Dutchy wrote:

Why is the NH90 such a failure in so many respects? Everyone who ordered it saw delays and cost increase. I think the Dutch still experiences some operational difficulties. Such a shame for such a beautiful machine.

Dutchy wrote:

They never learn..................

ThePointblank wrote:

Dutchy wrote:

They never learn..................

I would also add 6 parallel production lines all producing the same aircraft for each major user... not exactly a best practice example for production efficiency...

Mortyman wrote:

The Norwegian Armed Forces considers the NH90 contract to be broken and "considering alternative solutions" after 11 years of delays in the NH90 helicopters. The Defense Staff now put down a working group to look at different alternatives. A cancellation is probably not excluded.

ThePointblank wrote:

Dutchy wrote:

They never learn..................

I would also add 6 parallel production lines all producing the same aircraft for each major user... not exactly a best practice example for production efficiency...

VSMUT wrote:

Mortyman wrote:

The Norwegian Armed Forces considers the NH90 contract to be broken and "considering alternative solutions" after 11 years of delays in the NH90 helicopters. The Defense Staff now put down a working group to look at different alternatives. A cancellation is probably not excluded.

And yet, they just decided to order practically the same EH-101 variant Denmark has, a variant that is still causing major headaches over 10 years after they were delivered. Sounds more like incompetence on behalf of the Norwegian military if you ask me. It is also worth noting that the NH-90 hasn't had anywhere near as many problems in France and Italy among others.

ThePointblank wrote:

Dutchy wrote:

They never learn..................

I would also add 6 parallel production lines all producing the same aircraft for each major user... not exactly a best practice example for production efficiency...

That's pretty priceless coming from such an adamant JSF proponent as yourself. 3 assembly lines, and production spread out over as many states and countries as possible. Your criticism of the F-35 is noted.

VSMUT wrote:

ThePointblank wrote:

Dutchy wrote:

They never learn..................

I would also add 6 parallel production lines all producing the same aircraft for each major user... not exactly a best practice example for production efficiency...

That's pretty priceless coming from such an adamant JSF proponent as yourself. 3 assembly lines, and production spread out over as many states and countries as possible. Your criticism of the F-35 is noted.

Mortyman wrote:

VSMUT wrote:

Mortyman wrote:

The Norwegian Armed Forces considers the NH90 contract to be broken and "considering alternative solutions" after 11 years of delays in the NH90 helicopters. The Defense Staff now put down a working group to look at different alternatives. A cancellation is probably not excluded.

And yet, they just decided to order practically the same EH-101 variant Denmark has, a variant that is still causing major headaches over 10 years after they were delivered. Sounds more like incompetence on behalf of the Norwegian military if you ask me. It is also worth noting that the NH-90 hasn't had anywhere near as many problems in France and Italy among others.

ThePointblank wrote:

I would also add 6 parallel production lines all producing the same aircraft for each major user... not exactly a best practice example for production efficiency...

That's pretty priceless coming from such an adamant JSF proponent as yourself. 3 assembly lines, and production spread out over as many states and countries as possible. Your criticism of the F-35 is noted.

It is the producer that are not able to deliver the promised Product to the promised time. It is now 11 years over due time ! Hardly incompetence on the Norwegian part, but the producer. Furthermore, Norway is not the only country that has had problems With the NH90. Don't know about France and Italy. They may have different criteria and different conditions. Fact of the matter is that the producer has not met it's promises and have gotten ample time to solve the probelms. Again 11 years over due !

Dutchy wrote:

Mortyman wrote:

VSMUT wrote:

And yet, they just decided to order practically the same EH-101 variant Denmark has, a variant that is still causing major headaches over 10 years after they were delivered. Sounds more like incompetence on behalf of the Norwegian military if you ask me. It is also worth noting that the NH-90 hasn't had anywhere near as many problems in France and Italy among others.



That's pretty priceless coming from such an adamant JSF proponent as yourself. 3 assembly lines, and production spread out over as many states and countries as possible. Your criticism of the F-35 is noted.

It is the producer that are not able to deliver the promised Product to the promised time. It is now 11 years over due time ! Hardly incompetence on the Norwegian part, but the producer. Furthermore, Norway is not the only country that has had problems With the NH90. Don't know about France and Italy. They may have different criteria and different conditions. Fact of the matter is that the producer has not met it's promises and have gotten ample time to solve the probelms. Again 11 years over due !

Why is it that the Norwegian examples haven't been delivered? Hundreds are flying and even the line in Finland is closing or is already closed. Something doesn't add up here. If it was that pressing, they could just have made 6 more examples in Finland.

In January 2015, it was reported that Finnish NH90s had been experiencing considerable reliability issues, at one time in 2014 fleet availability dipped to 19%, and some spare parts had up to seven months waiting time. By early 2015, the combined NH90s fleet had accumulated a total of 7,000 flight hours, and had an availability rate of 40%. On 18 June 2015, delivery of the final Finnish NH90 took place. In November 2015, the availability rate was reported as having surpassed 50 percent.

Dutchy wrote:

Corrosion problems should have been solved, the Dutch have taken delivery again. There are other countries flying the Navy version as well. So again, what is so darn special about the Norwegian examples that they can't be produced and can't be delivered? We are missing something here and I don't know what. This can't be the whole story.

The background is obvious, but the Navy chooses to describe it in a somewhat technical way: The contract requires that the manufacturer not only deliver the helicopters themselves. It will also be delivered on different criteria such as the number of flight hours. In addition, maintenance work shall be measured against the number of flight hours to see how much maintenance is needed per flight time. Finally, the helicopters will deliver on operational requirements. For example, they should land on Coast Guard, have a certain range, equipment requirements, and so on.

The Armed Forces have previously stated that the operational requirements are not fulfilled - The Coast Guard Helicopters can not land on their vessels at the moment. It may be that the situation will be fine in three to five years, but it is uncertain. The frigate helicopters are not delivered and consequently do not meet any operational requirements.

The frigate helicopters are not delivered and consequently do not meet any operational requirements.

ZaphodHarkonnen wrote:

It's weird seeing stories like this while at home the RNZAF seems to have had bugger all problems with their new NH-90s. I wonder what the differences are that have led to these problems.

5. During the audit, the MRH90 Program was dealing with a range of challenges related to immaturity in the MRH90 system design and the support system. The challenges include:
resolving MRH90 cabin and role equipment design issues so that operational test and evaluation validates the MRH90 aircraft’s ability to satisfy Operational Capability Milestones set by Army and Navy;
the continuing need to conduct a wide range of verification and validation activities on problematic or deficient aircraft systems;
increasing the reliability, maintainability and flying rate of effort of the MRH90 aircraft;
embedding revised sustainment arrangements directed toward improving the value for money of these arrangements;
establishing a revised Australian industry activities plan, including performance metrics;
funding and managing the extended concurrent operation of the Army S‑70A‑9 Black Hawk and MRH90 aircraft fleets; and
managing a Navy capability gap following the retirement of the RAN Sea King aircraft in December 2011.

ZaphodHarkonnen wrote:

Sounds like a similar issue I find with IT projects in my line of work. When purchasing a platform you can either adapt it to your processes or adapt your processes to it. Generally groups want to adapt the platform but its usually easier to adapt your processes. As much as it irritates people.

GRIVely wrote:

Interesting article in today’s Wall Street Journal about problems with the new German F-125 frigate. Over cost, too complex, software not reliable, failed sea trials, etc. The Journal opined the basic problem was insufficient project management experience with large scale military projects. The money quote is “There’s a whole generation of German engineers who haven’t worked on a major defense project. It’s not that they lost this skill; they never learned it.”

The supplier of new helicopters to the Armed Forces Coast Guard and for the frigates has a great deal of responsibility for the delays, but the Ministry of Defense, Defense and Defense has not followed up the procurement well enough.

The delivery of the NH90 helicopters appears to be taking 14 years longer than agreed. "There have been shortcomings in the contract, poor planning and lack of coordination and governance for long periods," says Per-Kristian Foss, the auditor-general.

The Office of the Auditor General's investigation of the acquisition of maritime helicopters to the Armed Forces (NH90) (Document 3: 3 (2018-2019) was handed over to the Storting on 25 October.

The Storting's assumptions with the decisions of several propositions regarding the acquisition in the period 2000-2012 have not been met. This is also true for the 14 helicopters being delivered during 2008 and their operational capability. So far, eight helicopters have been delivered, six of which are in an interim version. The final delivery is expected to be in 2022, but there is still great uncertainty about delivery and phasing-in.

Those who have been delivered have so far provided few hours of flight, are significantly less accessible than planned, and have had very limited operating activities. In 2017, only one helicopter was available - the rest were waiting for spare parts and maintenance. Maintenance needs have been found to be about 15 times greater than expected for final version. Operating costs appear to be very high.

It was assumed that a helicopter should be chosen with known technology and proven operational reliability. The contract, concluded in 2001, was owned by four companies in four countries, the NATO Helicopter Industries (NHI), without production experience and with a new, untested helicopter.

"NHI obviously has a lot of responsibility for delays. At the same time, important prerequisites for the acquisition have not been followed up well enough on the Norwegian side. The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces did not go into the basis for choosing NH90 more seriously, and did not take the risk seriously," said Foss.

The contract was not sufficiently quality-assured and has been shown to have too low a daily penalty to avoid delays, and a low maintenance guarantee. This has given the supplier weak incentives to comply with delivery obligations. The contract has also not ensured stable supply of spare parts.

"In the Armed Forces, neither the planning, the staffing nor the coordination of the parties involved has been good enough," says Foss. There have been no basic plans for the maintenance, supply and operation of the equipment. A draft plan for material was only available in July 2017 and was recently approved.

The need for coordination of many actors in a highly complex and comprehensive process has been underestimated.

"Weak planning of such a large project with so many players, partial deliveries and the great need for coordination has been an important reason for the weak progress. Insufficient staffing in both maintenance, spare parts and procurement has also contributed to the delays, Foss notes.

The NH90 project has lacked one owner, standing above all others, to take responsibility for effective coordination and decision-making. The Ministry of Defense has been distant and unclear as project owners, and has not had enough management to capture the challenges, so measures were not taken on time, the OAG points out.

"The department's late involvement is serious in our opinion, especially given the economic size and the major operational consequences for our ships," says Foss.

The Ministry of Defense has also given the Storting little information, the OAG considers.

"This applies, among other things, to the fact that the conditions of the Armed Forces and Defense Matériels, not just the supplier, have contributed to the delays; that it has not been informed of the very low number of flight lessons that have been possible with the helicopters, information about the phase-in on the vessels, and little about the serious consequences for the coast guards' ability to carry out their tasks, "says Foss.

The Office of the Auditor General has examined the procurement and phasing-in of the NH90 helicopter to the Armed Forces. "I am familiar with the issues, largely agree with the production, and we will follow up the recommendations," said Frank Bakke-Jensen, Defense Minister.

“The report of the Office of the Auditor General is useful. It provides a thorough review of the current issues of the NH90 project related to the procurement under several governments going back to 2001,” says the Minister of Defense.

The report of the Office of the Auditor General indicates that the Storting's decision and prerequisites for the acquisition of NH90 were not met. According to the original contract, the Armed Forces should have received 14 NH90 by 2008. The status today is that the Armed Forces have received eight machines: six in an interim version and two in the final configuration.

The supplier's shortcomings and delays are identified as significant causes of the delays, but both the Office of the Auditor General and the Minister for Defense agree on the risk that the purchase was not sufficiently considered when the decision to choose NH90 was taken.

The Office of the Auditor General's investigation shows that phasing-in and commissioning of the NH90 has been challenging. The Defense Minister says that these are matters that are subject to specific follow-up for the NH90 procurement and that both the Armed Forces and Defense Matériel have established closer cooperation through the establishment of a joint program board for the NH90.

"NH90 was chosen in 2001, and part of the challenges the OAG observes are much more taken into consideration in today's routines for project planning and implementation. We have learned the NH90 acquisition and the experience is being used in the sector to learn and to further develop the materials investment methods, "said the Minister of Defense.

Information to the Storting

The Office of the Auditor General points out that the information to the Storting could be better.

"We have provided detailed information about NH90's operational capability to the Storting through established channels. Also, budget proposals to the Storting have for several years informed about the NH90. In Prop 1 S (2018-2019) I have also expanded the NH90 project deal," said the Minister of Defense.

Maintenance requirement

The Defense Minister shares the OAG's concern regarding NH90's maintenance needs. However, it is too early to conclude what the load is, or whether it is possible to correct claims against the supplier in this context. It is only when NH90 in the final version has been put through an operating period in Norway will it be possible to know how much maintenance will be needed.

“The Office of the Auditor General points out that the NH90 would originally be a unit helicopter and thus reduce operating costs by using the same helicopter type in many functions. But already in 2007 it became clear that the NH90 would not replace Sea King as a rescue helicopter. In addition, the plan was also that cooperation with other nations would bring savings, but it has turned out that the nations have so different needs and requirements that the cooperation was not as extensive as hopes," said Defense Minister Bakke-Jensen.

Auditor-General's recommendations
The OAG's recommendations include ensuring that basic assumptions are clearly defined and taken care of throughout the procurement process, including in quality assurance of the contract. Assessing measures that ensure that plans are made for phasing in material on time, especially when many units and these are involved depend on each other to achieve effective phasing-in. Such a practice would improve substantial procurement, ensuring clear division of responsibilities and clear governance and authority relationships between the Ministry of Defense, Defense Matériel, Defense Staff and the relevant manufacturers.

“These are recommendations that we will listen to and include in our efforts to further develop framework, methods and processes for investment activities. Several steps have already been taken since the NH90 acquisition was initiated, and these largely respect the recommendations of the Office of the Auditor General.

“One step I would especially like to draw is the creation of Defense Materials in 2016 as a separate agency under the Ministry of Defense to strengthen strategic management of material investment and material management in the defense sector," said the Minister of Defense.

NH90 is customized for Norwegian requirements and is tailored to the needs of the Navy. There is no other helicopter on the market today that will provide equivalent capacity. Assessments have been made on several occasions of the possibility of terminating the NH90 contract, most recently after the Storting requested a review of the contract in 2017. Following overall assessments, it was concluded that continuing the NH90 procurement is the best way to meet the Armed Forces needs for maritime helicopters.

"It is possible to cover Defense's needs for flight hours, but it will cost significantly more than expected. However, I have stated that both frigates and coastguards will have the number of flight hours with the NH90 as we determined in the last long-term plan. The need for more money and the Armed Forces' need for flight hours beyond today's ambition will be addressed in the next long-term plan, and we are working on measures to reduce operating costs," said the Minister of Defense.

Ozair wrote:

ZaphodHarkonnen wrote:

It's weird seeing stories like this while at home the RNZAF seems to have had bugger all problems with their new NH-90s. I wonder what the differences are that have led to these problems.

The same reason I think that NZ didn't have problems with the SeaSprites against what Australia treid to do. NZ typically takes the baseline variant and does not try to modify or enhance the platform

In Australian Service the MRH-90 has been a joke. It was another program that brought in way too much risk and many of the problems stem from two things, a lack of proper program oversight and requirements definition by the Australian Government procurement agency and the inability of the MRH-90 to be able to operate in the threat environments required.

For ease of manufacture and logistics, New Zealand deliberately chose their NH90 configuration to be nearly identical to the larger Australian fleet

Kiwirob wrote:

This makes no sense because NZ ordered the same variant as Australia. So what has Australia done wrong which NZ didn't?

For ease of manufacture and logistics, New Zealand deliberately chose their NH90 configuration to be nearly identical to the larger Australian fleet

Aesma wrote:

So what is preventing the NH90 from landing on the Norwegian frigates ? Do they have a smaller deck than other frigates or something like that ? Or do the Norwegian want it to land in bad visibility, bad weather etc., something more difficult to achieve that what other navies ask ?

I know nothing about the new German frigate but if you look at a country that has continuously had many gigantic military programs running together since the 40s, aka the USA, they very often have many problems not dissimilar to the ones described for the Germans...

ThePointblank wrote:

Aesma wrote:

So what is preventing the NH90 from landing on the Norwegian frigates ? Do they have a smaller deck than other frigates or something like that ? Or do the Norwegian want it to land in bad visibility, bad weather etc., something more difficult to achieve that what other navies ask ?

I know nothing about the new German frigate but if you look at a country that has continuously had many gigantic military programs running together since the 40s, aka the USA, they very often have many problems not dissimilar to the ones described for the Germans...

Probably a lack of certification that is originating from a lack of flight hours available to certify that the NH90 is fit for use on the Norwegian frigates. If the Norwegians are experiencing reliability and availability problems, this could cause the shipboard compatibility testing to get pushed out until there's enough flight hours available to do the testing.

You need to accumulate a certain amount of hours, under a variety of conditions in order to certify that the type is safe to operate from a ship. That includes determining handling characteristics, and developing CONOPS in order to effectively and safely operate the helicopter.

Kiwirob wrote:

4 frigates do not remain in service, only 3 do, the 4th Otto Sverdrup is basically a parts hulk.

Mortyman wrote:

Kiwirob wrote:

4 frigates do not remain in service, only 3 do, the 4th Otto Sverdrup is basically a parts hulk.

No it's not

Kiwirob wrote:

Mortyman wrote:

Kiwirob wrote:

4 frigates do not remain in service, only 3 do, the 4th Otto Sverdrup is basically a parts hulk.

No it's not

According to my neighbour who is in the Navy it is.

Mortyman wrote:

Kiwirob wrote:

Mortyman wrote:

No it's not

According to my neighbour who is in the Navy it is.

Hardly:

2 days ago:

TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018 - American Vice Admiral Lisa Franchetti Visits HNoMS Otto Sverdrup During Trident Juncture:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v1DsmPnzNPM

P1aneMad wrote:

The frigate was hit on its starboard side, if I am not hugely mistaken in maritime law you have to give right of way to the vessel coming from your right. So barring some other factors this accident was the fault of the frigate's crew manning the bridge at the time and not the oil tanker's.
Does anyone have any more info?

Mortyman wrote:

P1aneMad wrote:

The frigate was hit on its starboard side, if I am not hugely mistaken in maritime law you have to give right of way to the vessel coming from your right. So barring some other factors this accident was the fault of the frigate's crew manning the bridge at the time and not the oil tanker's.
Does anyone have any more info?

The question is if the frigate had enough space to go to the "correct" side.

Ozair wrote:

Mortyman wrote:

P1aneMad wrote:

The frigate was hit on its starboard side, if I am not hugely mistaken in maritime law you have to give right of way to the vessel coming from your right. So barring some other factors this accident was the fault of the frigate's crew manning the bridge at the time and not the oil tanker's.
Does anyone have any more info?

The question is if the frigate had enough space to go to the "correct" side.

According to Defence news it was docked at the time so clearly not enough room to avoid a collision...

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/ ... -exercise/

P1aneMad wrote:

Ozair wrote:

Mortyman wrote:

The question is if the frigate had enough space to go to the "correct" side.

According to Defence news it was docked at the time so clearly not enough room to avoid a collision...

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/ ... -exercise/

So the frigate was docked and the collision took place inside a port? Something doesn't add up.

Local media reported that the Maltese-flagged tanker Sola TS identified Ingstad and tried to avoid the disaster. The reports also revealed details that show that Ingstad did not have a firm grasp of the surface picture it was sailing into.

The disaster developed quickly, with Ingstad transiting the channel inbound at 17 knots and Sola TS traveling outbound at 7 knots.

Sola TS raised the Ingstad multiple times and was discussing the emerging danger with shore-based Central Station, according to the Norwegian paper Verdens Gang. The responses from Ingstad appear confused, at one point saying that if they altered the course it would take them too close to the shoals, which prompted Sola TS to respond that they had to do something or a collision would be unavoidable.

Contributing to the confusion, the Ingstad appears to have been transiting with its Automatic Identification System switched off. That seems to have delayed recognition by central control and the other ships in the area that Ingstad was inbound and heading into danger, the account in VG seems to indicate.

Kiwirob wrote:

She’s almost entirely under water now. I guess she’s a complete loss.

Kiwirob wrote:

Now the big question is do they build a replacement or just make do?