Revelation wrote:

MCC is a bit too wonky

Well I'm old enough to be used to that by now haha.
Not sure your inversion drains the wonk swamp though.
Your point about merit has merit... You identify the scaling problem, however, that IMO adds work. It also obscures the non-DOC expense by translating directly into revenue.
Maybe de gustibus non disputadem applies here as long as we pick one or the other.

But one more shot for MCC: using it for a bigger plane with equal pax numbers (more space only) would pretty much tell us the RASM bump necessary for a space-strategy yo be profitable. Non-DOC cost items (marketing, baggage handling, catering, ticketing, security) tend not to scale with seat pitch but do scale with pax count.

Applied to a bigger, pax-equal plane, we'd get something like MSC= marginal space cost. Which is nice.

Re pax only voting with their wallets - that just can't be true regardless of how many times an a.nut says it. Else why isn't everyone flying 9ab A330's and why do premium airlines exist? I agree that many pax vote that way - thus my rationale for undercutting routes to/from smaller hubs. But I have to believe the folks paying a premium to fly SQ - even in Y - would be willing to pay at least that premium for PY hard product at Y price (Which would still be highly profitable with a good VLA).

As for the rest, I also have to get back to work. Trump is throwing bombs in my practice area; it's nice to dwell in a world of numbers for a while.

Happy Friday!

I like wonk, and I like MSC better than MCC or 1/MCC.
I agree that the "vote only with wallets" segment is only a part of Y pax ... the ULCC part, the "zero dollar tour" part, the "buy enough flooring and win a trip to LAS" part.

par13del wrote:

Gasman wrote:

Boeing was caught napping with the A380. As events transpired they are now undoubtedly very glad they were; but that has more to do with good luck than good management. They won't let it happen again.

....does make you wonder what happened with the A32X-NEO, napping again or bad management?
Perhaps it has nothing to do with either option but the OEM attempting to do what is in its best interest based on its current resources?

I don't think Boeing "was caught napping with the A380" at all. They knew there was a market for an aircraft larger than the 747-400, which is why they had proposed the 747-500/-600/-700 (and the first two were even formally launched but later cancelled). They viewed the size of the VLA segment as being quite a bit smaller than Airbus did, so they were only willing to commit resources to a less expensive stretch of the 747. There's no point to committing eleven figures (in dollars) to an aircraft development program if you don't think it will generate an acceptable rate of return.

By the same token, Boeing's response to the A32Xneo was probably the best one they could come up with given the architectural constraints of the 737 family and the future product plans for the MoM. The 737-MAX8 is actually a very effective counter to the A320neo; it has roughly 3% lower cost per seat-mile (thanks to being two rows longer) and marginally better range (figures from Leeham). The -MAX9 is soundly beaten by the A321neo, but a more effective response would have meant a more costly program which would have also taken longer to come to market -- and would those trade-offs have been worth the incremental business they have lost by having the -MAX9 as an inferior competitor? Moreover, does it make more sense to choose to address that problem with the MoM product line?

Really, both Airbus & Boeing were forced to react when Bombardier launched the CS100; I think both were quite comfortable with the duopoly they shared in the narrowbody market. There was no reason for either to expend the capital on the neo or MAX programs as long as customers were willing to line up for the A320 & 737NG.

Matt6461 wrote:

Re pax only voting with their wallets - that just can't be true regardless of how many times an a.nut says it. Else why isn't everyone flying 9ab A330's and why do premium airlines exist? I agree that many pax vote that way - thus my rationale for undercutting routes to/from smaller hubs. But I have to believe the folks paying a premium to fly SQ - even in Y - would be willing to pay at least that premium for PY hard product at Y price (Which would still be highly profitable with a good VLA).

I think the issue with chasing higher-yielding passengers is that the size of that market segment is far more limited and airline loyalty programs tend to make those passengers much stickier -- so it's tough to steal them away from the competition. Pricing also feels like a barrier to PY -- I'm unwilling to pay 2x or 3x the Y fare for 10-15% more personal space and a slightly nicer meal. For that money I'd rather go to an establishment with a Michelin star.

Matt6461 wrote:

First, nobody believed MD had the resources to build it. Given that sufficient explanation of its failure, it's hard to draw any necessary conclusions related to its characteristics.

I don't disagree with that, but I suspect that if the market had been screaming for an aircraft in that size range, we might have seen customers willing to risk it -- with the added benefit of breaking Boeing's monopoly at the top of the market. And as you mention, with the same engines as the 744 and a suboptimal wing, it likely didn't provide a large enough unit cost benefit. The headline benefit of more capacity wasn't enough to break through all the other challenges of the program.

Is it 20 this year? I thought this year was cut back as well but could be wrong of course.
But in any event I agree.The chart as it stands is a pretty good rendering as to where it may end up both in numbers and timings (EO 2020).
BA may pop in with their 'top up' or even take some production slots off Emirates for a good deal.Or nothing of course.
Emirates have (IMHO only) been given a very tough time by key countries pretty unfairly I think.They are a good well run airline and all these countries are afraid of competition -competition a concept they follow (when it suits them).
Let's name a few.Canada,US,Germany,India even China to a lesser extent.With these (and more) countries giving greater access then their original order made sense.But not without them.
I imagine 20+A388's will be swapped for A359's or similar.Probably all be announced at Farnbrough next year.

HighBypass wrote:

Both Western commercial aircraft manufacturers do indeed provide a definition of the term, "very large aircraft" (VLA). Airbus defines a VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats or the ability to carry more than 80 tonnes of cargo. Boeing defines a VLA as an aircraft that can carry more than 400 passengers. These figures and definitions are from published reports from the airframers themselves.

Forecast clarifications - during the development years, Boeing projected a demand for 340 frames, whilst Airbus was visualizing over 1200 frames. Both 20 year projections were published prior to September 11.

It seems that the term VLA is mainly used on here to point out that Airbus got their market projections wrong, usually by judging those projections using a very different definition of the term from the one used by Airbus when the projections were made.

The fact is that Airbus overestimated (though by far less than many people around here claim), and Boeing underestimated. So what? 20 year projections of anything, in any industry, are rarely anywhere close to 100% accurate.

speedbored wrote:

HighBypass wrote:

Both Western commercial aircraft manufacturers do indeed provide a definition of the term, "very large aircraft" (VLA). Airbus defines a VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats or the ability to carry more than 80 tonnes of cargo. Boeing defines a VLA as an aircraft that can carry more than 400 passengers. These figures and definitions are from published reports from the airframers themselves.

Forecast clarifications - during the development years, Boeing projected a demand for 340 frames, whilst Airbus was visualizing over 1200 frames. Both 20 year projections were published prior to September 11.

It seems that the term VLA is mainly used on here to point out that Airbus got their market projections wrong, usually by judging those projections using a very different definition of the term from the one used by Airbus when the projections were made.

The fact is that Airbus overestimated (though by far less than many people around here claim), and Boeing underestimated. So what? 20 year projections of anything, in any industry, are rarely anywhere close to 100% accurate.

People? The claim is in the post you are replying to. Airbus defined VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats and projected a market of over 1200 frames. We see the market has turned out to be around 300 over 20 years.

So what? Suppose Airbus management was telling the BOD that the market they were about to put more than ten billion EU into was for 300-340 frames instead of 1200. Unless they were totally blinded by arrogance, I don't think there would be an A380.

My point distinguishes between (1) wingspan's utility and (2) the differential impact of quad vs twin for greater or lesser wingspan. For planes of greater size AND greater wingspan, the square-cube principle makes increases a quad's favorability. This is because big planes with big wings benefit relativelt more from wing bending relief than small planes with shorter wings.

Btw you said several things about wingspan that don't make sense. We can discuss further if you like.

It is far from necessarily true that a twin has lower maintenance costs. The A380 has lower engine mx per pax than the 77W, for example. This is because engine mx is mostly related to total thrust; quads require less total thrust, ceteris paribus

Dear Matt6461,

I would like to see how you would like to bring MCC down to 30% on an improved A388 versus B779.

Wing-bend relief of the quads has very marginal beneficial effects on performance if considering the same aiframe in a twin configuration.
Let's put it this way: considering that a twin-engined A380 will fill 70 tons of fuel in each wing on a 100 tons lower MTOW, does it matter for wing bend related issues whether there are 2 engines on a wing weighing 7 tons each or 1 big engine weighing 13 tons placed where the inboard one is? I think that the lower MTOW will overcompensate by huge margins the lower wing bend relief of not having an outboard engine.
Your wing bend relief argument is hence rejected.

You are welcome to discuss the wingspan things that don't make sense to you. I think that they make perfectly sense.

I also refute your claim that "The A380 has lower engine mx per pax than the 77W, for example", starting from the fact that "engine mx cost per pax" is a metric that has no meaning.
If we consider engine MX cost per ASM/ASK instead, I can assure you that the B77W has engine maintenance costs per ASM lower than the A380.
This is easily explained by the fact that engine maintenance costs is not measured in units of thrust, but man-hours and parts costs.
While engine size does affect the required man-hours to do the same task on different engine sizes to some extent, the difference is not huge when comparing large engines such as a single Trent 900 with a GE90.
It won't cost many more manhours to carry out a given scheduled task on a single GE90 versus the same task on a single Trent 900. Of more significance in this case is how accessible the component to be maintained is and here bigger engines actually have an advantage over smaller engines in that it's easier to make everything more accessible in terms of component location. So a bigger engine could, depending on the component and overall architecture, require less man hours for maintenance.
The parts are generally bigger on a bigger engine, but the cost relationship is not linear. Parts count is a much more important metric in this case and is what maintenance professionals use as benchmark to compare engine maintenance cost efficiency.
Of more significance is that unscheduled maintenance has similar occurrence rates between engines flying the same profile and missions, so having twice the amount of engines is just going to bring twice more risk of occurences, with AOG, IRROPS and pax in hotels and compensations as a result.


I'm staying on my point of view that a lower MTOW and slightly lighter twin with the latest engine technology, could reach the MCC of 30% that you're talking about versus the B779. In all other cases, MCC would be 60-70% at best on a stand-alone basis so it would only be worthwhile if the combination with other significant benefits such as engine interchangeability with A350's, similar purchase cost, cockpit commonality, surging airport and en-route costs, etc... would allow the MCC to get down to a point that it makes sense to have the risk of additional seats to fill and go for the A380 versus the B779.

At the end of the day, we come back to the fact that without significant changes, the A380 is dead in the water.

ScottB wrote:

if the market had been screaming for an aircraft in that size range, we might have seen customers willing to risk it

Is the "it" to be risked the original MD12 or a rationally-scaled A380?

Only John Leahy and his 2000 forecast stooges would argue the market was screaming for any VLA - whether 450 or 550 seats - in 2005, let alone in 1995.

So in that sense I agree. There might not have been any pofitable VLA design feasible circa 2000. To the extent any was feasible, its strategic goal should have been to minimize the capacity burden for a compelling efficiency target.

Airbus got that bassackwards by targeting capacity with a small efficiency kicker; efficiency is the only reason to carry a huge capacity burden.

Revelation wrote:

speedbored wrote:

HighBypass wrote:

Both Western commercial aircraft manufacturers do indeed provide a definition of the term, "very large aircraft" (VLA). Airbus defines a VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats or the ability to carry more than 80 tonnes of cargo. Boeing defines a VLA as an aircraft that can carry more than 400 passengers. These figures and definitions are from published reports from the airframers themselves.

Forecast clarifications - during the development years, Boeing projected a demand for 340 frames, whilst Airbus was visualizing over 1200 frames. Both 20 year projections were published prior to September 11.

It seems that the term VLA is mainly used on here to point out that Airbus got their market projections wrong, usually by judging those projections using a very different definition of the term from the one used by Airbus when the projections were made.

The fact is that Airbus overestimated (though by far less than many people around here claim), and Boeing underestimated. So what? 20 year projections of anything, in any industry, are rarely anywhere close to 100% accurate.

People? The claim is in the post you are replying to. Airbus defined VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats and projected a market of over 1200 frames. We see the market has turned out to be around 300 over 20 years.

So what? Suppose Airbus management was telling the BOD that the market they were about to put more than ten billion EU into was for 300-340 frames instead of 1200. Unless they were totally blinded by arrogance, I don't think there would be an A380.

The A380 was and is still in the first place, a legacy project of the EU to demonstrate that Europeans can build bigger, heavier and more comfortable aircraft than the Americans.
The benefits of that demonstration trickles down to other aircraft programs, through prestige and recognition of craftsmanship and competence.

I think that the A380 can be applauded for raising the comfort standards of people movement across the globe.
Does the A380, Airbus, its engineering and marketing team deserve more credit than that?
There are bigger issues at play on our little rock we call Earth.

Waterbomber wrote:

The A380 was and is still in the first place, a legacy project of the EU to demonstrate that Europeans can build bigger, heavier and more comfortable aircraft than the Americans.
The benefits of that demonstration trickles down to other aircraft programs, through prestige and recognition of craftsmanship and competence.

I think that the A380 can be applauded for raising the comfort standards of people movement across the globe.
Does the A380, Airbus, its engineering and marketing team deserve more credit than that?
There are bigger issues at play on our little rock we call Earth.

With all due respect sir... You are completely wrong and I do not recall a single Airbus Supporter back in the years suggesting in any way that the A380 was just a project to demonstrate the Europeans could build a bigger more comfortable aircraft than the Americans. That is revisionist history created out of thin air.

You were not on this site back when the A380 was conceived, when it had it's initial construction and mismatched design problems (when I joined), and the years of initial production and very very slow ramp up.

I looked at the Airbus market projections and claims and did not find them reasonable; and was I believe only 1 of 3 people on this site at the time pointing that out and projected that it would not work out. Us few were beat up mercilessly by all the others (and the vast majority of people now admitting the A380 is now a market failure were huge defenders of the projections back in the day...).

Build it and they will come (put an A380 on a route and the needed passengers will flock to it). We did not understand how the Hub to Hub market would grow. VLA's would be needed just due to world wide passenger growth - regardless of efficiency. Those are the three core arguments that I recall from all the A380 supporters. Totally dismissed by them was the argument that it was an ego prestige project by Airbus; and Airbus defended it's market projections and the reasons for them for well over a decade (even after sales dried up).

So, in my opinion you can't step in now and make that claim. I doubt that the financiers never would have supported the A380 if that was part of its business case.

It's almost as bad as the flat earth myth that Columbus took a huge risk and was going to fall off the edge of the world that the Americans created for their own history in the 1800's to make Columbus look like a hero; as Columbus actually knew that the earth was round; and his navigation instruments were based on a round earth and he had argued that the reason he could get to the far east for spices by sailing east was that his projections on the size of the round earth were totally wrong by about a factor of 2 (or 200%). At the time I believe the projection on the size of the earth by many others was within 500 miles diameter, which is within 6.25% of current calculations.

Revisionist history does not have a place if we are to learn the lessons of the past and move forward,

The fact is Airbus had a clear definition of what a VLA was, and they missed their projected market by a size range way beyond normal compared to other projections for other aircraft and other business cases for other mature industries. I do not believe there would be an A380 if they had projected a market of less than 600 aircraft in 20 years. There would be better and more likely places to invest the money to make a better return on investment.

Have a great day

Waterbomber wrote:

Revelation wrote:

speedbored wrote:

It seems that the term VLA is mainly used on here to point out that Airbus got their market projections wrong, usually by judging those projections using a very different definition of the term from the one used by Airbus when the projections were made.

The fact is that Airbus overestimated (though by far less than many people around here claim), and Boeing underestimated. So what? 20 year projections of anything, in any industry, are rarely anywhere close to 100% accurate.

People? The claim is in the post you are replying to. Airbus defined VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats and projected a market of over 1200 frames. We see the market has turned out to be around 300 over 20 years.

So what? Suppose Airbus management was telling the BOD that the market they were about to put more than ten billion EU into was for 300-340 frames instead of 1200. Unless they were totally blinded by arrogance, I don't think there would be an A380.

The A380 was and is still in the first place, a legacy project of the EU to demonstrate that Europeans can build bigger, heavier and more comfortable aircraft than the Americans.
The benefits of that demonstration trickles down to other aircraft programs, through prestige and recognition of craftsmanship and competence.

I think that the A380 can be applauded for raising the comfort standards of people movement across the globe.
Does the A380, Airbus, its engineering and marketing team deserve more credit than that?
There are bigger issues at play on our little rock we call Earth.

Comfort is a matter of how the airlines fit out their planes. I flew on a Lufthansa A380, and the rock hard slimline seats were awful. It's one thing to have decreased padding on the back of the seat, but they also consistently had little padding on the seat cushion too. I had back surgery more than 12 years before I flew on the LH A380 on a round trip between IAH and FRA. The lack of padding on the seat cushion made me rather uncomfortable for most of the trip.

Revelation wrote:

People? The claim is in the post you are replying to. Airbus defined VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats and projected a market of over 1200 frames. We see the market has turned out to be around 300 over 20 years.

Yes, sorry - I forgot to point out the mistake in what highbypass wrote. Airbus did not define VLAs as aircraft with more than 500 seats - they defined them as aircraft with more than 400 seats.

See their forecast from the year the A380 was launched:
http://www.as777.com/data/manufacturer/ ... s_2000.pdf

I can understand why some people read their definition of VLA as >500 if they only look at the start of the "Very Large Aircraft" section, where it mentions how many existing aircraft there are with >500 seats, and the text and graph on page 36 splits out the forecast into categories marked 500, 600, 800 and 1000 (which probably should be "up to 500", "up to 600", "up to 800" and "up to 1000".

But, if you look at where VLAs are mentioned elsewhere in the document:
- the graph at the bottom of page 25
- text at the top of page 26
- graph at the top of page 28
- text at the bottom of page 30
- graph at the bottom of page 37
it is clear that their definition of a VLA is anything with more than 400 seats.

So, if we look at how many >400 seat aircraft have been sold since 2000, and add in what we think will be sold by the end of 2019, I'm sure we'll find that it will be considerably more than the 300 you claim, and that Airbus's forecast is not nearly as wrong as some people think.

The OP argues that there will be a next-gen VLA, and that it will be an A380. I agree with the first half of that statement. Just because Airbus misread the VLA market, and subsequently got unlucky with both fuel prices, 9/11 and a GFC; doesn't mean there is not a VLA market. Things *could* have been different.

The reason why the next-gen VLA will *not* be an A380 however is also partly why the A380 hasn't been a complete success. Too big on the outside and too small on the inside. Its massive wing was designed with a stretch in mind that let's be honest - will never eventuate. Its seat-mile costs are respectable, but not revolutionary. And technologically, aircraft like the 787 and A350 have well and truly moved the game on. By the time we're even thinking about a new VLA; even these aircraft will be looking old-hat and the A380 a dinosaur. There are just too many issues here for an evolutionary enhancement being enough to breathe fresh life into the '380.

Despite the arguments of slot spaces being proved wrong 15 years ago; that doesn't mean it won't become an issue in the future. And currently, A380's and 747s are still contributing significantly on the routes in which they are effective. That isn't going to go away. My prediction is that the VLA (and we all have a roughly similar idea as to what is meant by the term) will stay. B-800 anyone?

Revelation wrote:

speedbored wrote:

HighBypass wrote:

Both Western commercial aircraft manufacturers do indeed provide a definition of the term, "very large aircraft" (VLA). Airbus defines a VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats or the ability to carry more than 80 tonnes of cargo. Boeing defines a VLA as an aircraft that can carry more than 400 passengers. These figures and definitions are from published reports from the airframers themselves.

Forecast clarifications - during the development years, Boeing projected a demand for 340 frames, whilst Airbus was visualizing over 1200 frames. Both 20 year projections were published prior to September 11.

It seems that the term VLA is mainly used on here to point out that Airbus got their market projections wrong, usually by judging those projections using a very different definition of the term from the one used by Airbus when the projections were made.

The fact is that Airbus overestimated (though by far less than many people around here claim), and Boeing underestimated. So what? 20 year projections of anything, in any industry, are rarely anywhere close to 100% accurate.

People? The claim is in the post you are replying to. Airbus defined VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats and projected a market of over 1200 frames. We see the market has turned out to be around 300 over 20 years.

So what? Suppose Airbus management was telling the BOD that the market they were about to put more than ten billion EU into was for 300-340 frames instead of 1200. Unless they were totally blinded by arrogance, I don't think there would be an A380.

Airbus defined the VLA market as bigger than 400 pax.. We should never forget that execution was bungled. The break even point was supposed to be 250 frames. Everything above that was supposed to be gravy.

Gasman wrote:

The OP argues that there will be a next-gen VLA, and that it will be an A380. I agree with the first half of that statement. Just because Airbus misread the VLA market, and subsequently got unlucky with both fuel prices, 9/11 and a GFC; doesn't mean there is not a VLA market. Things *could* have been different.

...
Despite the arguments of slot spaces being proved wrong 15 years ago; that doesn't mean it won't become an issue in the future. And currently, A380's and 747s are still contributing significantly on the routes in which they are effective. That isn't going to go away. My prediction is that the VLA (and we all have a roughly similar idea as to what is meant by the term) will stay. B-800 anyone?

I think any statement will need to be time limited. IE, I don't think there will be a new VLA before 2030. I think both airframes will concentrate on building the largest version of their current model and will not upsize before it becomes obsolete. I think that by 2030 Boeing will decide it needs to completely replace the 777 and Airbus needs to replace the A350.

speedbored wrote:

So, if we look at how many >400 seat aircraft have been sold since 2000, and add in what we think will be sold by the end of 2019, I'm sure we'll find that it will be considerably more than the 300 you claim, and that Airbus's forecast is not nearly as wrong as some people think.

I'm not sure that claiming the Airbus "forecast is not nearly as wrong as some people think" by defining it as aircraft over 400 seats, and lumping the 777-300/-300ER into that class because a handful of carriers operate high-density configurations on domestic/holiday routes helps the argument, to be honest. If we accept that as true, then it says they went ahead with a project that was just plain wrong for the segment given that the sweet spot of demand was/is much closer to 400 seats than the nominal 555-seat capacity (as per manufacturer promotion) of the A380.

speedbored wrote:

But, if you look at where VLAs are mentioned elsewhere in the document:
- the graph at the bottom of page 25
- text at the top of page 26
- graph at the top of page 28
- text at the bottom of page 30
- graph at the bottom of page 37
it is clear that their definition of a VLA is anything with more than 400 seats.

But they also have a fairly specific breakdown of passenger aircraft demand by subsegment of the VLA market on page 36:

the 575 500-seaters, 404 600-seaters, 223 800-seaters, and 33 1,000-seaters for which a need is forecast in twenty years' time represent a slight increase compared with last year's GMF.

If we just take the 600-seater to 1000-seater segments as the ones being addressable by the A380 (as the closest match), that's 660 aircraft through 2019 and the actual demand ended up being less than half that.

Matt6461 wrote:

Is the "it" to be risked the original MD12 or a rationally-scaled A380?

Only John Leahy and his 2000 forecast stooges would argue the market was screaming for any VLA - whether 450 or 550 seats - in 2005, let alone in 1995.

In that context, the MD-12. And I agree; by the late 1990s I think it was clear that demand for the 747-400 had fallen off pretty dramatically and that wasn't because the product was viewed as obsolete. Rather, competing aircraft like the A340, MD-11, and 777 were able to address many of the 747's markets with similar range but less capacity risk.

mjoelnir wrote:

Airbus defined the VLA market as bigger than 400 pax.. We should never forget that execution was bungled. The break even point was supposed to be 250 frames. Everything above that was supposed to be gravy.

But they didn't undertake the project to break even on 250 frames, and they didn't plan a production capacity of 4 frames per month to produce for 5 or 6 years and then shut down.

KD5MDK wrote:

Gasman wrote:

The OP argues that there will be a next-gen VLA, and that it will be an A380. I agree with the first half of that statement. Just because Airbus misread the VLA market, and subsequently got unlucky with both fuel prices, 9/11 and a GFC; doesn't mean there is not a VLA market. Things *could* have been different.

...
Despite the arguments of slot spaces being proved wrong 15 years ago; that doesn't mean it won't become an issue in the future. And currently, A380's and 747s are still contributing significantly on the routes in which they are effective. That isn't going to go away. My prediction is that the VLA (and we all have a roughly similar idea as to what is meant by the term) will stay. B-800 anyone?

I think any statement will need to be time limited. IE, I don't think there will be a new VLA before 2030. I think both airframes will concentrate on building the largest version of their current model and will not upsize before it becomes obsolete. I think that by 2030 Boeing will decide it needs to completely replace the 777 and Airbus needs to replace the A350.

I completely agree. I estimate the early 2020s for an announcement, with delivery aimed at roughly 2030. The existing A380 fleet could continue in its mission specific roles until then.

Passenger numbers are increasing exponentially. You can ignore the "bigger aircraft" solution only for so long.

The newer twins, and I start with the smallest, 787, 350, and 777 are so relatively efficient that no VLA is going to be built in my lifetime which will be significantly more efficient. Tube and wings have met their limits in these 3 planes. Engines may improve, but even there we may be at the limits.

I suspect hybrid and multi motor aircraft may be the next step, and they will be for shorter ranged planes.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

The newer twins, and I start with the smallest, 787, 350, and 777 are so relatively efficient that no VLA is going to be built in my lifetime which will be significantly more efficient. Tube and wings have met their limits in these 3 planes. Engines may improve, but even there we may be at the limits.

There are huge advances still to be applied to tube+wing. AR continues to increase, CNTP may become viable for primary structures, passive laminar flow for wings, body/propulsion integration, strut-braced wings.

NASA hasn't sketched tube/wing designs with 70% improvement because they're idiots.

Re VLA efficiency it's the simple arithmetic of fuselage wetted area and weight per pax. The 2deck fuse is at least as much a kink in the efficiency curve as is the narrowbody/widebody gap.

The A380 proves this: there you have an excellent 2deck fuselage combined with a bad wing. Yet it's as fuel-efficient as any contemporary high-AR design.

speedbored wrote:

Revelation wrote:

People? The claim is in the post you are replying to. Airbus defined VLA as an aircraft with more than 500 seats and projected a market of over 1200 frames. We see the market has turned out to be around 300 over 20 years.

Yes, sorry - I forgot to point out the mistake in what highbypass wrote. Airbus did not define VLAs as aircraft with more than 500 seats - they defined them as aircraft with more than 400 seats.

No, that's not quite right, Speedbored. It can be confusing. Airbus has, understandably so, created a bit of a moving target when it comes to defining the segment, not to mention what a successful program outcome should look like. So you see, we are not splitting any hairs, you and I, Airbus has been doing so for the both of us.

Just before the launch of the A380 program, Airbus published a widely disseminated forecast where they defined "medium" wide bodies being of the circa 400 seat variety. The very same document, published in Blagnac, went on to discuss the VLA segment, describing aircraft having 500, 600, 800, and, yes, even 1,000 seats, and went on to break down the VLA market segment as 500 seats or more - the very market their proposed A3XX was aimed at (and hit square on the nose). You are partially correct in that, at some point along the way to present day, they settled on the 400+ seat definition, like their American counterparts.

You say large, I say, larger!
The Boeing VLA definition of greater than 400 seats comes from several internal and published market forecast documents beginning in 2000, locking in that definition nearly two decades ago. Prior to that, their "new large airplane" was defined as an aircraft with 500+ seats, and before that, a select Airbus partners and Boeing "very large commercial transport" joint study was defined as a 600 to 800 seat beastie, however, the working group decided, and I quote, "market studies do not indicate sufficient volumes to justify the launch of the program today."

Forecasts - will it rain or shine next week?
The Airbus VLA forecast has been understandably jiggered several times since, yet the effervescent Mr. Leahy remains remarkably bullish, as of 2016, where in another published market forecast, he has Airbus' 2016 projected 20 year global demand for VLA's at 1,480 aircraft, alongside around 8,000 "twin aisle" aircraft.

Is this VLA definition and Airbus' forecast so important for you guys?
Airbus makes projections and that's all part of internal and external marketing.

Matt6461, care to enlighten what is so bad about the A380's wing design?

The newer twins, and I start with the smallest, 787, 350, and 777 are so relatively efficient that no VLA is going to be built in my lifetime which will be significantly more efficient. Tube and wings have met their limits in these 3 planes. Engines may improve, but even there we may be at the limits.

I suspect hybrid and multi motor aircraft may be the next step, and they will be for shorter ranged planes.

In terms of fuel efficiency, the smaller widebodies are indeed relatively efficient.
Airbus states that a 310 pax B77W has 11% higher fuel burn per pax versus a 525 pax A380.

The A380 does bring non-fuel savings of scale that are too often overlooked, while these affect 50-80% of total operating cost.
For instance, JAL is having trouble filling JL415/416 NRT-CDG B788 flights which are very premium light and departing within a couple of hours of their JL45/46 HND-CDG B77W flights which are packed and high yield.
Switching to a single A380 flight would enable them to increase market share, revenues and profits by increasing the comfort standards, while maximising the potential out of slot constrainted HND and reducing costs, as a single A380 flight would be much cheaper to operate than the B77W + B788 flights.
For JAL, this scenario is duplicated in LHR, where slot constraints are limiting their revenue potential on their single daily B77W flight and again in SFO and LAX, where the B77W is too small and they have to give up some of their revenue potential.

So slot constraints are already a real issue today and it will only get worse and worse.

Similarily, during the summer schedule, JL and AY are operating 3 HEL-NRT + 2 HEL-KIX flights as good as simultaneously using A330/A350 for AY and B787's for JL on a joint-venture basis. What a waste.

Perhaps with the increasing number of joint-ventures, we will see these flights getting merged into bigger equipment, with the preferred carrier operating them.
It makes sense to do so.

Matt6461 wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

The newer twins, and I start with the smallest, 787, 350, and 777 are so relatively efficient that no VLA is going to be built in my lifetime which will be significantly more efficient. Tube and wings have met their limits in these 3 planes. Engines may improve, but even there we may be at the limits.

There are huge advances still to be applied to tube+wing. AR continues to increase, CNTP may become viable for primary structures, passive laminar flow for wings, body/propulsion integration, strut-braced wings.

NASA hasn't sketched tube/wing designs with 70% improvement because they're idiots.

Re VLA efficiency it's the simple arithmetic of fuselage wetted area and weight per pax. The 2deck fuse is at least as much a kink in the efficiency curve as is the narrowbody/widebody gap.

The A380 proves this: there you have an excellent 2deck fuselage combined with a bad wing. Yet it's as fuel-efficient as any contemporary high-AR design.

LOL - I should have started on with my age(near 80), which likely makes my statement true! More seriously if the 737, 777 and 321 with their modifications are three of the latest greatest updates in practical terms what is a new tube going to do in the next 20 years? The rumors are that by 2030 hybrid may be making its contribution, and at that point planes may once again really start looking different. I am guessing that five years from now all airframe manufacturers will have engineering crews on frames, energy storage, and motors developing early hybrids. Flying? experimental planes by 2025.

Waterbomber wrote:

For instance, JAL is having trouble filling JL415/416 NRT-CDG B788 flights which are very premium light and departing within a couple of hours of their JL45/46 HND-CDG B77W flights which are packed and high yield.
Switching to a single A380 flight would enable them to increase market share, revenues and profits by increasing the comfort standards, while maximising the potential out of slot constrainted HND and reducing costs, as a single A380 flight would be much cheaper to operate than the B77W + B788 flights.

False comparison. You're comparing airports, not aircraft.
International connections are at NRT, not at HND. The high LFs at HND are TYO O/D willing to pay higher fares for ex-HND. HND will never be NRT, and v.v.
Both HND and NRT are slot-controlled, so the "A380 for slot-controlled airports" philosophy applies to both.

WPvsMW wrote:

Waterbomber wrote:

For instance, JAL is having trouble filling JL415/416 NRT-CDG B788 flights which are very premium light and departing within a couple of hours of their JL45/46 HND-CDG B77W flights which are packed and high yield.
Switching to a single A380 flight would enable them to increase market share, revenues and profits by increasing the comfort standards, while maximising the potential out of slot constrainted HND and reducing costs, as a single A380 flight would be much cheaper to operate than the B77W + B788 flights.

False comparison. You're comparing airports, not aircraft.
International connections are at NRT, not at HND. The high LFs at HND are TYO O/D willing to pay higher fares for ex-HND. HND will never be NRT, and v.v.
Both HND and NRT are slot-controlled, so the "A380 for slot-controlled airports" philosophy applies to both.

You are saying false but I don't get what is false, your arguments are not complete.
First of all, JL's international connections to Asia that you are referring to are irrelevant for the Paris flights that you are quoting me on.
All pax from CDG to either NRT or HND head for immigration. Some connect onto domestic flights, but for that HND is the obvious choice.
There is no point in operating the NRT-CDG route separetely from the HND-CDG when all pax want to head to Tokyo or elsewhere in Japan. So it's obvious that capacity should be consolidated onto a bigger A380 aircraft and the B788 NRT-CDG dropped (and they are thinking about dropping this route and keeping only the B77W HND-CDG route)

Then again JL has the problem on LHR-HND where they are limited by the capacity of the 244 seat B77W and the slots at both ends. They could easily fiil a daily 400 seat A380 on this route. This route would require 2 aircraft to operate daily.

Once again JL has the prroblem on SFO-HND and LAX-NRT, where they are big enough to operate a daily A380. Especially on LAX-NRT, they could do more international connections if they had the A380, but instead, they are operating a B788 on LAX-KIX, which is a high cost, low yield solution.

Finally, while in the past NRT was the international connections gateway between TPAC and Asia for JL, this is no longer that clear-cut today as they are for instance offering a lot of Asia connections for AA's LAX-HND route. Some connections such as between TPAC and CAN are only offered through HND.

These are very precise examples of a carrier that could really use the A380 if the A380 has enough attributes to make it competitive.
The market exists already today, the current aircraft is jut not convincing the market yet.
If the A380 were to become a big twin with costs that are in the same dimension as the B779, I can see many carriers make the jump and go for it.
In JL's case, even a NEO with Trent XWB could convince if they can get it for the same price as a discounted B779.

Waterbomber wrote:

These are very precise examples of a carrier that could really use the A380 if the A380 has enough attributes to make it competitive.
The market exists already today, the current aircraft is jut not convincing the market yet.

You are absolutely correct on that. There is a market for several hundred A380 over a 20 year period for a limited number of city pairs. I have never my entire time here ever disputed that.

The problem is that no one is going to modify the current A380 for that market (already been decided by Airbus); nor is anyone going to design a new similar sized aircraft for a market of that size in the future.

Show us that the market is 2.5 or more times the size and something will happen... Until then... arguing that there are places where the A380 (or a future version) would work is not that relevant to the discussion; as the discussion is really about the quantity of such places - not that some exist.

While it is true that air travel numbers are going to increase. It is also true that in most cases that will occur with smaller aircraft and the development of more hub to point flights that used to go hub to hub to point. The majority of the market for A380's and similar aircraft is going to be in a hub to hub segment; and I just don't see the total numbers growing much - even if you doubled world air travel (Perhaps a 25% growth in VLA passenger jets for double world wide air travel).

Also, to restate my previous position earlier in this thread. Portions of the the current A380 fleet can be maintained for decades to serve the places that an A380 sized VLA makes sense. There will be zero pressure for decades to design a replacement; and then technology will be much different (blended wings, and other possibilities).

Have a great day,

If the A380 is such an uneconomic aircraft, why do BA park it all day long at JNB and QF all day long at LHR?

2175301 wrote:

Waterbomber wrote:

These are very precise examples of a carrier that could really use the A380 if the A380 has enough attributes to make it competitive.
The market exists already today, the current aircraft is jut not convincing the market yet.

You are absolutely correct on that. There is a market for several hundred A380 over a 20 year period for a limited number of city pairs. I have never my entire time here ever disputed that.

The problem is that no one is going to modify the current A380 for that market (already been decided by Airbus); nor is anyone going to design a new similar sized aircraft for a market of that size in the future.

We really seem to be getting somewhere here! The seems to be an emerging agreement of this thread that an enduring VLA market (putting aside the ambiguity of the term for a moment) does indeed exist; but the A380 as we know it might be a less than ideal expression of that market going forward.

So a few questions and my answers, in no particular order.

- Is the A380 a failure? "Failure" is a highly emotive and relative term. But there is no doubt that the aircraft was/is beset with production issues, and while it is functioning very well in its mission specific roles, hasn't sold enough frames to justify its production, and will almost certainly not have the 30-40 year program lifespan as envisaged by Airbus. So - gun to my head - much as I love the A380 - yes it is a commercial failure.

- If it is a failure then, was this bad luck or bad management on Airbus's part A bit of both. Putting a huge draggy wing on it to cover the fuselage extension that *might (and now almost definitely won't) happen in the future was a really dumb call. This rendered every A380-800 - the aircraft that has to establish the legacy - less efficient than it could've been. With the benefit of hindsight, it's easy to see that Airbus overcalled the VLA market. But no-one could have predicted oil prices skyrocketing from 2005-20012, the GFC, and the effects of 9/11.

- Will there be sufficient demand for new A380-800 frames to keep the line open? Yes, at least while EK is in existence.

- For how long will this be the case? for around ten years, after which time airlines will be looking towards the next-gen VLA which by then will have been announced.

Re: international connections ex-TYO

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narita_In ... #Passenger

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haneda_Airport#Passenger

Nearly all non-JP carriers have exactly one destination ex-HND, usually a capital city airport, and no "banks" of international flights. NRT has banks of international flights.

I agree that there will be a market for VLA between slot-controlled hubs, but that VLA won't be an A380 for the reasons others have posted.

Digression: Given that ATL has a catchment of about 6 million, then TYO needs SEVEN airports the size of ATL. HND can only grow by sea reclamation and/or curfew relaxation. Neither is likely. NRT has struggled to grow for decades and result is a second, shorter, runway. [humor] The solution is to level some of the mountains on Boso Hanto and build an ATL-multiplex with all VLA gates. [/humor]

Waterbomber wrote:

Airbus states that a 310 pax B77W has 11% higher fuel burn per pax versus a 525 pax A380.

Interesting how Airbus uses 310 pax 77W when calculating cost per seat but assigns it to the 400+ seat VLA category.

As above the A380's innate capacity is around 80% greater than 77W since it's a 10+8 aircraft. It'd hold 853 pax in an all-economy configuration. Airbus knows this since it did emergency evacuation tests to support the 853 number, and both JAA and FAA certified the results ( http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=m ... ca4e5a232a ).

People can often be very critical on this site with 100% hindsight.But actually the market (and the technology) is hard to predict I believe.Go back 10-20 years and the 737-700 and A319 (the 150 seater S) were big sellers and the key product for many major LCC's and others.Today you can't give 'me away!A321's and no doubt 737-10's being the new 'black'. And it may get even larger v soon 797/321 'plus'.

I don't think those rapid developments were that easy to see and nor 20 years ago was the terminal decline of the VLA today.

But the 300 odd that will exist will be with us (but declining)for the next 20 years.But by then they will become as rare as a trijet is today!

Waterbomber wrote:

Is this VLA definition and Airbus' forecast so important for you guys?
Airbus makes projections and that's all part of internal and external marketing.

Well, of course the forecast matters if one is trying to understand the rationale behind the project and why they have fallen so far behind what they expected to sell; remember, the company's plan was to manufacture four A380s per month and they designed it with the -900 stretch in mind. And one must wonder why Boeing predicted a market of 340 units while Airbus predicted over 1200. They both have very smart analysts on staff and generally have access to similar data sources.

HighBypass wrote:

yet the effervescent Mr. Leahy remains remarkably bullish, as of 2016, where in another published market forecast, he has Airbus' 2016 projected 20 year global demand for VLA's at 1,480 aircraft, alongside around 8,000 "twin aisle" aircraft.

Of course he's going to remain bullish until Airbus takes the decision to end the program or he retires: it's his job to evangelize the products his organization is charged with selling. If the A380 program were to be terminated, you can bet he'd be out saying that the A350-1000 (or -1100/1200/2000) are the perfect size for the market and the 777-9/10 are just too big for most customers.

Waterbomber wrote:

For instance, JAL is having trouble filling JL415/416 NRT-CDG B788 flights which are very premium light and departing within a couple of hours of their JL45/46 HND-CDG B77W flights which are packed and high yield.
Switching to a single A380 flight would enable them to increase market share, revenues and profits by increasing the comfort standards, while maximising the potential out of slot constrainted HND and reducing costs, as a single A380 flight would be much cheaper to operate than the B77W + B788 flights.
For JAL, this scenario is duplicated in LHR, where slot constraints are limiting their revenue potential on their single daily B77W flight and again in SFO and LAX, where the B77W is too small and they have to give up some of their revenue potential.

Except that the Japanese don't want the A380 operating at HND during the day due to wake separation requirements, and planned terminal expansions aimed at international flights will somewhat ease the constraints at HND by 2020 when the Olympics come to Tokyo. And the separate services with a more premium aircraft at HND and a less premium one at NRT allows them to target different market segments and connecting flows.

Waterbomber wrote:

Once again JL has the prroblem on SFO-HND and LAX-NRT, where they are big enough to operate a daily A380. Especially on LAX-NRT, they could do more international connections if they had the A380, but instead, they are operating a B788 on LAX-KIX, which is a high cost, low yield solution.

But serving LAX-KIX allows them to serve the Kansai region with a non-stop rather than a connection from ITM at HND. That's like arguing UA shouldn't fly from Asia into IAD because they can offer connections to DCA at ORD. JAL was once the world's largest 747 operator and they went bankrupt. They have learned their lesson regarding operating aircraft which are too large for their network.

Gasman wrote:

- If it is a failure then, was this bad luck or bad management on Airbus's part A bit of both. Putting a huge draggy wing on it to cover the fuselage extension that *might (and now almost definitely won't) happen in the future was a really dumb call. This rendered every A380-800 - the aircraft that has to establish the legacy - less efficient than it could've been. With the benefit of hindsight, it's easy to see that Airbus overcalled the VLA market. But no-one could have predicted oil prices skyrocketing from 2005-20012, the GFC, and the effects of 9/11.

Ignoring the CATIA snafu, I'd put it entirely on poor management, to be honest. I think they inflated the market projections in order to guarantee the green light for a prestige project and the availability of government loans meant that a bad decision wouldn't bankrupt the company. And on the contrary, the airline industry had a history of economic disruption -- the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, the Persian Gulf War, the Arab Oil Embargoes in the 1970s, etc. Heck, the iconic customer which green-lit the 747, Pan Am, eventually found that aircraft to be too large for its network and somewhat ironically was in the process of switching to Airbus widebodies in the transatlantic market when they finally went under.

That isn't to say there is zero market for aircraft the size of the A380-800 or A380-900 -- there clearly is some. But that market is far smaller than Airbus predicted and their intentionally overoptimistic market projections are why they went too large in planning for the future stretch.

ScottB wrote:

Ignoring the CATIA snafu, I'd put it entirely on poor management, to be honest.

The CATIA snafu also was due to bad management. Airbus itself states that the core issue was investing in tools too late in the program. This thread from earlier this year is one of the better ones I've read and participated in here. It spells it all out in great detail, with quotes from a few past and present industry insiders.

ScottB wrote:

That isn't to say there is zero market for aircraft the size of the A380-800 or A380-900 -- there clearly is some. But that market is far smaller than Airbus predicted and their intentionally overoptimistic market projections are why they went too large in planning for the future stretch.

Some here love to conflate these two statements, but they each stand on their own.

ScottB wrote:

Waterbomber wrote:

Is this VLA definition and Airbus' forecast so important for you guys?
Airbus makes projections and that's all part of internal and external marketing.

Well, of course the forecast matters if one is trying to understand the rationale behind the project and why they have fallen so far behind what they expected to sell; remember, the company's plan was to manufacture four A380s per month and they designed it with the -900 stretch in mind. And one must wonder why Boeing predicted a market of 340 units while Airbus predicted over 1200. They both have very smart analysts on staff and generally have access to similar data sources.

HighBypass wrote:

yet the effervescent Mr. Leahy remains remarkably bullish, as of 2016, where in another published market forecast, he has Airbus' 2016 projected 20 year global demand for VLA's at 1,480 aircraft, alongside around 8,000 "twin aisle" aircraft.

Of course he's going to remain bullish until Airbus takes the decision to end the program or he retires: it's his job to evangelize the products his organization is charged with selling. If the A380 program were to be terminated, you can bet he'd be out saying that the A350-1000 (or -1100/1200/2000) are the perfect size for the market and the 777-9/10 are just too big for most customers.

Waterbomber wrote:

For instance, JAL is having trouble filling JL415/416 NRT-CDG B788 flights which are very premium light and departing within a couple of hours of their JL45/46 HND-CDG B77W flights which are packed and high yield.
Switching to a single A380 flight would enable them to increase market share, revenues and profits by increasing the comfort standards, while maximising the potential out of slot constrainted HND and reducing costs, as a single A380 flight would be much cheaper to operate than the B77W + B788 flights.
For JAL, this scenario is duplicated in LHR, where slot constraints are limiting their revenue potential on their single daily B77W flight and again in SFO and LAX, where the B77W is too small and they have to give up some of their revenue potential.

Except that the Japanese don't want the A380 operating at HND during the day due to wake separation requirements, and planned terminal expansions aimed at international flights will somewhat ease the constraints at HND by 2020 when the Olympics come to Tokyo. And the separate services with a more premium aircraft at HND and a less premium one at NRT allows them to target different market segments and connecting flows.

Waterbomber wrote:

Once again JL has the prroblem on SFO-HND and LAX-NRT, where they are big enough to operate a daily A380. Especially on LAX-NRT, they could do more international connections if they had the A380, but instead, they are operating a B788 on LAX-KIX, which is a high cost, low yield solution.

But serving LAX-KIX allows them to serve the Kansai region with a non-stop rather than a connection from ITM at HND. That's like arguing UA shouldn't fly from Asia into IAD because they can offer connections to DCA at ORD. JAL was once the world's largest 747 operator and they went bankrupt. They have learned their lesson regarding operating aircraft which are too large for their network.

That the Japanese don't want A380's into HND is your imagined opinion, not a fact. In fact, what the Japanese don't want is narrowbodies that need more separation behind heavies,clog up runways, taxiways and take up gate space, while carrying few passengers. IMO the A380 is a very welcome aircraft at HND and if there's anyone that would know exactly how to manage separation in the most efficient way, it's the Japanese.

Serving the Kansai region is mostly irrelevant. The high-yield market is where the business is, e.g. in Tokyo.
The catchement area of KIX has no earning power compared to Tokyo ,so these flights go packed with low yield package tourists East-bound, and tourists who want to enjoy Okonomiyaki and Takoyaki the other way.
The lost opportunity cost on those B787's operating KIX-LAX is huge.

ScottB wrote:

demand for the 747-400 had fallen off pretty dramatically and that wasn't because the product was viewed as obsolete. Rather, competing aircraft like the A340, MD-11, and 777 were able to address many of the 747's markets with similar range but less capacity risk.

I'm not so sure that the 744's age didn't play a huge role in the declining sales.
You're looking at the sales numbers and saying conclusively that the market moved to smaller planes (A343, 77E, A333) from ~1995 to ~2000.
Yet I could argue that the market moved to larger planes (77W from 77E/A343) for the long haul segment from ~2000 to ~2010.
And then I could argue the market moved BACK to smaller planes from ~2010 to now (A350/787).

If you followed my positions about the "market," you'd be merely throwing up your hands and deferring to some animal spirit that moves up and down in capacity wily-nily.
We don't need to be so superstitious.
Instead, the economics of the relative offerings explain "the market's movement."
In 2000, a 744 probably had bad MCC over a 77E/A343.
In 2010 a 77W had great MCC over a 77E/A343.
In 2017, a 77W has poor MCC over a 787/A350.

"The market" is simply a shorthand for aggregated responses of individual firms to the capacity/efficiency tradeoffs that the OEM's offer at a particular time.

Waterbomber wrote:

In JL's case, even a NEO with Trent XWB could convince if they can get it for the same price as a discounted B779.

Other than for current 778 and 779 customers, the A380 is available for less money than either, especially if an EK configuration is selected.

If the 778 and 779 meet or exceed Boeing promises, the A380's fate is sealed. If the 778/779 doesn't meet targets, or there are wing or engine issues, or.... there might be a few who take the compensation on early builds, and buy A380's.

Boeing would like to see the A380 option gone before first 778/779 deliveries, so the fallback position for customers isn't an option. Can Airbus eke out A380 production that long? And can Boeing drift first 777 deliveries out just a little without incurring penalties, but just enough so Airbus loses it's cool and wraps up A380 production?

Waterbomber wrote:

I would like to see how you would like to bring MCC down to 30% on an improved A388 versus B779.

I've written quite a bit about this. If you care to read further, check out these threads in TechOps.
viewtopic.php?t=776333
viewtopic.php?t=775071

Elevator pitch:

• 2deck fuse has far less wetted area and weight per pax: ~15% more for ~60% more capacity at ~A388 size.
• 2025 VLA would be 10+ years newer than any other frame, with scant chance of clean sheet competition for a decade

Waterbomber wrote:

Matt6461, care to enlighten what is so bad about the A380's wing design?

Too big, too short.

Waterbomber wrote:

Wing-bend relief of the quads has very marginal beneficial effects on performance if considering the same aiframe in a twin configuration.
Let's put it this way: considering that a twin-engined A380 will fill 70 tons of fuel in each wing on a 100 tons lower MTOW, does it matter for wing bend related issues whether there are 2 engines on a wing weighing 7 tons each or 1 big engine weighing 13 tons placed where the inboard one is? I think that the lower MTOW will overcompensate by huge margins the lower wing bend relief of not having an outboard engine.
Your wing bend relief argument is hence rejected.

You're going to have to learn a bit more of the basics for our exchanges to be profitable. I don't mean that in any mean-spirited way, though I know it sounds harsh. When I first started posting here I knew absolutely nothing and gradually came to what I now call illuminated ignorance - a big improvement over my former plain ignorance.

On this specific issue, you're not realizing that the critical case for wing bending strength is at MZFW - there's no fuel in the wings at that point (practically speaking). Increasing MTOW through fuel-weight-only does have some effect on wing weight, but it's dominated by the impact of MZFW bending moment.

This is because the "static pull up" ultimate load case at MZFW puts far more stress on the wing than the case where a downdraft causes negative lift and downward deflection (lower lift coefficient in that direction).

Revelation wrote:

ScottB wrote:

Ignoring the CATIA snafu, I'd put it entirely on poor management, to be honest.

The CATIA snafu also was due to bad management. Airbus itself states that the core issue was investing in tools too late in the program. This thread from earlier this year is one of the better ones I've read and participated in here. It spells it all out in great detail, with quotes from a few past and present industry insiders.

ScottB wrote:

That isn't to say there is zero market for aircraft the size of the A380-800 or A380-900 -- there clearly is some. But that market is far smaller than Airbus predicted and their intentionally overoptimistic market projections are why they went too large in planning for the future stretch.

Some here love to conflate these two statements, but they each stand on their own.

Ah yes, CATIA. When your aircraft design app tells you there are updates available, you should always click "yes". Not to mention wing spars, and Trent 900s. Undoubtedly these issues all affected sales to some degree.

Gasman wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Ah yes, CATIA. When your aircraft design app tells you there are updates available, you should always click "yes".

From my understanding of the IT methodology in a large organization, permissions are set so that nobody, especially those using a mission critical piece of software, is able to update. Updates are rolled out in a pre-planned organized way by IT, not by the end users. Why? Operating system compatibility, support training, interoperability, and incompatible version changes (what caused the nearly two year delay on the A380) to name a few obvious reasons.

Long story short on the CATIA snafu: Subsequent analysis has indeed blamed management, not the design teams, for failing to forcefully insist on a single version. The structure of the multi-headed beast that was Airbus of that era also takes some responsibility. Asking a design engineer and their support teams to engage in a major software upgrade is no trivial request. This is the basis of the German team's reluctance. CATIA and support staff found work arounds and they were promised this kludge approach would succeed. Turns out they were wrong.

To the VLA definition kerfuffle, I have no horse in this race, but just like to keep things honest and enjoy sharing knowledge. I believe we can all agree that the A380 falls into the "greater than 500 seats" category without a doubt. That's the market Airbus aimed for and hit square on the nose with their super jumbo and that is the market they forecast in 2000 to be 1,200 frames over 20 years.