Matt6461 wrote:

You are telling us about a method of solving games in answer to arguments about the substantive "game values."
I think your very long posts would benefit - as would we readers - from a little more analytical clarity. Please no more posts about method in response to points about substance. That said I appreciate your joining the discussion.

Listen, I am really tired of repeating myself & talking to people who really have no idea how negociations & strategic industrial decisions are made. My earlier posts were pretty analytical & a few unobtuse members understood them - even extolled them, so I invite you to reread them carefully until you "get it". I mentionned a number of books by Tirole ( also based in a University Toulouse ) you can buy or read in a library if you will, each a daunting 1000 pages, plus all the other literature written by others, which is what it takes to let fine-tuned calculations to sink in. The practical applications are detailed & published in restricted academic journals, the likes of which you seem to have never consulted despite your academic claims - let alone studied on.
All I did was to try to channel some of that professional information between the swaths of unlearned & tiresome discussions. The book I just put a link to has minimalized case study but relevant to the discussion. If you deem the assumptions wrong, then you may want to take them with other knowledgeable economists before you continue to make an embarrrassment to yourself.

To kittyplane : you also need to work in the real world of large industries - like commercial aviation but not only, before dismissing things per gut feelings or shallow assumptions. That many think like you is not a sign of truth, but of ignorance. I won't discuss my role or pedigree in Economics, but mark my words : all I have said is standard practice, most people here have never heard of is a fact. That book, if you cared to understand it, will give you some elementary bases.
I am glad though a few members have seen the merit of my posts : one needs indeed to be trained well to accept strategic economic modelling & calculations both OEMs have resorted to in past decades - and not just them.


Back on topic, even without the exact figures & Airbus' econometric model, EK show no sign of abandonning the A380, STC is on record for saying this is his only problem with Airbus, and from what I know of the industrial impacts for both, they will strike a deal. If they do, A380 bashers would be well inspired to reconsider their way of analyzing facts. If they don't & scrap the A380, then either I am missing intel or something new came up ( stupidity on both sides being one ).
As precised by posts above, very little has unfolded as planned : 9/11, the 2000s economic downturn, delays, the Catia mess-up, the CA & A380F mes- ups , even EK. But that is how it goes, no one foresaw either the success of the A320 ( target was 800 units ) or the A330, or that the A358 would be still-born.

Boeing are very conservative & quite risk averse as they maximize short term profits, I am the first to acknowledge all their family lines have proven to be great commercial successes. Yet they have made many mistakes, the biggest one being the loss of US market share with the emergence of Airbus : had they been leading in every aspect, and known more about Game theory, this would never have happened, not even with public aids, Boeing squandered their position in great part because of blinded ignorance that should be enough to have every board member fired, fined & proscribed to lead imho.
Airbus on the other hand started from scratch & in much adversity if not outright hostility, their mistakes are part of their successes, there was no real blunder that could have sunk the company. Their success, which I find fascinating considering the odds, is not only due to good innovations & smart strategy, it has a toll of unforeseen factors : John Leahy for starters. Without him, no one can have an idea now of where Airbus would be, most probably below the 50/50 market share & thus with much less cash flows to launch the A380 or even the A350.
I am now hoping Boeing will come up with a soung NMA &/or MoM before Airbus NB double line-ups nail them in that segment. I love the 787 & 777X, but their financial positions are not as solid as they should be - nor is the A380. But the A350, A330 & A330neo are net & huge cashcows.

David_itl wrote:

Not really, They have sold more than what they stated was the business case number (250). What they said is the market number in the VLA category is not and never has been the number they alone would have sold. They didn't anticipate that 1 airline would end up dominating the type.

Without the production problems that were discovered that put the programme back costing billions and so raising the break-even number, more aircraft would have entered into airline fleets sooner and Airbus could potentially ease the base price a it would already be profitable with us talking about the introduction of the A389 now,. But with having to recoup costs as best they can, pricing isn't being overly discounted which is disincentivising airlines.

Since the 1st A380 delivery, Airbus have delivered 961 A330/340 (backlog of 326) and 122 A350s (backlog 730). Where exactly is the "missing" aircraft for them.. perhaps in the VLA category?

According to this thread, think of all of the things that had to go right for A380 to sell well:
• No initial production problems (but 787 had them in spades, and now sells in droves)
• Oil prices not too high (so pax can afford to travel) and not too low (so A380 small efficiency delta is meaningful)
• High production volume so you can discount prices (but then orders are taken away from A330/A340/A350)

The more posters defend the A380 the more they highlight how incredibly unrealistic the original plans were, and have to move on to second order effects such as the brand halo effect to try to justify it.

DWC wrote:

Back on topic, even without the exact figures & Airbus' econometric model, EK show no sign of abandonning the A380, STC is on record for saying this is his only problem with Airbus, and from what I know of the industrial impacts for both, they will strike a deal. If they do, A380 bashers would be well inspired to reconsider their way of analyzing facts. If they don't & scrap the A380, then either I am missing intel or something new came up ( stupidity on both sides being one ).

Yes, we see both parties want to get a deal done, but no motion for weeks now. STC's boss wants "copper bottomed guarantees" and presumably Enders's bosses (the board) are now in the decision loop. They are probably asking the obvious question: Do we want to sign an agreement that locks us in to another decade of loss making production and some form of large payout if we do not chose to make an massively upgraded A380? Apparently this calls for long deliberations.

DWC wrote:

As precised by posts above, very little has unfolded as planned : 9/11, the 2000s economic downturn, delays, the Catia mess-up, the CA & A380F mes- ups , even EK. But that is how it goes, no one foresaw either the success of the A320 ( target was 800 units ) or the A330, or that the A358 would be still-born.

We find ourselves at the point where it's clear A380 v1.0 is not in the runaway success category and the Airbus board needing to bet many years in advance if the A380 v2.0 will become a runaway success or suffer large future financial penalties if it is not. Shutting it down now has huge financial consequences, and kicking the can down the road now also has huge financial consequences.

Seems the only way forward is to replace copper bottomed guarantees with tin bottomed guarantees. Maybe this is what is being discussed.

tphuang wrote:

LTCM wrote:

tphuang wrote:

Just looking on Beijing to Shanghai. China Eastern and air China already operates shuttles with mostly 330s 787 and 777s. The only way to upgauge from that would be to vla. If passenger count double in 15 years between the two cities, what else can they operate?

Same with Beijing to Guangzhou, it is all wide-bodies. Where are these narrow body aircraft?

On top of that, There are huge demand in China for these special operations which could result in a380 demands specifically by operators looking to do it in China.

I don't know exactly which variants both airlines use on that route, but in gerneral there are plenty of options to upgauge beyond going to A380s.
A330-200 to -300
787-9 to -10
A330-300 to 77W
77W to 777-9

Or even run nothing but 777s. The idea that upgauging has to be to the largest plane out there is a myth that airliners.net has repeated far too many times.

If passengers count double in 15 years and number of flights stay constant, going from 330 to 777 isn't going to solve the problem.

Of course, there are many other factors in play. My point is to not dismiss china from a380 equation just because they have not jumped on this train yet.

Correct and you don't need to listen to the haters who don't live in China who spout wrong information. We frequently get 747s subbed on the PEK-SHA or PEK-CAN routes by CA. Essentially any aircraft can fly between the main Chinese cities and majority are widebody (minimum A330). The 77W is the largest aircraft from MU, 748 for CA and A380 for CAN. All are used for domestic hops and yes over time they will not be enough for the travel between these cities (high speed rail supplements the air network well howevers it is not as fast and the population is too great so that both can coexist).

Revelation wrote:

STC's boss wants "copper bottomed guarantees" and presumably Enders's bosses (the board) are now in the decision loop. They are probably asking the obvious question: Do we want to sign an agreement that locks us in to another decade of loss making production and some form of large payout if we do not chose to make an massively upgraded A380? Apparently this calls for long deliberations.
Seems the only way forward is to replace copper bottomed guarantees with tin bottomed guarantees. Maybe this is what is being discussed.

JL is the champion of creative deals & walk-away clauses, he pushed for the A380, he championned it worldwide, "it takes a A380 to beat a A380", he would want to secure its future. So he more than anyone now knows his job & if EK's demands can be met or something else be done. Concretizing STC insistent demands would certainly be a bloodline to the programme, I made rough calculations to know any other alternative would be way more expensive to EK. Problem now lies with Airbus as you say & at this point, Airbus better have very good intel for the decision they make, either way.

I share Brégier's view that China & Asia are the obvious choices, but it is also obvious no one there is championning the frame, barely better than the US3. From an econ PoV, CX & BA twin flights are a nonsense, means these additional slots & negative externalities are not priced high enough, in that duplicating services within the same or 2 hours in constrained airports means opportunity costs to consumers by way of less flights elsewhere. Cargo revenue aside, flying two or more long haul flights tailing each other is more expensive for the airline too : two frames instead of one to lease or buy, doubles cockpit crews, plus one or two additional FAs, to say nothing of all the other costs of running a second frame ( insurance, slots, checks, maintenance ), all paid for in the end by consumers in higher ticket fares.

I am expecting some "coup de théâtre" in January for Leahy's last fift quarter, but then February may be one last deadline :

There are suggestions, however, he might bid adieu after the Singapore Airshow in mid-February 2018 where, it is thought, Leahy will go out in a blaze of glory with a multibillion dollar order from an Asian customer.
https://endauanalytics.wordpress.com/2017/11/23/being-john-leahy/

DWC wrote:

Their success, which I find fascinating considering the odds, is not only due to good innovations & smart strategy, it has a toll of unforeseen factors : John Leahy for starters. Without him, no one can have an idea now of where Airbus would be, most probably below the 50/50 market share & thus with much less cash flows to launch the A380 or even the A350.

IMU Airbus success showcases the shortcomings of those "capitalist theories" that the real commercial entities like Boeing live by.
Most of the "disabling" environmental properties that Airbus has to work with are acutally anything but disabling.
Things like Mitbestimmung, job savety, working health care, protected pensions, sufficient free time all work to Airbus long range advantage.

For Boeing there should be no surprise that waging war against you workforce shows longterm downsides.

As long as the relevant nobel prize tends to go to the inventor of this years hippest theory this will not change.
Voodoo science on levels equivalent to any deranged religion.

No game strategy can change technical facts and it takes a lot of faith to believe that a A380v2 will do better against the 777-9 than the A380v1 did against the 777W. Simply because the only cheap solution is new engines but those only help so much when the airframe and wing are the problem. The other option is money, you will need a lot of money to turn the A380 into something useful and the costs would be close to a new design. This money will be missing for other projects though, like a replacement for the A330 or the A320 series or a counter to the MoM.

I really do not see an A380neo without Chinese orders.
So as it stands, EK still want the A380 classic, not the A380+, yet the wing tweaks are probably on the negociation table for the new order.
If Airbus can retrofit them remains to be seen, engineers here could tell us if that would be over the 5-10 million no-go mark for STC.

The issue I have with the theory that when air travel picks up the A380 will come into its own is this, how old will the a/c and its tech be when that happens, at present the a/c is in one place, little tweaks here and there, but do we really believe that if the demand for a large people mover comes in 20 - 30 years that the tech in the A380 will be sufficient? If new tech is around then does that not mean a new a/c even if from Boeing?

WIederling wrote:

Matt6461 wrote:

Don't forget the illuminati.

long dead.

But "competing" in insiduous ways is alive and well.

Like bribes, perhaps?

Back to planet earth and to the topic and away from nebulous conspiracy theories...

The deal gets done between EK and Airbus for up to 50 frames, it's in everyone's interest, but no commitment on new versions yet. Vaya con dios, JL.

DWC wrote:

Matt6461 wrote:

It's easy to underestimate the human side of things when looking at financial issues like an aircraft program. Leahy was the ultimate author of the market forecasts that made the A380 "business case" and his attachment to the big bird must have some sway in the organization. His retirement without another A380 sale makes cancellation more likely.

True from a human standpoint but that is not how big ( aviation ) enterprises macroeconomics work.
I'll gladly buy you a beer if I am mistaken but
1. Airbus needs it to pressure Boeing's profits down, someone said that without the A380, the 777X would sell for $50 million more. With 326 orders, assuming a conservative 50% discount on launch orders, that is more than $8 billions Boeing won't get for the 777X alone. Add $20 million min. for every 777 sold after year 1999 (A380 launched in 2000), that's an additional 20x1450 = 29 billion min Boeing never got, to say nothing of a possible pressure on the 787 & 748, very crude calculations but they give an idea of what is at stake for Airbus.
2. And I don't see EK abandonning the A380, they want it in their guts, all their recent shebang is to ensure its financial & thus commercial viabilities. No matter the lack of sales, Airbus won't be stopping the programme until EK decides to.
As to the Chinese bet, well, it's a bate the Chinese evidently are in no hurry to take...

Posts on the Game theory aspect seem to look at the game as a 2 Degree of Freedom system - the A380 dropped the price on the 777X by 50 million and the price on the 777 by some figure in the millions; it is then assumed that the A380 led to an effective loss of billions of dollars in profit for Boeing, rendering an advantage to airbus.

Consider what would happen in the absence of the A380: Boeing would raise prices on the 747/777 to the highest the market can bear, and would fill production with high priced orders for customers who need the very longest range and largest capacity aircraft. This would leave some demand unfilled for somewhat less demanding routes - many additional orders would be placed for A330s and now A350s. As each additional plane sold uses fixed resources more efficiently, these would likely be highly profitable sales. In the end, these secondary effects may dramatically weaken any positive effects that the A380 had on Airbus's profit and market position.

In response to post 901.

Hogwash.

I can be categorized as a Boeing fanboy but this myth that Airbus came out of nowhere and took down the Boeing giant is ridiculous. First and foremost the commercial aviation market was and is too big for a single manufacturer to monopolize, even back at the formation of Airbus. Second, Airbus didn’t emerge from nothing, it was a conglomerate of the majority of the European aviation industry, many with existing civil aircraft lines, and the support of the entire European political and economic landscape. They made a great product and capitalized on their strengths to their credit. However, they also filled a void left by the departure of Lockheed (and essentially MD), as well as their constituent companies themselves in the market.

This A vs B thing is enjoyable as hell but sometimes it loses the fact that neither company can dominate the other.

As for the A380, the irony is that Airbus is better off selling them at a loss because if they ever tun a profit they have to repay the launch aid. Source is the latest edition of AW&ST cover story.

Game Theory is one of the tools in decision making - but not every problem and factor is a nail.

Then again as Matt suggests game theory does have a lot to offer in our discussions. My suspicion is that the area where it will apply the most is in determining the specs in a new plane, and how the manufacturers and airline customers will respond. Another area (my pet peeve) is in pricing Y versus Y+ etc. Airlines seem to have found that making seats 10% more comfortable costs passengers most often 25-50% (even 100%) more. How can passengers respond?

Revelation wrote:

Boeing made a big mistake with the 747-8. Airbus made a huge mistake with A380. Neither will return their development costs. They were 2x-3x bigger for A380.

I have to take issue with that. The 747-8 development costs were said at the time to be more than 50% of the total A380 development costs (IIRC $6-8 billion versus $11-12 billion - I think we can ignore all the hyperbolic "A380 cost 30 bazillion" claims which get larger every time they're spouted...). Even allowing for another few billion to fix the wiring and rib feet I don't think it was anywhere near 3x the 747 costs - the development of which, don't forget, also involved wading through its own river of poo.

In that context, the 747 sales have been utterly dismal with respect to the A380 sales - ergo I firmly believe Boeing dug themselves a bigger hole overall with the 747 and the A380, while making a loss for the early frames, still has some chance of a profitable future and is making a lot more money on the side in terms of maintenance, etc.

DWC wrote:

Listen, I am really tired of repeating myself & talking to people who really have no idea how negociations & strategic industrial decisions are made. My earlier posts were pretty analytical & a few unobtuse members understood them - even extolled them, so I invite you to reread them carefully until you "get it". I mentionned a number of books by Tirole ( also based in a University Toulouse ) you can buy or read in a library if you will, each a daunting 1000 pages, plus all the other literature written by others, which is what it takes to let fine-tuned calculations to sink in. The practical applications are detailed & published in restricted academic journals, the likes of which you seem to have never consulted despite your academic claims - let alone studied on.
All I did was to try to channel some of that professional information between the swaths of unlearned & tiresome discussions. The book I just put a link to has minimalized case study but relevant to the discussion. If you deem the assumptions wrong, then you may want to take them with other knowledgeable economists before you continue to make an embarrrassment to yourself.

Spoken like a true Euro technocrat. You must either work in Brussels or Stausburg? All of this theoretical minutiae isn't worth a hill of bean-counters when you have two determined men sitting across a table, each looking after their best interests. I know which negotiator I'd want;
the one who has been trading horses (or camels) for forty years or the one who shows up carrying an obtuse 1000 page academic tome?

AUxyz wrote:

Consider what would happen in the absence of the A380: Boeing would raise prices on the 747/777 to the highest the market can bear, and would fill production with high priced orders for customers who need the very longest range and largest capacity aircraft. This would leave some demand unfilled for somewhat less demanding routes - many additional orders would be placed for A330s and now A350s. As each additional plane sold uses fixed resources more efficiently, these would likely be highly profitable sales. In the end, these secondary effects may dramatically weaken any positive effects that the A380 had on Airbus's profit and market position.

THe reasoning is flawed, both per Airbus own calculations AND published 747 case studies.
1. first part is true : 773 & 747 would indeed fill the VLA market, the winner takes it all. But then
2. that would have allowed Boeing to make better offers for airlines taking either of them AND the 787 and/or 737, to the detriment of the A330s and now A350s.
3. the 767, 772 & later 787 would keep in check the prices of the A330 & A358/9. The A330 price would not go up as you suggest, but if anything further down for Airbus to get a deal in such an environment.
4. history also shows that selling to all-Boeing airlines is a non-contestable market with high entry barriers, Leahy had to be very creative & Airbus' board very understanding ( 6 months leases for free with Eastern, walk-away clauses with UA, fine-tuned case studies with Northwest, etc. ) to let him proceed with what were very risky deals for non-visionnary men. Boeing later devized exclusivity contracts which were trounced by the EU but gentlemen US CEOs respected them nonetheless. Ryanair used Airbus to get "rape-deals" ( MOL's own expression ) with Boeing & even resold several 737 to a net profit (!), so JL always refused thereafter to negociate with MOL again ( even when he came back with 200 frames to negociate, told him "talk to Boeing about that" ), sending then a clear message to all other airlines : "if Boeing uses their financial power & profits elsewhere to outbid Airbus, Airbus will no longer sell frames to you as long as I am on board" - seems it was pretty effective.
5. AIrbus have sold all A330 & A350 they could without the A380.
With the A380, they sold a few more thanks to linked deals ( the 747 strategy ) and per reason 1&2, probably significantly more.

Actually I think game theory has spent a fair amount of time looking at how horse and camel traders work.

DWC wrote:

AUxyz wrote:

Consider what would happen in the absence of the A380: Boeing would raise prices on the 747/777 to the highest the market can bear, and would fill production with high priced orders for customers who need the very longest range and largest capacity aircraft. This would leave some demand unfilled for somewhat less demanding routes - many additional orders would be placed for A330s and now A350s. As each additional plane sold uses fixed resources more efficiently, these would likely be highly profitable sales. In the end, these secondary effects may dramatically weaken any positive effects that the A380 had on Airbus's profit and market position.

THe reasoning is flawed, both per Airbus own calculations AND published 747 case studies.
1. first part is true : 777 & 747 would indeed fill the VLA market, the winner takes it all. But then
2. that would have allowed Boeing to make better offers for airlines taking either of them AND the 787 and/or 737, to the detriment of the A330s and now A350s.
3. history also shows that selling to all-Boeing airlines is a non-contestable market with high entry barriers, Leahy had to be very creative & Airbus' board very understanding ( 6 months leases for free with Eastern, walk-away clauses with UA, fine-tuned case studies with Northwest, etc. ) to let him proceed with what were very risky deals for non-visionnary men. Boeing later devized exclusivity contracts which were trounced by the EU but gentlemen US CEOs respected them nonetheless. Ryanair used Airbus to get "rape-deals" ( MOL's own expression ) with Boeing & even resold several 737 to a net profit (!), so JL always refused thereafter to negociate with MOL again ( even when he came back with 200 frames to negociate, told him "talk to Boeing about that" ), sending then a clear message to all other airlines : "if Boeing uses their financial power & profits elsewhere to outbid Airbus, Airbus will no longer sell frames to you as long as I am on board" - seems it was pretty effective.
4. AIrbus have sold all A330 & A350 they could without the A380.
With the A380, they sold a few more thanks to linked deals ( the 747 strategy ) and per reason 1&2, probably significantly more.

That is only how things were in the past, however the question is the future.

and that poses some questions

- is the A380 a valid competitor to the 777-9 in the long run
- how much does it cost to make it a valid competitor
- how likely is that the money needed can be regained through sales
- are there cheaper options to keep Boeing honest

and even your recap misses on important part, the A340. Either it was enough to keep Boeing honest with 777 pricing or it shows that the desired effects only apply when you have a competitive product at hand, which questions the future of the A380.

I think Airbus could achieve the desired results with a A350-1100 for less investment and they would also gain a more marketable product with much lower risks for them.

Dantepel wrote:

First and foremost the commercial aviation market was and is too big for a single manufacturer to monopolize, even back at the formation of Airbus. Second, Airbus didn’t emerge from nothing, it was a conglomerate of the majority of the European aviation industry, many with existing civil aircraft lines, and the support of the entire European political and economic landscape. They made a great product and capitalized on their strengths to their credit. However, they also filled a void left by the departure of Lockheed (and essentially MD), as well as their constituent companies themselves in the market.

This A vs B thing is enjoyable as hell but sometimes it loses the fact that neither company can dominate the other.

As for the A380, the irony is that Airbus is better off selling them at a loss because if they ever tun a profit they have to repay the launch aid. Source is the latest edition of AW&ST cover story.

1. Airbus only had 18% market share in 1994, and perhaps half of that thanks to Leahy.
2. Airbus was tiny & with a lot of diverging interests between EU countries if you care to read the literature on Airbus' first 15 years.
3. Not a A vs B thing, I was actually trained on Boeing business cases in the 1990s
4. If your last point is true, is further explains why Airbus will promote the A380, plain common sense, no need of Game Theory.
5. Per the mistakes & arrogance of Boeing, I am eyeing the Chinese & the Russians ( particularly the MC-21 ) in case they don't turn out to be a new A320 textbook story.

DWC wrote:

I really do not see an A380neo without Chinese orders.
So as it stands, EK still want the A380 classic, not the A380+, yet the wing tweaks are probably on the negociation table for the new order.
If Airbus can retrofit them remains to be seen, engineers here could tell us if that would be over the 5-10 million no-go mark for STC.

STC's position is quite clear, what he really wants is a guaranteed future for the A380 classic. I doubt adding the aero improvements changes the negotiating status much if at all. I also doubt it's enough to attract orders from other customers, which is what the program really needs.

par13del wrote:

The issue I have with the theory that when air travel picks up the A380 will come into its own is this, how old will the a/c and its tech be when that happens, at present the a/c is in one place, little tweaks here and there, but do we really believe that if the demand for a large people mover comes in 20 - 30 years that the tech in the A380 will be sufficient? If new tech is around then does that not mean a new a/c even if from Boeing?

Yes, that's one problem the A380 has in the short range people mover role, it's tech is aging faster than demand is building.

The other problem is that its design point is long range high capacity. It is not optimized for China domestic routes. It's carrying around tonnes of extra weight so it can service the long range routes, and all of this is dead weight in the domestic role. The weight of the 2nd deck doesn't help much either.

And of course bigger airplanes is not the only way to address the problem. As mentioned before, HSR is one approach. Opening more airspace to commercial traffic is another. Up-gauging flights to secondary airports is another.

It's hard to see A380s being introduced in the Chinese domestic market at all, and even more so, it's hard to see them being introduced early enough and in large enough numbers to impact the future of the A380.

Revelation wrote:

Yes, that's one problem the A380 has in the short range people mover role, it's tech is aging faster than demand is building.

The other problem is that its design point is long range high capacity. It is not optimized for China domestic routes. It's carrying around tonnes of extra weight so it can service the long range routes, and all of this is dead weight in the domestic role. The weight of the 2nd deck doesn't help much either.

Agreed. But :
1. What did Boeing do to the 747 for JAL's domestic versions ? Not sure the A380 can replicate that & no one at Airbus has mentionned it.
2. I do not know what the Chinese will do. But this year alone Chinese airlines traffic to the US went up 13%. If they ever buy more frames, they should be for long-haul traffic, not domestic. CZ is trying to boost its Canton Route, but MU & CA are much better placed for premium LH connecting traffic

DWC wrote:

Matt6461 wrote:

You are telling us about a method of solving games in answer to arguments about the substantive "game values."
I think your very long posts would benefit - as would we readers - from a little more analytical clarity. Please no more posts about method in response to points about substance. That said I appreciate your joining the discussion.

Listen, I am really tired of repeating myself & talking to people who really have no idea how negociations & strategic industrial decisions are made. My earlier posts were pretty analytical & a few unobtuse members understood them - even extolled them, so I invite you to reread them carefully until you "get it". I mentionned a number of books by Tirole ( also based in a University Toulouse ) you can buy or read in a library if you will, each a daunting 1000 pages, plus all the other literature written by others, which is what it takes to let fine-tuned calculations to sink in. The practical applications are detailed & published in restricted academic journals, the likes of which you seem to have never consulted despite your academic claims - let alone studied on.
All I did was to try to channel some of that professional information between the swaths of unlearned & tiresome discussions. The book I just put a link to has minimalized case study but relevant to the discussion. If you deem the assumptions wrong, then you may want to take them with other knowledgeable economists before you continue to make an embarrrassment to yourself.

To kittyplane : you also need to work in the real world of large industries - like commercial aviation but not only, before dismissing things per gut feelings or shallow assumptions. That many think like you is not a sign of truth, but of ignorance. I won't discuss my role or pedigree in Economics, but mark my words : all I have said is standard practice, most people here have never heard of is a fact. That book, if you cared to understand it, will give you some elementary bases.
I am glad though a few members have seen the merit of my posts : one needs indeed to be trained well to accept strategic economic modelling & calculations both OEMs have resorted to in past decades - and not just them.

Hi DWC, your comments above have merit. If I were you I would give this thread a rest, for the sake of your own well being. Regards, Egerton.

Egerton wrote:

Hi DWC, your comments above have merit. If I were you I would give this thread a rest, for the sake of your own well being. Regards, Egerton.

Was trying to... unless tagged.
So thanx for reminding me some elementary wisdom - which I'll follow.
I have said what I had to share in this respect

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Actually I think game theory has spent a fair amount of time looking at how horse and camel traders work.

One basic tenet of science. Look at things and deduct the internal rules from externally visible behavior.
Now with the theoretical workings derived you can make quite often step forward into places
that are not accessible by simple try and error.

David_itl wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

To me (and lots of other people) this is simple. Airbus could have spent that money to develop a different plane that sold a thousand copies, and was profitable. Instead they made the A380. Bad choice.

Not really, They have sold more than what they stated was the business case number (250). What they said is the market number in the VLA category is not and never has been the number they alone would have sold. They didn't anticipate that 1 airline would end up dominating the type.

The A380 had it's commercial launch in 2000. In their 2000 market forecast the predicted the needs for 1,235 VLA aircraft between 2000-2020 (1). Boeing thought 930 (2). Boeing was closer to correct.

In 2000, Airbus thought it would sell at "least 700" A380s between 2000-2020. (3)
In 2004, their stockholders presentation said they expected to sell 751 (4)
Their sales predictions at the time of the launch were WAY off.

Now that sales are only 317, they say that (1) they had a business case at 250 and (2) they are going to lose money at 317. Either way, their predictions when they launched the program, and for years after, was about 750.



[1]http://www.as777.com/data/manufacturer/forecast/airbus_2000.pdf
[2]https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/airbus-a3xx-economics-target-unachievable-says-b-56343/
[3]Airbus A380: Superjumbo of the 21st Century, page 38
[4] https://company.airbus.com/dam/assets/. ... _sperl.pdf

AUxyz wrote:

Posts on the Game theory aspect seem to look at the game as a 2 Degree of Freedom system - the A380 dropped the price on the 777X by 50 million and the price on the 777 by some figure in the millions; it is then assumed that the A380 led to an effective loss of billions of dollars in profit for Boeing, rendering an advantage to airbus.

Consider what would happen in the absence of the A380: Boeing would raise prices on the 747/777 to the highest the market can bear, and would fill production with high priced orders for customers who need the very longest range and largest capacity aircraft. This would leave some demand unfilled for somewhat less demanding routes - many additional orders would be placed for A330s and now A350s. As each additional plane sold uses fixed resources more efficiently, these would likely be highly profitable sales. In the end, these secondary effects may dramatically weaken any positive effects that the A380 had on Airbus's profit and market position.

But there is a third option.

Airbus in 2000 decides to make a plane that competes directly with the 777.

Airbus does not lose the billions on the A380.

Instead Airbus and Boeing split the 777 market (which is bigger because there is no A380 and maybe no 747-8). I don't know if Airbus makes a profit in this scenario, but it's a better financial scenario than paying to develop the A380 and then only selling 317.[/quote]

Was there an engine in 2000 that would have worked in an 11 abreast with 18 inch seats? Typically a new plane does not directly compete with an older one, so the Airbus biggie would have been significantly bigger than a 777, and marginally bigger (and much better) than a 744. Say just a bit bigger than the now 777X, I don't know if that were possible.

WIederling wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Was there an engine in 2000 that would have worked in an 11 abreast with 18 inch seats? Typically a new plane does not directly compete with an older one, so the Airbus biggie would have been significantly bigger than a 777, and marginally bigger (and much better) than a 744. Say just a bit bigger than the now 777X, I don't know if that were possible.

That, actually, is an old story:

Airbus gets an engine and can, if they really want, build an airframe around it.
Boeing is waited hand and foot what kind of engine they would like with their new frame.

comparable story to ETOPS creation/expansion.

Yeah RR is a notoriously anti-Airbus. They're also run by the illuminati's anti-A380 conspiracy.

WIederling wrote:

That, actually, is an old story:

Airbus gets an engine and can, if they really want, build an airframe around it.
Boeing is waited hand and foot what kind of engine they would like with their new frame.

comparable story to ETOPS creation/expansion.

Huh, I have participated in engine design campaigns for Airbus. Where every detail was optimized for the airframe. While certain basics must be fixed due to technology progress.

The A350 certainly had a custom engine.
The A330 received T700 and PW4172s that were custom.
The A320NEO certainly has new custom engines. In fact, for the MAX, originally CFM wanted to force Boeing to accept -1A core. Only when Boeing threatened to open up the bidding did CFM optimize the core to what was better for Boeing.

There is nothing personal in this business, it is all business case. Bombardier went with Pratt as CFM didn't see enough of a business case to offer a competitive engine. However Pratt had a core they were quite willing to scale to Bombardier's BRX needs. When the BRX was shelved, Pratt was willing to do a custom core for the MRJ. However, due to delay after delay on the MRJ, Pratt went off and developed the PW1500G and the PW1200G received the core with higher economies of scale.

It is finding the engine vendor willing to take a lower ROI or more risk.

Which airframe of Airbus are you claiming wouldn't get a custom engine? The A320CEO received the V2500. That was 100% custom for that airframe.

The only airframe I'm aware of that couldn't get a custom engine is the A300 and history has shown there wasn't a business case for a custom design.

If the A380NEO has enough of a business case, it will get a new engine. But a new engine takes 7 years and billions of R&D. The current A380 sales didn't justify GP7200 and T900 development. So unless Airbus is offering such a significant upgrade to the airframe, there is no justification from a business case for a new engine.

How will Airbus persuade (via technology investment) in a new engine for the A380?

Lightsaber

lightsaber wrote:

Which airframe of Airbus are you claiming wouldn't get a custom engine?

Leahy complained at the time of the A350 Mk1 -> XWB transition that GE would not build a new engine for the bigger airplane and was only offering GEnX as is. It was a true statement. GE was on the Mk1 but had exclusive rights on 777 and the XWB was going to be a 777 competitor so it would not offer a new engine. As we know, RR later came on board with TXWB.

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Boeing made a big mistake with the 747-8. Airbus made a huge mistake with A380. Neither will return their development costs. They were 2x-3x bigger for A380.

I have to take issue with that. The 747-8 development costs were said at the time to be more than 50% of the total A380 development costs (IIRC $6-8 billion versus $11-12 billion - I think we can ignore all the hyperbolic "A380 cost 30 bazillion" claims which get larger every time they're spouted...). Even allowing for another few billion to fix the wiring and rib feet I don't think it was anywhere near 3x the 747 costs - the development of which, don't forget, also involved wading through its own river of poo.

In that context, the 747 sales have been utterly dismal with respect to the A380 sales - ergo I firmly believe Boeing dug themselves a bigger hole overall with the 747 and the A380, while making a loss for the early frames, still has some chance of a profitable future and is making a lot more money on the side in terms of maintenance, etc.

The 747 was a verry sucesfull plane and then they made the 747/8 and well compared to the a380 program they will never catch the 747 sales
I flew in the a380 and for me its the most comfortable ride i had.
But i dont see a big future for 4 holers.

Revelation wrote:

lightsaber wrote:

Which airframe of Airbus are you claiming wouldn't get a custom engine?

Leahy complained at the time of the A350 Mk1 -> XWB transition that GE would not build a new engine for the bigger airplane and was only offering GEnX as is. It was a true statement. GE was on the Mk1 but had exclusive rights on 777 and the XWB was going to be a 777 competitor so it would not offer a new engine. As we know, RR later came on board with TXWB.

What I remember is that this story originally went back to A300 times finding a repeat at the A350Mk1 time.
But I could well misremember that.

WIederling wrote:

Matt6461 wrote:

WIederling wrote:

That, actually, is an old story:

Airbus gets an engine and can, if they really want, build an airframe around it.
Boeing is waited hand and foot what kind of engine they would like with their new frame.

comparable story to ETOPS creation/expansion.

Yeah RR is a notoriously anti-Airbus. They're also run by the illuminati's anti-A380 conspiracy.

you appear less then illuminated

I reproduced an old Airbus storry. Afair you can read it up in the Airbus History written by $forgotten American journalist.
Start here: http://www.aircraft.airbus.com/company/history/

Your link starts

Airbus makes the freedom of flight possible

Are you sure this wasn't written by a certain German A.net poster?

Bricktop wrote:

WIederling wrote:

Matt6461 wrote:

Yeah RR is a notoriously anti-Airbus. They're also run by the illuminati's anti-A380 conspiracy.

you appear less then illuminated

I reproduced an old Airbus storry. Afair you can read it up in the Airbus History written by $forgotten American journalist.
Start here: http://www.aircraft.airbus.com/company/history/

Your link starts

Airbus makes the freedom of flight possible

Are you sure this wasn't written by a certain German A.net poster?

There can be quantum leap differences in overstatement Lets have a look:
http://www.boeing.com/history/
Since July 15, 1916, we've been making the impossible, possible. From producing a single canvas-and-wood airplane to transforming how we fly over oceans and into the stars, The Boeing Company has become the world's largest aerospace company. And we're just getting started.

I'd be more interested in who wrote up the Airbus history section.

Revelation wrote:

Do we want to sign an agreement that locks us in to another decade of loss making production and some form of large payout if we do not chose to make an massively upgraded A380? Apparently this calls for long deliberations.

You keep saying this. While it's clear that current production is run at a small (how did Enders describe it - non material?) loss, you don't know that the Emirates order, should it materialize, will be. The anaemic production rate will be no surprise.

bob75013 wrote:

Slug71 wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

This is one of the cases in which it's clear that Boeing was right and Airbus was wrong. Boeing's prediction of the future market for VLA aircraft was much closer to correct, and Airbus's prediction was disastrously wrong. (No, I'm not a Boeing fanboi, but the historic archives of predictions is available).

The brand value of the A380 is real, but it's not worth ten billion.

What was Boeing right about? maybe numbers, but again, they fired back with the 747-8. And the 747-8 will never return it's development costs.

He told you in his post what Boeing was right about : "Boeing's prediction of the future market for VLA aircraft was much closer to correct, and Airbus's prediction was
disastrously wrong." Didn't you read it?

And I acknowledged they may have been regarding the numbers. I always thought Airbus's numbers were far too high. But I don't think Boeing got it "right". They were a lot closer, but also far from right. Of course, the depression had a big impact on the market and sales (lack thereof), but Boeing is set to lose BILLIONS on the 747-8. There is nothing "right" about that. The whole notion that B was right and A was wrong, needs to be put to rest.

Revelation wrote:

Slug71 wrote:

A decade ago, we were in a depression...
Passenger numbers are expected to double by mid 2030s and airports and gates are already getting constrained. Why wouldn't an A380 help?

A380 was based on a lot of "fair weather sailing" presumptions.

How do you know that we won't be in a depression between now and the mid 2030s?

Our economist friends can tell you how often we encounter recessions and depressions.

I'm pretty sure it won't be all fair weather sailing between now and 2030, unfortunately.

Agreed.

Revelation wrote:

Slug71 wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

This is one of the cases in which it's clear that Boeing was right and Airbus was wrong. Boeing's prediction of the future market for VLA aircraft was much closer to correct, and Airbus's prediction was disastrously wrong. (No, I'm not a Boeing fanboi, but the historic archives of predictions is available).

The brand value of the A380 is real, but it's not worth ten billion.

What was Boeing right about? maybe numbers, but again, they fired back with the 747-8. And the 747-8 will never return it's development costs.

Boeing made a big mistake with the 747-8. Airbus made a huge mistake with A380. Neither will return their development costs. They were 2x-3x bigger for A380.

The A380 has returned it's development costs. It's losing money on production costs per plane with the low rate profuction.

kitplane01 wrote:

AUxyz wrote:

Posts on the Game theory aspect seem to look at the game as a 2 Degree of Freedom system - the A380 dropped the price on the 777X by 50 million and the price on the 777 by some figure in the millions; it is then assumed that the A380 led to an effective loss of billions of dollars in profit for Boeing, rendering an advantage to airbus.

Consider what would happen in the absence of the A380: Boeing would raise prices on the 747/777 to the highest the market can bear, and would fill production with high priced orders for customers who need the very longest range and largest capacity aircraft. This would leave some demand unfilled for somewhat less demanding routes - many additional orders would be placed for A330s and now A350s. As each additional plane sold uses fixed resources more efficiently, these would likely be highly profitable sales. In the end, these secondary effects may dramatically weaken any positive effects that the A380 had on Airbus's profit and market position.

But there is a third option.

Airbus in 2000 decides to make a plane that competes directly with the 777.

Airbus does not lose the billions on the A380.

Instead Airbus and Boeing split the 777 market (which is bigger because there is no A380 and maybe no 747-8). I don't know if Airbus makes a profit in this scenario, but it's a better financial scenario than paying to develop the A380 and then only selling 317.

We had 9/11, wars, global depression, and record high fuel prices since then. All of which could not have been predicted and it would have been too late to back out at that point.

Airbus is not losing "billions" on the A380.

lightsaber wrote:

The only airframe I'm aware of that couldn't get a custom engine is the A300 and history has shown there wasn't a business case for a custom design.

A300 was lucky to get an engine. Neither engine manufacturer wanted to fall out of favour with existing key airline customers and aircraft manufacturers. No customisation. List price. No offsets. Every purchase required a Letter of Credit. Both official suppliers, or neither.

Consortium was politically unable to source RR, unless they bought in as a full risk sharing partner, as this would have upset the work/value distribution. US engines were excluded from the work/value distribution formula.

Naive to assume 'exclusive' agreements today don't include clauses covering supply, pricing, customisation and improvement delays/embargoes.

Bet Airbus and EK want EA back as an A380 option, to extract unit and maintenance pricing concessions, and technical improvements, though expect EA happy to sit on the sidelines.

And Boeing has the power on the 777X (and other X derivatives), though wonder how many customers are lobbying for a choice. A model lifetime of exclusive supply, maintenance and parts. Happy times GE.

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Boeing made a big mistake with the 747-8. Airbus made a huge mistake with A380. Neither will return their development costs. They were 2x-3x bigger for A380.

I have to take issue with that. The 747-8 development costs were said at the time to be more than 50% of the total A380 development costs (IIRC $6-8 billion versus $11-12 billion - I think we can ignore all the hyperbolic "A380 cost 30 bazillion" claims which get larger every time they're spouted...). Even allowing for another few billion to fix the wiring and rib feet I don't think it was anywhere near 3x the 747 costs - the development of which, don't forget, also involved wading through its own river of poo.

Wikipedia ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A3 ... pment_cost ) gives us:

In 2000, the originally projected development cost was €9.5 billion.[33] In 2004 Airbus estimated 1.5 billion euros ($2 billion) would be added for a €10.3 Bn ($12.7 Bn) total.[34] In 2006 at €10.2 Billion, Airbus stopped publishing its reported cost and then provisioned €4.9 Bn after the difficulties in electric cabling and two years delay for an estimated total of €18 Bn.

In 2014, the aircraft was estimated to have cost $25bn (£16bn – €18.9bn) to develop.[35] In 2015, Airbus said development costs were €15bn (£11.4bn – $16.95 Bn), though analysts believe the figure is likely to be at least €5bn ($5.65 Bn) more for a €20 Bn ($22.6 Bn) total.[3] In 2016, The A380 development costs were estimated at $25 billion for 15 years,[36] $25–30 billion,[37] or 25 billion euros ($28 billion).[4]

It's hard to know where to draw the line, but your $11-$12B is below even Airbus's 2015 statement of €15B / $17B.

I'm not finding as crisp a set of references for the 747-8, but my recollection is the initial development cost estimate was $2B and that doubled to $4B due to all the "poo" it stepped in. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... r-takeoff/ gives us "development costs that analysts estimate at some $4 billion" at the time of the first flight. If you or anyone else has better data, please share.

And so I think my 2x-3x statement is justified.

And I think we can see the parallels that also justify the statements. 747-8 is a new engine and a wing twist and a stretch, so should be on a similar level of cost as is the A330neo, which is a bit cheaper because of no stretch. A380 was a clean sheet and had bad birth pains and its cost is on a similar level as is the 787 which also was a clean sheet with bad birth pains.

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

In that context, the 747 sales have been utterly dismal with respect to the A380 sales - ergo I firmly believe Boeing dug themselves a bigger hole overall with the 747 and the A380, while making a loss for the early frames, still has some chance of a profitable future and is making a lot more money on the side in terms of maintenance, etc.

I don't follow at all. The data you chose shows it cost twice as much to build, and so by your measure it has twice as big a hole to dig out of, and as above, probably even larger than twice as big. We know it only covered its production costs for a brief period. Both programs are not selling, but it's a fact that the 747-8 has sold more frames in recent years than has A380.

Revelation wrote:

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Boeing made a big mistake with the 747-8. Airbus made a huge mistake with A380. Neither will return their development costs. They were 2x-3x bigger for A380.

I have to take issue with that. The 747-8 development costs were said at the time to be more than 50% of the total A380 development costs (IIRC $6-8 billion versus $11-12 billion - I think we can ignore all the hyperbolic "A380 cost 30 bazillion" claims which get larger every time they're spouted...). Even allowing for another few billion to fix the wiring and rib feet I don't think it was anywhere near 3x the 747 costs - the development of which, don't forget, also involved wading through its own river of poo.

Wikipedia ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A3 ... pment_cost ) gives us:

In 2000, the originally projected development cost was €9.5 billion.[33] In 2004 Airbus estimated 1.5 billion euros ($2 billion) would be added for a €10.3 Bn ($12.7 Bn) total.[34] In 2006 at €10.2 Billion, Airbus stopped publishing its reported cost and then provisioned €4.9 Bn after the difficulties in electric cabling and two years delay for an estimated total of €18 Bn.

In 2014, the aircraft was estimated to have cost $25bn (£16bn – €18.9bn) to develop.[35] In 2015, Airbus said development costs were €15bn (£11.4bn – $16.95 Bn), though analysts believe the figure is likely to be at least €5bn ($5.65 Bn) more for a €20 Bn ($22.6 Bn) total.[3] In 2016, The A380 development costs were estimated at $25 billion for 15 years,[36] $25–30 billion,[37] or 25 billion euros ($28 billion).[4]

It's hard to know where to draw the line, but your $11-$12B is below even Airbus's 2015 statement of €15B / $17B.

I'm not finding as crisp a set of references for the 747-8, but my recollection is the initial development cost estimate was $2B and that doubled to $4B due to all the "poo" it stepped in. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... r-takeoff/ gives us "development costs that analysts estimate at some $4 billion" at the time of the first flight. If you or anyone else has better data, please share.

And so I think my 2x-3x statement is justified.

And I think we can see the parallels that also justify the statements. 747-8 is a new engine and a wing twist and a stretch, so should be on a similar level of cost as is the A330neo, which is a bit cheaper because of no stretch. A380 was a clean sheet and had bad birth pains and its cost is on a similar level as is the 787 which also was a clean sheet with bad birth pains.

Your claim of 2x-3x is justified. Probably more like 3x-4x (or higher) even. But as you say, the A380 is a clean sheet vs a update. Not really a fair comparison anyway.

From the research I did a little while back, costs for the 747-8 were at $4bn In 2014/15, excluding all the charges it took on.
Haven't looked into those charges, but I'm guessing they would put development around $5bn. So probably around a 1/5th of the A380's costs.


However, looking at these numbers, kinda hard to see how neither A or B will return most of the costs. Of course we don't know the actual sales prices or costs.

747-8F - @ $387.5m x 88 = $34.1bn
747-8i - @ $386.6m x 47 = $18.2bn
T = $52.3bn

A380 - @ $436.9m x 270 = $118bn

Slug71 wrote:

The A380 has returned it's development costs. It's losing money on production costs per plane with the low rate profuction.

As far as I know - and a lot of other investigators know - The A380 has never repaid any of its development cost (nor has Airbus claimed it has), and lost huge amounts of money during initial production, had one or perhaps 2 years of breakeven on production, and is again loosing money on production ("losses are not material" is the recent official Airbus statement).

You really need to do some research on your claims. Because Airbus has never published the numbers (unlike Boeing with its program accounting numbers for each program) no one publicly really knows. Best estimates that I have seen from different credible sources puts the A380 in the range of at least $25 Billion in losses for Airbus.

IF you have better sources you need to provide them. Just your claiming what you do in the face of much other evidence does not make you right, and affects how people view you.

Have a great day,

2175301 wrote:

Slug71 wrote:

The A380 has returned it's development costs. It's losing money on production costs per plane with the low rate profuction.

As far as I know - and a lot of other investigators know - The A380 has never repaid any of its development cost (nor has Airbus claimed it has), and lost huge amounts of money during initial production, had one or perhaps 2 years of breakeven on production, and is again loosing money on production ("losses are not material" is the recent official Airbus statement).

You really need to do some research on your claims. Because Airbus has never published the numbers (unlike Boeing with its program accounting numbers for each program) no one publicly really knows. Best estimates that I have seen from different credible sources puts the A380 in the range of at least $25 Billion in losses for Airbus.

IF you have better sources you need to provide them. Just your claiming what you do in the face of much other evidence does not make you right, and affects how people view you.

Have a great day,

That sounds about right. But that $25bn (which would include development & production) in losses is based off of list prices.
The actual cost per A380 will be far lower than the list price. Just as sales prices were likely lower than list. Just how much is anyone's guess. But as has been quoted, the losses are not material. I wouldn't consider $25bn NOT material. I'm positive the shareholders wouldn't either. Especially while running development costs of 3 other types (A350, A320NEO, and A330NEO).

It's easy to see why Airbus is reluctant to take on any additional costs to update the A380 though.
I'm sure they are kicking themselves for not making the -800 the base model.

Slug71 wrote:

That sounds about right. But that $25bn (which would include development & production) in losses is based off of list prices.
The actual cost per A380 will be far lower than the list price. Just as sales prices were likely lower than list. Just how much is anyone's guess. But as has been quoted, the losses are not material. I wouldn't consider $25bn NOT material. I'm positive the shareholders wouldn't either. Especially while running development costs of 3 other types (A350, A320NEO, and A330NEO).

My understanding is that the "not material" refers to the marginal loss on each additional current frame, not on aggregate program costs to date. Am I wrong?

PS (and not to Slug71): And yes I know, mein Freund, "But the 787!"

Bricktop wrote:

My understanding is that the "not material" refers to the marginal loss on each additional current frame, not on aggregate program costs to date. Am I wrong?

The statement was by Bregier, and he did not explain himself any further.

Revelation wrote:

Bricktop wrote:

My understanding is that the "not material" refers to the marginal loss on each additional current frame, not on aggregate program costs to date. Am I wrong?

The statement was by Bregier, and he did not explain himself any further.

What Revelation said.

However, accounting tricks only go so far. Those losses will still end up in the same pool as the overall losses in one way or another. It would still have to be satisfied by the shareholders/investers who is looking at the whole/big picture anyway.

The 380 has covered production costs only for 2-3 years (maybe 1-2) as I have read, if I understood correctly. NO R and D costs!

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Was there an engine in 2000 that would have worked in an 11 abreast with 18 inch seats? Typically a new plane does not directly compete with an older one, so the Airbus biggie would have been significantly bigger than a 777, and marginally bigger (and much better) than a 744. Say just a bit bigger than the now 777X, I don't know if that were possible.

I don't think that's true.

The A320/737 are direct competitors. The A330/787 are direct competitors (for any but the longest routes). The MRJ and the ERJ-175-E2.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Typically a new plane does not directly compete with an older one, so the Airbus biggie would have been significantly bigger than a 777, and marginally bigger (and much better) than a 744. Say just a bit bigger than the now 777X, I don't know if that were possible.

Not a bit bigger, a lot bigger than a 777X. The 777X is not much bigger than the 77W.

I call foul on the status of this thread! The title is "Airbus Working With Emirates on New Order for Flagship A380", and I visit here expecting some discussion or even news on the Airbus - Emirates joint efforts on this

For the last few days, this thread has radically departed from the title's aim

If you all want to continue debating all other aspects of the A380 or any other aircraft, if it is not relevant to the thread title, please take it elsewhere

Sorry to be "Grumpy old man" again, but please remember that thread titles are meant to set the direction of thread discussion

I'll ask for this thread to be locked, you can take all your other discussions to new threads with appropriate titles!