I know it's a bit early to speculate, and it's not easy to discern fact from fiction in the currently available information, but I can't help wondering whether events unravelled something like this: Having been switched from landing on runway 30, to runway 12, the pilots were already experiencing a ...
Jump to postHuman's just aren't good enough or fast enough to handle complex systems especially when they do unexpected things Humans are far far better at dealing with systems "when they do unexpected things" than any autonomous system can be. Until we have true artificial intelligence, systems can ...
Jump to postHuman's just aren't good enough or fast enough to handle complex systems especially when they do unexpected things Humans are far far better at dealing with systems "when they do unexpected things" than any autonomous system can be. Until we have true artificial intelligence, systems can ...
Jump to postI still wonder how the things would have played out if the accidents happened in the United States, with almost exclusively U.S. passengers killed and U.S. pilots being branded as "second rate"... wait, U.S. pilots are always first rate... I suspect that the first difference would have be...
Jump to postI will need you to educate me I'm afraid. I genuinely have no idea what the answer is going to be? How many people have died in 737 size plus commercial plane accidents (I use that size as its the minimum size of plane I travel on) as a result of turbine disc failure in the last 5 years? And if and...
Jump to postI will need you to educate me I'm afraid. I genuinely have no idea what the answer is going to be? How many people have died in 737 size plus commercial plane accidents (I use that size as its the minimum size of plane I travel on) as a result of turbine disc failure in the last 5 years? And if and...
Jump to postPlease tell me what design faults normal 737 have that I shouldn't trust? And if they are recognised faults what has been made different to correct them on the Max whilst making the other changes to the plane What design faults should I be aware of and what accidents have they caused that could hav...
Jump to postI will need you to educate me I'm afraid. I genuinely have no idea what the answer is going to be? How many people have died in 737 size plus commercial plane accidents (I use that size as its the minimum size of plane I travel on) as a result of turbine disc failure in the last 5 years? And if and...
Jump to postInterested wrote:It's cheap enough to fly already. We didn't need Max planes for that.
There will always have to be a cost/benefit compromise when it comes to all of this - if we want totally safe aircraft then aviation will cease. Totally disagree on that Every person who has ever paid to fly has accepted that compromise. Based on the level of safety they find acceptable I give up. ...
Jump to postAre you suggesting that paying more cash for a ticket is safer? Absolutely bollocks. Ryanair sells very cheap tickets and has an excellent safety record. One of the safest, if not the safest, airlines worldwide - well, it's the safest one considering the amount of flights and transported pax. Fligh...
Jump to postThere will always have to be a cost/benefit compromise when it comes to all of this - if we want totally safe aircraft then aviation will cease. Totally disagree on that Customers would put safety on planes ahead of cost Corporate greed has led to this And given the chance to turn the clock back an...
Jump to postThis isn't a new aircraft? It's a grandfathered aircraft? The two are not mutually exclusive. Isn't grandfathering designed to ensure we don't face any serious issues that can fall through the cracks as you say? No. Grandfathering is about avoiding having to comply with new regulations. Would this ...
Jump to postShouldn't every new model at least maintain the safety status quo, if not improve on it? Yes, but compared to what? And over what period of time? Given the complexity of aircraft these days, expecting a new aircraft to be as safe as it can be right from EIS is just wishful thinking. Even with the b...
Jump to postThe point is that many other aircraft with very significantly higher fatal accident rates than the 737NG are deemed acceptable, so why can the MAX not be? Shouldn't every new model at least maintain the safety status quo, if not improve on it? Yes, but compared to what? And over what period of time...
Jump to postWhat is an acceptable number of Max crashes per year caused partly at least by design of the plane and/or inability of pilots to be able to fly the plane as safely as they can fly other commercial planes in operation today or by mechanical error If you're asking me it depends whether I'm on the fli...
Jump to postEven if the MAX is 33% "less safe" than the NG, it would still only equal the A320 fatal accident rate. i dont not want to open up a off topic conversation here but statistics are a important part of the whole 737MAX discussion I can not finde numbers like this if you go to http://www.air...
Jump to postAnyway yes my point is if the Max can't be as safe or safer than the NG - the plane fails I don't see why. Even if the MAX is 33% "less safe" than the NG, it would still only equal the A320 fatal accident rate. Even at 300% "less safe", it would still have a lower fatal accident...
Jump to postInterested wrote:To increase you have to multiply by 1.0001?
You cant start with 0.545 crashes and increase it and end up with less crashes?
Lol
How can the plane be as safe as NG? It will need to be fixed to be pretty close to "as safe as" the NG otherwise it will not get certified. My point is that your numbers are way off the mark. Even if the MAX hit 10 million flights a year, and was 50% more accident prone than the NG, it wo...
Jump to postso you think a kinda calculatable "additional" crash, compared to a far older but similar product every two years is acceptable for a transport category aircraft in 2020 ? Not at all. The figures presented by Interested (which appear to be mostly guesswork) would show an increase of 0.000...
Jump to postThanks for the correction So with your figures bearing in mind I picked a random extra risk associated with the new design Then just 0.0001 percent extra risk of crashing would produce 5.5 crashes per year of Max planes with 5,000 in operation? Would you agree? No. Unless each of those aircraft was...
Jump to postSo your suggested 0.0001% increase would result in 0.55 fatal accidents per year for the MAX. Negligible difference compared with the NG. so you think a kinda calculatable "additional" crash, compared to a far older but similar product every two years is acceptable for a transport categor...
Jump to postYou would think a plane just 0.0001 percent more likely to crash than NG each time it flies due to extra potential to stall or any other safety design flaws would be acceptable wouldn't you? Based on 25k flights per day x 365 days of the year if the Max was just 0.00001 percent more likely to crash...
Jump to postThe exact quote of balancing the forces is in the FCOM I think. However, the NNC says to use the main electric trim to control the pitch attitude in step 2. No, it does not. If the pilots could adequately control "airplane pitch" with just the control column, there would be no need to eve...
Jump to postPlease do show us exactly where in the NNC it tells pilots to "balance the control column forces". 2 Autopilot (if engaged) . . . . . . . . . . . . .Disengage Do not re-engage the autopilot. Control airplane pitch attitude manually with control column and main electric trim as needed. The...
Jump to postplanecane wrote:zoom321 wrote:planecane wrote:The ET crew did not follow the runaway stabilizer NNC exactly because they cut off electric trim before they balanced the control column forces.
The 737 MAX will fly when it is safe. With a political delay. Why would you expect a political delay? Seems to me that any advantage that could possibly be gained from this grounding by Boeing's competitors would be far outweighed by the damage caused to airlines from having parts of their fleets g...
Jump to postDo I understand MentourPilot correctly? At 2:20 he asks to trim the nose further down? And isn't that what the FO does? Exactly what does this prove - that if you allow the trim (or cause the trim) to move nose down there could be a point where you can't save the plane? I believe that they were &qu...
Jump to postmacc wrote:I believe Boeing will be very careful with the fix. AS others have mentioned, the MCAS seems only half of the trouble. The AoA sensor, the integration to the ADIRU might provide some more headache as well.
Do I understand MentourPilot correctly? At 2:20 he asks to trim the nose further down? And isn't that what the FO does? Exactly what does this prove - that if you allow the trim (or cause the trim) to move nose down there could be a point where you can't save the plane? I believe that they were &qu...
Jump to postSeems like Tajer isn't even sure if the type will fly again. I don't think we can make conclusions from his somewhat hyperbolic statement. I think if you ask the 737 pilot community at large they are quite confident the 737 will fly again, but of course, nothing is a certainty in life. I'd estimate...
Jump to postThe AD clearly states that: 1) Once the "STAB TRIM" cutoff switches are turned OFF, they are to remain OFF for the remainder of the flight. 2) Electrical stabilizer trim is to be used prior to using the "STAB TRIM" cutoff switches. This is not a footnote but is contained in the ...
Jump to postExcept that: 1) The AD was not followed as the "STAB TRIM" switches were turned back on. The AD says clearly to turn them off and leave them off. The AD also says to use the manual trim wheel. At the point that they discovered that that was not possible, they probably abandoned the checkl...
Jump to postNo, I did not get it wrong. I am talking about the chance of any one sensor failing; it is an average. You are talking about the chance of one or more sensors failing. Not the same thing. Does not matter what you are talking about. Adding probabilities of independent events is always wrong. Not whe...
Jump to postYes, with 5 sensors, each of which has a 20% failure rate, the chance of any one of the sensors failing is 100%. That does not mean that you will get a failure every time, because sometimes you will get multiple failures and sometimes you will get zero failures. You get it wrong. Sorry. 100% probab...
Jump to postThat rubbish about the force needed to move the horizontal stabilizer is astonishing. Astonishing, yes. Rubbish, definitely not; it has been confirmed by multiple independent simulator tests, like the one in the video. The manual trim wheel becomes unusable by most pilots at high speeds with signif...
Jump to postHere's another way to look at it: Let's say the probability of 1 sensor failing is 20%. Let's put 5 sensors on the plane. the probability of any one of a group failing is always exactly = p(one sensor failing) * n(sensors) = 20% * 5 = 100% failure? You have to multiply 0.2. 0.2 * 0.2 and so on. Wha...
Jump to postI have the feeling the video is not serious. Why? Why? Because none of the two actors looks towards the instruments not toward the handle. A normal human being working in a cockpit would have been looking at what they are doing instead of looking elsewhere.. They literally spend the entire time loo...
Jump to post≠ p(one sensor failing) * n(sensors) = 0.2 x 2 = 0.40 True but you are comparing "at least one of" to "any one of". Not the same. Please understand that it is significantly different if you can assume the failed sensor is serviced after the flight on which it is not used. Cyclin...
Jump to postThe probability of at least 1 of 2 sensors failing is... indeed approximately double the probability of 1 sensor failing. As I posted previously we have an estimate of sensor MTBF 20000hrs. This equates to a failure rate of 5E-5 per hour. Both sensors have the same predicted failure rate, so if you...
Jump to postIf you have more than one sensor, the probability of any individual one failing doesn't change, so the probability of any one of a group failing is always exactly = p(one sensor failing) * n(sensors) No "approximately" about it. Let's say a sensor has a failure rate of 20%. Probability of...
Jump to postThe probability of at least 1 of 2 sensors failing is... indeed approximately double the probability of 1 sensor failing. As I posted previously we have an estimate of sensor MTBF 20000hrs. This equates to a failure rate of 5E-5 per hour. Both sensors have the same predicted failure rate, so if you...
Jump to postThe probability of one of two separate sensor failing is double of one sensor failing. So if you fly a trip with the broken sensor, but use the unbroken sensor, you will hit the broken sensor on the next trip. If you have no AoA disagree you have no warning that one sensor has failed. I wasn't conv...
Jump to postIf you switch them OFF it is then to fly the aircraft manually. And manual means the manual trim wheel (and the handle) without the help of any electrical power. That's my interpretation anyway. So I am totally confused by the report. I can't understand why when it's been pointed out dozens of time...
Jump to postSorry, but I see far more similarities than you obviously do. You seem to have already made up your mind that Boeing is solely to blame. I'm still waiting for the final report. While it is true that there are some similarities, there are also some big differences: In the case of the A330, the fault...
Jump to post... Not least to confirm it's really all down to those inexperienced, poorly trained, 3rd World pilots. Boeing and FAA decided to include "Denzel Washington Flip" in both MAX simulator training and FCOM to overcome this problem. For anyone who might still be of the opinion that low hours ...
Jump to postOne would hope that the fact that the captain's AoA display had gone all blue while the FO's was still ~40% brown would also be a clue. The display with the blue and brown is called attitude indicator (aka artificial horizon). It displays pitch and bank. However, this is not an AoA indicator! Yes, ...
Jump to postI am not sure if this was explained in previous posts. Hope someone can explain: At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First-Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out From 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 (about two and a half minutes), the stabilizer position gr...
Jump to postIt is also known (whether the pilots actually tried or not) that manually trimming nose up while holding back pressure to counteract far out of trim nose down is nearly impossible and that training and documentation on the "roller coaster" procedure from the 737-100 should be reintroduced...
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