Remember the Boeing board need to give "authority to offer", well before a launch. The board will need to see the anticipate pricing, anticipated margin, cost to develop, the manufacturing plan, the worst case predictions of lifetime profitable production, and far more. Authority to offer means that due diligence has been made of the business case, if not properly done it can expose the manufacture to stockholder angst and litigation.

I predict that only one model will be offered at first, with the 2nd in the family identified but not offered. This first model will take a Leap engine that is current tech upsized to handle the lowest thrust required model. Remember the 777, there were the A market version, B market version later, then the ER and LR models. I personally see 3 models - a 757 capacity plane with 5 to 600 miles more range. The 2nd model would be more pax with less range, basically right up the mainline of range / capacity. A 3rd model would be a stretch that could possibly do 3,000 m with lots of pax.

brindabella wrote:

Sorry Rheinwaldner, I think this one is just too big a potential success - or alternatively, potentially another massive fiasco al la 787.
If Boeing is checking, double-checking and then checking yet again, then that must be expected, IMO.
It is money very well spent, no matter which way the decision goes.

You don't need to apologize to me. I am personally fine with all you say. It is Boeings CEO who sends out not nearly as optimistic signals as you. IMO a lot of people seem to ignore what Boeing is saying about the NMA and would not be mentally prepared if e.g. the launch would be canceled.

To me it seems, that Boeing is presenting a fantastic product to the airlines and the fans (so they like it), that seems to be hard to realize (so Boeing needs to be sure, that this moonshot turns out better than the last). Because getting widebody boarding efficiency with narrowbody economics requires nothing less than another moonshot imho. Kudos to Boeing if the would accomplish it. But they seem to be not 100% convinced either.

I say once more, I cant remember any other program, where the vendor months before the supposedly launch had no clarity about the business case.

Although Muilenburg said, the decision would be made in a year, so what would exactly do you expect in Farnborough? You guys remind me of some Apple disciples who year after year waited for the 12 inch IPad.

Will the engine supplier(s) be selected before the board approves offering the aircraft?

bigjku wrote:

I will tell you there are people at Boeing who believe that both the A320neo and 737max should never have been done and that long term both are mistakes to be corrected. Not saying I agree with it but they do have some points when they make their case.

Well Boeing would have clearly preferred to go straight to NSA and if not for the 787 and 747-8 programs imploding probably could have had it ready now instead of MAX. Instead, NSA was looking more like a 2020 prospect and once fuel started heading back to $4 a gallon in 2010 and 2011, airlines were panicking and Boeing had to respond sooner.

CRHoward wrote:

Will the engine supplier(s) be selected before the board approves offering the aircraft?

Yes, because the airframe needs the engines to make the business case.

JayinKitsap wrote:

Remember the Boeing board need to give "authority to offer", well before a launch. The board will need to see the anticipate pricing, anticipated margin, cost to develop, the manufacturing plan, the worst case predictions of lifetime profitable production, and far more. Authority to offer means that due diligence has been made of the business case, if not properly done it can expose the manufacture to stockholder angst and litigation.

I have a feeling they already have given “authority to offer”. We have a half dozen airlines on records saying they are highly interested. I have a feeling that those discussions are leading to launch orders that may be imminent. I may be wrong but with so many airlines talking about the plane, I would assume the sales teams are actively selling it.

rheinwaldner wrote:

I say once more, I cant remember any other program, where the vendor months before the supposedly launch had no clarity about the business case.

Please define what you mean by “no clarity”. From what I read and hear, they are close to closing the business case and expect to be ready for a launch soon. I would like to know where you gathered the information that resulted in you repeating that they have no clarify about the business case.

Newbiepilot wrote:

JayinKitsap wrote:

Remember the Boeing board need to give "authority to offer", well before a launch. The board will need to see the anticipate pricing, anticipated margin, cost to develop, the manufacturing plan, the worst case predictions of lifetime profitable production, and far more. Authority to offer means that due diligence has been made of the business case, if not properly done it can expose the manufacture to stockholder angst and litigation.

I have a feeling they already have given “authority to offer”. We have a half dozen airlines on records saying they are highly interested. I have a feeling that those discussions are leading to launch orders that may be imminent. I may be wrong but with so many airlines talking about the plane, I would assume the sales teams are actively selling it.

That's sound pretty disconnected from reality if you read Muilenburgs quote below.

Newbiepilot wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

I say once more, I cant remember any other program, where the vendor months before the supposedly launch had no clarity about the business case.

Please define what you mean by “no clarity”. From what I read and hear, they are close to closing the business case and expect to be ready for a launch soon. I would like to know where you gathered the information that resulted in you repeating that they have no clarify about the business case.

Thats the denial I meant. Did you care to listen to Muilenburgs interview? I extracted the relevant quote word for word for you:

Boeing CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, April 12, 2018:
"Now the question is whether we can make a business case close, because it will have to be an airplane that has widebody efficiencies in terms of moving people on and off the plane but has narrowbody economics (= a moonshot/miracle kind of aircraft, remark Rheinwaldner). That business case is what we are still working on. We are not up to a decision point yet, we haven't made a launch decision but I would say, over the next year we'll get to that (decision) point."

So I say challenge you once more, to find any source, where the vendor openly talked so defensive about the business case shortly before launching a program.

Interest from airlines is easy.

Ask any airline: "Would you like a plane with 270 single class seats, that has a fuel burn per seat mile lower than the A321, a range of 5000nm and will have a list price of 160 million dollars?"

The gap between 737-10/A321 and 787-8/A338 is real and nearly every airline would probably be interested in a plane that fills the gap, the problem is getting airlines to agree on requirements, because in the end the MoM is always an optional member of the fleet. Airlines can cover their route network without it, as they are currently doing. So the MoM must either offer a huge operational cost advantage or it must offer a low purchase price to reduce the financial risk for the airline. Those 2 points are very much in conflict.

seahawk wrote:

Interest from airlines is easy.

Ask any airline: "Would you like a plane with 270 single class seats, that has a fuel burn per seat mile lower than the A321, a range of 5000nm and will have a list price of 160 million dollars?"

...now add those three lovely "neo" letters at the end of the A321 and your offer is screwed right there.

bigjku wrote:

I will tell you there are people at Boeing who believe that both the A320neo and 737max should never have been done and that long term both are mistakes to be corrected. Not saying I agree with it but they do have some points when they make their case.

With combined sales of over 10,500, I'd love to hear in what way they're mistakes that need "to be corrected".

bigjku wrote:

I will tell you there are people at Boeing who believe that both the A320neo and 737max should never have been done and that long term both are mistakes to be corrected. Not saying I agree with it but they do have some points when they make their case.

I have no idea who these "people at Boeing" are, and I have no idea why they might even have the conversation, because the market has already spoken.

Boeing were completely wedded to NSA - it was all they spoke about, "all their customers wanted it", and there was no way that Airbus, under the yoke of the A380 and A350 developments could respond (this bit not without merit).
The moment the NEO came out and shortened the route to new narrowbodys in large volumes all the above became history.
If staying all new was the right answer, then Boeing would have stuck with the NSA and let history take its course.

The reality that makes the NEO the most clairvoyant launch of all time is that a number of new narrowbodys (C-series, C919, MC-21 et al) were going to bring next gen engines to the market way sooner than any NSA from Airbus or Boeing (2013 for the C-series to 2016 for the others), which brought the risk that they had space to gain traction.
At a stroke, Airbus could put new engined narrowbodys into the hands of the airlines sooner, and in way greater volumes, than the new entrants could possibly emulate, mopping up all the latent demand, and through sheer volume, generating a pricing model that they couldn't possibly match. That it also forced Boeing to do the MAX just rams the point home

There is no way on this planet that the A320NEO was the wrong decision.
Rates as the best decision in the history of aviation in my view.
The MAX following it was also correct as a consequence.

To me these comments sound like sour grapes because it forced Boeing to do something they didn't want to do, rather than an appreciation of how the market actually behaved

Rgds

I think that is a fair,balanced and accurate summary of what happened Astureman.
I wonder however ( and it's no more than that) whether Boeing forsaw all the myriad of 'little' developments that have occurred 'since' the NEO was first launched in 2010.
IE.Slimline seats 'buying' 2" of pitch per seat which is being used for extra rows of seats.Slim/Flex toilets and galleys 'buying' another 2 rows of seats.Repositioning of exit doors for greater pax numbers (to 250).Of course the extra range the GTF (particularly) offered.Particulary when you move to '3' ACT's and get over 4knm out of the aircraft!

If all these little things are added together it created a new class of aircraft.A better B757-200 minus 30% sfc.Not only can it do 240 pax today it is known (historically) that this aircaft can take one more stretch.It won't have been missed by Boeing that the new door arrangement is certified for 250 pax.
I am not at all sure all of those 'little' developments - combined - were seen 8 years ago by Boeing.If they had been then the dash10 work would have been done at the outset not as a last minute panic (which it was imho).Hence the need for a 'proper' long term solution - which the 797 clearly is.
Such a MOM market gap didn't really exist 10 years ago as the 332 was circa 7knm max and the 763 6knm max - both with an emphasis on the word max.These were 5knm aircaft really.Since then of course the 787 and 338 NEO have come out.Both are far more suited to the longer ranged missions.Hence the gap - particularly for Boeing where the 7310 'runs out' at 3knm max ( and at only 220-230 pax one class).
The mom gap is bigger for them than it is Airbus.

rheinwaldner wrote:

Newbiepilot wrote:

JayinKitsap wrote:

Remember the Boeing board need to give "authority to offer", well before a launch. The board will need to see the anticipate pricing, anticipated margin, cost to develop, the manufacturing plan, the worst case predictions of lifetime profitable production, and far more. Authority to offer means that due diligence has been made of the business case, if not properly done it can expose the manufacture to stockholder angst and litigation.

I have a feeling they already have given “authority to offer”. We have a half dozen airlines on records saying they are highly interested. I have a feeling that those discussions are leading to launch orders that may be imminent. I may be wrong but with so many airlines talking about the plane, I would assume the sales teams are actively selling it.

That's sound pretty disconnected from reality if you read Muilenburgs quote below.

Newbiepilot wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

I say once more, I cant remember any other program, where the vendor months before the supposedly launch had no clarity about the business case.

Please define what you mean by “no clarity”. From what I read and hear, they are close to closing the business case and expect to be ready for a launch soon. I would like to know where you gathered the information that resulted in you repeating that they have no clarify about the business case.

Thats the denial I meant. Did you care to listen to Muilenburgs interview? I extracted the relevant quote word for word for you:

Boeing CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, April 12, 2018:
"Now the question is whether we can make a business case close, because it will have to be an airplane that has widebody efficiencies in terms of moving people on and off the plane but has narrowbody economics (= a moonshot/miracle kind of aircraft, remark Rheinwaldner). That business case is what we are still working on. We are not up to a decision point yet, we haven't made a launch decision but I would say, over the next year we'll get to that (decision) point."

So I say challenge you once more, to find any source, where the vendor openly talked so defensive about the business case shortly before launching a program.

What further business case is needed beyond "major airlines are already lining up out the door to jump in with both feet"?

It seems like the airlines...the customers...have already made the case for them.

KFLLCFII wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

Newbiepilot wrote:

I have a feeling they already have given “authority to offer”. We have a half dozen airlines on records saying they are highly interested. I have a feeling that those discussions are leading to launch orders that may be imminent. I may be wrong but with so many airlines talking about the plane, I would assume the sales teams are actively selling it.

That's sound pretty disconnected from reality if you read Muilenburgs quote below.

Newbiepilot wrote:

Please define what you mean by “no clarity”. From what I read and hear, they are close to closing the business case and expect to be ready for a launch soon. I would like to know where you gathered the information that resulted in you repeating that they have no clarify about the business case.

Thats the denial I meant. Did you care to listen to Muilenburgs interview? I extracted the relevant quote word for word for you:

Boeing CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, April 12, 2018:
"Now the question is whether we can make a business case close, because it will have to be an airplane that has widebody efficiencies in terms of moving people on and off the plane but has narrowbody economics (= a moonshot/miracle kind of aircraft, remark Rheinwaldner). That business case is what we are still working on. We are not up to a decision point yet, we haven't made a launch decision but I would say, over the next year we'll get to that (decision) point."

So I say challenge you once more, to find any source, where the vendor openly talked so defensive about the business case shortly before launching a program.

What further business case is needed beyond "major airlines are already lining up out the door to jump in with both feet"?

It seems like the airlines...the customers...have already made the case for them.

That is the way to bankruptcy.

We don't know what they have said to Airlines. They certainly haven't shared the manufacturing costs.

BlueSky1976 wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Interest from airlines is easy.

Ask any airline: "Would you like a plane with 270 single class seats, that has a fuel burn per seat mile lower than the A321, a range of 5000nm and will have a list price of 160 million dollars?"

...now add those three lovely "neo" letters at the end of the A321 and your offer is screwed right there.

As far as I know Boeing already went way from the comparison and prefers to talk about CEOs or NGs.

Boeing always has and always will take their time to get their market positioning right.They know these are 30-40 year projects.Yes there is pressure from airlines to replace some aging 767's but those short term gains will not (imho) hurry them.
Their track record is immaculate.Every jet aircraft they have ever launched has sold over 1,000 copies.In today's giant market one might say that is easier,but many (300,310,340,380)have not.It ain't that easy.You have to get your crystal ball in absolute focus,it just is not about 'today' or even tomorrow.
It's not that they get their cost estimates right.The 747 and the 777 went way over budget,but look at the long term result - so don't worry about the 787 it will be just fine!
Boeing really do believe in a largely point to point future.The 797 (if it happens) will be based on that continuing belief imho.

rheinwaldner wrote:

.


Boeing CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, April 12, 2018:
"Now the question is whether we can make a business case close, because it will have to be an airplane that has widebody efficiencies in terms of moving people on and off the plane but has narrowbody economics (= a moonshot/miracle kind of aircraft, remark Rheinwaldner). That business case is what we are still working on. We are not up to a decision point yet, we haven't made a launch decision but I would say, over the next year we'll get to that (decision) point."

I read the same quote differently from you. To me it reads:


"Now the question is whether we can make a business case close, because it will have to be an airplane that has widebody efficiencies in terms of moving people on and off the plane but has narrowbody economics (= We have to develop technology around production efficiency to build it at the narrowbody cost structure and price it like a larger 737 instead of smaller 787, remark Newbiepilot). That business case is what we are still working on. (= We are still working with suppliers and our engineering team to find ways to get production cost down because it is not low enough yet, remark newbiepilot). We are not up to a decision point yet (= As a publicly traded company I can’t commit to a product without board approval since the stock price will be affected, remark newbiepilot), we haven't made a launch decision but I would say, over the next year we'll get to that (decision) point. (= we will present to the board to get approval to launch sometime in the next year, remark newbiepilot)"

Newbiepilot wrote:

I see the Airbus fans on this website talking about a marginal business case indicating there is not much of a market and the plane is unlikely to be successful.

I see the Boeing fans on this website supporting a deliberate careful approach to avoid mistakes in the past.

As is typical the two sides will never agree, but personally I can’t wait for Farnborough to see what happens. You can tell what side I am on

StTim wrote:

KFLLCFII wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

That's sound pretty disconnected from reality if you read Muilenburgs quote below.


Thats the denial I meant. Did you care to listen to Muilenburgs interview? I extracted the relevant quote word for word for you:

Boeing CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, April 12, 2018:
"Now the question is whether we can make a business case close, because it will have to be an airplane that has widebody efficiencies in terms of moving people on and off the plane but has narrowbody economics (= a moonshot/miracle kind of aircraft, remark Rheinwaldner). That business case is what we are still working on. We are not up to a decision point yet, we haven't made a launch decision but I would say, over the next year we'll get to that (decision) point."

So I say challenge you once more, to find any source, where the vendor openly talked so defensive about the business case shortly before launching a program.

What further business case is needed beyond "major airlines are already lining up out the door to jump in with both feet"?

It seems like the airlines...the customers...have already made the case for them.

That is the way to bankruptcy.

We don't know what they have said to Airlines. They certainly haven't shared the manufacturing costs.

What I hear is that airlines are lining up out the door to jump in with both feet if the sales price is low enough. In general there is a linear relationship with price and capability (meaning range and capacity sells for a higher price) for narrowbodies and there is a linear relationship with price and capability for widebodies. Meaning that airlines will pay X% more for Y% more capability. List prices are more or less linear (not quite linear but a curve that is relatively flat) as capability goes up.

Unfortunately It is not a continuous straight line. There is a step change upward from the narrowbody line to the widebody line since traditionally the two types of airplanes are in different markets and have different customers so they don’t compete. Boeing is working on finding a way to build the NMA so that it can be priced like a larger narrowbody instead of small widebody.

Recently the smaller end of the widebody market (lower left part of the line) is a place where the amount of money that can be earned with the plane vs the purchase price is not a particularly profitable segment for airlines. Recently 787-8s and A330-800s have been viewed as too expensive to be profitable in operation.

It is very difficult to get production costs of a widebody down to the level of the mature high production rate narrowbodies. 737s and A320s have become incredibly cheap to build. However pricing for A321neos and 737-10s isn’t cheap. There is a lot of profit margin there. That is part of why a new plane is looking like a good opportunity. However some would call it a moonshot to find ways to build a widebody at those production costs. That is where significant research into additive manufacturing, robots, vertical integration, and all the other things is going and we keep we hearing Muilenburg talking about it.

Now I am sure I will got picked apart and ridiculed for saying that, but it is why I think they are carefully studying and reviewing the business case. They don’t want billions in deferred production cost by guessing that they can get cost low enough. They need to be deliberate and have a plan.

That's all true Newbie, I agree with you. Now
It is a matter of when, not of if it will be built.
Stay tuned.

JayinKitsap wrote:

Tankage in the wing is divided up by the wing stiffening plates with relatively small holes at the top and bottom dividing the wing into cells. That way in a bank the fuel doesn't race outward while the far wing fuel races inward. It is generally not good to have 20 tons of fuel move 5' sideways. A long tank in the body would have even worst effect unless divided. On climb a half full tank would all be in the back. N2 inerting as well as fumes requires a true tank. Also having fuel at the skid surface in a belly landing is probably prohibited or killed by life safety review.

In a coordinated turn there is no reason for the fuel in the wings to move in either direction. As for a fuselage tank, assuming it would be considered, it probably would not be very long if it's not in the center of the fuselage, so any pitch up or down would have negligible effect.

Newbiepilot wrote:

StTim wrote:

KFLLCFII wrote:

What further business case is needed beyond "major airlines are already lining up out the door to jump in with both feet"?

It seems like the airlines...the customers...have already made the case for them.

That is the way to bankruptcy.

We don't know what they have said to Airlines. They certainly haven't shared the manufacturing costs.

What I hear is that airlines are lining up out the door to jump in with both feet if the sales price is low enough. In general there is a linear relationship with price and capability (meaning range and capacity sells for a higher price) for narrowbodies and there is a linear relationship with price and capability for widebodies. Meaning that airlines will pay X% more for Y% more capability. List prices are more or less linear (not quite linear but a curve that is relatively flat) as capability goes up.

Unfortunately It is not a continuous straight line. There is a step change upward from the narrowbody line to the widebody line since traditionally the two types of airplanes are in different markets and have different customers so they don’t compete. Boeing is working on finding a way to build the NMA so that it can be priced like a larger narrowbody instead of small widebody.

Recently the smaller end of the widebody market (lower left part of the line) is a place where the amount of money that can be earned with the plane vs the purchase price is not a particularly profitable segment for airlines. Recently 787-8s and A330-800s have been viewed as too expensive to be profitable in operation.

It is very difficult to get production costs of a widebody down to the level of the mature high production rate narrowbodies. 737s and A320s have become incredibly cheap to build. However pricing for A321neos and 737-10s isn’t cheap. There is a lot of profit margin there. That is part of why a new plane is looking like a good opportunity. However some would call it a moonshot to find ways to build a widebody at those production costs. That is where significant research into additive manufacturing, robots, vertical integration, and all the other things is going and we keep we hearing Muilenburg talking about it.

Now I am sure I will got picked apart and ridiculed for saying that, but it is why I think they are carefully studying and reviewing the business case. They don’t want billions in deferred production cost by guessing that they can get cost low enough. They need to be deliberate and have a plan.

Lets assume for a minute there is isn't technological breakthrough that makes it possible to price a widebody like a narrowbody, but that a small widebody will be priced at the cost of a small widebody. Stranger things have happened.. Probably airlines will stay be willing to pay value for money. But the value has to be there.

Something at production cost of a widebody but without the capabilities won't work, unless magically low operating cost can be realized. I think it's not even conservative to assume their won't be magically low operating costs.

keesje wrote:

Lets assume for a minute there is isn't technological breakthrough that makes it possible to price a widebody like a narrowbody, but that a small widebody will be priced at the cost of a small widebody. Stranger things have happened.. Probably airlines will stay be willing to pay value for money. But the value has to be there.

Something at production cost of a widebody but without the capabilities won't work, unless magically low operating cost can be realized. I think it's not even conservative to assume their won't be magically low operating costs.

Good comments. I think if they can’t get pricing down on the NMA and it is priced like a smaller widebody, the market is smaller. They would lose the customers interested in buying for domestic USA, domestic Australia, domestic India, domestic in China in non slot controlled airports, etc. It would turn more into a 757/767 direct replacement and A330neo competitor and not compete with the A321neo and 737-10. I think that is a much smaller market in the 1,000-2,000 range rather than 4,000 planes over the next 20 years that Boeing is hoping for.

I don’t see something revolutionary in operating costs for enough airlines to jump on the NMA. It is going after a segment of the market where efficiency matters, but purchase price is critical. If they can build it on the narrowbody cost curve with the CASM offered by a high density widebody, I think there is a big market.

I think this is why they are taking their time before launching and proceeding with design and supply chain coordination. The consequences of guessing wrong in manufacturing price could be devastating for the program. If the airplane is similar in cost to produce as a 787, I don’t many airlines eagerly jumping in to purchase it.

Newbiepilot wrote:

JayinKitsap wrote:

Remember the Boeing board need to give "authority to offer", well before a launch. The board will need to see the anticipate pricing, anticipated margin, cost to develop, the manufacturing plan, the worst case predictions of lifetime profitable production, and far more. Authority to offer means that due diligence has been made of the business case, if not properly done it can expose the manufacture to stockholder angst and litigation.

I have a feeling they already have given “authority to offer”. We have a half dozen airlines on records saying they are highly interested. I have a feeling that those discussions are leading to launch orders that may be imminent. I may be wrong but with so many airlines talking about the plane, I would assume the sales teams are actively selling it.

Authority to offer is a specific action by the Board. Only then can contracts with suppliers be executed. In July 03 Boeing was indicating that authority to offer the 7E7 was happening in the next year. It was granted by the board in Dec 03. Suppliers were announced from then on, April 24, 04 was the launch and Dec 04 the name changed to 787. So if the pace is similar for the 797 - 3 to 6 months to Offer, 5 months later to Launch. 5 years later first flight, 2 painful years to being in service.

IF (yes if) the business case is there it could be at Farnborough, but I expect in the late fall.

A thought - will it be the 797 or the 787 -2,3,4. It makes sense if it is a low risk project where it is 787 tech scaled down. That leaves 797 for the NSA.

Same cockpit, same power and control architecture, actuators, APU, AC packs, wing anti-ice wing lightning protection, tank inerting, etc adjusted in size to the new loads and evolved tech. This all uses most of the engineering of the 787. New gear, wing, fuse, and tail - basically scaled from the 787. Yes lots more than a stretch but far less than the 777. I see the initial models positioned like the 777, as new engines come along an ER or LR version with the better engines.

astuteman wrote:

bigjku wrote:

I will tell you there are people at Boeing who believe that both the A320neo and 737max should never have been done and that long term both are mistakes to be corrected. Not saying I agree with it but they do have some points when they make their case.

I have no idea who these "people at Boeing" are, and I have no idea why they might even have the conversation, because the market has already spoken.

Boeing were completely wedded to NSA - it was all they spoke about, "all their customers wanted it", and there was no way that Airbus, under the yoke of the A380 and A350 developments could respond (this bit not without merit).
The moment the NEO came out and shortened the route to new narrowbodys in large volumes all the above became history.
If staying all new was the right answer, then Boeing would have stuck with the NSA and let history take its course.

The reality that makes the NEO the most clairvoyant launch of all time is that a number of new narrowbodys (C-series, C919, MC-21 et al) were going to bring next gen engines to the market way sooner than any NSA from Airbus or Boeing (2013 for the C-series to 2016 for the others), which brought the risk that they had space to gain traction.
At a stroke, Airbus could put new engined narrowbodys into the hands of the airlines sooner, and in way greater volumes, than the new entrants could possibly emulate, mopping up all the latent demand, and through sheer volume, generating a pricing model that they couldn't possibly match. That it also forced Boeing to do the MAX just rams the point home

There is no way on this planet that the A320NEO was the wrong decision.
Rates as the best decision in the history of aviation in my view.
The MAX following it was also correct as a consequence.

To me these comments sound like sour grapes because it forced Boeing to do something they didn't want to do, rather than an appreciation of how the market actually behaved

Rgds

Never said I agreed with them. But there is a point here at least worth considering. Now you are stuck with these products at least until another generation of engines come along. While the NEO/MAX did reduce the chance of any early run by a competitor neither really runs away from the competition either. They have same engines and same general characteristics after all. If COMAC in particular gets any traction you are just looking at a cost race to the bottom so long as you have relatively like for like products.

Sure, Airbus and then Boeing beat them to the market with new narrows the airlines buy like crack addicts largely because there is no reasonable alternative. The Chinese to this point can’t get planes certified by western authorities and BBD is run by incompetent bozos that can’t actually build a meaningful number of airplanes. But to an extent Airbus and Boeing likely need to ask themselves where they need to go that COMAC and others can’t easily follow. They need to figure out how they will combat the fact that if the same engines are being sold to China they are at a huge labor disadvantage cost wise.

NEO and MAX programs aren’t in my eye really moving the bar. They are cash grabs. Very effective ones. Probably the right ones for short to mid term investors. But all the real value in those programs lies with the engine makers. And they sell to anyone in the present environment. So do many of the suppliers for other items. They were smart business decisions that were almost certain to not get anyone fired in their lifetime. But neither one puts the emerging competitors away. Neither really moves their parent compny forward technologically either.

NMA as much as anything is a necessary step to make progress. So is the vertical integration Boeing is doing and that I expect to see continue with several big acquisitions this year (not including the Embraer deal) as they look to reclaim their ability to control the value of their end product. In house work on avionics will be a big part of this as well. What are you really building if all of it is bought in and also for sale to COMAC after all? If you get involved in a competition with China that amounts to bolting together major parts bought from vendors you are going to lose out eventually. You had better have proprietary production methods and technology that is 100% in house in my view.

Imho this shows the huge conflicts found in defining the MoM.

Boeing needs a low price, which means they can only look at mature production technologies, which conflicts with the need to make a step forward in operational costs. But even if they only achieve a low price and slightly improved economics, the lower price will directly impact the prices they can ask for the 737/787. If the 797 is cheap compared to either of those, the first effect of will be a reduction in actual prices paid for the 737/787.

Newbiepilot wrote:

I read the same quote differently from you. To me it reads:
"Now the question is whether we can make a business case close, because it will have to be an airplane that has widebody efficiencies in terms of moving people on and off the plane but has narrowbody economics (= We have to develop technology around production efficiency to build it at the narrowbody cost structure and price it like a larger 737 instead of smaller 787, remark Newbiepilot). That business case is what we are still working on. (= We are still working with suppliers and our engineering team to find ways to get production cost down because it is not low enough yet, remark newbiepilot). We are not up to a decision point yet (= As a publicly traded company I can’t commit to a product without board approval since the stock price will be affected, remark newbiepilot), we haven't made a launch decision but I would say, over the next year we'll get to that (decision) point. (= we will present to the board to get approval to launch sometime in the next year, remark newbiepilot)"

Wow! If Muilenburg meant all of that, why didn't he say it?

About some of the things you mention he talked in other parts of the interview. That's fine. But in the quoted part he talked about the business case, not these other things. Would you at least agree, that the quoted statements are the confirmation, for which you asked, that Boeing has not yet clarity about the business case?

It feels strange to defend Boeings position against their supporters. Boeings boss is saying, black on white, that a positive business case is still outstanding and nobody believes him. At this point the conclusion can still fall in both directions. That is the definition of an unclosed business case. What you are interpreting is the opposite. It would make absolutely no sense for Boeing to talk like that if the business case would not be marginal (because vendors usually only promote their projects and don't publically question them). Never before did we hear such talk shortly before the alleged launch date of an aircraft program. And, in fact, I have never seen a CEO question the business case of a product, that was later launched anyway and did become a success.

This is just like the NSA project. The thing was...nobody wanted to pay for it or wait for it and it just wasn't going to be enough of a margin better than the old tin with new engines, to make it worthwhile.

And now we have NSA, MK2. The NMA so far, is lots of talk from Boeing about airlines lining up for not much more than an ephemeral idea. For the most part, they seem to be pushing the idea of a better 757/767. Maybe 7 abreast, maybe wide oval, maybe carbon fuse. It'll probably have a wing and a couple of engines...but how much wing and what engines...? So far...nobody seems to know, including Boeing.

They want the range, payload, weight and price somewhere between the 737-10/321neo and the 788/338. So...almost exactly a 767. It's too bad they're not still making that plane. Sounds like the perfect fit, with a few upgrades.

...oh...wait...

If an Aluminum fuselage is a better idea for this type of aircraft, because it reduces risks, time to market and upfront investments, eases MRO and pulls forward ROI, why not?

JoeCanuck wrote:

This is just like the NSA project. The thing was...nobody wanted to pay for it or wait for it and it just wasn't going to be enough of a margin better than the old tin with new engines, to make it worthwhile.

My recollection of the end of the NSA project was Boeing saying they could not figure out how to build a plane like the proposed NSA in the volume and at the cost that the market demanded.

My recollection of the beginning of the NMA project is:

Most intriguingly, he said that the composite wing of this aircraft will look much like a smaller version of the tremendously slender and aerodynamically efficient 787 wing — but it will be built in a new way.

“It’s a radically different set of parts and assembly sequence and technology that is significantly lower cost,” Delaney said, the result of what Boeing has learned from designing the 787, the first all-composite airplane, and then the composite wing of the 777X.

And:

“All of us are focused on the production-system transformation, on new engineering tools, new manufacturing tools,” he said.

Doesn't sound similar to me.

Many here seem to be taking really narrow minded conservative views of what is emerging.

Strangely enough many are the same people who slag Boeing for being too conservative.

It doesn't seem that hard to see a scenario where Boeing kicked off a bunch of research that was meant for NSA, but discovered back then (ca 2011) that the tech wasn't ready and they needed to do MAX instead, chose to minimize the spend on MAX while continuing research on new manufacturing approaches, and now seven years later see that work coming together on a lower volume target that would be an even better launch vehicle for the new tech.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... 97-awaits/

I see a lot of similarities to the 787 eventual launch and what is seen now. Boeing and the board need to be very non-committal until an official commit is announced. It could mean that pricing and specs are still moving around or not final yet. It could mean it ain't going to fly, but if that is the case it would disappear.

It is clear Boeing is looking at a very automated assembly for the structure and they are doing it in house this time.

rheinwaldner wrote:

Newbiepilot wrote:

I read the same quote differently from you. To me it reads:
"Now the question is whether we can make a business case close, because it will have to be an airplane that has widebody efficiencies in terms of moving people on and off the plane but has narrowbody economics (= We have to develop technology around production efficiency to build it at the narrowbody cost structure and price it like a larger 737 instead of smaller 787, remark Newbiepilot). That business case is what we are still working on. (= We are still working with suppliers and our engineering team to find ways to get production cost down because it is not low enough yet, remark newbiepilot). We are not up to a decision point yet (= As a publicly traded company I can’t commit to a product without board approval since the stock price will be affected, remark newbiepilot), we haven't made a launch decision but I would say, over the next year we'll get to that (decision) point. (= we will present to the board to get approval to launch sometime in the next year, remark newbiepilot)"

Wow! If Muilenburg meant all of that, why didn't he say it?

About some of the things you mention he talked in other parts of the interview. That's fine. But in the quoted part he talked about the business case, not these other things. Would you at least agree, that the quoted statements are the confirmation, for which you asked, that Boeing has not yet clarity about the business case?

It feels strange to defend Boeings position against their supporters. Boeings boss is saying, black on white, that a positive business case is still outstanding and nobody believes him. At this point the conclusion can still fall in both directions. That is the definition of an unclosed business case. What you are interpreting is the opposite. It would make absolutely no sense for Boeing to talk like that if the business case would not be marginal (because vendors usually only promote their projects and don't publically question them). Never before did we hear such talk shortly before the alleged launch date of an aircraft program. And, in fact, I have never seen a CEO question the business case of a product, that was later launched anyway and did become a success.

Now that you have softened your statement from “Boeing has no clarity” to “a positive business case is still outstanding”, I more or less agree with that.

I am not surprised by the noncommittal remarks before a potential launch. Until the board says yes and the announcement is made to the stock holders, the CEO must be noncommittal. That is how American business works. Wasn’t the Hawaiian CEO denying that they cancelled the A330neo just a few days before they officially canceled it? Executives can’t leak information that can have a significant impact on stock price.

I don’t see this as more complicated than that 321lr has set a really high bar. Pretty difficult to build a business case in the face of what AB has done with this ac.

I see a bit of negotiating in the press by Muilenberg. If there really were no business case to be had, he wouldn't be commenting on the product at all. But I think he's realizing there's a case... at a slightly higher price than the airlines are asking, but still one that can make economic sense against the A321neo on the one hand and the A330neo/787 on the other. This sort of waffling seems to be custom-designed to test airlines' resolve on pricing.

Airbus is not the problem, their own portfolio is. Explain the board why you want to develop a new plane to fight the A321LR without having to admit that the MAX does not cut it. Or explain to the board while you would like to come up with a plane that kills the A330NEO and why the 787-8 is not enough to do this. And that is imho the big problem. If the MoM would only take in sales from Airbus it would be a no-brainer. But it will also take sales from other Boeing products.

If they plan on selling 2000 MoMs it is very likely that this includes 1000 737/787s not sold. And that makes the business case challenging. In the past nearly all new programs aimed at a market space that was not covered by existing products or at markets for which your existing product was hopelessly outdated. In the case of the MoM Boeing has 2 products that can cover the market and which Boeing claims to be world leading.

Ok, I’ll put forward another scenario/thinking excercise expanding on the following topic and specifically the parts quoted:

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1391009

Taxi645 wrote:

But let's say Boeing will launch the 797 in the fashion that is being rumoured. Airbus can quickly and more cheaply respond to the bottom part of that market with the A320plus/plusplus. In the 2025-2028 time frame they could launch a A330 successor (around 205t MTOW, ultrafan type engines) and pinch the 797 from above and below. In the meantime Airbus could further increase the pressure on the 737MAX with further development of the A320/C-series that Boeing would be unable to effectively respond to because the 737MAX has insufficient development potential left and there would be no resources for a clean sheet design because it got it's hand full on the 797.

That looks to me like a very undesirable scenario for Boeing for a market/model that apparently is already hard to close a business case for.



Why would Boeing use most of it resources to launch a brand new plane in a market that is relatively not the most important around a time when a new generation of engines becomes available while their sole offering in probably the most important market by then is in urgent need of replacement and can't accept this generation of engines?

Please anyone explain to me the logic in that?

One problem Boeing indeed would have with the NSA (if only replacing the MAX) is that that it is extremely difficult to ramp up product quickly enough to current enormous production rates to satisfy the market and not loose significant market share to Airbus.
A strategy to address that could be to design a 737/757 replacement together (a few cm wider that the A320) with a shared fuselage diameter, cockpit and as much commonality as is sensible. But only launch the 757 replacement first keep producing the Max to be replaced afterwards as it will “hold the fort” in that segment for the time being. That way you can matsure your NSA production smaller scale with less pressure and risk (757 replacement) and are actually increasing production instead of reducing it (which would happen if you go for a MAX replacement comming from 60 a months without being able to learn and gear up the production with the NSA 757 replacement. Instead you are actually increasing revenue and putting pressure on the competition.

Airbus learned from this and shelved the A320plus (the current model is more than competitive wih the MAX already) and instead focused on the plusplus to be prepared for the 757 replacement and focus on production, a) to maximize revenue now and b) to further work towards a production rate of the A320 series (including plusplus) that could compete with the combined Boeings NSA (757 replacement bit) and MAX production rates.


I admit this is also possible scenario if the 797 is actually a 7-abreast, but I have my doubts about that.

Thanks for the link Revelation.It is so worth reminding ourselves of the engineering aspects of this potential project.And of course this article was written a year ago so things will have moved on greatly from there.What Boeing ( as they said) have learnt from the 787 project and now the 777x project in manufacturing terms must be. Enormous.
As re your extracted quotes there is also clearly more innovation (OOA?) to come.The sheer level of automation being introduced must impact very positively on costs.
It's getting to the point where designing a 'conventional' 3 axis aircaft to do a particular set of tasks is the easier part.The revolution is in the building it seems.i guess it all started well over a decade ago with the idea of a 'clip together' ready stuffed composite aircaft.
It appears they may now be ready for a (largely) robotically built clip together aircaft.
A brave new world indeed.But then that's pretty much what's already happened to the automotive industry.

[/quote]

I have a feeling they already have given “authority to offer”.

[/quote]

Yes that is my feeling also.
I doubt they are actually taking orders but they are out there offering and getting non binding commitments which they will hope to firm up when the "authority to offer" is given.

The main reason I am confident an "authority to offer" will come is because Boeing think they can offer this cheaply and the design will be low risk.

Ruscoe

astuteman wrote:

I have no idea who these "people at Boeing" are, and I have no idea why they might even have the conversation, because the market has already spoken.

Boeing were completely wedded to NSA - it was all they spoke about, "all their customers wanted it", and there was no way that Airbus, under the yoke of the A380 and A350 developments could respond (this bit not without merit).
The moment the NEO came out and shortened the route to new narrowbodys in large volumes all the above became history.
If staying all new was the right answer, then Boeing would have stuck with the NSA and let history take its course.

The reality that makes the NEO the most clairvoyant launch of all time is that a number of new narrowbodys (C-series, C919, MC-21 et al) were going to bring next gen engines to the market way sooner than any NSA from Airbus or Boeing (2013 for the C-series to 2016 for the others), which brought the risk that they had space to gain traction.
At a stroke, Airbus could put new engined narrowbodys into the hands of the airlines sooner, and in way greater volumes, than the new entrants could possibly emulate, mopping up all the latent demand, and through sheer volume, generating a pricing model that they couldn't possibly match. That it also forced Boeing to do the MAX just rams the point home

There is no way on this planet that the A320NEO was the wrong decision.
Rates as the best decision in the history of aviation in my view.
The MAX following it was also correct as a consequence.

To me these comments sound like sour grapes because it forced Boeing to do something they didn't want to do, rather than an appreciation of how the market actually behaved

Rgds

Bravo !

Taxi645 wrote:

Ok, I’ll put forward another scenario/thinking excercise expanding on the following topic and specifically the parts quoted:

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1391009

Taxi645 wrote:

But let's say Boeing will launch the 797 in the fashion that is being rumoured. Airbus can quickly and more cheaply respond to the bottom part of that market with the A320plus/plusplus. In the 2025-2028 time frame they could launch a A330 successor (around 205t MTOW, ultrafan type engines) and pinch the 797 from above and below. In the meantime Airbus could further increase the pressure on the 737MAX with further development of the A320/C-series that Boeing would be unable to effectively respond to because the 737MAX has insufficient development potential left and there would be no resources for a clean sheet design because it got it's hand full on the 797.

That looks to me like a very undesirable scenario for Boeing for a market/model that apparently is already hard to close a business case for.



Why would Boeing use most of it resources to launch a brand new plane in a market that is relatively not the most important around a time when a new generation of engines becomes available while their sole offering in probably the most important market by then is in urgent need of replacement and can't accept this generation of engines?

Please anyone explain to me the logic in that?

One problem Boeing indeed would have with the NSA (if only replacing the MAX) is that that it is extremely difficult to ramp up product quickly enough to current enormous production rates to satisfy the market and not loose significant market share to Airbus.
A strategy to address that could be to design a 737/757 replacement together (a few cm wider that the A320) with a shared fuselage diameter, cockpit and as much commonality as is sensible. But only launch the 757 replacement first keep producing the Max to be replaced afterwards as it will “hold the fort” in that segment for the time being. That way you can matsure your NSA production smaller scale with less pressure and risk (757 replacement) and are actually increasing production instead of reducing it (which would happen if you go for a MAX replacement comming from 60 a months without being able to learn and gear up the production with the NSA 757 replacement. Instead you are actually increasing revenue and putting pressure on the competition.

Airbus learned from this and shelved the A320plus (the current model is more than competitive wih the MAX already) and instead focused on the plusplus to be prepared for the 757 replacement and focus on production, a) to maximize revenue now and b) to further work towards a production rate of the A320 series (including plusplus) that could compete with the combined Boeings NSA (757 replacement bit) and MAX production rates.


I admit this is also possible scenario if the 797 is actually a 7-abreast, but I have my doubts about that.

At last!

The obvious way to go, IMO.

EGERTON recently speculated that the very large CMO projections by both AB and BA really justify lots & lots of Optimisation to a scale we just haven't seen before because the potential rewards are so great.
I'm very much onboard with that.
Indeed I expect the extra EMB highly-skilled design&development manpower to have lots & lots of interesting work ahead of them; and soon at that.
(I also think that BIGJKU is onto something with his idea of cumulative developments finally leading to an NSA which is effectively majorly debugged by the time it is launched, and hence will be capable of being rapidly scaled-up without excessive heartache or tears.)

However you are also right on the money with the thought that effectively launching the NSA at 757-scale FIRST will happily preserve the high-volume MAX production until the last possible moment; even including the MAX10!


The BA CFO, Board & shareholders will all love you!

Number of simultaneous Projects?:
Certainly if the 797 is 8ab I expect the 797 AND the NSA pair at (757-scale and then 737-scale) to appear as you have outlined it.

If it is 7ab also not sure, as in that alternative case I would then expect the BA thinking to have settled along lines something like this:

1. BA would then consider that the 7ab 797 can compete effectively with the 321neo and it's potential developments, and
2. BA also rates that they already have a handy 9ab-line which can out-compete any potential AB development at 8ab; therefore avoiding a repeat of the dismal past where an 8ab A330ceo ran over the top of the 7ab B767.

cheers

seahawk wrote:

Airbus is not the problem, their own portfolio is. Explain the board why you want to develop a new plane to fight the A321LR without having to admit that the MAX does not cut it. Or explain to the board while you would like to come up with a plane that kills the A330NEO and why the 787-8 is not enough to do this. And that is imho the big problem. If the MoM would only take in sales from Airbus it would be a no-brainer. But it will also take sales from other Boeing products.

That argument is easy to make. If Boeing doesn't occupy the MoM, Airbus will, and then Boeing will be losing more MAX and 787 sales to Airbus' MoM product instead of capturing them with their own MoM product. It's always better to cannibalize your own portfolio than to let your competitor do it to you.

monomojo wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Airbus is not the problem, their own portfolio is. Explain the board why you want to develop a new plane to fight the A321LR without having to admit that the MAX does not cut it. Or explain to the board while you would like to come up with a plane that kills the A330NEO and why the 787-8 is not enough to do this. And that is imho the big problem. If the MoM would only take in sales from Airbus it would be a no-brainer. But it will also take sales from other Boeing products.

That argument is easy to make. If Boeing doesn't occupy the MoM, Airbus will, and then Boeing will be losing more MAX and 787 sales to Airbus' MoM product instead of capturing them with their own MoM product. It's always better to cannibalize your own portfolio than to let your competitor do it to you.

With what would Airbus cover this market? With the existing planes, then my argument is correct, or with an all new design, then the question is if they would not launch it regardless of the MoM. And if they do, it would be realistic to divide that MoM market share by 2 to find the number of 797s Boeing can expect to sell.

I believe Boeing has predicted that the MOM sales potential, is around 4000 aircraft. If so, then there is plenty of room for Airbus to do a 'close enough' design to directly compete.

Maybe they revive a 321 stretch/rewing, or match Boeing by going all new. Regardless, either aircraft maker is fully capable of using state of the art robotics to streamline manufacturing. For all of the fluff of the Seattle Times article, they don't mention that Airbus also has a lot of experience making composite wings and other structures, including fuselages.

Let's face it; there is virtually nothing one of these guys can do that the other guys can't match...especially considering that the greatest efficiency improvements are from the engines, not the airframes...and there's not much that either can do about that.

Well a 220 pax (2 class) 797 is roughly a 240-250 one class a/c so it's easy to see that is attacking the 240 seat (max)A321NEO/A321LR.So it's hardly surprising that Airbus' response to date has been the plus,plus-plus.
The assumed larger, shorter ranged 797 variant at a suggested 270 pax is sort of -on its own,really.Its not obvious how Airbus would respond to this -so far nothing has been mentioned by Airbus.It sits in the old A310 position.One can only assume that Boeing feels this will be an expanding sector in the future (P2P?).It needs to,to justify the total development expenditure.Or is it that they see the LCC/Asian markets for travel continuing to expand so strongly that a classic narrowbodied aircaft is simply too constrained as a design?

JoeCanuck, are you sure AB can use the barrel method? I thought B had and fairly deep IP moat around this method.

Now weather this confers any advantage to B is a n open question. I suppose the 797 will give us some clues to the answer.

Planeflyer wrote:

JoeCanuck, are you sure AB can use the barrel method? I thought B had and fairly deep IP moat around this method.

Now weather this confers any advantage to B is a n open question. I suppose the 797 will give us some clues to the answer.

Patents only last 20 years so even if the barrel and it's relevant parts were patented in 2005 it's all good to make money with in 2025 by airbus.

Fred


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

2025 presumes there have been no additional IP related to barrel's applied for. Also having access to IP s one thing, implementing is another. Boeing bore the costs of being the first mover but will reap benefits( assuming they exist for another 20 or so years.

Assuming Airbus is even interested in pursuing monolithic barrels. Their (and their supplier's) experience with panels may encourage them down that road.

flipdewaf wrote:

Planeflyer wrote:

JoeCanuck, are you sure AB can use the barrel method? I thought B had and fairly deep IP moat around this method.

Now weather this confers any advantage to B is a n open question. I suppose the 797 will give us some clues to the answer.

Patents only last 20 years so even if the barrel and it's relevant parts were patented in 2005 it's all good to make money with in 2025 by airbus.

Fred


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

I don't see it as a question of patent rights... I see it as a question of "lessons learned - tricks of the trade." Can Airbus produce a barrel if they wanted to. Yes. But, it might realistically take them 5 years of steady production to learn all the lessons and tricks that Boeing already knows... in order to be truly cost competitive. Anyone who has tried to duplicate a high tech product runs into the same thing. Theory is great... We technically understand it and can see a way to produce it (and we even have the same machines...). Learning the practical lessons that allow you to speed up production or minimize certain things... are only learned.

Airbus can probably hire a few people from Boeing if they decide they need to produce barrels But, they will have to go through their own learning curve. My estimate is that is about a 5 year price/marketing advantage to Boeing (and I've said that before in other posts).

The real question is has Boeing figured out how to produce new design barrels cheaper than skin on frame for a 797 and larger size aircraft? If they have... then they will have a price advantage until Airbus gains real world working experience and learns the tricks of the trade.

The sense I get (and it's only a sense) is that the 797 will probably be barrels - and for the reason that they can be produced cheaper than skin on frame. However, that sense could be wrong and the 797 may well be a skin on frame aircraft; which would be very telling. Boeing certainly is the company with the right knowledge set to figure out which one is cheaper to produce while maintaining adequate life and repairability.

Have a great day,

Planeflyer wrote:

JoeCanuck, are you sure AB can use the barrel method? I thought B had and fairly deep IP moat around this method.

Now weather this confers any advantage to B is a n open question. I suppose the 797 will give us some clues to the answer.

Hawker 4000 Horizon Production on Mandrels, first flight 2002.

seahawk wrote:

monomojo wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Airbus is not the problem, their own portfolio is. Explain the board why you want to develop a new plane to fight the A321LR without having to admit that the MAX does not cut it. Or explain to the board while you would like to come up with a plane that kills the A330NEO and why the 787-8 is not enough to do this. And that is imho the big problem. If the MoM would only take in sales from Airbus it would be a no-brainer. But it will also take sales from other Boeing products.

That argument is easy to make. If Boeing doesn't occupy the MoM, Airbus will, and then Boeing will be losing more MAX and 787 sales to Airbus' MoM product instead of capturing them with their own MoM product. It's always better to cannibalize your own portfolio than to let your competitor do it to you.

With what would Airbus cover this market? With the existing planes, then my argument is correct, or with an all new design, then the question is if they would not launch it regardless of the MoM. And if they do, it would be realistic to divide that MoM market share by 2 to find the number of 797s Boeing can expect to sell.

You appear to be assuming Boeing won't be cannabilizing their own sales. 4,000 planes is a lot. Their are multiple factors to be considered in the business case for a MOM by both Boeing and Airbus. I would love to know how they reconcile them all in systemic way to come up with the optimal solution.