either. All needs taking into consideration IMHO.

NZ321 wrote:

We have to remember folks we are comparing apples and oranges. The apple - the 787 are a whole new product while the orange - A330 Neo is a product update without the technology of the A350 / 787. Airbus of course is well aware of this and no doubt its design team are progressing plans for the replacement for the A330/340 that fits between the A320 and the A350. What the 330 Neo has the potential to do is buy Airbus time to do this work properly while gaining additional sales and generating income for a relatively small investment in a update. Different strokes for different folks. Meanwhile all the signs are that the 797 / MOM will be quite a bit longer coming to market than initially envisaged and this is all time for Airbus to win sales from customers wanting a NEO for the right price while it comes up with a replacement which I imagine we will hear about in the next couple of years. The basis for comparison is not straight-forward and the aircraft are not direct competitors either. All needs taking into consideration IMHO.

Airbus has always put the A330neo directly against the 787, just like they always said that the A330ceo sold better then the 787 since the 787 launch.

So we can compare the A330neo with the 787 and we see that recently the larger orders have all gone to the 787. And that's the issue right now, open production slots for 2019. So even if it's just a stopgap for Airbus until they come up with a new reaction to the 797 it's still a problem that a number of large customers turns to the 787 instead and therefore will also be more likely customers for the 797 instead of a new Airbus model.

Cerecl wrote:

"Capability" is not just how far an airliner can fly but also how much it can carry over this distance. On average A350-900 can carry 30 more passengers than 787-9 for ~400nm further and if these 30 passengers can be filled consistently it is the more appropriate aircraft. The claim "So, on average... the 789 is a better financial deal for the average A350-900 route" by member 2175301 is therefore likely over-simplistic.

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, on average most if not all of those extra 30 seats might be going out empty.

The issue on shorter routes is how good the A321NEO is. It now takes cargo yield to pay for a widebody within range of a narrowbody.

Why are the 787s maintenance costs advantages ignored? I'm well aware at EIS the software over-predicted maintenance, but now it does well.

www.airlinerratings.com/news/boeing-787 ... y-soaring/

99.4% for the 787. 99.46% for the 77W (best in the industry)
Better dispatch reliability means fewer aircraft required for backup which means paying the lease on fewer airframes to get the job done.

Polot wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

Aptivaboy wrote:

I'm curious and I'd like to be educated - really. The way I see it, the NEO/CEO was relevant as long as fuel costs stayed low. That made the acquisition costs low by extension and the extra fuel burn of the NEO/ CEO compared to the 787 was financially acceptable. Now that fuel costs are creeping up, the 787 is looking far more efficient, and fuel burn numbers are suddenly more important, perhaps outweighing lower NEO/CEO acquisition costs. Does this sound reasonable? Seriously, its a real question, not an A versus B rant. Ideas? Views? Opinions?

There is a about 15% fuel burn difference between the A330neo and A330ceo, their is a small single digit fuel burn difference between the A330neo and the 787.

The higher the fuel prices become the more airlines care about small single digit fuel burn differences though, especially if the better one is still price competitive.

It isn't just fuel, but also payload at range. It is about resale value and financing options.

We see many A320 operators select the 787 (Vistara is the latest). Prediction is 3% to 4% better CASM/CASK for a similar configuration with the advantage growing on longer flights. Below 3000nm is now narrowbody range unless very high cargo yield.

zeke wrote:

On long sector lengths the A330-800/900 are not competitive, they are not designed to compete there. However the majority of the city pars are not going to take advantage over the long range capability of the 787.

I agree with both parts of the statement. The issue is only the 787 could be competitive on the longer missions.

The 787 in has the overhead crew rest in the weight.

This link asks it best, what metric is the A339 superior to the 789? With Boeing willing to reduce selling price due to reduced production costs.

http://www.strategicaeroresearch.com/20 ... periority/

One issue is declining A330 resale values:
http://www.aircraftvaluenews.com/a330ce ... -continue/

Any new type, if it sells, as the above article notes A330s are losing every year 15% of their value. I believe this trend is happening with all prior generation widebodies (e.g., 77W). There is simply too much surplus widebody capacity. Now, with the partial recovery in freight rates, there is more need for widebodies, but production rates of the latest types are so high (A350, 787, and soon 777X).

The unknown is the 797 (MoM). Mostly as to is the 2025 EIS real... Unfortunately for Airbus, since the A330NEO sells in a shorter range market, that closes an opportunity.


Lightsaber

Stitch wrote:

Cerecl wrote:

"Capability" is not just how far an airliner can fly but also how much it can carry over this distance. On average A350-900 can carry 30 more passengers than 787-9 for ~400nm further and if these 30 passengers can be filled consistently it is the more appropriate aircraft. The claim "So, on average... the 789 is a better financial deal for the average A350-900 route" by member 2175301 is therefore likely over-simplistic.

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, on average most if not all of those extra 30 seats might be going out empty.

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, by definition, on average 24 of those extra 30 seats are going out loaded. Surely?

I don't come on the forum much now because its way too full of unreasonably hawkish behaviour from even the most unlikely suspects, but when I do, I have to wonder how Airbus ever sold an A350.

Rgds

astuteman wrote:

Stitch wrote:

Cerecl wrote:

"Capability" is not just how far an airliner can fly but also how much it can carry over this distance. On average A350-900 can carry 30 more passengers than 787-9 for ~400nm further and if these 30 passengers can be filled consistently it is the more appropriate aircraft. The claim "So, on average... the 789 is a better financial deal for the average A350-900 route" by member 2175301 is therefore likely over-simplistic.

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, on average most if not all of those extra 30 seats might be going out empty.

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, by definition, on average 24 of those extra 30 seats are going out loaded. Surely?

I don't come on the forum much now because its way too full of unreasonably hawkish behaviour from even the most unlikely suspects, but when I do, I have to wonder how Airbus ever sold an A350.

Rgds

That assumes the system wide average stays 80% if the larger plane is added.

I happen to agree with you that the whole system wide average thing is a red herring though. It is just an excuse generally used by fanboys on both sides to justify why the competitor’s larger aircraft is suddenly ill suited for an airline versus their favorite manufacturer’s smaller plane. Airlines will adjust their pricing to maximize revenue with the size of the planes they choose.

astuteman wrote:

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, by definition, on average 24 of those extra 30 seats are going out loaded. Surely?

Err, that's not how Math works A better argument is that a majority of long hauls today are performed by 77W, and 80% LF means A350 is perfectly sized for max utilization as well as the additional 20-20% fuel savings for the same routes.

My personal take in the A330neo sales argument is that they are competing against themselves here. Price it too low and you risk swaying potential A350 customers to buy A330neo instead. On the other hand, price it a bit high, Boeing's aggressive 787 pricing entices them away.

sabby wrote:

astuteman wrote:

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, by definition, on average 24 of those extra 30 seats are going out loaded. Surely?

Err, that's not how Math works A better argument is that a majority of long hauls today are performed by 77W, and 80% LF means A350 is perfectly sized for max utilization as well as the additional 20-20% fuel savings for the same routes.

My personal take in the A330neo sales argument is that they are competing against themselves here. Price it too low and you risk swaying potential A350 customers to buy A330neo instead. On the other hand, price it a bit high, Boeing's aggressive 787 pricing entices them away.

There are so many variables you can’t really say anything with LFs. You are assuming that airline pricing will remain the same despite less supply which effects demand. Plus the whole average LF is just that, an average. It doesn’t mean every flight is 80% full. There are many flights that go out 100% full, they are just balanced out by flights that go out 50-60% full. In that scenario you are missing out seats on those full flights with smaller planes but still too large on the empty ones, but hey you now have a higher average LF.

astuteman wrote:

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, by definition, on average 24 of those extra 30 seats are going out loaded. Surely?

Not in the specific scenario I was responding to (as sabby and Polot subsequently alluded to).

astuteman wrote:

I don't come on the forum much now because its way too full of unreasonably hawkish behaviour from even the most unlikely suspects, but when I do, I have to wonder how Airbus ever sold an A350.

One could ask the same of Boeing and the 787 and 777 considering the same argument is often thrown at them when compared to a smaller frame from a competing OEM. *shrug*

Strato2 wrote:

Stitch wrote:

One could ask the same of Boeing and the 787 and 777 considering the same argument is often thrown at them when compared to a smaller frame from a competing OEM. *shrug*

Not even close. This forum has always been very US/Boeing centric. Basically the only time Boeing got some heat was when 787 had the battery debacle going on. The kind of remorseless chase the A380 for example has been put under for the last 15 years is something no Boeing product has ever had to endure here.

A lot of it depends on the individual's perspective. For some, there couldn't be enough Boeing bashing, and any negativity towards Airbus would be cause for war. Others see it differently. Hopefully the majority can get past the extremists and have more productive dialogue.

Strato2 wrote:

Stitch wrote:

One could ask the same of Boeing and the 787 and 777 considering the same argument is often thrown at them when compared to a smaller frame from a competing OEM. *shrug*

Not even close. This forum has always been very US/Boeing centric. Basically the only time Boeing got some heat was when 787 had the battery debacle going on. The kind of remorseless chase the A380 for example has been put under for the last 15 years is something no Boeing product has ever had to endure here.

Not true. Boeing has taken plenty of heat for getting rid of the 757, the 739, the 787's early woes, 10-abreast 777s, etc..

And let's not forget that this site was founded in Sweden.

Stitch wrote:

seahawk wrote:

But the price reduction on the 787 effects the 797 in the same way. It limits the price they can ask for the 797, especially if they are willing and able to out price the A330NEO.

As chiki noted, customers have already told Boeing what they're willing to pay for NMA and it's a fair bit less than what they're willing to pay for a 787. Likely one of the reasons Boeing is still trying to close the business case.

Then Boeing ought to make the 797 a narrowbody with a shared fuselage cross-section as the NSA.

sabby wrote:

My personal take in the A330neo sales argument is that they are competing against themselves here. Price it too low and you risk swaying potential A350 customers to buy A330neo instead. On the other hand, price it a bit high, Boeing's aggressive 787 pricing entices them away.

No doubt AB understood the trade-off; however, unfortunately, the Roulette marble seems to have ended its journey in the wrong slot
for the ultimate fortunes of the A330 family.

"Cheap, low-risk and instant availability" were obvious attractions for developing the A330ceo type into the 787 space.
However IMHO the strategy always looked fundamentally confused.

One of the the major drawbacks of the proposed upgrade then became unavoidable:

The two big AB twins were hence drawn into a bruising competition with each other.


Looks like the better strategy was the harder and more expensive one EG

i) leave the A330ceo family doing what is already does so effectively in the short-medium range space, (with a bit of polishing-up where opportune), and

ii) fully optimise the A358.

cheers

This thread is going A vs. B, so I'm going to back up to the economics.
There is more risk flying a larger aircraft so costs must be in favor of larger aircraft. But basic physics is in favor of larger aircraft.
Think of any basic shape such as a cylinder. The larger it is, the more volume to surface area.
Structures, MC/I means the larger the structure, the more weight efficient.

The issue is when a step change in costs must be stepped through.
For widebodies, that is going to twin isles. That 2nd isle means carrying added floor (volume) that makes no revenue and associated structural weight. To overcome, one must step through a large size range unless a major material switch cuts the weight costs.

With the A380, it went through the next step change, double decks. Two stairways and an elevator. The issue with the A380 is that it wasn't big enough to pay for the step change in costs. The A388 was just too short. It didn't reduce costs per unit of revenue enough to justify the risk. It was good, just not good enough to sell enough.

The goal is profit per flight and return on investment. The aversion is risk. Leasing companies want to sell the risk to investment tranches. So they need economy of scale in customers.

The old school rules of thumb is that an aircraft requires 20 plus airlines operating each sub-type for a liquid aftermarket.
400+ of a type to ensure economy of scale making parts.

The A380 only had 13 airline customers. At 331 sold, the parts market will always be at a premium.

777X only has 7 known customers with two possible (TK and ET) at Farnborough with 326 sold. With existing 777 economy of scale, despite new wing/actuators/anti-ice/engines, that will be good enough economy of scale, except for a secondary market on the aircraft. While I pessimistic on used 777 values, but there is a secondary market.

The A330NEO has the benefit of legacy A330 operators and has 12+ operators but only 214 planes. But if all delivered, with the CEO that is enough (Because over 400 engines will be in service and even then there is 80% engine cost commonality plus with the 787, except the nacelle.).

The A350 easily has economy of scale already (at least in units sold, 17 known planned operators, but that will grow or I just don't missed some).

The 787 has outstanding economy of scale. We'll skip the inevitable discussion on when a profit.
https://247wallst.com/aerospace-defense ... -guidance/

Lightsaber

brindabella wrote:

i) leave the A330ceo family doing what is already does so effectively in the short-medium range space, (with a bit of polishing-up where opportune), and

The A330ceo had no long term future for significant new orders as it’s fuel inefficiency catches it up to it and Boeing worked through the 787’s production issues and backlog. That is why Airbus developed the neo in the first place.

Polot wrote:

The A330ceo had no long term future for significant new orders as it’s fuel inefficiency catches it up to it and Boeing worked through the 787’s production issues and backlog. That is why Airbus developed the neo in the first place.

The demise of the A350-800 and the knowledge the 787-10 would eventually come left two potential gaps in Airbus' product portfolio, as well, which the A330-800 and A330-900 help address.

Stitch wrote:

With system-wide Average Load Factors for most long-haul carriers in the 80th percentile, on average most if not all of those extra 30 seats might be going out empty.

Stitch you know very well that average load means there are >90% routes and 60% routes. I have been on almost completely full A380s and a day later I had 3 seats to myself on 77Ws of the same airline. plus, 80% of a 77W is probably a wash between 787-9 and A359. For most airlines, most medium to longhaul routes are probably within the range of anything between 788 to A380 (and many are also within the range of A330), and some frequently change the airliner they deploy on the same routes. It makes no sense to assert that one type is always the better deal.

Polot wrote:

brindabella wrote:

i) leave the A330ceo family doing what is already does so effectively in the short-medium range space, (with a bit of polishing-up where opportune), and

The A330ceo had no long term future for significant new orders as it’s fuel inefficiency catches it up to it and Boeing worked through the 787’s production issues and backlog. That is why Airbus developed the neo in the first place.

It was an interesting choice on their end vs fully optimising the 358 which might have paid off better as I understand the 359 fuel burn is only marginally higher than the 339 despite it being a larger aircraft.

The 330 neo faces multiple issues, especially as we are in a time when fuel cost is rising quite quickly.

-The 333 CEO is lighter and should burn less fuel over distances <2000nm vs the 330NEO as per Airbus. Acquisition costs are lower and the secondary market is growing.

-The 787 burns less fuel than the 330CEO over short distances and burns less than the 330NEO over longer distances at a higher cruise speed. The price advantage which was supposed to be the main driver for the 330NEO over the 787 is largely gone. The 787 also has maintenance advantages which translates to cost savings.

I really wish they optimised and launched the 358 instead. I imagine they could have had a ULR version with the same MTOW as the 359 which might have better payload range than the current 359ULR

Antarius wrote:

Strato2 wrote:

Stitch wrote:

One could ask the same of Boeing and the 787 and 777 considering the same argument is often thrown at them when compared to a smaller frame from a competing OEM. *shrug*

Not even close. This forum has always been very US/Boeing centric. Basically the only time Boeing got some heat was when 787 had the battery debacle going on. The kind of remorseless chase the A380 for example has been put under for the last 15 years is something no Boeing product has ever had to endure here.

Because the a380 was a collosal financial failure that rivals HPs purchase of Autonomy. It isnt A vs B to state that one (in this case A) made a horribly poor decision that deserves to be lambasted to the degree of its poorness.

Acting like it's an even playing field in terms of failures is a false dichotomy to begin with.

The 747-8 is at least a similar failure, but have a look back and the threads here are not comparable to the poison spewed every time the A380 is mentioned.

Regarding the A330neo, it is far to early to declare here demise. Historically the position of 214 ordered frames at EIS is not to bad, something similar to the 777 program at EIS, compares only badly to the mad rush for the 787. There is now an order draught, also not unheard of around EIS.
Once the A330neo is in use, real numbers about her performance will be available and help further sales. Sales will not come in huge single orders, but in bits and pieces from some of the many current users of the A330ceo, being able to add a similar frame with a significantly reduction in fuel burn.

Folks, please stay on topic. This thread is become my favorite plane is less of a failure than yours. A vs. B

The topic is the A330NEO. Comparisons are encouraged, but if a post doesn't even mention the A330, it is obviously off topic.

Lightsaber

The 330neo is a decent example of the travails of going the re engine route. Over the years there have been many "we should put new engines on this plane". It looked pretty easy to put the Genx on the 747, should have been able to put the same engines on the 767 as the original engines were the same thrust on each. Boeing declined on the 767 tanker to go new, the 748 has been OK but it didn't resurrect the sales.

New engines are heavier, have different drag but burn less fuel. The new engine characteristics typically do not match the plane as well as the originals that were designed in concert. Often a slight stretch is needed to better match. The A330NEO is better than the CEO for some flight profiles but is it better than the other choices in the marketplace. Time will tell.

Another example of the rubric's cube of replacement - the B-52. It has 8 engines in 4 pairs, although not perfect the least disruptive is to still go with 8 engines of similar thrust to the originals, which are 1950's technology. Still a big mess.