Aesma wrote:

I'm glad I don't have any flight scheduled on EK.

Jayafe wrote:

Aesma wrote:

I'm glad I don't have any flight scheduled on EK.

Paranoia, hate, or just over reaction drama?

Jayafe wrote:

Aesma wrote:

I'm glad I don't have any flight scheduled on EK.

Paranoia, hate, or just over reaction drama?

Gonzalo wrote:

Good morning everybody. If someone has any aditional info to share about this... looks pretty serious.


http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0

Thanks in advance

JetBuddy wrote:

Looks like two go-arounds after one another.. is there a possibility this could be blamed on something other than the crew?

atcsundevil wrote:

Why would ATC not have noticed this..? They should have gotten an MSAW alert. At the very least the controller should have noticed the aircraft descending well below the approach.

atcsundevil wrote:

Why would ATC not have noticed this..? They should have gotten an MSAW alert. At the very least the controller should have noticed the aircraft descending well below the approach.

JetBuddy wrote:

Looks like two go-arounds after one another.. is there a possibility this could be blamed on something other than the crew?

JetBuddy wrote:

Looks like two go-arounds after one another.. is there a possibility this could be blamed on something other than the crew?

Gonzalo wrote:

Jayafe wrote:

Aesma wrote:

I'm glad I don't have any flight scheduled on EK.

Paranoia, hate, or just over reaction drama?

My humble opinion, not paranoia, not drama, not overreaction, just natural worries about a serious
Incident with one of the biggest passenger aircraft in service. The METAR published says condition
was CAVOK... this incident could ended much worse with low vis...let's hope we can read something in the future with the findings of the aviation authorities...

seat55a wrote:

Meters vs feet is an interesting speculation I was on a Piedmont flight into LGW (remember those?) where the first attempt/go around was absurdly high. I wondered at the time if the Piedmont pilots, with little or no experience outside the US, had assumed altitudes were given in meters.

KEWR2014 wrote:

atcsundevil wrote:

Why would ATC not have noticed this..? They should have gotten an MSAW alert. At the very least the controller should have noticed the aircraft descending well below the approach.

I'm not too sure about the terminal environment but in an enroute environment, the MSAW alert is auto-suppressed within a certain range around an airport. Also, we'll often lose radar contact below a certain altitude depending on the radar coverage.

ImperialEagle wrote:

The folks who ring the Lutine Bell might jerk a knot in EK's rope. They may find their partner in risk is not going to absorb the "big one" as easily as they think.

Gonzalo wrote:

Good morning everybody. If someone has any aditional info to share about this... looks pretty serious.


http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0

Thanks in advance

flymia wrote:

The good thing is the crew noticed the mistake and took action.

Newbiepilot wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

Looks like two go-arounds after one another.. is there a possibility this could be blamed on something other than the crew?

Yes it is possible that the approach or the navigation database had a problem. Two consecutive go arounds to me implies that there was a problem with the route plotted by the flight management computer. I have seen issues on other planes where the flight management computer does not correctly plot the path between the waypoints when loading an approach.

I don't know if Moscow has an unusual or unconventional approach. It could have been an error in the nav database. I don't know if anyone else is flying A380s into Moscow. There could have been a problem with how the database and airplanes flight management computers interpret the approach. 400 AGL is awfully late to catch such a problem

For those who don't know how nav databases work, here is a good handbook from the FAA

https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policie ... pter_6.pdf

... about to intercept the extended runway center line about 8nm before the runway threshold when the aircraft descended to about 400 feet AGL, initiated a go around climbing straight ahead and crossing through the localizer to safe altitude. The aircraft subsequently positioned for another approach to runway 14R, aligned with the extended runway center line but did not initiate the final descent and joined the missed approach procedure as result. The aircraft positioned again for an approach to runway 14R and landed without further incident on runway 14R about 35 minutes after the first go around (from 400 feet AGL).

OA940 wrote:

Gonzalo wrote:

Jayafe wrote:

Paranoia, hate, or just over reaction drama?

My humble opinion, not paranoia, not drama, not overreaction, just natural worries about a serious
Incident with one of the biggest passenger aircraft in service. The METAR published says condition
was CAVOK... this incident could ended much worse with low vis...let's hope we can read something in the future with the findings of the aviation authorities...

Incidents happen all the time, and if everyone's reaction was this then there would be 2 airlines in the world with a fleet of 4 aircraft each.

VirginFlyer wrote:

Newbiepilot wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

Looks like two go-arounds after one another.. is there a possibility this could be blamed on something other than the crew?

Yes it is possible that the approach or the navigation database had a problem. Two consecutive go arounds to me implies that there was a problem with the route plotted by the flight management computer. I have seen issues on other planes where the flight management computer does not correctly plot the path between the waypoints when loading an approach.

I don't know if Moscow has an unusual or unconventional approach. It could have been an error in the nav database. I don't know if anyone else is flying A380s into Moscow. There could have been a problem with how the database and airplanes flight management computers interpret the approach. 400 AGL is awfully late to catch such a problem

For those who don't know how nav databases work, here is a good handbook from the FAA

https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policie ... pter_6.pdf

Interesting possibility. It is worth pointing out in case it is missed in this thread that the AvHead article says:

... about to intercept the extended runway center line about 8nm before the runway threshold when the aircraft descended to about 400 feet AGL, initiated a go around climbing straight ahead and crossing through the localizer to safe altitude. The aircraft subsequently positioned for another approach to runway 14R, aligned with the extended runway center line but did not initiate the final descent and joined the missed approach procedure as result. The aircraft positioned again for an approach to runway 14R and landed without further incident on runway 14R about 35 minutes after the first go around (from 400 feet AGL).

So although the first go-around was from 400AGL, the second was made on centre line but prior to descent. Perhaps troubleshooting the issue?

OA940 wrote:

Gonzalo wrote:

My humble opinion, not paranoia, not drama, not overreaction, just natural worries about a serious
Incident with one of the biggest passenger aircraft in service. The METAR published says condition
was CAVOK... this incident could ended much worse with low vis...let's hope we can read something in the future with the findings of the aviation authorities...

Incidents happen all the time, and if everyone's reaction was this then there would be 2 airlines in the world with a fleet of 4 aircraft each.

I agree that it is frustrating when minor issues are overblown. At the same time however, it is probably unwise to dismiss incidents as "they happen all the time" - there are doubtless going to be safety lessons from this one, and it deserves to be professionally investigated rather than just treated as ops normal. The fact that we as an industry, by and large, take these things extremely seriously is why the number of fatal airliner accidents has been in steady decline for the last two decades.

V/F

Qantas744er wrote:

100% A.net of armchair pilots commenting here are unaware that QFE ops are still used in most of the Russian airspace. When ATC issued a "descend and maintain 500 meters (yes...meters)", on the ILS14R approach, the crew should have set 2200ft QNH on the FCU. There is a altitude conversion table for QFE/QNH on the approach plate. Add fatigue and a lapse of judgement, and you find yourself having set 500ft (feet) on the FCU......get the picture?

Not the first time this has happened in QFE airspace, and it wont be the last...

Do some research and youll find plenty of recent near CFIT events at the worlds biggest operators.

VirginFlyer wrote:

Have the flight crew been resigned yet?

[Yes, the wording of that is intentional]

V/F

727200 wrote:

Someone gonna get some time off to think bout this.

WorldFlier wrote:

727200 wrote:

Someone gonna get some time off to think bout this.

Was it co-pilot at the controls twice? Finally Captain took over?

Qantas744er wrote:

Gonzalo wrote:

Good morning everybody. If someone has any aditional info to share about this... looks pretty serious.


http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0

Thanks in advance

100% A.net of armchair pilots commenting here are unaware that QFE ops are still used in most of the Russian airspace. When ATC issued a "descend and maintain 500 meters (yes...meters)", on the ILS14R approach, the crew should have set 2200ft QNH on the FCU. There is a altitude conversion table for QFE/QNH on the approach plate. Add fatigue and a lapse of judgement, and you find yourself having set 500ft (feet) on the FCU......get the picture?

Not the first time this has happened in QFE airspace, and it wont be the last...

Do some research and youll find plenty of recent near CFIT events at the worlds biggest operators.

Qantas744er wrote:

Gonzalo wrote:

Good morning everybody. If someone has any aditional info to share about this... looks pretty serious.


http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0

Thanks in advance

100% A.net of armchair pilots commenting here are unaware that QFE ops are still used in most of the Russian airspace. When ATC issued a "descend and maintain 500 meters (yes...meters)", on the ILS14R approach, the crew should have set 2200ft QNH on the FCU. There is a altitude conversion table for QFE/QNH on the approach plate. Add fatigue and a lapse of judgement, and you find yourself having set 500ft (feet) on the FCU......get the picture?

Not the first time this has happened in QFE airspace, and it wont be the last...

Do some research and youll find plenty of recent near CFIT events at the worlds biggest operators.

Qantas744er wrote:

Gonzalo wrote:

Good morning everybody. If someone has any aditional info to share about this... looks pretty serious.


http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0

Thanks in advance

100% A.net of armchair pilots commenting here are unaware that QFE ops are still used in most of the Russian airspace. When ATC issued a "descend and maintain 500 meters (yes...meters)", on the ILS14R approach, the crew should have set 2200ft QNH on the FCU. There is a altitude conversion table for QFE/QNH on the approach plate. Add fatigue and a lapse of judgement, and you find yourself having set 500ft (feet) on the FCU......get the picture?

Not the first time this has happened in QFE airspace, and it wont be the last...

Do some research and youll find plenty of recent near CFIT events at the worlds biggest operators.

ExDubai wrote:

VirginFlyer wrote:

Have the flight crew been resigned yet?

[Yes, the wording of that is intentional]

V/F

According to the jungle drums "only" grounded

worldranger wrote:

One of the rumors doing the rounds is that they were high on left down wind 14R and when turned in and cleared they initiated the GS from above maneuver but neglected to arm the GS. The problem with this maneuver I see from new FOs is that many of them do that training at home base sim where the airport elevation is close to zero so they get in the habit of putting 1000' in MCP/FCP.

flymia wrote:

While concerning, things happen. An Air Canada crew almost landed on top of a 787 sitting on a taxi way. I will still fly Air Canada. The good thing is the crew noticed the mistake and took action.

Ladies and Gentlemen

STANDARDS ON THE LINE

You will be aware that we have experienced some poorly managed events on the line over the last few months; unfortunately we experienced another one last week. In Training we promote the fact that we are driven by evidence, well the evidence indicates that that these events can no longer be viewed as isolated events, therefore it is imperative action is taken to stop the onset of a potential trend. We need to raise the levels of airmanship, awareness, suspicion and professionalism across our pilot community. Let me state that we are of the firm belief that the vast majority of our pilots are professional, proficient, efficient and effective. Unfortunately, the evidence indicates there is still work to be done to bring a small minority of pilots to this standard. The acid test, as always is, if following any training/checking session you would not be confident with the pilot flying your loved ones into some of the demanding destinations, terrain, weather and ATC environments which we operate into, then you have to flag those concerns to Training Management by accurately grading and reporting your observations.

In reviewing the events of the last few months we have asked ourselves what are we doing wrong? What are we missing? What’s the root cause? Why is our training and checking not able to identify those pilots who underperform on the line? Whilst the PFs and PMs in each case demonstrated failures in one or more of the pilot competencies, it was the loss of Situation Awareness and ineffective Pilot monitoring which were so concerning; we therefore need to enhance our training with regards to both. We have already started this in the current round of RTGS, where we present the Flight Data Monitoring playbacks from some of the events in question and then facilitate a discussion on what went wrong and what could have been done to prevent the situation from developing. However it is obvious that we need to do more, therefore in cooperation with Fleet we have decided to introduce the following changes:

· Trainers are to re-emphasize the importance of Pilot Monitoring duties during all Training and Checking events; this is to happen with immediate effect.
· Recurrent training to include a manually flown (Auto Pilot/Auto Throttle off) short sector, focusing on SA and Monitoring. We already cover this on Day 3 on the A380 using NCE; Boeing will introduce something similar on Day 2, this will be effective from 1 Oct this year. Emphasis is to be placed on the Pilot Monitoring making timely exceedance calls and demonstrating a satisfactory level of monitoring throughout the session. Please continue to insert ‘distractors’ during your sessions to mirror the distractions encountered on the line. The PM is to prioritise his workload to ensure his own SA and the safety of the aircraft are never compromised.
· We have re-written the word pictures for the Communication and the Leadership, Teamwork and Support PAMs to include more focus on PM skills. The FCI detailing these changes will be published shortly and will be effective immediately on receipt.
· During a training/checking session should a pilot miss a number of radio or SOP calls which might jeopardise the safety of the flight, or if their attitude or professionalism is called into question then the pilot is to be graded a ‘1’ for Leadership, Teamwork and Support. I accept this is subjective and whilst I would not expect to see a trainee fail because of a ‘few’ missed calls, several missed radio and/or SOP calls could be indicative of capacity or SA issues, so additional training is entirely appropriate.
· Any commander who is graded a ‘1’ or a ‘2’ for any competency during Day 1 or 2 of their recurrent simulator session will continue with their remaining simulator sessions, unless they are removed by a Training Manager. However, on completion of their recurrent training sessions a review of their performance will be conducted by Training/Fleet management prior to the commander being released back to the line; this is effective immediately.
· We will develop learning modules to improve knowledge and understanding of Auto Flight Systems modes. In the interim it is vital that you not only train Automation awareness but also the understanding of the modes.
· 25% of line checks will be planned as ‘No Notice’, this will be effective from the next planned roster. If you are rostered for one of these No Notice line checks, it is important you do not make the rostered crew aware – we are trying to get better visibility over our crews’ standards and level of preparedness – a true No Notice line check will give us that.
· Safety will provide Training with a list of our most challenging destinations and where possible Line Checks will be planned to these destinations going forward.
· There will be an additional 1-week ground school introduced for all new conversion courses to enhance/refresh fundamental ATPL knowledge; date for implementation TBD.
· Starting 1 Feb 2018, Day 3 of the recurrent PPC will be separated from Day 1 and 2. This will give trainees more regular exposure throughout the year to manual flight in the simulator as well as the opportunity to practise their monitoring skills. This initiative will also address the negative feedback we have received relating to 3 x deep night duties in a row and the limited training value gained from the 3rd night.
· We will be working with a third party research team to trial ‘eye tracking’ functionality in the simulator. We will use the results of the trial in the following RTGS phase to demonstrate the effectiveness, or not, of some crews’ scanning techniques during various stages of the flight.

In conclusion, the recent spate of poorly managed events on the line is deeply disappointing. Inaction on our part was simply not an option; as a result I hope you understand why these actions are being taken. It is vital that as trainers we lead by example and we demonstrate the standards others wish to aspire to. We recognise that ‘change’ can lead to uncertainty, especially if that change is introduced quickly. Therefore, if you are faced with a situation during your training and checking sessions over the coming weeks and are unsure of what is expected of you, please call your training management team who will be happy to assist.

As always thank you for your continued support.


SVP Flight Training

ExDubai wrote:

Management response.......

Ladies and Gentlemen

STANDARDS ON THE LINE

SVP Flight Training

No selfreflection. Lowering the entry requirements and loosing a large number of experienced pilots/trainers and nobody is asking why.....

worldranger wrote:

Amongst commercial pilots - EK is considered one the poorest outfits to work for - and as such droves of experienced Captains have left for greener pastures such as Korean & China over the last 4-5 years.

They are now hiring turbo prop pilots with minimum experience to fly large wide bodies aircraft in complex ops - which was unheard of 7-10 years ago.

There is a global shortage of that kind of experience and they seem to not kept up with the market in terms of pay & benefits. The main complaints are they are a 'dollar shy but penny wise.'

EK is the largest international airline in the world and they are the Ryaniar of long haul - the conversation amongst my buddies there is "who are you applying to?"

Most of my friends say they don't want to be there WHEN the big one happens not IF.

Jayafe wrote:

Aesma wrote:

I'm glad I don't have any flight scheduled on EK.

Paranoia, hate, or just over reaction drama?

flymia wrote:

While concerning, things happen. An Air Canada crew almost landed on top of a 787 sitting on a taxi way. I will still fly Air Canada. The good thing is the crew noticed the mistake and took action.