par13del wrote:

So what is China's end game by having NK with nukes,

par13del wrote:

economic blackmail of the South could be one

salttee wrote:

Then there would be the usual smugglers, drug dealers and various miscreants, which are a fairly suppressed lot in China itself.

tommy1808 wrote:

That is a pretty US centric perspective,

WIederling wrote:

and in the same myopic vein also ignores that the US caused the turn about
in NK relations by categorically denying a peace treaty.

With no peace available NK has no option beyond being unpeaceful so to speak.
The US needs that to throw their weight around in East Asia, their new focus region.

par13del wrote:

So the peace treaty you are talking about is recent or what has been denied since the Armistice was signed,

WIederling wrote:

par13del wrote:

So the peace treaty you are talking about is recent or what has been denied since the Armistice was signed,

Ah, ok.
Maybe fill some voids in your background knowledge first?

June 6, 2001: In a press release, President Bush announces the completion of his administration’s North Korea policy review and its determination that “serious discussions” on a “broad agenda” should be resumed with Pyongyang. Bush states his desire to conduct “comprehensive” negotiations, including “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework,” “verifiable constraints” on North Korea’s missile programs, a ban on North Korea’s missile exports, and “a less threatening conventional military posture.”

June 13, 2001: U.S. Special Envoy Jack Pritchard meets in New York with the North Korean representative to the UN, Hyong-ch’ol Yi, to make arrangements for bilateral talks.

June 26, 2001: The State Department announces sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 on North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, for unspecified missile-related transfers to Iran. The announcement represents the second time that sanctions had been imposed under the act, the first also being on Changgwang Sinyong on January 2.

The sanctions prohibit any U.S. entity from doing business with the North Korean firm, which has been punished several times previously under more general missile transfer sanctions. However, the sanctions are largely symbolic, as Changgwang Sinyong is still subject to the active sanctions imposed on January 2, 2001, and missile sanctions that were imposed on April 6, 2000.*

July 6, 2001: Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirms that North Korea tested a rocket “motor engine” in late June, but that there was “nothing in itself wrong with that,” nor did the administration consider the test to have violated Pyongyang’s testing moratorium.

August 4, 2001: During a meeting in Moscow with President Putin, Kim Jong Il reaffirms his pledge to maintain a moratorium on ballistic missile flight-tests until 2003.
2002

January 29, 2002: In his State of the Union address, President Bush criticized North Korea for “arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.” Bush characterized North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, as constituting an “axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”

February 5, 2002: At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Powell reiterates the administration's policy that it is willing to resume a dialogue with North Korea at "any time, any place, or anywhere without any preconditions." Powell also confirms that the administration believes that Pyongyang continues to "comply with the [missile flight-test] moratorium they placed upon themselves and stay within the KEDO agreement," which is also known as the Agreed Framework.

March 15, 2002: Following reports that the U.S. nuclear posture review discusses the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, Pyongyang's state-run press organ announces that, if the United States "tries to use nuclear weapons" against North Korea, it will be compelled to "examine all the agreements" reached with the United States. The report says that, "if the U.S. inflicts nuclear holocaust upon [North Korea], the former's mainland will not be safe either."

April 1, 2002: President Bush issues a memorandum stating that he will not certify North Korea's compliance with the Agreed Framework. However, for national security considerations, Bush waives applicable U.S. law prohibiting Washington from funding KEDO, allowing the United States to continue financially supporting the Agreed Framework.

July 2, 2002: The United States cancels a planned delegation visit to North Korea, citing Pyongyang’s failure to respond to a proposed July 10 meeting date, as well as a June 29 naval skirmish between North and South Korea.

July 31, 2002: Powell meets briefly with Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, generating speculation that a U.S. envoy will visit North Korea. It is the highest-level exchange between the two countries since the Bush administration took office.

August 7, 2002: KEDO holds a ceremony to mark the pouring of the concrete foundation for the first LWR that the United States agreed to provide North Korea under the Agreed Framework. Jack Pritchard, the U.S. representative to KEDO and State Department special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, attends the ceremony. Pritchard is the most senior U.S. official to visit North Korea since former Secretary of State Albright in October 2000.

The United States urges North Korea to comply with IAEA safeguarding procedures for all its nuclear facilities as soon as possible, but Pyongyang states that it will not do so for at least three years, the Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports August 8. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman also states that delays in completing the reactor project might motivate Pyongyang to pull out of the agreement.

August 16, 2002: The United States imposes sanctions on Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of North Korea and on the North Korean government itself for transferring missile technology to Yemen. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer states August 23 that the sanctions were a “pro forma requirement under the law for the State Department” and that Washington remains willing to “talk with North Korea any time, any place.”

August 31, 2002: Responding to an August 29 speech by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, North Korea says that “if the U.S. has a will to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK it will have dialogue…the ball is in the court of the U.S. side.” Bolton had criticized Pyongyang’s missile, nuclear, and biological weapons programs.

September 17, 2002: North Korea announces that it will indefinitely extend its moratorium on missile testing as part of the North Korea-Japan Pyongyang Declaration signed during a meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

A portion of the North Korea-Japan declaration references nuclear weapons, saying that the two countries “affirmed the pledge to observe all the international agreements for a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.” It is unclear whether this statement simply affirms a commitment to existing agreements or signals support for additional arms control measures.

October 3-5, 2002: James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visits North Korea. The highest-ranking administration official to visit Pyongyang, Kelly reiterates U.S. concerns about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, export of missile components, conventional force posture, human rights violations, and humanitarian situation. Kelly informs North Korea that it could improve bilateral relations through a “comprehensive settlement” addressing these issues. No future meetings are announced.

Referring to Kelly’s approach as “high handed and arrogant,” North Korea argues that the U.S. policy “compels the DPRK to take all necessary countermeasures, pursuant to the army-based policy whose validity has been proven.”

October 16, 2002: The United States announces that North Korea admitted to having a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons after James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, confronted representatives from Pyongyang during an October 3-5 visit. Kelly later explained that the North Korean admission came the day after he informed them that the United States was aware of the program. North Korea has denied several times that it admitted to having this program.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher states that "North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program is a serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework as well as under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
Boucher also says that the United States wants North Korea to comply with its nonproliferation commitments and seeks "a peaceful resolution of this situation."

November 5, 2002: North Korea threatens to end its moratorium on ballistic missile tests if North Korea-Japan normalization talks do not achieve progress.

November 14, 2002: KEDO announces that it is suspending heavy-fuel oil deliveries to North Korea in response to Pyongyang's October 4 acknowledgement that it has a uranium-enrichment program. The last shipment reached North Korea November 18.

November 29, 2002: The IAEA adopts a resolution calling upon North Korea to "clarify" its "reported uranium-enrichment program." North Korea rejects the resolution, saying the IAEA's position is biased in favor of the United States.

December 9, 2002: Spanish and U.S. forces intercept and search a ship carrying a shipment of North Korean Scud missiles and related cargo to Yemen. The United States allows the shipment to be delivered because it lacks the necessary legal authority to seize the cargo. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says that Washington had intelligence that the ship was carrying missiles to the Middle East and was concerned that its ultimate destination might have been Iraq.

December 12, 2002: North Korea sends a letter to the IAEA announcing that it is restarting its one functional reactor and is reopening the other nuclear facilities frozen under the Agreed Framework. The letter requests that the IAEA remove the seals and monitoring equipment from its nuclear facilities. A North Korean spokesman blames the United States for violating the Agreed Framework and says that the purpose of restarting the reactor is to generate electricity-an assertion disputed by U.S. officials.

A November 27 Congressional Research Service report states that the reactor could annually produce enough plutonium for one bomb. The CIA states in a 2002 report to Congress that the spent-fuel rods "contain enough plutonium for several more [nuclear] weapons."

U.S. estimates on North Korea's current nuclear status differ. A State Department official said January 3, 2003 that the U.S. intelligence community believes North Korea already possesses one or two nuclear weapons made from plutonium produced before the negotiation of the Agreed Framework. The CIA publicly estimates that Pyongyang "has produced enough plutonium" for one or two weapons.

December 14, 2002: North Korea states in a letter to the IAEA that the status of its nuclear facilities is a matter between the United States and North Korea and "not pursuant to any agreement" with the IAEA. The letter further declares that North Korea will take unilateral action to remove seals and monitoring cameras if the IAEA does not act.

December 22-24, 2002: North Korea cuts all seals and disrupts IAEA surveillance equipment on its nuclear facilities and materials. An IAEA spokesman says December 26 that North Korea started moving fresh fuel rods into the reactor, suggesting that it might be restarted soon.

December 27, 2002: North Korea orders IAEA inspectors out of the country. They leave on December 31.
2003

January 6, 2003: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution condemning North Korea's decision to restart its nuclear reactor and resume operation of its related facilities. The resolution "deplores" North Korea's action "in the strongest terms" and calls on Pyongyang to meet "immediately, as a first step" with IAEA officials. It also calls on North Korea to re-establish the seals and monitoring equipment it dismantled, comply fully with agency safeguards, clarify details about its reported uranium-enrichment program, and allow the agency to verify that all North Korea’s nuclear material is "declared and…subject to safeguards."

January 10, 2003: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), effective January 11. Although Article X of the NPT requires that a country give three months’ notice in advance of withdrawing, North Korea argues that it has satisfied that requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day before it was to become legally binding.

January 12, 2003: Choe Jin Su, North Korea’s ambassador to China, signals that Pyongyang might not adhere to its moratorium on testing long-range missiles, saying that Pyongyang believes it “cannot go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer,” according to a January 12 Los Angeles Times article.

February 12, 2003: Responding to North Korea’s rejection of the November 2002 and January 2003 IAEA resolutions, the IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution declaring Pyongyang in “further non-compliance” with its obligations under the NPT. The board decides to report the matter to the UN Security Council, in accordance with agency mandates.

tommy1808 wrote:

That is a pretty US centric perspective, while hard numbers are hard to come by, the number of addicts in China seems to be about on par or slightly higher compared to what we have in Europe, at about 1% of the population.

Tugger wrote:

WIederling wrote:

par13del wrote:

So the peace treaty you are talking about is recent or what has been denied since the Armistice was signed,

Ah, ok.
Maybe fill some voids in your background knowledge first?

Isn't this is a discussion and a forum where we share information that we have, know and how we understand it?

I think you are trying to refer to the issues of 2002, for that this is what I could find. Is this what you are talking about Wlederling? (Things seem to fall apart after October 2002 in the information below.)

salttee wrote:

I assume that the Chinese government has legal means available to them that are lacking in non totalitarian states. So at least they have the ability to suppress lawlessness that other countries don't have - we hear of occasional public executions of "corrupt" officials.

I take any information about crime in China with a large grain of salt. China is not an open society where information can be checked and cross checked.

Noshow wrote:

How much radiation fallout does an underground test of this size generate for the neighbouring countries?

WIederling wrote:

What is not mentioned is
that NK really has zero options beyond what they are doing today.
( Similar to the Cuba crisis. don't mention the initial cause and present reaction as senseless aggression.)

salttee wrote:

I think equipping the south with tactical nukes and pulling out would be an acceptable idea.

moo wrote:

salttee wrote:

I think equipping the south with tactical nukes and pulling out would be an acceptable idea.

Are we just throwing out the Non-Proliferation Treaty these days...?

salttee wrote:

I think equipping the south with tactical nukes and pulling out would be an acceptable idea.

moo wrote:

Are we just throwing out the Non-Proliferation Treaty these days...?

par13del wrote:

moo wrote:

Are we just throwing out the Non-Proliferation Treaty these days...?

I thought that treaty was thrown out by India, Pakistan, Iran and NK, don't recall whether it was in effect when Israel went nuclear.

par13del wrote:

moo wrote:

Are we just throwing out the Non-Proliferation Treaty these days...?

I thought that treaty was thrown out by India, Pakistan, Iran and NK, don't recall whether it was in effect when Israel went nuclear.

moo wrote:

The only country to have thrown it out so far is NK, when they withdrew from it in 2003.

tommy1808 wrote:

moo wrote:

The only country to have thrown it out so far is NK, when they withdrew from it in 2003.

They didn´t withdraw. they made an error in form, if they had done that properly no one had any standing to do anything about their nuke program.

best regards
Thomas

salttee wrote:

WIederling, you've got it all figured out; the US is guilty guilty if they stay and guilty guilty if they go.

Have you ever considered changing your handle to "Pujiin light"?

mxaxai wrote:

TWA772LR wrote:

Stitch wrote:

The US strategic arsenal of ICBM and SLBMs are currently targeted at the Arctic Ocean, I believe. Same with the Russian ICBM and SLBM force, to my knowledge. I am not sure if this is by treaty or mutual agreement. The weapons can be very quickly re-targeted so it's a symbolic gesture. I am sure OPLAN 8010 (the general plan for a nuclear engagement) includes North Korean assets.

Why the Arctic? Why not into outer space?

Presumably because
(a) the rockets are not able to even enter a stable orbit, let alone leave earth and
(b) a detonation high in the atmosphere or just outside of it, up to the van-Allen belt, can cause strong EMP's with potentially much higher damage. Nobody lives in the arctic and the released radiation would still be manageable should someone accidentally pull the trigger on a nuke. Plus you would not cross hostile countries.

aeromoe wrote:

mxaxai wrote:

TWA772LR wrote:

Why the Arctic? Why not into outer space?

Presumably because
(a) the rockets are not able to even enter a stable orbit, let alone leave earth and
(b) a detonation high in the atmosphere or just outside of it, up to the van-Allen belt, can cause strong EMP's with potentially much higher damage. Nobody lives in the arctic and the released radiation would still be manageable should someone accidentally pull the trigger on a nuke. Plus you would not cross hostile countries.

Nobody lives in the arctic?? I beg to differ.

Just one quote from the internet:

"Indigenous populations now range from about 80% in Greenland, 50% in Canada, 20% in Alaska, 15% in Arctic Norway and as little as 3-4% in Arctic Russia. In contrast, Antarctica has no indigenous populations. The permanent human population of the Arctic - about 4,000,000. The Antarctic - 0."

salttee wrote:

............. there would be a parade of idiot missionaries working across that border trying to Christianize the heathen Chinese. ............

mxaxai wrote:

aeromoe wrote:

mxaxai wrote:

Presumably because
(a) the rockets are not able to even enter a stable orbit, let alone leave earth and
(b) a detonation high in the atmosphere or just outside of it, up to the van-Allen belt, can cause strong EMP's with potentially much higher damage. Nobody lives in the arctic and the released radiation would still be manageable should someone accidentally pull the trigger on a nuke. Plus you would not cross hostile countries.

Nobody lives in the arctic?? I beg to differ.

Just one quote from the internet:

"Indigenous populations now range from about 80% in Greenland, 50% in Canada, 20% in Alaska, 15% in Arctic Norway and as little as 3-4% in Arctic Russia. In contrast, Antarctica has no indigenous populations. The permanent human population of the Arctic - about 4,000,000. The Antarctic - 0."

That depends on what is considered "arctic". I am quite sure that the population at the north pole is exactly 0 (most of the time). Even considering the people that do live in parts of the arctic, its population density is among the lowest on earth and even other environmental effects should be lower than e. g. some other oceans.