MKEdude wrote:

What became of the pilots? Did they get canned outright, or are they still flying?

MKEdude wrote:

What became of the pilots? Did they get canned outright, or are they still flying?

26point2 wrote:

Odd that the captain would insist on flying this ATL-LGA leg when leg rotation would have had SIC (with equal experience) flying. Ego? Seems to me SIC was way ahead of the situation but not his leg and not much he could do but advise and hold on. Good for him to do what he did though.

The captain decided to continue the approach to a landing because he and the first officer had determined that the landing criteria had been met, including the landing distance performance requirements for good braking action. The captain called the runway in sight as the airplane descended through an altitude of about 233 feet agl. Besides company and ATIS reports indicating that the runway was plowed, sanded, and chemically treated and was wet with snow, the flight crew had overheard ATC stating, as late as 1040, that arriving airplanes were being held for runway cleanup. The first officer stated that these communications “painted a picture” of what he and the captain could expect to see once the airplane broke out of the clouds—a runway that had at least some patches of runway surface visible. However, the captain and the first officer reported that the runway appeared white rather than dark or patchy, which was not with their expectations regarding the nature and extent of the contamination on the runway given the recent snow cleaning operations and the reports of good braking action. Delta’s MD-88/90 operating procedures for adverse weather indicated that, “when there is contamination on the runway…captains must evaluate crew, aircraft, and environmental conditions in determining the safety of operating their flight.” Key environmental conditions included braking action reports, the nature of contamination (water, wet snow, or dry snow), and the depth of the contamination. The flight crew knew that two preceding airplanes had reported good braking action on the runway. However, it would have been difficult for the crew to visually assess the nature and depth of the snow on the runway. Also, little time was available for the flight crew to reevaluate the decision to continue. Only 13 seconds had elapsed between the time that the captain called the runway in sight and the time of the 50-foot automated callout, when the captain would have been preparing to flare the airplane. During these 13 seconds, the captain was engaged in several tasks, including adjusting the aim point to land closer to the approach end of the runway, decrabbing the airplane to align its longitudinal axis with the runway, and making aileron inputs to correct for drift. The NTSB concludes that, even though the flight crewmembers’ observations of snow on the runway were inconsistent with the expectations that they formed based on the field condition information that they received, their decision to continue the approach was not inappropriate because the landing criteria had been met.

26point2 wrote:

Yes. Clearly the captain, with 11000 hours in type, was qualified but there is no doubt the dude in right seat with a measly 3000 hours in type was far ahead of the game during crash sequence and, as it should have been his leg anyway, could have prevented this accident if he was the flying pilot.

26point2 wrote:

NBGSkygod claims: "Pilots are idiots...". Let's be clear...anyone who feels it necessary to call themselves SkyGod must think highly of themselves. Good for you. Evidently you have made up your mind.

You also claim " I also noticed you said nothing about the fact the BRA had degraded from GOOD to POOR on a contaminated runway". Where does it say this? Did you read the report SkyGod?

26point2 wrote:

Sky God sez "Pilots are idiots.."

Dude....what have you been smoking? There is no report of "medium" braking action. Only PIREPS of Good braking action.

The accident airplane was the fifth arrival on runway 13 after it was last cleared. During this time, one report of medium braking action at the touchdown zone was received about 19 minutes before the accident landing, and reports of good braking action were received about 16 and 8 minutes before the accident landing. Because braking action reports are inherently subjective, the NTSB considered the results of the simulations it conducted with Boeing as part of this accident investigation. The simulations showed that the wheel braking coefficient for the accident airplane was, at a minimum, consistent with the description of medium braking action in AC 25-32 and that the Delta MD-88 that landed uneventfully on runway 13 just before the accident landing had a similar wheel braking coefficient. In addition, the flight crew of the MD-88 airplane that landed on runway 13 just before the accident landing did not report any adverse landing conditions. Thus, the NTSB concludes that, although the runway was contaminated with snow, runway friction when the accident airplane landed was sufficient for stopping on the available runway length.

NBGSkyGod wrote:

The simulations showed that the wheel braking coefficient for the accident airplane was, at a minimum, consistent with the description of medium braking action in AC 25-32 and that the Delta MD-88 that landed uneventfully on runway 13 just before the accident landing had a similar wheel braking coefficient. In addition, the flight crew of the MD-88 airplane that landed on runway 13 just before the accident landing did not report any adverse landing conditions. Thus, the NTSB concludes that, although the runway was contaminated with snow, runway friction when the accident airplane landed was sufficient for stopping on the available runway length."

INFINITI329 wrote:

Maybe someone a little smarter than me can explain this... why stop using reserve thrust at 110K? In those conditions, I would expect them to be used until the airplane is brought down to a much lower speed where brakes are more effective but Im guessing here