zeke wrote:

worldranger wrote:

One of the rumors doing the rounds is that they were high on left down wind 14R and when turned in and cleared they initiated the GS from above maneuver but neglected to arm the GS. The problem with this maneuver I see from new FOs is that many of them do that training at home base sim where the airport elevation is close to zero so they get in the habit of putting 1000' in MCP/FCP.

That is not the way G/S from above is done on any FBW Airbus, you have just given yourself away as a Boeing driver by saying you set an altitude below.

Given myself away ? Don't remember hiding the fact that I'm a Boeing pilot.

The fact is Boeing use the 1000' aal for precisely the reason of forgetting to arm the GS - as a final stop gap to EGPWS & then CFIT.

Do not understand the Airbus logic. But having only the EGPWS as the final stop gap when the GS is not armed erroneously? Is that it? Genuine question.

Aesma wrote:

Well their recent crash landing doesn't help build confidence. After that I would have expected serious improvements in training.

You mean EK521, more than 1 year ago, on an airline that operates daily a fleet of 238 aircrafts?

Jayafe wrote:

Aesma wrote:

Well their recent crash landing doesn't help build confidence. After that I would have expected serious improvements in training.

You mean EK521, more than 1 year ago, on an airline that operates daily a fleet of 238 aircrafts?

Great comeback. Airlines that operate 700+ aircraft on many more cycles per day have had no crash landings like EK did.

32andBelow wrote:

Great comeback. Airlines that operate 700+ aircraft on many more cycles per day have had no crash landings like EK did.

Nice try.
Airlines 700+ birds and no crashes.... waiting for the list. Please google the crash/incident list before posting

Jayafe wrote:

32andBelow wrote:

Great comeback. Airlines that operate 700+ aircraft on many more cycles per day have had no crash landings like EK did.

Nice try.
Airlines 700+ birds and no crashes.... waiting for the list. Please google the crash/incident list before posting

You forgot the in the last year part. There hasn't been a hull loss in the USA since 2009 with tens of millions of cycles per year.

32andBelow wrote:

Jayafe wrote:

32andBelow wrote:

Great comeback. Airlines that operate 700+ aircraft on many more cycles per day have had no crash landings like EK did.

Nice try.
Airlines 700+ birds and no crashes.... waiting for the list. Please google the crash/incident list before posting

You forgot the in the last year part. There hasn't been a hull loss in the USA since 2009 with tens of millions of cycles per year.

So according to your statistics (one every...), it is pretty clear where the next one might be, and far away from EK

Jayafe wrote:

32andBelow wrote:

Jayafe wrote:

Nice try.
Airlines 700+ birds and no crashes.... waiting for the list. Please google the crash/incident list before posting

You forgot the in the last year part. There hasn't been a hull loss in the USA since 2009 with tens of millions of cycles per year.

So according to your statistics (one every...), it is pretty clear where the next one might be, and far away from EK

No it'll probably be in the middle east/asia. Those who can't keep wrecking brand new 777s

Jayafe wrote:

So according to your statistics (one every...), it is pretty clear where the next one might be, and far away from EK

Nice Try. Here is the list of flight crew related events.since 2007.

B777 at Auckland on March 22, 2007 Flex takeoff despite reduced runway length
A332 at Birmingham on February 26, 2008 Heavy landing
A345 at Melbourne on March 20, 2009 Tail strike and overrun on takeoff
A388 at Manchester on September 6, 2010 Hard landing
B773 at Hamburg on February 13, 2011 Began takeoff roll without clearance
B773 at Melbourne on November 30, 2011 Took off from unlit runway
A388 at Sydney on January 6, 2012 Runway incursion
A388 at Toronto and Ottawa on June 1, 2012 Weather related hold go-around and diversion Mayday fuel
B773 at Dubai on February 12, 2013 Near collision with fighter aircraft in initial climb
B773 at Melbourne on July 18, 2014 Descended below minimum safe height on approach
A388 over Northern Canada on October 30, 2014 Climbed without clearance, separation not assured
B773 over the Indian Ocean on March 29, 2015 Near miss with EY
A388 at Warsaw on May 20, 2015 Runway excursion on backtrack
A388 over Dubai on October 22, 2015 Loss of separation with helicopter while shooting promotional video
B773 over Canada on March 13, 2016 Diversion and fuel emergency
A388 at Melbourne on July 14, 2016 Descended below minimum assigned altitude
B773 at Dubai on August 3, 2016 Long landing go around without thrust results in runway impact aircraft on fire

A388 over Arabian Sea on January 7, 2017 Wake turbulence sends business jet in uncontrolled descent
B773 over China Urumqi on April 17, 2017 Crew misunderstood instructions and flew at wrong altitude
B773 over China Urumqi on May 18, 2017 Radio communications were cut off
A388 near Mauritius on July 14, 2017 Descended below cleared level causing TCAS resolution
B773 over Africa on August 21, 2017 Allegedly two male crew members had some consensual fun in the flight deck
B773 at Geneva on August 25, 2017 Wakes roof
A388 at Moscow on September 10, 2017 Go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway

B772 near Hamburg on August 27, 2009 First officer incapacitated
A332 near Dubai on July 5, 2010 Pilot incapacitation
B773 at Dubai on June 25, 2016 Pilot vision impaired

at London on January 1, 2007 Drunk Pilot
at Perth on October 21, 2016 Drunk Pilot refused alcohol test

BTW, EK has more ICAO Accident rated events than AI. Now call the cavalry and get the thread closed.

EK have a problem. Details of this incident notwithstanding (we don't know them) they are absolutely hammering their crews. A friend of mine is an A380 Captain with them and is leaving the company precisely because of it.

worldranger wrote:

They are now hiring turbo prop pilots with minimum experience to fly large wide bodies aircraft in complex ops - which was unheard of 7-10 years ago.

While I don't doubt for one moment that Emirates lacks a just safety culture and all of that, you should stop talking shit about stuff you obviously don't know.

You will find that turboprop pilots are probably among the most skilled pilots in the business. They do lots of short flights, often to airports without precision approaches and radar coverage, in aircraft that lack all the supporting automation that makes life easy on a 777/A380. I would trust a turboprop pilot with minimum experience over an A320 or 737 pilot with minimum experience any day. They might be smaller, but they are not easier.

worldranger wrote:

Amongst commercial pilots - EK is considered one the poorest outfits to work for - and as such droves of experienced Captains have left for greener pastures such as Korean & China over the last 4-5 years.

What an arrogant thing to say. There are thousands of commercial pilots out here working for less than 1000 eur per month with employers who discourage deicing in the winter and so on. Emirates might be worse than what you guys could get elsewhere, but you are still in the super-league.

dtw2hyd wrote:

Jayafe wrote:

So according to your statistics (one every...), it is pretty clear where the next one might be, and far away from EK

Nice Try. Here is the list of flight crew related events.since 2007.

B777 at Auckland on March 22, 2007 Flex takeoff despite reduced runway length
A332 at Birmingham on February 26, 2008 Heavy landing
A345 at Melbourne on March 20, 2009 Tail strike and overrun on takeoff
A388 at Manchester on September 6, 2010 Hard landing
B773 at Hamburg on February 13, 2011 Began takeoff roll without clearance
B773 at Melbourne on November 30, 2011 Took off from unlit runway
A388 at Sydney on January 6, 2012 Runway incursion
A388 at Toronto and Ottawa on June 1, 2012 Weather related hold go-around and diversion Mayday fuel
B773 at Dubai on February 12, 2013 Near collision with fighter aircraft in initial climb
B773 at Melbourne on July 18, 2014 Descended below minimum safe height on approach
A388 over Northern Canada on October 30, 2014 Climbed without clearance, separation not assured
B773 over the Indian Ocean on March 29, 2015 Near miss with EY
A388 at Warsaw on May 20, 2015 Runway excursion on backtrack
A388 over Dubai on October 22, 2015 Loss of separation with helicopter while shooting promotional video
B773 over Canada on March 13, 2016 Diversion and fuel emergency
A388 at Melbourne on July 14, 2016 Descended below minimum assigned altitude
B773 at Dubai on August 3, 2016 Long landing go around without thrust results in runway impact aircraft on fire

A388 over Arabian Sea on January 7, 2017 Wake turbulence sends business jet in uncontrolled descent
B773 over China Urumqi on April 17, 2017 Crew misunderstood instructions and flew at wrong altitude
B773 over China Urumqi on May 18, 2017 Radio communications were cut off
A388 near Mauritius on July 14, 2017 Descended below cleared level causing TCAS resolution
B773 over Africa on August 21, 2017 Allegedly two male crew members had some consensual fun in the flight deck
B773 at Geneva on August 25, 2017 Wakes roof
A388 at Moscow on September 10, 2017 Go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway

B772 near Hamburg on August 27, 2009 First officer incapacitated
A332 near Dubai on July 5, 2010 Pilot incapacitation
B773 at Dubai on June 25, 2016 Pilot vision impaired

at London on January 1, 2007 Drunk Pilot
at Perth on October 21, 2016 Drunk Pilot refused alcohol test

BTW, EK has more ICAO Accident rated events than AI. Now call the cavalry and get the thread closed.

Don't they also have way more annual pax than AI? While some on the list are worrisome, quite a bit of it appears to be things that occur at other airlines at a similar frequency.

emiratesdriver wrote:

Not sure if they were ever established on the localiser, but the word is it was an attempt to intercept from above in Open Descent and the GPWS was due to obstacles. The Captain I am told is very experienced, the FO not so much.

Again someone who does not know how G/S from above is done on an FBW Airbus, and you have told us before you fly the A380.

FO was one of the captains that was demoted for being too young ?

Why is there still a division in the world between feet and meters?

Conversion errors between imperial and metric have caused all sorts of losses. Being a geek, the Mars probe that crashed due to a bungled conversion comes to mind, everybody went to the effort to fly the thing to another freaking planet and then it faceplanted on short finals because somebody didn't convert foot-pounds to newtons.

Countries (are there even more than one any more?) who want to keep imperial for common usage, that's fine, but anything that matters should be in metric. The end.

worldranger wrote:

Given myself away ? Don't remember hiding the fact that I'm a Boeing pilot.

The fact is Boeing use the 1000' aal for precisely the reason of forgetting to arm the GS - as a final stop gap to EGPWS & then CFIT.

Do not understand the Airbus logic. But having only the EGPWS as the final stop gap when the GS is not armed erroneously? Is that it? Genuine question.

I have had this discussion with many Boeing pilots over the years as they think setting 1000' provides terrain protection. The ILS procedure design does not provide a 1000 ft AGL terrain clearance floor, it is a sloped obstacle clearance surface (OCS). That Boeing procedure at a number of airports around the world will result in CFIT. A lot of pilots also do not know that G/S from above is prohibited between the FAP and the runway, they get away with it without knowing by flying into airports with mainly flat terrain which does not have the OCS at the design limit.

At 8nm on a 3 degree slope the G/S will be at 2547 ft, the OCS for a 3 degree ILS at 8 nm is 1425 ft (1.68 degrees), your "1000 ft protection" would be 425 ft below the OCS. It is unclear if they were 400 ft AGL or 400 ft AAL at 8 nm, by the procedure design if they were 1825 ft AAL at 8 nm they would be 400 ft above the OCS. That would be 0.849 degrees below slope, two dots below the G/S is 0.800 degrees (each dot is +/- 0.400 degrees on the glide slope ).

On the FBW Airbus to fly an ILS the APPR button is pressed on the FCU which simultaneously arms LOC and G/S, G/S and LOC will appear in blue on the FMA. After LOC capture (LOC* or LOC in green) the G/S procedure from above is permitted, and the aircraft will capture the armed G/S providing the terrain clearance.

This is not the Boeing procedure as early Boeings permitted the capture the G/S before the LOC, Airbus does not permit this as an aircraft is more likely to intercept a false lobe when not on the LOC. As a customer option Boeing will also provide the software so that LOC must be captured before G/S.

treetreeseven wrote:

Why is there still a division in the world between feet and meters?

Conversion errors between imperial and metric have caused all sorts of losses. Being a geek, the Mars probe that crashed due to a bungled conversion comes to mind, everybody went to the effort to fly the thing to another freaking planet and then it faceplanted on short finals because somebody didn't convert foot-pounds to newtons.

Countries (are there even more than one any more?) who want to keep imperial for common usage, that's fine, but anything that matters should be in metric. The end.

Basically only China and Russia are metric for altimetry and wind speeds. As of February this year Russia has started to phase out the feet-meters conversion/QFE/descend to height, everything is moving to QNH, so it's now descend to altitude. LED was the first airport to be changed to QNH, DME still has QFE charts.

zeke wrote:

emiratesdriver wrote:

Not sure if they were ever established on the localiser, but the word is it was an attempt to intercept from above in Open Descent and the GPWS was due to obstacles. The Captain I am told is very experienced, the FO not so much.

Again someone who does not know how G/S from above is done on an FBW Airbus, and you have told us before you fly the A380.

FO was one of the captains that was demoted for being too young ?

Zeke, pull your head out of your own self righteousness buddy, I don't recall ever extolling the techniques or SOPs regarding flying the Whale, I merely passed on what was passed onto me. As for how one intercepts a glideslope from above...tell you what, when you sit in the left seat of the 380 and have the same set of procedures as me, then we can discuss what's right or wrong, until that day I will pay as much attention your opinions as I do to my navel lint.

VSMUT wrote:

worldranger wrote:

They are now hiring turbo prop pilots with minimum experience to fly large wide bodies aircraft in complex ops - which was unheard of 7-10 years ago.

While I don't doubt for one moment that Emirates lacks a just safety culture and all of that, you should stop talking shit about stuff you obviously don't know.

You will find that turboprop pilots are probably among the most skilled pilots in the business. They do lots of short flights, often to airports without precision approaches and radar coverage, in aircraft that lack all the supporting automation that makes life easy on a 777/A380. I would trust a turboprop pilot with minimum experience over an A320 or 737 pilot with minimum experience any day. They might be smaller, but they are not easier.

worldranger wrote:

Amongst commercial pilots - EK is considered one the poorest outfits to work for - and as such droves of experienced Captains have left for greener pastures such as Korean & China over the last 4-5 years.

What an arrogant thing to say. There are thousands of commercial pilots out here working for less than 1000 eur per month with employers who discourage deicing in the winter and so on. Emirates might be worse than what you guys could get elsewhere, but you are still in the super-league.

My friend if you knew anything about wide body ops with high hours - you would know it's not about seat of the pants hi temp ops with multiple take off and landings.

It's about mgt. QF 380 SIN comes to mind.

Whooooshhhh - the sound of what just went over your head

zeke wrote:

worldranger wrote:

Given myself away ? Don't remember hiding the fact that I'm a Boeing pilot.

The fact is Boeing use the 1000' aal for precisely the reason of forgetting to arm the GS - as a final stop gap to EGPWS & then CFIT.

Do not understand the Airbus logic. But having only the EGPWS as the final stop gap when the GS is not armed erroneously? Is that it? Genuine question.

I have had this discussion with many Boeing pilots over the years as they think setting 1000' provides terrain protection. The ILS procedure design does not provide a 1000 ft AGL terrain clearance floor, it is a sloped obstacle clearance surface (OCS). That Boeing procedure at a number of airports around the world will result in CFIT. A lot of pilots also do not know that G/S from above is prohibited between the FAP and the runway, they get away with it without knowing by flying into airports with mainly flat terrain which does not have the OCS at the design limit.

At 8nm on a 3 degree slope the G/S will be at 2547 ft, the OCS for a 3 degree ILS at 8 nm is 1425 ft (1.68 degrees), your "1000 ft protection" would be 425 ft below the OCS. It is unclear if they were 400 ft AGL or 400 ft AAL at 8 nm, by the procedure design if they were 1825 ft AAL at 8 nm they would be 400 ft above the OCS. That would be 0.849 degrees below slope, two dots below the G/S is 0.800 degrees (each dot is +/- 0.400 degrees on the glide slope ).

On the FBW Airbus to fly an ILS the APPR button is pressed on the FCU which simultaneously arms LOC and G/S, G/S and LOC will appear in blue on the FMA. After LOC capture (LOC* or LOC in green) the G/S procedure from above is permitted, and the aircraft will capture the armed G/S providing the terrain clearance.

This is not the Boeing procedure as early Boeings permitted the capture the G/S before the LOC, Airbus does not permit this as an aircraft is more likely to intercept a false lobe when not on the LOC. As a customer option Boeing will also provide the software so that LOC must be captured before G/S.

Your first paragraph is incorrect - in basic mode (VS) without capture of GS - MCP set alt of 1000' AAL - WILL stop the descent at the appropriate baro alt.

This is the Boeing procedure:

"Arm the APP mode.

Set the MCP altitude no lower than 1000 feet above touchdown.

Select V/S mode.

WARNING: Ensure the localizer is captured before descending.

Set appropriate vertical speed. Monitor progress of G/S capture Call “GLIDESLOPE ALIVE”

At G/S captured, set the missed approach altitude in the MCP.

If G/S is not captured by 1,000 feet above touchdown or ALT engages at anytime, go-around."


My question for an Airbus 380 pilot is not Glide PATH from above - G/Slope from above - if in the same scenario as above, on loc, high on slope what protection is provided if the GS fails to capture for whatever reason (forgot to arm or other) - and a high VS of say 2000fpm is engaged? What is in the FCP? What's tops the CFIT? Genuinely curious.

Here you go Ranger, straight out of my 380 FCOM.

GLIDE INTERCEPTION FROM ABOVE

The following procedure should only be applied when established on the localizer. The flight crew must react without delay to meet the stabilization criteria. In order to get the best rate of descent when cleared by ATC and below the limiting speeds, the flight crew should lower the landing gear and select flaps as required (at least CONF 2 should be selected to ensure that the aircraft speed will not increase).
If above the glideslope:
APPR mode ARM/CHECK ARMED PF

AFS CP ALTITUDE SET ABOVE A/C ALTITUDE PF
L2 Select an altitude above the aircraft altitude, in order to prevent inadvertent ALT* engagement.

L1 V/S MODE SELECT PF

Do not exceed 2 000 ft/min.

emiratesdriver wrote:

Here you go Ranger, straight out of my 380 FCOM.

GLIDE INTERCEPTION FROM ABOVE

The following procedure should only be applied when established on the localizer. The flight crew must react without delay to meet the stabilization criteria. In order to get the best rate of descent when cleared by ATC and below the limiting speeds, the flight crew should lower the landing gear and select flaps as required (at least CONF 2 should be selected to ensure that the aircraft speed will not increase).
If above the glideslope:
APPR mode ARM/CHECK ARMED PF

AFS CP ALTITUDE SET ABOVE A/C ALTITUDE PF
L2 Select an altitude above the aircraft altitude, in order to prevent inadvertent ALT* engagement.

L1 V/S MODE SELECT PF

Do not exceed 2 000 ft/min.

Interesting- cheers

emiratesdriver wrote:

Zeke, pull your head out of your own self righteousness buddy, I don't recall ever extolling the techniques or SOPs regarding flying the Whale, I merely passed on what was passed onto me. As for how one intercepts a glideslope from above...tell you what, when you sit in the left seat of the 380 and have the same set of procedures as me, then we can discuss what's right or wrong, until that day I will pay as much attention your opinions as I do to my navel lint.

This is what you said previously "Not sure if they were ever established on the localiser, but the word is it was an attempt to intercept from above in Open Descent "

Now look at what you posted regarding the SOP, for G/S from above

1) Be established on the LOC (i.e. not "Not sure if they were ever established on the localiser")
2) Be in a speed mode (i.e. not "in Open Descent")

That is the SAME for every FBW Airbus, one of the reasons why you can MFF between FBW types, as the procedure is identical. If you are not on the LOC, and not in a speed mode, you are not doing a G/S from above. The procedures you posted prove exactly what I have stated.

worldranger wrote:

Your first paragraph is incorrect - in basic mode (VS) without capture of GS - MCP set alt of 1000' AAL - WILL stop the descent at the appropriate baro alt.

It will however not ensure terrain clearance, as 1000' AAL is not 1000' above the OCS. I posted above at 8 miles 1000 ft AAL is is over 400 ft below the OCS. So if you descent to 1000 ft at 8 miles and the terrain is at 1400 ft (which is within the standard 3 degree ILS procedure design), the MCP altitude will not stop you, the terrain will. Exactly the same on NPAs, Boeing pilots also think that setting the MDA on a NPA will protect them from terrain, there are many examples around where this provides no terrain protection at all.

worldranger wrote:

My question for an Airbus 380 pilot is not Glide PATH from above - G/Slope from above - if in the same scenario as above, on loc, high on slope what protection is provided if the GS fails to capture for whatever reason (forgot to arm or other) - and a high VS of say 2000fpm is engaged? What is in the FCP? What's tops the CFIT? Genuinely curious.

You can only do the G/S from procedure if established on the LOC after APPR is pressed, once on the LOC and with G/S armed the FCU altitude is set above. The APPR button as previously stated simultaneously arms G/S and LOC in one action. If the transmitter(s), receiver(s), or rad alt fail, the aircraft will revert out of the APPR mode a triple click sounds, the new guidance mode on the FMA is boxed for 10 sec, and the the pitch and roll bars of the FDs flash for 10 sec.

The L1/L2/L3 in the Airbus books denotes the difference between what must be known L1, and what is nice to know L2 etc.

AAL' - is above airport level - OCS is not commonly used in the airlines I have flown and the degree of difference between the two is such that with TERPS the implications on the approach design for a normal ILS will not be compromised.

Can you give some examples where the threat is NOT mitigated by the Boeing procedure I posted?

Cheers

VSMUT wrote:

While I don't doubt for one moment that Emirates lacks a just safety culture and all of that, you should stop talking shit about stuff you obviously don't know.

You will find that turboprop pilots are probably among the most skilled pilots in the business. They do lots of short flights, often to airports without precision approaches and radar coverage, in aircraft that lack all the supporting automation that makes life easy on a 777/A380. I would trust a turboprop pilot with minimum experience over an A320 or 737 pilot with minimum experience any day. They might be smaller, but they are not easier. .
....
What an arrogant thing to say. There are thousands of commercial pilots out here working for less than 1000 eur per month with employers who discourage deicing in the winter and so on. Emirates might be worse than what you guys could get elsewhere, but you are still in the super-league.

You are absolutely correct, we always forget some of the airports TP pilots operate are the most dangerous in the world.

EK has multiple issues, pilots are not one of those problems. Actually, EK pilots are one of the most hardworking among wide-body long-haul carriers. Management doesn't value experience or hard work. Management thinks inducing fear brings the best out of the crew.

A TP pilot at Lukla may battle the machine and weather, but an EK pilot has to factor in what kind of verbal warning letter they are going to get for any trivial thing. Without protection from unions or regulators, they are constantly under pressure. Reading pilots comments this fear factor is one of the main reasons for these incidents. This is also one of the reasons senior pilots are quitting, leaving new recruits without mentors to grow up.

ExDubai wrote:

Management response.......

In reviewing the events of the last few months we have asked ourselves what are we doing wrong? What are we missing? What’s the root cause? Why is our training and checking not able to identify those pilots who underperform on the line?

No selfreflection. Lowering the entry requirements and loosing a large number of experienced pilots/trainers and nobody is asking why.....

Yeah, reading comprehension is hard, right...?

worldranger wrote:

AAL' - is above airport level - OCS is not commonly used in the airlines I have flown and the degree of difference between the two is such that with TERPS the implications on the approach design for a normal ILS will not be compromised.

Can you give some examples where the threat is NOT mitigated by the Boeing procedure I posted?

In my experience pilots never consider the OCS as it is never highlighted in training. As to where it is not mitigated, look at any approach that is greater than 3 degrees and my bet it would be for terrain. My bet is also most pilots would not know that G/S from above is prohibited inside the FAP, or what a FAP is, or where it is depicted on a chart.

And any ILS with minimums greater than 200' HAT!

GF

ExDubai wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

Looks like two go-arounds after one another.. is there a possibility this could be blamed on something other than the crew?

If you ask the Muppets on the 3rd. floor, nope....... Would be interesting to see the crews roster of the last weeks.

I have been a pilot for 43 years. 25 in the airline industry with many years left. What is a roster? Do you want to find out who they were flying with that day? Not being a smart ass, I just don't see what a crew list has to do with a bad approach? Is it an English term like finals instead of final or overshoot instead of go around. Just never heard it used as you are asking.

Your right about the muppets!


Cheers!

reltney wrote:

Do you want to find out who they were flying with that day? Not being a smart ass, I just don't see what a crew list has to do with a bad approach?

I think it's more along the lines of wondering how much rest the crew had.

zeke wrote:

worldranger wrote:

AAL' - is above airport level - OCS is not commonly used in the airlines I have flown and the degree of difference between the two is such that with TERPS the implications on the approach design for a normal ILS will not be compromised.

Can you give some examples where the threat is NOT mitigated by the Boeing procedure I posted?

In my experience pilots never consider the OCS as it is never highlighted in training. As to where it is not mitigated, look at any approach that is greater than 3 degrees and my bet it would be for terrain. My bet is also most pilots would not know that G/S from above is prohibited inside the FAP, or what a FAP is, or where it is depicted on a chart.

Hmm your wish washing now, - name one normal ILS approach at 8nm or inside where the buying SOP would NOT protect you given the procedure I mentioned.

You also wrote
"Exactly the same on NPAs, Boeing pilots also think that setting the MDA on a NPA will protect them from terrain, there are many examples around where this provides no terrain protection at all. "

You set the MDA with VNAV - not basic modes, which is what I was referring to - the VNAV on approach logic is the protection. Your changing the byline.

reltney wrote:

ExDubai wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

Looks like two go-arounds after one another.. is there a possibility this could be blamed on something other than the crew?

If you ask the Muppets on the 3rd. floor, nope....... Would be interesting to see the crews roster of the last weeks.

I have been a pilot for 43 years. 25 in the airline industry with many years left. What is a roster? Do you want to find out who they were flying with that day? Not being a smart ass, I just don't see what a crew list has to do with a bad approach? Is it an English term like finals instead of final or overshoot instead of go around. Just never heard it used as you are asking.

Your right about the muppets!


Cheers!

A 'roster' is your 'line' or 'schedule' or 'rota'

It is the duties and trips you fly for the month. EK pilots are flying 1000hrs pa. East west north south out of a 24hr hub over multiple ULH destinations.

Lots on prune about how fatigue is impacting safety there.

reltney wrote:

ExDubai wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

Looks like two go-arounds after one another.. is there a possibility this could be blamed on something other than the crew?

If you ask the Muppets on the 3rd. floor, nope....... Would be interesting to see the crews roster of the last weeks.

I have been a pilot for 43 years. 25 in the airline industry with many years left. What is a roster? Do you want to find out who they were flying with that day? Not being a smart ass, I just don't see what a crew list has to do with a bad approach? Is it an English term like finals instead of final or overshoot instead of go around. Just never heard it used as you are asking.

Your right about the muppets!


Cheers!

It's about how many hours flying and what about the resting times. Fatigue is an issue @EK
Cheers

@worldranger Thanks

Jayafe wrote:

Aesma wrote:

Well their recent crash landing doesn't help build confidence. After that I would have expected serious improvements in training.

You mean EK521, more than 1 year ago, on an airline that operates daily a fleet of 238 aircrafts?

Yes I mean more than 1 year to improve training and see the results by now.

With all due respect specially to the proffessional pilots who take time to educate us here, the most concerning thing in this kind of incidents is precisely the human factor, with crews failing to attend very basic items at critical phases of the flight.
As a member in this forum for more than 12 years I can say there are some phrases that are tatooed in my brain, for example, aviate, navigate, communicate. The first word in that phrase means basically one thing: the two guys in the first row must keep the aircraft flying safely, keeping two basic items constantly checked: altitude and speed. The second word is about the path to take the plane from point A to point B safely. In this incident someone was not doing what it was supposed or expected, otherwise the go around should be initiated earlier. As a very frequent flyer I expect the performance of the people in the cockpit will always be the best in order to keep me and all aboard safe, and this kind of incidents should be very isolated, sadly we are seeing this events are alarmingly frequent.
Rgds.
G.

worldranger wrote:

Hmm your wish washing now, - name one normal ILS approach at 8nm or inside where the buying SOP would NOT protect you given the procedure I mentioned.

You also wrote
"Exactly the same on NPAs, Boeing pilots also think that setting the MDA on a NPA will protect them from terrain, there are many examples around where this provides no terrain protection at all. "

You set the MDA with VNAV - not basic modes, which is what I was referring to - the VNAV on approach logic is the protection. Your changing the byline.

I have changed nothing at all. The procedure says nothing about 8 nm, I mentioned 8 nm up in the thread as that is where this incident happened.

Some approaches you can look at and see what terraIn you will hit 1000' AAL on the LOC. Naples RW24, Sarajevo RW12, Milas RW28R, Basle RW33, Geneva RW05, Petropavlovsk 16R, Gulin RW19, Luxor RW02, Latacunea RW19,Lugano RW01 Sion RW25, Abakan RW20, Tbilisi RW13R, Tel Aviv RW26, Mumbai RW27, Mauritius RW14, Kabul RW29, Tabriz RW 30L/R, Zurich RW28/34, Tehran RW29L, Subic Bay RM25, Songshan RW28, Exeter RW26, Chambery RW18, Bilbao RW30. There is more, that is all I could think of off the top of my head.

Wow! I vote for zeke in the LH seat.

WPvsMW wrote:

Wow! I vote for zeke in the LH seat.

I'm sure he's quite happy flying for CX.

Hats off to Zeke, world ranger, et al. for shedding some light on the technical nuances of this event. Nice to see some pilot banter back on this website. I was beginning to despair that it had been overrun by paid corporate shills and stuffed-shirt types that just want to tell everyone how many times they've flown first class this year.

Confuscius wrote:

WPvsMW wrote:

Wow! I vote for zeke in the LH seat.

I'm sure he's quite happy flying for CX.

An acronymic pun.

zeke wrote:

worldranger wrote:

Hmm your wish washing now, - name one normal ILS approach at 8nm or inside where the buying SOP would NOT protect you given the procedure I mentioned.

You also wrote
"Exactly the same on NPAs, Boeing pilots also think that setting the MDA on a NPA will protect them from terrain, there are many examples around where this provides no terrain protection at all. "

You set the MDA with VNAV - not basic modes, which is what I was referring to - the VNAV on approach logic is the protection. Your changing the byline.

I have changed nothing at all. The procedure says nothing about 8 nm, I mentioned 8 nm up in the thread as that is where this incident happened.

Some approaches you can look at and see what terraIn you will hit 1000' AAL on the LOC. Naples RW24, Sarajevo RW12, Milas RW28R, Basle RW33, Geneva RW05, Petropavlovsk 16R, Gulin RW19, Luxor RW02, Latacunea RW19,Lugano RW01 Sion RW25, Abakan RW20, Tbilisi RW13R, Tel Aviv RW26, Mumbai RW27, Mauritius RW14, Kabul RW29, Tabriz RW 30L/R, Zurich RW28/34, Tehran RW29L, Subic Bay RM25, Songshan RW28, Exeter RW26, Chambery RW18, Bilbao RW30. There is more, that is all I could think of off the top of my head.

Nice try but completely wrong. Read again the Boeing SOP I wrote above.

Again this is all predicated on protections using SOPS

On LOC above GS - and OBVIOUSLY cleared for approach. (That's the only reason you conduct a GS not a path from above SOP) With the SOP you are CFIT protected - ILS' s are design around the topography legend. Otherwise it does not qual as an ILS

NAP - NAP ILS 24 'V' 'W' 'Y' you won't be on the LOC on those step downs until approaching POM - SOP protected

GVA - ILS 05 - SOP protected, will not result in CFIT - Terr off LOC

LXR - ILS 02 - SOP protected, will not result in CFIT - Terr off LOC

TBS - ILS 13R - - SOP protected, will not result in CFIT - Terr off LOC

BOM - ILS Z & Y 27 - SOP protected, will not result in CFIT - Terr off LOC

MRU - ILS 14 - flown it many times, ATC maintains you at 4000' until passing BIGARA and then you are cleared. Co. SOPs no greater than VS 2000fpm below 3000' permitted - SOP protected, will not result in CFIT.

KBL - ILS 29 - flown it many times, same as above from ATC are ILS clearance and step down.

ZRH - ILS 28 - SOP protected, will not result in CFIT - Terr off LOC

ZRH - ILS 34 - SOP protected, will not result in CFIT - Terr off LOC.
The light strip of TERR under the 34 LOC is explained in LIDO LATs (and applies to all approaches)
QUOTE: "The color coding of terrain elevation on IACs starts with white at airport elevation changing to darker brown in the following way: 1st layer: white, max. 500ft above aerodrome elevation (rounded mathematically to the nearest 500ft step). 2nd layer: light beige, 501-max. 1000ft above aerodrome elevation. 3rd layer: beige, 1001-max. 2000ft above aerodrome elevation. 4th layer: dark beige, 2001-3000ft above aerodrome elevation. 5th layer: light brown, 3001-4000ft above aerodrome elevation (flexible). 6th layer: brown, beyond 4001ft above aerodrome elevation (flexible to cover the highest topographical feature within the plan view)."
END QUOTE

IKA - ILS 29L - there currently is no published ILS APP for 29L

All the others you have mentioned I do not have access to but TBH I don't need to - because your assertions are incorrect.

Have you flown the Boeing? I have flown every variant of the 744 & 777 -amongst many others. I'm in my 50's, took my first flying lesson when I was 17, served in the military (which gave me a high regard for chain of command & procedures) - and I respect the fact that SOPs have been fashioned over decades of learning from mistakes.

it is designed to protect me - if I comply with Boeing and Co SOP but forget to arm the GS - 1000' AAL in MCP while useing max max VS SOPs - I am protected from CFIT

WPvsMW wrote:

Wow! I vote for zeke in the LH seat.

Be careful about not questioning those who talk authoritatively without suspicion.

While I believe Zeke means well, a little more circumspection is needed with his kinds of posts on public forums.

While earlier he said he didn't refer to 8nm - it was mentioned in the paragraph following his flawed argument in the 1000' AAL discussion.

He Segways a little to quickly from one point to the next.

Reminds me of Junior trainers that sign off junior FOs - great with books, assertive, enthusiastic- just need a little bit more seasoning.

B595 wrote:

Hats off to Zeke, world ranger, et al. for shedding some light on the technical nuances of this event. Nice to see some pilot banter back on this website. I was beginning to despair that it had been overrun by paid corporate shills and stuffed-shirt types that just want to tell everyone how many times they've flown first class this year.

Thanks - debate is vital for knowledge and self learning. I'm sure Zeke could teach me a thing or two about aviation.

We are always learning

It's never personal.

Hm... I flew both #131 and #133 for years. Never experienced anything like this.
Things happen. EK is still my favorite airline.

worldranger wrote:

Nice try but completely wrong. Read again the Boeing SOP I wrote above.
Again this is all predicated on protections using SOPS
On LOC above GS - and OBVIOUSLY cleared for approach. (That's the only reason you conduct a GS not a path from above SOP) With the SOP you are CFIT protected - ILS' s are design around the topography legend. Otherwise it does not qual as an ILS

I have read what you said, and will re-post the Boeing procedure you posted a little further down i.e.

worldranger wrote:

The fact is Boeing use the 1000' aal for precisely the reason of forgetting to arm the GS - as a final stop gap to EGPWS & then CFIT.

I will only need to go through the first example I cited (LIRN/NAP ILS Y 24 Jepp chart dated 4 MAR 16) to explain how the Boeing procedure does not protect against CFIT. The approach starts at BENTO, G/S interception is at 7000' at D19.0 INPL. Aerodrome elevation is 223'. There is no at or above altitude constraints on the ILS Y 24 approach after D19.0.

If you were flying along at FL100 an receive “direct BENTO, cross BENTO at or above 7000 feet cleared ILS Y runway 24 QNH 1013 report established”. At BENTO above 7000’ LOC captured advise established, at D19.0 INPL still above G/S, intercept the G/S from above, window set to 1300' per the Boeing procedure. That provides no terrain protection for the terrain that rises to over 3000' AAL on the LOC between BENTO and D10 INPL, as 3000' >> 1000'.

worldranger wrote:

MRU - ILS 14 - flown it many times, ATC maintains you at 4000' until passing BIGARA and then you are cleared. Co. SOPs no greater than VS 2000fpm below 3000' permitted - SOP protected, will not result in CFIT.

This is the Boeing procedure you posted above, it says nothing about max of 2000 fpm below 3000', just says "Set appropriate vertical speed".

"Arm the APP mode.
Set the MCP altitude no lower than 1000 feet above touchdown.
Select V/S mode.
WARNING: Ensure the localizer is captured before descending.
Set appropriate vertical speed. Monitor progress of G/S capture Call “GLIDESLOPE ALIVE”
At G/S captured, set the missed approach altitude in the MCP.
If G/S is not captured by 1,000 feet above touchdown or ALT engages at anytime, go-around."

E.g. ground speed of 140 kts with a V/S of 2000 fpm you would hit the 1584' and 1391' obstacles. 4000' to 1200' ft (1000'AAL) at 140 kts/2000 fpm would take 84 seconds to descent 2800’ leveling off at D6.7 IPL( travel 3.26 nm in 84 seconds at a 140 kt ground speed). There are obstacles at between 1070' to 2251' between BIGARA and D4.0 IPL.

worldranger wrote:

All the others you have mentioned I do not have access to but TBH I don't need to - because your assertions are incorrect.

I am not incorrect as the examples above demonstrate.

worldranger wrote:

Have you flown the Boeing?

Yes the 747, and we used to be able to intercept the G/S before the LOC on that but we did a software upgrade later to remove that feature.

Zeke

Here we again you are adding extra holes in the cheese block that are not part of the discussion.

You are now talking about an additional error - ALTITUDE BUSTs.

The ILS 14R DME 14/9/17 does not have altitude restrictions when on straight in LOC like the others you have mentioned. You have added a dimension that is not part of the discussion

The NAP ILS Y 24 has the following ALTITUDE restrictions:

BENTO to D16 INPL 5900
D16-D13 INPL 4830
D13-D10 INPL 3770

MRU ILS 14
BIGARA-CUREPIPE 3200

Anytime you have an approach like the example you use for Naples - because ATC issue BENTO at 7000 it means ATC has cleared you to 5900 then 4830 then 3770! - they do not specify these further descents because it's on the plate and cause ATC congestion- you are cleared in accordance with that plate. The 7000' call is not the mother of all calls it's the 'proceed to 5900' call, that's what the CLERANCE means. DME Is different.

I'm DME 14R case the critical difference is after D.8 there are no altitude restrictions AFTER D.8 IDM - it's a critical point & separate issue. The altitude restriction is from D9 to D8 - 3200 - that's a clearance!

Once again The SOP protects a cleared ILS app GS from above - if you want to have a separate discussion about altitude busts then that's different - appropriate VS rate must be used to avoid an ALTITUDE bust. Trust me Boeing has it covered.

Gonzalo wrote:

My humble opinion, not paranoia, not drama, not overreaction, just natural worries about a serious
Incident with one of the biggest passenger aircraft in service.

Sure. And Daily Mail is just "reporting what the public has the right to know".

Gonzalo wrote:

With all due respect specially to the proffessional pilots who take time to educate us here, the most concerning thing in this kind of incidents is precisely the human factor, with crews failing to attend very basic items at critical phases of the flight.

REALLY!? Failing to attend? Come on, Rupert. If they FAILED to attend to whatever you think they had to attend, it'd be a serious accident. The fact that they landed safely means they actually knew what they were doing. And you definitely don't have "due respect" to the professional pilots. Without knowing anything at all, you jump to the conclusion that they "failed to attend".

zeke wrote:

I will only need to go through the first example I cited (LIRN/NAP ILS Y 24 Jepp chart dated 4 MAR 16) to explain how the Boeing procedure does not protect against CFIT. The approach starts at BENTO, G/S interception is at 7000' at D19.0 INPL. Aerodrome elevation is 223'. There is no at or above altitude constraints on the ILS Y 24 approach after D19.0.

If you were flying along at FL100 an receive “direct BENTO, cross BENTO at or above 7000 feet cleared ILS Y runway 24 QNH 1013 report established”. At BENTO above 7000’ LOC captured advise established, at D19.0 INPL still above G/S, intercept the G/S from above, window set to 1300' per the Boeing procedure. That provides no terrain protection for the terrain that rises to over 3000' AAL on the LOC between BENTO and D10 INPL, as 3000' >> 1000'.

The question I'd be asking Zeke, based on the approach and scenario you've mentioned is "why accept that clearance?" The MSA in the area is 8400 there's a note that in turb the minimum holding alt is 8000 so in the absence of anything else I'd establish on the LOC inbound, be fully configured and intercept from above safe in the knowledge that a valid G/S protects me and that it remains above the minimum crossing heights, which are very clear on the charts.
Another thing to add is that a 3.3 slope is problematic at times, so it's more likely I'd do a spin in the hold at Bento to lose excess energy and height getting myself down to 7000 as I established inbound.
There's more than one way to skin a cat, and in this case with this approach...having a plan and avoiding the need to intercept from above is far more appropriate.
The Boeing procedure in this case is an inappropriate application of the SOP, however as ever you can't write an SOP for everything...but every airline I've ever worked at (EK included) encourages resilience in procedural adherence and application, i.e set 5900 (after getting ALT HLD at 7000) in the MCP..and if not on the slope inside the IF, set 4900 for the the next step down...which is the intent of the intercept from above proc, is SOP compliant at EK...and it works.

You let the cat out with two separate statements.

BREECH wrote:

... what the public has the right to know...

BREECH wrote:

... Without knowing anything at all, ...

1) The public has no right to know because neither airline nor GCAA will ever release the truth.
2) The public should not comment without knowing anything.

Perfect strategy, isn't it?

Even $1.7B PR spending cannot make all issues disappear.

dtw2hyd wrote:

You let the cat out with two separate statements.

BREECH wrote:

... what the public has the right to know...

BREECH wrote:

... Without knowing anything at all, ...

1) The public has no right to know because neither airline nor GCAA will ever release the truth.
2) The public should not comment without knowing anything.

Perfect strategy, isn't it?

Even $1.7B PR spending cannot make all issues disappear.

It was North Korean communists working together with the CIA to damage the reputation of an Arabic airline for religious purposes. And zombies, too, of course!

BREECH wrote:

..
It was North Korean communists working together with the CIA to damage the reputation of an Arabic airline for religious purposes. And zombies, too, of course!

And you are complaining about DM aviation reports!!!