I dont think you can blame GE.

Airbus designs for the A380 started in the 90s and into the early 2000's...... everything with this aircraft since it was launched was old and outdated. I think we all know, if the A380 was designed right now, a lot would be different. (not talking about the engines)

As for Boeing / GE - Boeing came at GE with the 787 concept, Boeing gave the specs they wanted / needed from the engine, and GE delivered.

Airbus just took what GE had and thought it was good enough. They rushed and wanted to get the plane off the ground.

Bald1983 wrote:

Good points. I believe one was left out. Status. Airbus wanted a plane to surpass the 747 as the largest passenger plane. They achieved that status but they did so when medium size twins and larger twins took over the market. But for Emirates, the plane would be dean already.

Wrong, you don't build 20+ billion airplanes for status, we are not talking Toyota Crown vs. Camry, Corolla or Yaris.
But there is a strong economic case in controlling the flagship market, which the 747 had & exerced monopolistic prices for 30 years :
- the winner takes it all, as it pressures WB prices down
- also the winner takes all sales your competitor loses, thereby weakening the latter's position & strengthening the formers.
This was amply discussed months ago & is a business case taught at the world's top business schools.
It is a similar case that led Toyota to introduce the Lexus division, to beat BMW & Mercedes Benz at there own game.

Last, as discussed ad nauseam, EK thwarted the market in an unpredictable way that prevented many European & Asian airlines from ordering top-ups or even consider the frame. EK were not on Airbus' A380 radar at launch time. But EK do prove they have a case, one that no other airline has succeeded in, in some ways reminiscent of BA & JL with their former massive 747 fleets. As STC pointed out, airlines are risk averse. If you take the time to check FR24, you'll see how massive EK are & how other airlines market share have been eaten up by them. SQ's use of A380s is also interesting as is LH with its 748+A380 fleet

On the conversation :
1. Brégier is actually on record for saying the A380 was launched a decade too soon, not just five years.
2. I don't get how Airbus could not know of the posibility of new engine technology being developped, plus both OEMs have "spys" everywhere...

Somehow I doubt that Airbus lacked the technical people to assess future engine development. More likely sales and marketing people did not listen to them.

enzo011 wrote:

Sure, but if they didn't pass on information to Airbus that in a few years time there could be better engines if they knew it then they were deliberately misleading them on what they could offer. I have no problem with the OEMs doing this, but don't pretend that if they did do this on purpose that it isn't lying. If engine technology improves 1% a year (a mention we see on here all the time), how did the 787 get an engine that is 10% better when it should be somewhere in the region of 7% better. Did all of the OEMs just find technology in those few months after giving Airbus the details of the engines they could supply to the A380?

I'm skeptical of the idea that all three engine manufacturers misled Airbus in the same manner. It does not make a lot of sense. If engine OEMs were worried about future twin sales, they could raise the price, afterall, they would still be selling 4 units/plane.

enzo011 wrote:

I have read the article. He does not say the engines were the reason they didn't sell. He does say they launched the program 5 years too early (at least impled by the article that he said this without quoting him).

Leahy concedes the program was probably launched five years too soon for demand. The program should have been launched in 2005, he says in hindsight. It was also ill-timed and unlucky.

So yeah, lets all talk about Leahy blaming the engines for slow A380 sales when he does state they launched it too early in hindsight.

He blames the "strategic mistake" of launching 5 years too early on the engine manufacturers. So yes, he is indeed blaming them in large extent.

I am glad he is talking, it helps to have his side of the background but it doesn't mean it is gospel.

QuarkFly wrote:

So imagine if this technology from GE, RR -- was introduced with the A380 a few years earlier...it would have been a disaster for the A380. Airbus would have been foolish NOT to go with existing technology -- well regarded RR Trent technology

Imagine how that would have gone down after the great wiring fiasco, the sacking of two Airbus CEOs, etc.

QuarkFly wrote:

and GE/PW...they got some GE90 technology.

EA's fan was so good that PW later claimed GE used EA as a conduit to steal their fan design ideas.

QuarkFly wrote:

The A380 is not struggling in the marketplace because of engines...customers balked at the 500+ passenger product.

And most still do.

QuarkFly wrote:

Leahy knows that and is trying to shift blame !!

Yet another reason he's a great salesman: he's great at assigning blame to others when his product doesn't live up to his earlier claims.

Maybe oil prices had something to do with it.
At the launch of the 787 oil price had almost doubled from the 20 dollar era preceding the launch of the A380, and in 20 dollar enviroment it did not make economic sense to develop expensive fuel saving technology.

So, if he had gotten a 10% better fuel burn from the "git go", the 380 would be a big success story? Does anyone in the know believe that for a nano second?

Another thing to keep in mind, even though the 787 was almost 3 years late in delivery the engines still were not quite up to snuff at entry into service time IIRC.

DWC wrote:

Bald1983 wrote:

Good points. I believe one was left out. Status. Airbus wanted a plane to surpass the 747 as the largest passenger plane. They achieved that status but they did so when medium size twins and larger twins took over the market. But for Emirates, the plane would be dean already.

On the conversation :
1. Brégier is actually on record for saying the A380 was launched a decade too soon, not just five years.

Thats quite optimistic, in any case it was probably a decade too late. For it to be successful, it should had been introduced in the early 1990s. By 2010s, the attention had shifted to 77Ws as a 747 replacement, the A380 would had an even bigger challenge in garnering sales.

There are a couple of design themes of the A380 I never understood, that don't seem like they ever would work in any other B or A product. I look at other widebodies and A380 stands out to me in a few ways:

Use of floor space - While the A380 is massive, the floor space (to me) has always seemed inefficiently used. The two large staircases and the two "gallery" on the upper deck have always seemed very inefficient. Some airlines have used those spaces for showers, or large toilets, etc. Bunt, on the whole, those spaces seem like huge wastes to me. In a world where airlines look to use slimline seats, squeeze aisles, armrests and seat width and minimize pitch to maximize seating, it never made sense to me to have an aircraft with large swaths of unsellable floor space.

Over reliance on stretch optimization - While many other airliners use a wing that is optimized for a larger aircraft and still turn out successfully, the most successful aircraft to me have always seemed to center around a wing optimized for the smaller model and the stretch is modified to work around it. Foe example, the the 788 wing is used for the /9 and /10. The A321, the new darling of the market uses the same wing optimized for the A320. Same with the 739. The A380 wing was built around a /9 variant that wasn't even co-launched when the A388 was released. It always seemed very risky to build the -800 on a -900 optimized wing, if you weren't even offering it yet.

I do think she is a very comfortable bird, and I appreciate that leaps in aviation she represents. But, for me, I never understood why the A380 was realized in the form she was. The market seems to agree.

JustSomeDood wrote:

Engine tech doesn't just improve "naturally", it takes sustained R&D for such improvements to materialise, naturally, GE/RR rightly project that they can afford to spend a lot more R&D for engines for 787s/A330s than A380s, simply because there'd much more engines sold (and more ancilliary revenue from maintenece) to amortize the R&D dollars over...

I was clumsy in my wording. It has been posted by those with more knowledge of the industry that you can expect, with R&D and investment, you can expect engines to improve by around 1% per year if an OEM decides to undertake the effort. This also seems mostly true for new engine technology, you can look at improvement of around 1% per year. I understand that this is not a hard and fast rule as technology and material changes can affect the type of improvement you can expect, but I see people are talking about a 1% or so improvement in engine performance if they talk about future models (797 vs A322).

So what I wanted to say is that if there was no new technology that the engine OEMs were working on you would expect the engines to be in the region of 3-5% better for the 787 instead of the 10% they promised Boeing. In hindsight we know both OEMs were optimistic with their figures, but they surely had good reason to propose these figures. Unless they were goaded into promising something they couldn't deliver, in that case they are idiots, or both suddenly discovered technology that would have a significant leap in efficiency it does seem like they were holding back information from Airbus on what they could offer.

par13del wrote:

So the fact that RR who powers the 787 and is the exclusive supplier on the A350 is supplying them with engines that some say are superior resulting in the A350 being a more capable frame than the 787 is just happenstance or payback?
One can start conspiracy theories on why the RR engines on the 787 is resulting in groundings while their engine on the A350 is fine.....

I think we should just accept that this is the Sales Man and not the technical expert and stop trying to validate his sales pitch, after all, this has been his life for more than a
decades, it is what he knows, lived and is very good at... the conspiracy is why they are not fighting harder to delay his retirement.

Well the A350 is an aircraft that is supposed to EIS about 5 years after the 787 (2008 vs 2013) so you would expect a better engine on offer, right? The fact that RR and GE struggled to reach their intended targets on the 787 probably contributes to the shortfall in performance between those engines and the XWB. I have no doubt had they reached their targets in 2008, or as it turned out 2011, then the current engines would be 3-5% better due to R&D and investment.

You are more than welcome to start a conspiracy theory on why the RR 787 engine is not performing as well as the XWB. It could be pointed out that they have learned from the 787 experience, but I guess that will be too easy of an answer for those that want to see a conspiracy. Maybe they promised too much with the 787 and this is why they are having problems with the new technology. We have quotes from Boeing stating the 787 was a moonshot and I suppose this is true for the engine OEMs as well.

Bald1983 wrote:

Of course he is explaining his take on why the plane did nto sell. It was not that fuel efficient because, in his view, there was a conspiracy in engine manufactures. If all the airlines were fighting each other to get to the front of the line in A-380 orders, do you really think Airbus would care about the engines?

There will be a defensive argument that he will put forward. I guess it comes down to the fact that the OEMs will need to work with Airbus in future so while one program may not look promising regarding the numbers, surely you don't want to shoot yourself in the foot when it comes to future programs that would have more promise regarding sales. This is the second time where it seems that GE has been somewhat cold to Airbus on what they can offer. They only offered the GEnx on the XWB and didn't want to offer anything for the A35K because of a gentleman's agreement they have with Boeing. They basically wanted to offer Airbus the same "old" engines as on the 787, but as we see with RR there was newer technology available for the XWB. Seems to me that there is pattern emerging from GE towards Airbus.

Route66 wrote:

He blames the "strategic mistake" of launching 5 years too early on the engine manufacturers. So yes, he is indeed blaming them in large extent.

I am glad he is talking, it helps to have his side of the background but it doesn't mean it is gospel.

I read it differently, he is commenting it could have been different for the A380 had they known what technology was available a few years later. He is of the opinion that had they then waited those 5 years for these engines then it may have turned out better for sales as well. I still don't see where he blames RR or GE for poor sales. He blames them for not informing him that they could have delivered better engines in a few years time.

keesje wrote:

If, looking back, it was really wise of GE to do the pro Boeing strategy they did.. Maybe hundreds of 777 will be replaced by A350's in the next 6 years. (BA, AF, CX, UA, JAL, DL, KL, SQ, QR) In that case, it probably wasn't the mother of all smart partnerships. But that's looking back.

It's pretty hard to see how GE screwed up by selling 2100+ (plus spares) GE90-115B engines on 1050+ 777NG's.

Would it have been better for GE to have given up exclusivity on the 777NG's to RR in 2000 on the hope they'd get on the A350 in 2006? Would that have been a better strategic move?

Remember it was Airbus that insisted GE have an all new engine for the A350. GE had proposed using an GEnX engine for the A358/9 but was told by Airbus that such an engine wouldn't be adequate.

http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=m ... a4d0adfced

jeffrey0032j wrote:

DWC wrote:

Bald1983 wrote:

Good points. I believe one was left out. Status. Airbus wanted a plane to surpass the 747 as the largest passenger plane. They achieved that status but they did so when medium size twins and larger twins took over the market. But for Emirates, the plane would be dean already.

On the conversation :
1. Brégier is actually on record for saying the A380 was launched a decade too soon, not just five years.

Thats quite optimistic, in any case it was probably a decade too late. For it to be successful, it should had been introduced in the early 1990s. By 2010s, the attention had shifted to 77Ws as a 747 replacement, the A380 would had an even bigger challenge in garnering sales.

No, you are acting as if Brégier does not what he meant or his business.
Plus there was no tech to fly a whale economically prior to 2000, let alone in 1990, as has been discussed here extensively. The most Airbus could do was the A330/A340. The general consensus is that Airbus did the best they could at that time, but things changed dramatically : even they did not anticipate the success of the A330, that of the A320, or Boeing that of the 777. The world in 1995-2000 is very different from the one we know today, and there were no superconnectors.

2175301 wrote:

If Airbus was unaware of the kind of engine technology being developed for future engines when they were designing the A380... That's on Airbus. The general information was known (The 787 and other engines did not just appear out of the blue one day - they had been in development for years).

Well, he did assume (some) responsility on their own account:

Leahy wrote:

“They wanted to sell their own generation engines. None of our engineers knew it. None of our product development people were aware of it. That was a real strategic mistake (on our end).

2175301 wrote:

If Airbus was unaware of the kind of engine technology being developed for future engines when they were designing the A380... That's on Airbus. The general information was known (The 787 and other engines did not just appear out of the blue one day - they had been in development for years).

I think we also need to appreciate that that was a different era in terms of industry relationships. It should be recognized that Airbus industry power at the time (late 1990s) was much, much less; it was simply not comparable to its power position today. Airbus was still very much building up their port folio, growing-up if you will. I think this is an important point easily overlooked by some of the "youngsters" (not saying you are, just offering some perspective). 747 was still going pretty strong, you know . . .

I find it very likely that engine OEMs were not sharing all their cards with Airbus at the time. Boeing was the industry big boy, no engine OEM could afford to upset them in any way at the time.

Times have changed, Airbus has learned, growing up. They are a powerhouse now, and will not make that same mistake again.

2175301 wrote:

If you wanted engines using those capabilities you would have to delay your program until after they became available and were proven in service for their initial size offering. If you wanted your program to move forward now, then you have to accept current technology. That is a decision that every airline manufacturer makes when developing a new model. There is nothing new about the process.

The process becomes much easier if you are a power house in the industry. Not dismissing your words, but I don't think it is/was black or white, but somehere in the (darkish part of the) grey scale.

2175301 wrote:

Have a great day,

Same to you!

Rgds,
PW100

It is absolutely ridiculous, but sadly unsurprising, that nobody on this thread (nor Leeham) fact-checked Leahy on this "missing 10% SFC" claim. Leeham's own figures do not support it:



The SFC delta between a ~2008 T-1000 and T-900 is 3.6%, not 10%.

I won't blame Bjorn much for not pushing back - Leeham needs access and they're more analysts over there than journalists. But I do blame folks here for forgetting basic arithmetic.

Leahy is spinning BS to cover for the single stupidest product launch in modern aviation history. He had a great, successful career. Doesn't mean the A380 wasn't a massive disaster for which he takes a lot of the blame. Indeed his greatest sales campaign ever may been the internal campaign to sell this project. Anyone can sell great products like A320/330/350; only a genius could have got $15bn for the A380.

Just as I don't grasp how you can be so obtuse with clear arguments & industrially so short sighted.
But Leahy did propel Airbus from a comfy 18% to 50% within 5 years (1994-99), if that is not vision, I don't know what is.
Staying with the house is another feat, I seem to recall he worked under 6 CEOs... European management is often like the Balkans, he was a real Yank to the eyes of the Europeans, did not learn a word of French or German, deserved the firing squad many times over not to mention Boeing's, I truly have no idea how he survived with the sharks. Kudos to him.

That said, your engine meme is a true treasure, let's see what members here have to say, because if you are right, Leahy's comment & the whole thread is moot.

DWC wrote:

Just as I don't see how you can be so obtuse with clear arguments & industrially so short sighted.

So you're back to "something, something... game theory...$20bn...totally worth it." It's not that I don't understand your arguments; I just find them wanting. As I've said before, game theory is a method for solving problems with known, discrete options. The A380 debate was/is about the values for possible options in the game. You can't play a game whose parameters you don't know.

I've said elsewhere that I appreciate your contributions. Still do. But it's better to actually address an interlocutor's argument than to just rest on one's credentials.

par13del wrote:

I thought the A380 has massive composite structures, if so what is he talking about?

It does, but it's mainly GLARE, not CFRP like the 787/A350, although the A380 uses some CFRP as well. I'm not an engineer but as far as I understand, GLARE is apparently techically better in some ways but it's also much more expensive. Airbus banked on the fact that the cost would drop making it more economically competitive, and that their much greater experience with it would give them an advantage over Boeing. They were wrong on the cost front and were blindsinded by Boeing's switch to CFRP.

DWC wrote:

if you are right, Leahy's comment & the whole thread is moot.

More like if Leeham is right.

Re mootness of the thread - regardless of Leahy's specific excuse, it's instructive that he - and by extension perhaps others in Airbus leadership - can't acknowledge Airbus' massive strategic errors in this program.

Matt6461 wrote:

So you're back "something, something... game theory...$20bn...totally worth it." It's not that I don't understand your arguments; I just find them wanting. As I've said before, game theory is a method for solving problems with known, discrete options. The A380 debate was/is about the values for possible options in the game. You can't play a game whose parameters you don't know.

I've said elsewhere that I appreciate your contributions. Still do. But it's better to actually address an interlocutor's argument than to just rest on one's credentials.

Well Matt, I did detail the whole Game Theory thing in another thread & you didn't get it. One member however who knew what I was talking about said I had delivered a Master Class in GT, which is actually what I do for a living & am handsomely paid for in my conferences ( in another tech industry ). Because I want to keep my anonymity with ignoramuses here, I won't brag more over this.

As to Leahy, I did launch a thread on why I considered him a visionnary. Actually, this conversation could have been under it, as it is the 5th installment in the Leeham series discussed therein. viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1379985

enzo011 wrote:

fcogafa wrote:

Not my fault the A380 didn't sell better, it was the engine manufacturers fault, it's not fair....

I must have missed him saying that. Can you point to him saying that is the reason it didn't sell? I think he is just voicing his disappointment that the engine OEMs told him there is no new engine technology on the horizon when this was patently false.

Leahy lied. Pratt, GE, and RR all offered more technology for an exclusive. I was at Pratt when the A380 was launched. I was working with Airbus on a far more advanced widebody engine than the GP7200 for a very 787 like concept and A346 2nd engine.

So the idea Airbus didn't know about the tech... I took that Airbus proposal for the A346 and other widebody and just copy pasted into the Sonic cruiser bid. Boeing rejected a few items as too low a TRL (technology readiness level) and kept coming back asking for more and more on the Sonic cruiser. Then they promised an exclusive for the engine vendor who made the Sonic cruiser viable at a slightly reduced cruise speed.

Then they cancelled the Sonic cruiser and asked for the same technology in 787 engines, two vendors maximum.

For the Sonic cruiser all three engine vendors dug out every concept they could get Boeing to agree to as it was a HUGE exclusive.

Then Boeing told the now exposed engine makers to put that same technology in 787 engines.

So Airbus saying they weren't offered more is an outright lie. When the dual sourced A380 engines, GE bowed out, but offered Pratt a partnership. At that point, only Frankenstein engines met the business case.

Developing an all out new engine back then cost another $3 Billion. Nothing is free. Either offer the engine companies an outstanding offer or they will cheap out.

This isn't anything malicious. Pratt was offered on the A346 pre-77W and an exclusive on the other widebody. You had better believe Pratt saw a business case. Pratt was also offered a guarantee of 1 of 2 engines for what became the A320NEO.

Then Airbus asked for A380 only bids. Gee... No business case to spend $3 billion more. No A320NEO as Airbus correctly realized the could delay A320NEO development 7+ years (it ended up being very plus) as what we call the CEO would sell and Aviation partners was expected to have certified winglets by 2003 or 2004 (before the wing understrength issue for winglets was found by AP).

Lightsaber

DWC wrote:

Well Matt, I did detail the whole Game Theory thing in another thread & you didn't get it.

Please explain the dominant strategies and equilibria in the following game:

...........Aibus/Boeing............A builds 650-seater.......................A no A380

B no VLA..............................C / D..............................................E / F

B builds VLA..........................G / H.............................................I / J

No matter your expertise in GT, there is no such thing as any solution to this game until you know the values of C-J.
THAT IS THE WHOLE DEBATE.
Once we know values C-J, the game is easy.

Airbus predicted that C and G had a higher value than E/I. They were wrong. They played the wrong game.

That is not the Game they played : that is a kindergarden introduction 101 to GT.
Big companies like Airbus play with way more variables & add differential solutions, including positive externalities to other aircraft families, which actually happened & are not in your Game. Then there is what it does to the world market in terms of market share & financial flows, also absent in your simplistic diagram. In fact, they play several imbricated games.
For the sake of us all, go back to school & get a degree before lecturing on GT.
I wouldn't mind if moderators scrapped all our senseless conversation. Over & out.

DWC wrote:

That is not the Game they played

Once again you miss the point. No matter what game they played, there is no game theory solution without actual values, even for the simplest games. The A380 debate was/is about the values, not about meta-strategy. Endless posting about game theory only enables obfuscation of the fact that Airbus and Leahy were wrong about the size of the VLA market, and wrong about how to play in that market.

DWC wrote:

positive externalities to other aircraft families, which actually happened & are not in your Game.

Values C-J are for Airbus/Boeing outcomes, not for narrow project outcomes.

Plus I don't know if it's your native language or what, but same-company impacts on other projects are not externalities in English economics literature. Externalities are values not captured - positive or negative - by the firm. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externality

tommy1808 wrote:

SFOtoORD wrote:

Sounds like sour grapes..

Sounds like a Boeing/GE Cartel .....

Withholding PIPs from the A320s CFMs, withholding latest Engine roadmaps......

best regards
Thomas

Hold on while I get my tinfoil hat. JL is making the kind of excuses only sales people make.

According to your opinion everything about the 380 is old and outdated. Can you please explain why Airlines are still flying the old and outdated 380? #quoteoftheday

Buffalomatt1027 wrote:

I dont think you can blame GE.

Airbus designs for the A380 started in the 90s and into the early 2000's...... everything with this aircraft since it was launched was old and outdated. I think we all know, if the A380 was designed right now, a lot would be different. (not talking about the engines)

As for Boeing / GE - Boeing came at GE with the 787 concept, Boeing gave the specs they wanted / needed from the engine, and GE delivered.

Airbus just took what GE had and thought it was good enough. They rushed and wanted to get the plane off the ground.

Please do not turn this thread in one of the usual A380 discussions and stay on topic, otherwise it will be locked.

I am not sure we need to blame the engine manufacturers for the A380's situation.

If I remember well, the A3XX started very early, perhaps it was in late 1980s or early 1990s. It is likely at that point the engine specification or the target had been set. Even if Airbus suddenly changed the specification of the engine prior of A380 industrial launch in December 2000, it would have been difficult for the engine manufacturers to radically change the engine design.

Perhaps Airbus should have reset the engine performance target again in 1998, or so just before the launch. It is also possible that the engine manufacturers might drop out if the engine spec changed again at that time.

Boeing started to talk about the sonic cruiser around 2000 and then the focus was on the 7E7 in 2002 or so. I guess the engine specification was a little bit different and was more ambitious for the 787 program than that of the A380.

I do not know what exactly happened there, but it is too easy to blame the engine manufacturer for the fact A380 does not sell as expected. Is it the engine that is not good enough or is it the market that decided VLA is not the way to go?

I am persuaded that with the right passenger density the A380 would be more efficient than the 777-300ER. Let us not forget the 777-30ER entered into service in April 2004 and yet it has 839 orders in total, of which 770 have been delivered. So the question on the A380 is probably not about the engine.

DWC wrote:

Because I want to keep my anonymity with ignoramuses here, I won't brag more over this.

DWC wrote:

For the sake of us all, go back to school & get a degree before lecturing on GT.

Shades of arrogance and hypocrisy, no?

DWC wrote:

One member however who knew what I was talking about said I had delivered a Master Class in GT, which is actually what I do for a living & am handsomely paid for in my conferences.

Just on the words of ONE member and your head swelled to the size of the Whalejet, wow!

VV wrote:

I do not know what exactly happened there, but it is too easy to blame the engine manufacturer for the fact A380 does not sell as expected. Is it the engine that is not good enough or is it the market that decided VLA is not the way to go?

I am persuaded that with the right passenger density the A380 would be more efficient than the 777-300ER. Let us not forget the 777-30ER entered into service in April 2004 and yet it has 839 orders in total, of which 770 have been delivered. So the question on the A380 is probably not about the engine.

Agree. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engine_Alliance_GP7000 says:

Originally intended to power Boeing Commercial Airplanes' cancelled 747-500X/-600X, the (EA GP7000) engine has since been pushed for Airbus' A380-800 superjumbo. It is built around an 0.72 scale of the GE90-110B/115B core [1] and contains a Pratt & Whitney fan and low-pressure system design.

So Airbus had access to the same core engine technology as 77W, scaled to fit their application. The engines were not the problem, the application was.

Leahy can bleat on about what if Airbus waited another five years to launch the A380, but that's not how it went down, and since he was one of the movers and shakers he should just accept his share of the blame, as he also accepts the credit for the things he did to help elevate Airbus since 1985.

Typical technology and business timing. Airbus made a decision to move forward with the engines available at the time. Their engineers are smart, they could have speculated or investigated what future engines would be available. You think Airbus trusted some outside salesman to give them engine technology advice? Wait 5 more years, things will change again. It's like cars, computers, electronics. If you keep waiting on the new technology, you'll just be sitting on the sidelines year after year.

keesje wrote:

I know on the RR site the T900 are slightly compromised to meet the stringent LHR nght noise restrictions.

Anyway I guess it is less relevant because the A380 is mostly about capacity & CASM and has little competition.

Even the 747-8 (with GENX engines) proved incapable of matching that.

All the better they can now do a generation ahead of GENX/T1000 on the A380NEO.

Slightly better BPR, higher temps, OPR, better carbon fans, etc.



We are talking 1999/2000 I guess.

Maybe if none of Airbus engineers knew it, none of product development people were aware, they should have been be more outgoing, participating ..

GE working together with Boeing to shield off their 777 investments has been clear from the start, even admitted.

GENX built on evolutionairy GE90 technology.

I don't remember Airbis asking anybody to develop the A380 with them. Boeing always has the engine manufacturers work with them in the aircraft planning stage which is why Rolls and GE always seem to come up with innovative designs and applications for their airplanes. Airbus seems to take whatever is available..

strfyr51 wrote:

keesje wrote:

I know on the RR site the T900 are slightly compromised to meet the stringent LHR nght noise restrictions.

Anyway I guess it is less relevant because the A380 is mostly about capacity & CASM and has little competition.

Even the 747-8 (with GENX engines) proved incapable of matching that.

All the better they can now do a generation ahead of GENX/T1000 on the A380NEO.

Slightly better BPR, higher temps, OPR, better carbon fans, etc.



We are talking 1999/2000 I guess.

Maybe if none of Airbus engineers knew it, none of product development people were aware, they should have been be more outgoing, participating ..

GE working together with Boeing to shield off their 777 investments has been clear from the start, even admitted.

GENX built on evolutionairy GE90 technology.

I don't remember Airbis asking anybody to develop the A380 with them. Boeing always has the engine manufacturers work with them in the aircraft planning stage which is why Rolls and GE always seem to come up with innovative designs and applications for their airplanes. Airbus seems to take whatever is available..

Perhaps engine OEM's take more interest when they make an upfront development fee to join the program, and ongoing royalty payments?

strfyr51 wrote:

keesje wrote:

I know on the RR site the T900 are slightly compromised to meet the stringent LHR nght noise restrictions.

Anyway I guess it is less relevant because the A380 is mostly about capacity & CASM and has little competition.

Even the 747-8 (with GENX engines) proved incapable of matching that.

All the better they can now do a generation ahead of GENX/T1000 on the A380NEO.

Slightly better BPR, higher temps, OPR, better carbon fans, etc.



We are talking 1999/2000 I guess.

Maybe if none of Airbus engineers knew it, none of product development people were aware, they should have been be more outgoing, participating ..

GE working together with Boeing to shield off their 777 investments has been clear from the start, even admitted.

GENX built on evolutionairy GE90 technology.

I don't remember Airbis asking anybody to develop the A380 with them. Boeing always has the engine manufacturers work with them in the aircraft planning stage which is why Rolls and GE always seem to come up with innovative designs and applications for their airplanes. Airbus seems to take whatever is available..

Not sure about the Trent 900, Trent XWB, PW1100 and LEAP. But anyway, that's what JL is complaining about.

MaverickM11 wrote:

Still would have been too big to fill

I think that this is the only way to put it.
No amount of engine efficiency can compensate for the fact that most airlines are scared of getting A380's due to its shear size.

Now, the fact that the B787 EISed exactly 4 years after the A380 doesn't tell the full story.
For one thing, the A380 was intended for EIS in 2005. Next, when we look at the fact that the GENX and Trent 1000 missed their targeted SFC at EIS in 2011, means that the gap was 6 years and not 3 years.
Add the fact that numerous airlines still have B787's grounded today for engine swaps on their Rollers and one could argue that the new engine technology wasn't ready until 2016, ie 8 years after EIS, which to me is one generation of engines.

So to me this is not JL criticising the engine manufacturers, but rather, trying to blame on them the fact that he couldn't sell the amount that he promised them.
If RR and GE/PW knew that they were going to split this small of a market and that JL's promises were empty air, 1. the A380 wouldn't have had an engine choice and 2. the engine wouldn't have been much more than a warmed up Trent 800.


The reality is that without lessons from the Trent 900, RR wouldn't have been able to make the Trent 1000 nor the Trent XWB as efficient as they are.
So whatever price they paid with the A380 on the engines, they are getting it back on the A350XWB.
In fact, the difference in cruise SFC efficiency between the Trent 900 and the Trent 1000, is just as large as the difference in cruise SFC between the Trent 1000 and the Trent XWB. Does this make the B787 a gas guzzler?

The A380 has pretty efficient engines. It's not worth putting the big money in a new engine at these fuel price IMO, the investment can't be recovered from the savings in fuel. Earlier I was an advocate to put the XWB's on the A380, because the SFC difference is big enough and also the A380 would benefit from the higher thrust rating in terms of MTOW and A389, but we were assuming a temporary fall of oil prices, not a semi-permanent one as we are seeing now.


Get your facts straight before writing rubbish.
The graph at the bottom of this page is a good start:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_Trent

Also worth noting from the graph that the A330NEO is basically getting the same engines as the B787, just with bleed air and a different marketing name.

Engine OEMs invest in programs with huge potential like the 787 and are conservative for programs which promise little success, like the A380. In the end it is still true that Boeing gets the best choice of engines and Airbus can pick the engines rejected by Boeing. The 797 shows this again.

"Boeing gets the best choice of engines" - "Airbus can pick the engines rejected by Boeing". Only in your reality, only there

RalXWB wrote:

"Boeing gets the best choice of engines" - "Airbus can pick the engines rejected by Boeing". Only in your reality, only there

I do not believe that the A380 got deliberately worse engines, than it could have got. GE and P&W had bigger hopes with EA than only supplying engines for the A380 and the Trent 900 was RR´s newest and best at that time. But if one wants to talk about Boeings rejects, than the EA GP7000 is a Boeing reject, not developed for Airbus, but a 747 project.

strfyr51 wrote:

keesje wrote:

I know on the RR site the T900 are slightly compromised to meet the stringent LHR nght noise restrictions.

Anyway I guess it is less relevant because the A380 is mostly about capacity & CASM and has little competition.

Even the 747-8 (with GENX engines) proved incapable of matching that.

All the better they can now do a generation ahead of GENX/T1000 on the A380NEO.

Slightly better BPR, higher temps, OPR, better carbon fans, etc.



We are talking 1999/2000 I guess.

Maybe if none of Airbus engineers knew it, none of product development people were aware, they should have been be more outgoing, participating ..

GE working together with Boeing to shield off their 777 investments has been clear from the start, even admitted.

GENX built on evolutionairy GE90 technology.

I don't remember Airbis asking anybody to develop the A380 with them. Boeing always has the engine manufacturers work with them in the aircraft planning stage which is why Rolls and GE always seem to come up with innovative designs and applications for their airplanes. Airbus seems to take whatever is available..

I've worked with Airbus integrating Airframe/engine concepts.

What Boeing does is offer exclusives in return for the contractual commitment for the engine vendor to spend billions more on the R&D of the new engine.

For the A346, Airbus refused an exclusive until RR had the exclusive and demanded it for a PIP. So instead of locking RR into spending another billion or so on engine R&D, RR received a cheap exclusive.
For the A380, the engine order being split also kept either vendor from putting in those extra billions.
For the A350, RR demanded and received an exclusive so they spend the money.

For the 787, it was the only high volume game coming into town. The A380 had locked up Airbus engineering, so everyone knew (Airbus had been vocal to vendors in fact) that there was no near term Airbus widebody and after the knowledge gained from a 'dangled carrot dreamliner exclusive', Boeing knew every trick the engine vendors had to offer. Boeing made it clear, two engines at most and because Pratt was desperate, RR and GE had to up their game to get onto the airframe.

Boeing is more mercenary. They couldn't care less which engine sells as long as enough of both engines sell to make every sale an engine contest (to cut sales price). Airbus... has played favorites at times which boosts the airframe sales price and makes it less competitive (Boeing will laugh at this when it happens).

With the 77W, Boeing made it clear to GE if they didn't meet contract terms, RR was on the airframe (in the contract). With a later start, it would have been a better engine. GE was motivated to deliver to keep the exclusive. Boeing isn't nice to GE or any vendor by any means.

Lightsaber

Waterbomber wrote:

Also worth noting from the graph that the A330NEO is basically getting the same engines as the B787, just with bleed air and a different marketing name.

You do realize the A330NEO was such a bad business case that no one was willing to put an engine on it without an exclusive and no one was willing to develop a new engine? It happens RR had an engine that better met the A330NEO business case on price and climb fuel burn (Trents are better optimized for climb fuel burn, GE's engines for cruise fuel burn, so it is mission dependent on which is optimum). Airbus had a time to market issue and due to the GE9X development effort, RR was able to promise earlier time to market. GE would have been two or three years later! Not exactly viable for Airbus.

And RR was keen on an exclusive... so with that delay, no Pratt, SAFRAN, or other engine in works... RR won by default.

Engine offers are by business case, not by any drinking buddy. Teams of directors at the engine companies claw for their hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D budgets. Sometimes billions of dollars... Airbus will present a business case, but the engine vendor will derive their own business case (always more pessimistic than the airframer on widebodies, sometimes more optimistic on narrowbodies).

Airbus is no victim here. They certainly weren't on the A350. The airframers get the engine their business case dictates.

An easy example is the MRJ. Mitsubishi was in violation of their contract for the original highly optimized engine for the MRJ (the one that the business jet would be the PW810 or 10k of thrust). So when the c-series was launched, Pratt informed Mitsubishi they either had to modify the contract to a PW1500 derived engine or they weren't getting an engine. Mitsubishi was learning they were far behind in Aerospace engineering definition, so they accepted the current PW1200G. Was Pratt evil forcing Mitsubishi to switch? No. Pratt was originally willing to lose a billion dollars on the MRJ engine just to keep an engineering staff employed. But once they had the PW1500G contract, they needed that staff doing profitable work. But engineering a new low spool would be OK. So that is what they did.
I'm actually impressed how common the PW1200G and PW1500G are. To save engineering costs, the PW1200G has a lot of oversized PW1500G parts that are orificed or have spring changes to work on the PW1200G (e.g., backpressure regulator for the thrust bearing, starter valve, TCCV, and other components that have production costs high for the PW1200G but overall Mitsubishi saved $150+ million not paying for development which Pratt would have insisted upon in engine price).

The cost by the engine vendors is always paid for in engine price or maintenance costs. This is a business.

Lightsaber

RalXWB wrote:

"Boeing gets the best choice of engines" - "Airbus can pick the engines rejected by Boeing". Only in your reality, only there

GP7000 started for a 747 development, Trent XWB is based on the 787 engine, as is the Trent 7000. Yet Boeing had all 3 interested in the 787 and have all three interested in the 797 again.

Leahy's overly sharp comments about engine people has, at least for me, created a credibility drop and a reduced value to any book he puts out. He could just as easily said why he misunderstood what was happening with engines. That would have been interesting - and informative.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Leahy's overly sharp comments about engine people has, at least for me, created a credibility drop and a reduced value to any book he puts out. He could just as easily said why he misunderstood what was happening with engines. That would have been interesting - and informative.

His choice of selling the shrink of the A380 to start with is more damming. Imagine if the 777's first and only model was the never sold -100 model. That's the literal equivalent to the A388. Both companies don't even try to sell the shortest lengths of their narrowbodies anymore and those at least are cheap to make with the hundreds of bigger brothers that are worth making leaving the factory each year.

His 10% better fuel might have been a thing if all the dead weight there to support the -900 and F variants was gone. Better cargo too with less wingbox for the length.

Blaming the engine makers for not offering an engine that wouldn't be ready till years after Airbus needed them is just stupid. Like blaming the lack of weather radar for the loss of the Spanish armada.

So we are again at a normal A380 bashing thread. The theme was A380 engines.

lightsaber wrote:

Boeing is more mercenary. They couldn't care less which engine sells as long as enough of both engines sell to make every sale an engine contest (to cut sales price). Airbus... has played favorites at times which boosts the airframe sales price and makes it less competitive (Boeing will laugh at this when it happens). Lightsaber

There is rather more to the equation than simply engines. For example, Boeing negotiated a funding 'take out' arrangement with GE for Boeing Capital.

MS assisted Apple a few decades ago. MS realised the market needed / wanted a competitor, and better the devil you know. Watch A & B fight to prevent a PW/RR merger, reversing the same arguments used to justify the B/McD merge.

XT6Wagon wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Leahy's overly sharp comments about engine people has, at least for me, created a credibility drop and a reduced value to any book he puts out. He could just as easily said why he misunderstood what was happening with engines. That would have been interesting - and informative.

His choice of selling the shrink of the A380 to start with is more damming. Imagine if the 777's first and only model was the never sold -100 model. That's the literal equivalent to the A388. Both companies don't even try to sell the shortest lengths of their narrowbodies anymore and those at least are cheap to make with the hundreds of bigger brothers that are worth making leaving the factory each year. .

The A380-800 is not a "shrink." It is a base model just like the 777-200. We know this because Airbus contemplated a shrink A380-700 seating approximately 450 passengers. The A380-900 was always a growth variant not the "base."

This is another A380 apologist trope. Virtually all commercial aircraft incorporate margin for significant future growth. That hasn't stopped the initial variants from being market successes on their own merits.

Let's face it, Airbus made a huge strategic mistake in thinking that the A380 would have a much larger market than it does. Boeing OTOH made a decision for more long thinner routes. Clearly Boeing's strategy was the better one. (this is regardless of the development and manufacturing screwups on both sides).

I was reading articles in Aviation Week about this in the late 90's, it was an obvious difference of opinion between these two companies, and it drove the products that were developed and produced.

The engine thing wouldn't have made a huge difference as far the most significant issue is the aircraft themselves, not a few percent fuel burn.

Chemist wrote:

Let's face it, Airbus made a huge strategic mistake in thinking that the A380 would have a much larger market than it does. Boeing OTOH made a decision for more long thinner routes. Clearly Boeing's strategy was the better one. (this is regardless of the development and manufacturing screwups on both sides).

I was reading articles in Aviation Week about this in the late 90's, it was an obvious difference of opinion between these two companies, and it drove the products that were developed and produced.

The engine thing wouldn't have made a huge difference as far the most significant issue is the aircraft themselves, not a few percent fuel burn.

I am so tired of this myth. Yes Airbus did miscalculate the sales possibilities of the A380, but Boeing did a counter with the 747-8 so they did not give up on that market.
Yes, Boeing did the 787 and Airbus did have the A330 in that market selling like hotcakes, no need for a new frame at that time.

Boeing sold between 2004 and end of December 2017 1,249 787.
Airbus sold from 2004 to December 2017 about 1,400 A330. (all together 1,712)

RalXWB wrote:

According to your opinion everything about the 380 is old and outdated. Can you please explain why Airlines are still flying the old and outdated 380? #quoteoftheday

Buffalomatt1027 wrote:

I dont think you can blame GE.

Airbus designs for the A380 started in the 90s and into the early 2000's...... everything with this aircraft since it was launched was old and outdated. I think we all know, if the A380 was designed right now, a lot would be different. (not talking about the engines)

As for Boeing / GE - Boeing came at GE with the 787 concept, Boeing gave the specs they wanted / needed from the engine, and GE delivered.

Airbus just took what GE had and thought it was good enough. They rushed and wanted to get the plane off the ground.

Sure .... the A380 was designed in the 90s and early 2000s. Its 2017 now ...... so the plane designed started over 20 years ago. Sure some interior designs and technology has improved but the basic overall design like the wings, engines, newer materials, and the overall shape of the plane is an older design. Materials improve, engine tech like this current topic has improved, and so on.

Like the 747 through out the years went through upgrades as time went on and tech got better. The A380 could use that.

I would make a solid bet that the A380 massive heavy wing could be redesigned and lighter. The wannabe winglets have tried to be added as a selling point but havent been sold or tested yet I believe.

lightsaber wrote:

enzo011 wrote:

fcogafa wrote:

Not my fault the A380 didn't sell better, it was the engine manufacturers fault, it's not fair....

I must have missed him saying that. Can you point to him saying that is the reason it didn't sell? I think he is just voicing his disappointment that the engine OEMs told him there is no new engine technology on the horizon when this was patently false.

Leahy lied. Pratt, GE, and RR all offered more technology for an exclusive. I was at Pratt when the A380 was launched. I was working with Airbus on a far more advanced widebody engine than the GP7200 for a very 787 like concept and A346 2nd engine.

So the idea Airbus didn't know about the tech... I took that Airbus proposal for the A346 and other widebody and just copy pasted into the Sonic cruiser bid. Boeing rejected a few items as too low a TRL (technology readiness level) and kept coming back asking for more and more on the Sonic cruiser. Then they promised an exclusive for the engine vendor who made the Sonic cruiser viable at a slightly reduced cruise speed.

Then they cancelled the Sonic cruiser and asked for the same technology in 787 engines, two vendors maximum.

For the Sonic cruiser all three engine vendors dug out every concept they could get Boeing to agree to as it was a HUGE exclusive.

Then Boeing told the now exposed engine makers to put that same technology in 787 engines.

So Airbus saying they weren't offered more is an outright lie. When the dual sourced A380 engines, GE bowed out, but offered Pratt a partnership. At that point, only Frankenstein engines met the business case.

Developing an all out new engine back then cost another $3 Billion. Nothing is free. Either offer the engine companies an outstanding offer or they will cheap out.

This isn't anything malicious. Pratt was offered on the A346 pre-77W and an exclusive on the other widebody. You had better believe Pratt saw a business case. Pratt was also offered a guarantee of 1 of 2 engines for what became the A320NEO.

Then Airbus asked for A380 only bids. Gee... No business case to spend $3 billion more. No A320NEO as Airbus correctly realized the could delay A320NEO development 7+ years (it ended up being very plus) as what we call the CEO would sell and Aviation partners was expected to have certified winglets by 2003 or 2004 (before the wing understrength issue for winglets was found by AP).

Lightsaber

Thank you very much for sharing this and your other posts on this thread; it is great to have some real meat to chew on instead of the circular arguments ad nauseum these threads tend to attract!

V/F